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On  27  April  1998,  the  European  Union  (EU)  removed  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
from  its  list  of  non-market  economies  (NMEs)  due  to  the  progress  made  under  China's 
economic  reforms.  After  that,  it  has  applied  a  hybrid  anti-durnping  policy  towards 
imports  from  China,  including  the  use  of  the  analogue  country  method,  conditional 
market  economy  treatment,  one  country  one  duty  rule  and  individual  treatment. 
However,  there  has  been  no  significant  change  as  far  as  the  EU  anti-dumping  authority's 
practice  is  concerned.  This  is  inconsistent  with  China's  current  economic  status  as  a 
transitional  economy  with  many  sectors  very  close  to  a  market  economy. 
This  thesis  analyses  the  implementation  of  the  policy  and  explores  its  legal  problems 
and  issues  from  both  a  theoretical  and  practical  standpoint.  The  study  begins  by 
examining  the  origin  of  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  -  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  anti-dumping  rules.  It  identifies  the  legal  problems  of  EU 
anti-dumping  practice  in  the  context  of  China's  economic  reforms  starting  from  1979. 
In  order  to  suggest  solutions  to  several  of  the  problems  thus  identified,  comparative 
studies  are  made  to  reveal  alternative  strategies  by  illustrating  the  anti-dumping 
legislation  of  the  U.  S,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan  insofar  as  it  is  applicable  to 
China.  Due  to  China's  accession  to  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  on  II 
December  2001,  new  issues  and  disputes  may  arise  with  regard  to  the  FU's 
anti-dumping  practice.  With  regard  to  all  of  these  issues,  this  thesis  finally  attempts  to 
propose  solutions  to  both  the  EU  and  China. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
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xviii Introduction 
1.  Purpose  of  the  study 
This  thesis  explores  the  legal  problems  and  issues  that  have  arisen  in  the  application  of 
the  current  European  Union  (EU)1  anti-dumping  legislation2as  it  is  applied  against  the 
People's  Republic  of  China.  It  analyzes  these  problems  from  both  a  theoretical  and 
practical  standpoint.  The  origin  of  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  is  found  in  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATTý  framework  and,  for  this  reason,  it  is  important 
to  recall  the  development  of  the  GATT  rules  themselves.  The  study  must  be  seen  against 
the  background  and  in  the  context  of  Chinese  economic  reforms  that  have  been  put  in 
place  since  1979.  After  more  than  twenty  years'  efforts,  up  to  now,  China  has  successfully 
transformed  from  a  state  trading  country  to  a  transitional  economy.  Failing  to 
accommodate  this  change,  the  current  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  towards  China  has 
turned  to  be  rather  problematic  in  practice.  These  issues  are  analyzed  in  the  chapters  that 
follow.  The  thesis  also  attempts  to  suggest  solutions  to  several  of  the  problems  thus 
identified.  To  reach  such  solutions,  comparative  studies  are  used  to  reveal  alternative 
strategies  and  to  provide  useful  insights  into  EU  practice.  Due  to  China's  accession  to  the 
World  Trade  Organization  (WTO),  new  issues  and  disputes  may  arise  with  regard  to  the 
I  Technically,  the  anti-dumping  legislation  is  made  under  the  power  conferred  on  the  EC  by  the  Treaty 
establishing  the  EC.  However,  since  EU  is  a  commonly  understood  term,  'EU  anti-dumping 
legislation'  will  be  used  instead  of  'EC  anti-dumping  legislation'  throughout  this  thesis  unless 
otherwise  explained. 
2  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against  dumped  imports 
frorn  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community,  OJ  1996  L  56/1,  amended  by  Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  2331/96  of  2  December  1996,  OJ  1996  L  317/1;  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
905/98  of  27  April,  OJ  1998  L  128/18;  and  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  223  8/2000  of  9  October  2000, 
OJ  2000  L  257/2;  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002  of  5  November  2002,  OJ  2002  L305/1. 
They  are  all  available  from  <http:  //europa.  eu.  int/comm/trade/policy/dumping/legis.  htm>  (I 
December  2002). 
3  The  Uruguay  Round  Agreements,  available  from 
<Iittp:  //www.  wto.  org/engIish/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.  htm#finalact>  (I  December  2002). EU's  anti-dumping  practice.  Solutions  to  all  of  these  issues  are  suggested  for  both  sides  in 
the  conclusion  of  this  thesis. 
It  is  important  for  the  purpose  of  this  thesis  to  define  some  key  concepts  here.  The  first  is 
based  on  a  distinction  between  market  economies  (MEs)  and  non-market  economies 
(NMEs).  Generally  speaking,  NME  refers  to  the  country  where  goods  and  resources  are 
t4  allocated  by  government  planning  agencies  rather  than  by  prices  freely  set  in  a  marke  . 
Normally,  NME  has  the  same  meaning  as  state  trading  country  or  state-controlled  country. 
The  classification  of  NME  and  ME  is  not  scientific  nor  sustainable  in  the  reality  of  today, 
because  there  is  no  purely  free  market  nor  totally  centrally  controlled  economy  but  rather 
a  spectrum  of  national  economies  with  more  or  less  state  control  of  certain  economic 
activities.  5  Further  and  worse,  since  the  GATT  did  not  define  the  concepts  of  ME  and 
NME  nor  did  it  provide  any  guideline  to  the  categorization,  this  issue  is  left  to  the  national 
authorities  of  the  GATT  Contracting  Parties  with  huge  discretion.  In  fact,  the  room  for 
flexibility  has  been  so  widely  used  that  these  countries  categorize  MEs  and  NMEs 
according  to  their  own  criteria.  As  a  result,  former  Communist  countries  are  normally 
regarded  as  having  NMEs,  while  the  developed  western  countries  are  viewed  as  having 
M6  Es. 
Like  NME,  ME  is  a  very  complex  concept,  but  no  international  organization  or 
agreement  provides  its  definition.  ME  is  a  term  to  measure  the  certain  level  of  economic 
development  of  a  sector  or  industry.  It  stresses  that  transactions,  including  prices,  are 
basically  regulated  by  market  forces  rather  than  state  control.  Generally  speaking,  it  asks 
for  enterprises'  rights  to  allocate  their  own  resources  and  the  freedom  to  make  business 
decisions  and  a  fair  competition  environment  sustained  by  sound  legislation. 
4  John  H.  Jackson  (co-editor),  Legal  Problems  of  International  Economic  Relations  3d  edn.,  (New 
York:  West  Publishing,  1995)  at  p  1139. 
5  This  issue  is  further  analyzed  in  the  section  IV  of  chapter  one. 
6  This  issue  is  fully  illustrated  in  section  11  of  chapter  five. 
I? In  the  wide  spectrum  of  economic  structures,  different  industries  of  a  same  country  may 
have  different  economic  development  levels.  Therefore,  some  sectors  may  be  ME  or 
close  to  ME  while  others  are  not.  However,  in  the  context  of  anti-dumping  legislation. 
importing  countries  normally  classify  exporting  countries  into  ME  and  NME.  In  that  case, 
a  country  that  has  most  of  its  industries  as  ME  should  be  regarded  as  an  ME,  and  ME 
treatment  should  be  applied  to  these  countries  in  default. 
China  was  generally  regarded  as  an  NME  when  its  economy  was  operated  on  a  strict 
state-controlled  basis  before  1979.  However,  after  more  than  twenty  years'  economic 
reform,  it  has  become  a  transitional  economy  whose  development  of  many  sectors  is  very 
close  to  market  economies.  This  fact  is  well  recognised  and  confirmed  in  the  world  by  its 
accession  to  the  WTO.  7 
The  second  key  concept  is  the  concept  of  dumping  itself.  According  to  the  GATT 
anti-dumping  rules,  a  product  is  considered  to  have  been  dumped  if  the  export  price  is 
lower  than  its  normal  value.  In  the  ordinary  course  of  trade,  the  normal  value  is  based  on 
the  domestic  sales  price  of  the  import!  However,  in  case  of  'imports  from  a  country 
which  has  a  complete  or  substantially  complete  monopoly  of  its  trade  and  where  all 
domestic  prices  are  fixed  by  the  State',  9  GATT  allows  its  contracting  parties  to  adopt 
7  China's  economic  reforms  and  progress  obtained  are  illustrated  in  chapter  four. 
8  'A  product  is  to  be  considered  as  being  introduced  into  the  commerce  of  an  importing  country  at  less 
than  its  normal  value,  if  the  price  of  the  product  exported  from  one  country  to  another  is  less  than  the 
comparable  price,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade,  for  the  like  product  when  destined  for  consumption 
in  the  exporting  country,  or,  in  the  absence  of  such  domestic  price,  is  less  than  either  (i)  the  highest 
comparable  price  for  the  like  product  for  export  to  any  third  country  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade,  or 
(ii)  the  cost  of  production  of  the  product  in  the  country  of  origin  plus  a  reasonable  addition  for  selling 
cost  and  profit.  ' 
Para  1,  Art.  VI  of  the  GATT  1994.  Available  from: 
<http:  //www.  wto.  org/english/docs_e/legal-e/gatt47_01_e.  htm>  (I  December  2002) 
9  The  second  Supplementary  Provision  to  paragraph  I  of  Article  VI  in  Annex  I  to  GATT. 
3 other  methods  to  determine  the  normal  values  of  the  imports.  This  provision  provides  the 
basis  for  national  anti-dumping  laws  to  establish  the  rules  with  regard  to  state  trading. 
Instead  of  being  dropped,  surprisingly,  the  rule  enacted  in  1947  has  been  automatically 
transposed  into  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  in  1994.10  Therefore,  in  contrast  to 
significant  advancements  in  many  other  areas  covered  by  the  GATT  provisions,  its 
current  anti-dumping  rules  relating  to  state  trading  remain  as  vague  as  they  were  50  years 
ago.  As  a  result,  most  WTO  Members  apply  different  rules  to  calculate  normal  values  of 
imports  from  NMEs,  which  will  basically  artificially  increase  the  dumping  margin  of  the 
products  concerned.  "  Therefore,  whether  the  exporting  country  is  regarded  as  an  NME  is 
crucial  to  its  trade  interests  in  anti-dumping  proceedings. 
Under  the  GATT  anti-dumping  framework,  the  EU  provides  different  rules  to  calculate 
normal  values  of  products  imported  from  MEs  and  NMEs  respectively.  With  regard  to  the 
former,  the  normal  values  of  their  exports  are  'based  on  the  prices  paid  or  payable,  in  the 
ordinary  course  of  trade,  by  independent  customers  in  the  exporting  country"'.  While  as 
to  the  NMEs,  especially  'those  to  which  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  519/94  applies,  '  3 
normal  values  shall  be  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  price  or  constructed  value  in  an  ME 
third  country,  or  the  price  from  such  a  third  country  to  other  countries,  including  the  price 
actually  paid  or  payable  in  the  Community  for  the  like  product.  '  14  In  the  meantime,  since 
all  imports  from  NMEs  are  considered  to  emanate  from  a  single  producer,  a  single  rate  is 
applied  to  all  producers  from  NME  exporting  countries  in  order  to  avoid  circumvention  of 
10  Article  2  (7),  Agreement  on  Implementation  of  Article  VI  of  GATT  1994  (WTO  Anti-  Dumping 
Agreement).  Available  from:  <http:  //www.  wto.  org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01-e.  htm>  (I 
December  2002). 
11  This  issue  is  examined  specifically  in  chapter  one. 
12  Article  2  (1)  of  Council  Regulation  (EQ  No  384/96. 
13  Council  Regulation  (EQ  No  519/94  of  7  March  1994  on  common  rules  for  imports  from  certain 
third  countries  and  repealing  Regulations  (EEC)  Nos  1765/82,1766/82  and  3420/83,  OJ  1994  1,67/89. 
14  Article  2  (7)  of  Council  Regulation  (EQ  No  384/96. 
4 the  anti-dumping  duties,  that  is  the  channelling  of  exports  through  the  exporter  with  the 
lowest  duty  rate.  This  is  the  so-called  one  country  one  duty  rule.  Both  the  rule  and  the 
analogue  country  method  are  regarded  as  the  EU's  traditional  NME  treatments.  15 
The  EU  used  to  regard  China  as  an  NME  for  the  purpose  of  antýdumping.  16  Due  to 
China's  economic  reform  since  1979  and  the  dramatic  progress  obtained  afterwards,  the 
EU  eliminated  China  from  its  list  of  NMEs  in  1998  and  introduced  conditional  market 
economy  treatment  (MET).  17  However,  since  the  criteria  for  the  new  treatment  are 
extremely  stringent,  only  few  Chinese  exporters  can  actually  get  it.  1  8  For  this  reason, 
most  Chinese  products  involved  in  EU's  anti-dumping  investigations  are  still  subject  to 
the  analogue  country  method  and  the  one  country  one  duty  rule.  Consequently,  almost  all 
of  them  are  judged  to  have  been  dumped,  so  that  they  have  to  either  make  satisfactory 
undertakings  to  revise  the  price  or  to  suffer  anti-dumping  duties  for  certain  periods.  As  a 
result,  most  of  these  Chinese  exporters  have  to  give  up  their  business  in  the  European 
market. 
Under  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation,  Chinese  exports  are  subject  to  a 
disproportionately  high  number  of  anti-dumping  measures.  There  are  170  anti-dumping 
measures  in  force  covering  63  products  and  33  countries  determined  by  the  EU 
institutions  by  30  June  2002.  Among  them,  34  measures  are  concerned  with  China,  which 
accounts  for  20  percent  of  overall  cases  although  imports  from  China  only  account  for  7 
percent  of  the  total  EU  imports.  19  So,  it  appears  that  China  has  now  become  the  primary 
15  This  issue  is  fully  analyzed  in  chapter  three. 
16  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  519/94. 
17  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  of  27  April  1998  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on 
protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community.  OJ  1998 
L  128/18. 
18  The  reasons  are  explained  in  chapter  three. 
19  ,  Trade  in  Goods'  EU  International  Trade  Statistics 
<http:  //europa.  eu.  int/comm/trade/goods/stats.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
5 target  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  practice  among  all  exporting  countries  since  August  1979 
when  the  first  anti-dumping  investigation  against  Chinese  exportS20  was  initiated. 
Furthermore,  the  anti-dumping  duties  charged  by  the  EU  on  Chinese  exports  are  very 
high.  Up  to  I  January  2002,  there  were  91  antýdumping  proceedings  launched  by  the  EU 
against  Chinese  exports.  In  69  cases,  Chinese  exports  were  found  to  have  been  dumped 
and  anti-dumping  measures  were  subsequently  taken  towards  them  .21 
Most  of  the 
anti-dumping  duties  imposed  in  these  cases  were  very  high  -  especially  when  the  one 
country  one  duty  rule  was  applied,  i.  e.  a  single  duty  rate  was  charged,  there  are  only  8 
cases  whose  rate  of  duty  charged  was  under  20  percent.  22 
Here,  we  should  note  three  inconsistencies  in  EU  practice  by  examining  the  relevant  data. 
1.  The  increasing  anti-dumping  measures  taken  by  the  EU  do  not  agree  with  Chinese 
current  economic  status,  which  has  fundamentally  changed  after  reforms  initiated  in  the 
last  two  decades. 
The  methods  that  the  EU  adopts  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  products  exported  from 
China  were  based  on  the  former  Chinese  economic  structure  and  its  government  policy  -- 
central  state  control  twenty  years  ago.  However,  since  1992  when  China  officially 
confirmed  its  current  policy  to  accelerate  the  transformation  of  the  country  into  a 
market-oriented  economy,  reforms  have  been  designed  and  implemented  to  make 
state-owned  enterprises  operate  as  independent  economic  entities  and  to  be  fully 
responsible  for  their  profits  and  losses.  As  a  result,  dramatic  changes  in  China's  economic 
20  80/1116/EEC:  Commission  Decision  of  4  December  1980  accepting undertakings  offered  by  the 
exporters  of  saccharin  and  its  salts  originating  in  China  and  the  United  States  of  America  and 
terminating  the  proceedings  concerning  imports  of  saccharin  and  its  salts  from  China,  Japan  and  the 
United  States  of  America.  OJ  1980  L  331/4  1. 
21  It  is  collected  by  the  author  from  the  WTO  and  the  EUs  anti-dumping  statistics 
<http:  //www.  wto.  org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.  htm>  and 
-littp:  //europa.  eu.  int/comm/trade/policy/dumping/reports.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
22  Ibid. 
6 structures  and  development  took  place,  and  the  prices  of  over  90  percent  of  final  goods 
are  now  determined  by  market  forces,  a  factor  which  has  been  confirmed  by  the  World 
Bank.  23  According  to  these  significant  changes,  most  countries  (such  as  the  United  States, 
Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan)  which  used  to  regard  China  as  an  NME  have  changed 
their  anti-dumping  policies  towards  China  and  granted  individual  treatment  to  Chinese 
state-owned  enterprises  after  the  investigation  is  initiated.  This  has  proved  to  be  more 
rational  and  practical  as  can  be  seen  in  the  cases  discussed  later.  24  However,  the  EU  seems 
to  have  responded  less  to  the  fundamental  changes  resulting  from  the  Chinese  economic 
reform.  Though  in  Council  Regulation  No.  905/98,25  it  deleted  China  from  the  list  of 
NMEs  and  agreed  to  grant  conditional  MET  to  Chinese  exporters  who  meet  certain 
criteria.  This  is  no  doubt  a  big  step  forward,  but  things  have  not  changed  significantly 
because  the  criteria  set  in  the  new  Regulation  are  too  severe  and  impractical  to  meet  the 
26 
need  of  actual  situations  . 
As  a  result,  most  Chinese  companies  involved  in  antýdumping 
proceedings  are  still  subject  to  the  analogue  country  method  in  the  calculation  of  their 
normal  value  and  one  country-one  duty  when  determining  anti-dumping  duties. 
Furthermore,  anti-dumping  investigations  initiated  by  the  EU  in  1999  reached  12,  which 
is  the  highest  number  compared  with  the  past  years.  27  The  fact  shows  that  the  EU's  new 
anti-dumping  policy  against  China  has  not  achieved  the  objective  to  fit  the  changes 
resulting  from  the  Chinese  economic  reform,  and  this  also  brings  about  the  following  two 
inconsistencies. 
Considering  the  past  twenty  years,  the  number  of  the  total  EU's  antimdumping  cases 
23  World  Bank  Discussion  Paper  No.  215,  China:  Reform  and  Development  in  1992-1993. 
24  Alternative  anti-dumping  approaches  towards  China  are  examined  in  chapter  five. 
25  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98. 
26  This  issue  will  be  fully  analyzed  in  chapter  three. 
27  'Committee  on  Anti-Dumping  Practices  -  Semi-Annual  Report  under  Article  16.4  of  the 
Agreement  -  European  Communities',  WTO  Document  Code:  G/ADP/N/59/EEC.  26/01/2000 
<http:  //www.  wto.  org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e. 
htm>  (I  December  2002). 
7 has  gone  down,  while  those  against  China  has  risen  sharply.  From  1979  to  1998,  the 
number  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  cases  against  third  countries  decreased.  The  average 
cases  initiated  per  year  declined  from  42  ten  years  ago  to  33  within  the  residual  ten  years, 
while  cases  concerning  China  increased  from  an  average  2.3  per  year  in  the  first  ten  years 
to  4.6  in  the  last  ten  years,  which  occupied  from  5.5  percent  of  the  total  EU's 
28  anti-dumping  cases  for  the  former  period  to  13.8  percent  for  the  later  ten  years  . 
3.  The  actual  effect  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  policy  towards  China  is  not  consistent 
with  the  objectives  of  anti-dumping  policy  (i.  e.  to  restore  fair  competition,  offset  the 
injury  and  limit  the  sharply  increasing  quantity  of  dumped  goods  rather  than  exclude 
them  from  the  EU).  But,  in  fact,  statistics  of  imports  from  China  suffering  from  the  effects 
of  EU's  anti-dumping  measures  show  that  they  exceed  their  original  purpose.  Due  to  the 
factors  discussed  above,  most  Chinese  exporters  involved  in  investigations  suffer  very 
high  anti-dumping  duties  so  that  they  are  virtually  excluded  from  the  European  market 
since  then.  29For  example,  China  exported  more  than  200  million  bicycles  to  the  EU  in 
1991,  but  since  the  anti-dumping  duty  as  high  as  30.6  percent  was  imposed  in  1993,  it  has 
been  excluded  from  the  European  market  gradually.  Similarly,  colour  televisions  from 
China  have  almost  disappeared  from  the  European  market  now  after  being  levied  44.6 
percent  anti-dumping  duty  30 
. 
From  this  point,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  virtual  effects  of  the 
EU's  anti-dumping  policy  obviously  deviate  from  its  purpose! 
These  inconsistencies,  both  in  the  legislative  framework  of  the  EU  and  in  the  practical 
28  'The  EU's  Anti-Dumping  Practice  against  China'  (Chinese) 
<http:  //www.  ec3286.  com/report/zhengce/002.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
29  t  There  were  still  thirty-one  Chinese  products  subject  to  anti-dumping  measures  in  the  cases  initiated 
between  1988  and  1994.  In  the  majority  of  these  cases,  the  rates  of  duty  were  above  20  percent.  In  a 
number  of  cases,  the  rates  of  duty  were  even  above  50  percent.  '  Donghui  Fu,  'EC  Anti-Dumping  Law 
and  Individual  Treatment  Policy  in  Cases  Involving  Imports  from  China'  (1997)  31(l)  Journal  of 
World  Trade,  73  at  p  76. 
30  'Anti-Dumping  Measures  against  China  Sharply  Decrease  Chinese  Exports' 
--Iittp:  //www.  peopledaily.  com.  cn/zcxx/2000/08/0821  IO.  html>  (I  December  2002). 
8 effects  of  the  application  of  the  rules,  form  the  subject  of  study  of  this  thesis.  It  is  here 
argued  that  there  is  real  urgency  in  providing  such  an  analysis  and  a  genuine  need  to 
formulate  practical  solutions.  The  needs  are  pressing  on  both  sides.  It  is  argued  that  the 
current  rules  undermine  fair  competition  in  the  EU  market  and,  eventually,  may  lead  to 
retaliatory  measures  being  taken  against  the  EU.  Furthermore,  Chinese-EU  relation  may 
be  undermined  if  the  current  policy  continuous  to  be  followed. 
As  previously  discussed,  the  current  EU's  anti-dumping  rules  against  China  already 
exceed  this  purpose,  which  is  to  offset  the  injury  and  discourage  increasing  impacts  of 
dumped  imports.  In  fact,  imports  from  China,  where  anti-dumping  measure  have  been 
taken,  have  decreased  rapidly.  In  the  long  term,  this  will  have  deleterious  effects  on  the 
economic  development  of  the  EU  itself. 
In  addition,  the  anti-dumping  measures  imposed  on  Chinese  exporters  by  the  EU  are 
likely  to  stimulate  trade  retaliation  actions  by  China  in  the  future.  China  has  developed  its 
own  anti-dumping  legislation  since  January  21,1997,  when  the  Chinese  State 
Commission  for  Economy  and  Trade  announced  it  was  setting  up  investigation 
mechanisms  to  combat  dumped  and  subsided  imports  into  the  People's  Republic  of 
China.  31  On  25  March  of  the  same  year,  China  formally  promulgated  its  legislation  on 
anti-dumping  -  the  Regulation  on  Anti-Dumping  and  Countervailing  Measures.  The 
32 
current  law  was  amended  on  31  October  2001.  Article  56  provides: 
Where  a  country  (region)  discriminatorily  imposes  anti-dumping  measures  on  the 
exports  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  China  may,  on  the  basis  of  the  actual 
31  Craig  Pouncey,  'The  New  Anti-Dumping  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China:  the  Dragon  Bites 
Back'  (1997)  3(4)  Int.  T.  L.  R,  143  at  p  143. 
32  Regulations  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China  on  Anti-Dumping,  adopted  at  the  46th  Executive 
Meeting  of  the  State  Council  on  31  October  2001,  promulgated  by  Decree  No.  328  of  the  State 
Council  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China  on  26  November  200  1,  and  effective  as  of  I  January  2002. 
WTO  Document  Code:  G/ADP/N/l/CHN/2.  <http:  //docsonline.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I 
December  2002). 
9 situations,  take  corresponding  measures  against  that  country  (region). 
Therefore,  we  should  have  the  worry  that  China  may  use  its  anti-dumping  legislation 
against  products  imported  from  the  EU  to  retaliate  against  the  latter's  unjustified 
measures  suffered  by  Chinese  exporters.  China  entered  the  WTO  on  II  December  200  1, 
which  will  greatly  strengthen  its  economic  growth  and  increase  its  share  of  world  trade.  It 
is  estimated  that  China's  real  imports  from  Western  Europe  will  increase  from  28,571 
33  Million  US  Dollars  in  1995  to  50,182  Million  US  Dollars  in  2005,  and  it  will  become 
the  EU's  second  largest  economy  and  trading  partner  next  to  the  US  in  twenty  years, 
rather  than  the  I  Oth  largest  trading  partner  of  today.  34  Therefore,  if  the  EU  does  not  adjust 
those  undue  points  in  its  current  anti-dumping  legislation  against  China  and  if  its 
anti-dumping  measures  are  found  to  have  been  unduly  imposed  on  Chinese  exports, 
China  will  have  the  capability  to  adopt  similar  actions  to  imports  from  Europe  and 
exclude  the  European  exporters  from  the  Chinese  market.  From  this  point  of  view,  the 
consequence  of  such  retaliation  measures  towards  the  EU  cannot  be  underestimated. 
Furthermore,  when  we  consider  the  consequences  of  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  and 
practice  against  China,  Chinese  exporters  are  those  who  suffer  the  adverse  effects  directly. 
This  constitutes  the  largest  obstacle  to  the  development  ofEU-China  trade  relations.  Here, 
we  should  make  one  point  clear:  the  development  of  exports  from  China  to  the  EU  is  not 
only  in  the  interest  of  China  but  also  in  the  interest  of  the  EU.  The  two  sides  are  at 
different  levels  of  economic  development:  the  EU  needs  a  large  amount  of  cheap  and  low 
value-added  products  that  can  be  well  supplied  by  Chinese  exporters,  while  China 
imports  expensive  and  high-technology  products  from  the  EU.  This  means  that  a 
substantial  part  of  Chinese  products  are  not  in  direct  competition  with  the  products  of  EU 
33  D  Bhattasali  and  M  Kawai,  'Implications  of  China's  Accession  to  the  World  Trade  Organization'  at 
p  18.  <  http:  //www.  worldbank.  org.  cn/English/content/wto-implications.  pdf>  (I  December  2002). 
34  Yukon  Huang,  'Realizing  China's  Potential' 
<http:  //www.  worldbank.  org.  cn/engIish/content/529z6l4659  I.  shtml>  (I  December  2002). 
10 industry.  Furthermore,  Chinese  products  provide  an  economic  advantage  for  the  EU's 
processing  industry  and  European  consumers.  Based  on  this  point,  to  develop  a  sound 
trade  relationship  for  closer  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  China  is  very  important. 
The  negative  policy  of  the  EU  that  encourages  anti-dumping  actions  against  Chinese 
products  will  definitely  affect  the  interests  of  both  sides  and  undermine  their  relations. 
Particularly  now  that  China  has  entered  the  World  Trade  Organization,  its  economic 
reforms  will  be  further  deepened  based  on  free  market  principles.  So,  if  the  EU  does  not 
adjust  its  current  policy,  the  'analogue  country'  and  'one  country  one  duty'  approaches  for 
Chinese  exporters  will  certainly  stimulate  greater  controversies.  35 
11.  The  structure  of  the  thesis 
This  thesis  consists  of  seven  chapters.  It  begins  by  explaining  the  development  and  key 
concepts  of  the  Agreement  on  the  Implementation  of  Article  VI  of  the  GATT  1994 
(Anti-Dumping  Agreement),  which  provides  a  legal  framework  for  the  EU  antiýdumping 
legislation.  Chapter  two  examines  the  main  substantive  and  procedural  rules  of  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  regulations  applicable  to  China.  The  following  chapter  identifies  the  legal 
problems  and  issues  arising  from  the  above  legislation  in  practice.  Together  the  first  three 
chapters  constitute  the  theoretical  and  practical  analysis  of  the  EU  anti-dumping 
legislation  towards  China  in  this  thesis.  The  following  chapter  elucidates  China's  current 
economic  situation  and  prospects  after  more  than  twenty  years'  reforms.  It  thus  presents 
the  need  for  the  EU  to  adopt  an  anti-dumping  policy  which  corresponds  to  China's 
economic  development.  In  order  to  suggest  solutions  to  the  problems  and  issues 
identified  in  chapter  three,  chapter  five  makes  a  comparative  study  of  other  developed 
countries'  anti-dumping  legislation  applicable  to  China.  Due  to  China's  accession  to  the 
WTO,  new  legal  problems  and  disputes  may  arise  with  regard  to  the  EU's  antýdumping 
practice  towards  China.  They  are  illustrated  in  chapter  six.  Finally,  in  chapter  seven,  the 
35  China's  economic  reforms  and  prospects  are  analyzed  in  chapter  four. thesis  concludes  by  proposing  solutions  to  all  the  issues  identified  above  for  both  EU  and 
China. 
Ill.  Chapter  outlines 
Chapter  one  focuses  on  the  analysis  of  the  GATT  anti-dumping  legislation,  which 
provides  the  framework  for  EU's  anti-dumping  law.  The  legislation  in  force  includes 
Article  VI  of  the  GATT  and  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement.  This  chapter  analyzes 
the  nature,  history,  objectives  and  main  provisions  of  these  rules,  especially  those 
regulating  imports  from  state  trading  countries.  It  concludes  by  identifying  two  practical 
problems  arising  from  the  legislation  with  regard  to  state  trading  countries.  First,  the  rules 
are  too  out  of  date  to  accommodate  the  current  situation  of  transitional  economies 
properly.  Second,  they  are  too  simple  and  vague  to  be  applied  by  the  WTO  Members 
fairly.  They  are  also  the  key  reasons  behind  the  legal  problems  arising  from  the  EU's 
current  anti-dumping  legislation  towards  China. 
Chapter  two  elaborates  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation.  First,  it  examines  the 
evolution  of  the  rules,  especially  those  applicable  to  China.  Second,  it 
introduces  the  objectives,  key  concepts  and  contents  of  the  Regulations  in 
force.  Finally,  it  gives  a  general  analysis  of  the  enforcement  of  the  rules  with 
regard  to  China.  Thus,  this  chapter  provides  a  theoretical  basis  to  further 
discuss  problems  and  issues  arising  from  these  rules  in  the  next  chapter. 
Chapter  three  focuses  on  unreasonable  factors  in  the  current  EU's 
anti-dumping  policy  towards  China.  It  examines  four  different  methodologies 
adopted  by  the  European  Commission,  36  including:  analogue  country  method. 
conditional  market  economy  treatment,  one  country  one  duty  rule  and 
36  The  European  Commission  is  the  authority  in  EU's  anti-dumping  investigations. 
12 individual  treatment.  For  each  of  them,  the  relevant  rules  in  force,  outcomes 
of  the  enforcement  and  legal  problems  arising  in  practice  will  be  analyzed 
respectively.  Therefore,  this  chapter  constitutes  a  significant  part  of  the  thesis. 
Chapter  four  examines  China's  economic  reform  of  foreign  trade,  enterprise,  pricing  and 
financial  systems  and  their  development  prospects  after  its  accession  to  the  WTO  on  II 
December  200  1.  Pre-reform  conditions,  progress  made  after  the  reform,  relevant 
legislation,  and  commitments  made  on  China's  accession  to  the  WTO  are  illustrated 
respectively  for  the  four  areas.  Of  crucial  importance  in  this  chapter  is  the  Report  of  the 
Working  Party  on  China's  accession  to  the  WTO 
. 
37  This  report  provides  the  analysis  - 
economic  and  legal  -  which  corroborates  the  central  argument  of  this  thesis  that  the  EU, 
by  failing  to  take  into  account  the  very  real  changes  that  have  occurred  in  the  Chinese 
economy,  is  acting  unreasonably  in  its  application  of  its  anti-dumping  regime. 
Chapter  five  examines  alternative  approaches  to  anti-dumping  legislation  applicable  to 
China.  First  of  all,  it  introduces  anti-dumping  legislation  of  the  U.  S.,  Australia,  New 
Zealand  and  Japan  briefly.  It  then  enumerates  the  different  approaches  adopted  by  these 
countries  to  identify  NMEs,  calculate  normal  values  of  imports  from  these  economies  and 
determine  anti-dumping  duties  for  dumped  products.  In  particular,  it  makes  a 
comparative  analysis  of  legislative  amendments  made  by  these  countries  due  to  China's 
economic  reforms.  Based  on  case  studies,,  these  approaches  have  turned  out  to  be  more 
reasonable  and  fair  than  that  of  the  EU  in  practice,  because  these  countries  have  adjusted 
their  anti-dumping  policy  to  the  extent  that  can  better  accommodate  the  present  economic 
situation  of  China  as  a  transitional  economy.  The  comparative  study  made  in  this  chapter 
provides  important  references  to  proposals  given  to  the  EU  in  the  conclusion  of  the  thesis. 
Chapter  six  explores  new  issues  and  disputes  that  may  arise  with  regard  to  the  EU's 
37  ,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China',  I  October  200  1,  WTO  Document  Code: 
WT/ACC/CHN/49.  <http:  //docsonline.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I  December  2002). 
13 anti-dumping  practice  after  China's  accession  to  the  WTO  as  a  developing  country.  First, 
it  analyzes  Article  15  of  the  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  and  its  application  in  the 
Indian  Bed  Linen  case.  38  This  provision  basically  provides  a  developed  country 
Member's  obligation  to  actively  consider  the  possibility  of  constructive  remedies  prior  to 
imposition  of  an  anti-dumping  measure  that  would  affect  the  essential  interests  of  a 
developing  country.  Second,  it  illustrates  the  special  and  differential  treatment  (SDT)  for 
developing  and  least-developed  country  Members  under  the  WTO  dispute  settlement 
system.  After  that,  it  enumerates  three  types  of  foreseeable  EU-China  anti-dumping 
disputes  after  China's  accession  to  the  WTO.  Finally,  it  indicates  potential  difficulties  for 
China  to  invoke  the  above-mentioned  provisions  to  protect  its  trade  interests  against  the 
EU's  anti-dumping  decisions.  In  this  way,  chapter  six  deepens  the  study  of  this  thesis 
from  a  prospective  point  of  view. 
Chapter  seven  provides  the  conclusion  to  this  thesis.  Firstl  it  summarizes  the  legal 
problems  and  issues  arising  from  the  EU's  current  anti-dumping  legislation  towards 
China.  Second,  it  emphasizes  the  urgency  tDfind  solutions  to  these  problems.  Third,  it 
examines  their  underlying  reasons  from  the  perspective  of  both  the  EU  and  China.  Finally, 
based  on  the  study  made  in  the  previous  chapters  (i.  e.  the  theoretical  and  practical 
analysis  of  the  legislation,  the  illustration  of  China's  economic  development,  the 
comparative  study  of  alternative  approaches  of  anti-dumping  legislation  towards  China, 
and  the  deduction  of  new  issues  and  disputes  that  may  arise  with  regard  to  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  practice  due  to  China's  WTO  membership),  it  attempts  to  propose 
corresponding  solutions  to  the  problems  and  issues  posed  previously.  Thus,  this  chapter 
becomes  the  highlight  of  the  thesis. 
38  ,  European  Communities  -  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton-Type  Bed  Linen  from  India', 
Report  of  the  Panel,  WTO  Document  Code:  WT/DS141/R.  Available  from:  Available  by  searching 
through  <http  -//docsonl  i  ne.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I  December  2002). 
14 IV.  Some  comments  on  methodology 
A.  Analysis  methods 
Five  different  types  of  research  methods  will  be  used  to  analyze  issues  in  this  thesis: 
statistical,  explanatory,  descriptive,  comparative  and  prescriptive  analysis. 
Statistical  analysis  is  applied  to  identify  legal  problems  and  issues  arising  from  the  EU 
anti-dumping  legislation  towards  China.  They  can  be  shown  clearly  by  examining  the 
statistics  relating  to  EU-China  trade  of  different  years,  such  as  the  total  anti-dumping 
measures  taken  by  the  EU  vis-a-vis  those  imposed  on  Chinese  exports,  overall  imports  of 
the  EU  vis-a-vis  those  from  China. 
As  to  the  explanatory  analysis,  it  will  be  used  to  examine  the  nature  of  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  law  against  China.  Those  basic  notions  and  fundamental  questions  will  be 
explained  in  this  way.  They  include: 
1.  What  are  the  major  principles  and  basic  purpose  of  this  law? 
2.  When  and  how  should  it  be  applied? 
3.  What  kinds  of  problems  and  difficulties  arising  when  it  is  put  into  practice  and  why? 
4.  Why  we  need  to  consider  those  side  effects? 
5.  How  can  we  attempt  to  adjust  the  current  measures  to  offset  the  unfavourable  effects? 
The  descriptive  analysis  is  designed  to  examine  some  of  the  EU's  typical  anti-dumping 
cases  against  China,  such  as  the  Bicycles  case  in  1993,39  in  which  the  EU  refused  to  grant 
39  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2474/93  of  8  September  1993  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping 
duty  on  imports  into  the  Community  of  bicycles  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China  and 
collecting  definitively  the  provisional  anti-  dumping  duty  OJ  1993  L228/1. 
15 individual  treatment  to  Chinese  producers/exporters,  including  joint-ventures  with 
foreign  investment,  even  many  Hong  Kong  companies.  This  case  set  out  the  principles 
that  were  subsequently  applied  by  the  EU  in  dealing  with  Chinese  exporters.  Since  that 
case,  a  single  anti-dumping  duty  was  imposed  in  respect  of  all  exporters  in  China  and 
applied  to  all  Chinese  products  exported  to  the  EU,  regardless  of  the  different  dumping 
margins  established  for  each  of  the  producers  or  exporters  concerned.  In  this  way,  a 
Chinese  exporter  who  does  not  practice  dumping  is  subject  to  an  anti-dumping  duty  if 
other  Chinese  exporters  are  dumping  their  products.  Such  a  description  of  cases  is 
expected  to  support  and  to  further  understand  the  key  ideas  in  this  dissertation.  Besides,  I 
will  use  this  method  to  describe  the  favourable  results  of  China's  economic  reforms, 
which  include  those  on  price,  enterprise,  financial  and  traditional  foreign  trade  systems. 
With  regard  to  the  comparative  and  prescriptive  analysis  methods,  they  will  be  used  in 
chapter  five  of  this  thesis.  After  examining  and  demonstrating  the  unreasonable  factors  in 
the  current  EU's  anti-dumping  measures  against  China,  I  will  analyze  the  anti-dumping 
policies  of  the  U.  S.,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan.  These  countries,  whencompared 
with  the  EU,  are  much  more  flexible  and  therefore  justified  in  their  practices,  because 
they  are  fully  aware  of  the  changes  of  China's  economic  structure  after  reform  and  they 
have  made  corresponding  adjustments  to  their  previous  policies.  This  comparative 
approach  yields  insights  into  the  approach  taken  by  the  EU  and  provides  valuable 
pointers  as  to  how  the  EU  approach  might  be  reformed.  It  is  argued  that  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  practice  should  be  consistent  with  the  purpose  of  the  anti-dumping 
measures:  to  offset  the  injury  and  restore  fair  competition. 
B.  Sources  of  the  database. 
As  far  as  the  database  and  references  needed  are  concerned,  they  can  be  categorized  into 
six  types:  opinions  and  suggestions  from  relevant  officials  and  scholars  directly  through 
interviews,  experience  of  positively  involving  EU's  anti-dumping  proceedings  towards 
16 NMEs  by  doing  internship  in  relevant  law  firm,  current  legislation  in  force,  typical  cases 
of  recent  years  and  literature  review. 
1.  Interviews 
The  EU's  anti-dumping  policy  towards  China  is  a  very  sensitive  political  issue  to  the 
EU-China  trade  relationship,  particularly  because  there  has  been  no  significant  change 
considering  the  implementation  of  the  amended  legislation,  and  the  EU  still  treats  China 
as  an  NME  in  most  of  its  anti-dumping  proceedings.  Therefore,  there  is  little  official 
information  relating  to  the  disputes  publicly  available.  For  this  reason,  this  thesis  draws 
upon  the  legal  and  economic  expertise,  information  and  opinions  obtained  in  interviews 
conducted  with  officials  of  the  European  Commission  and  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade 
and  Economic  Cooperation  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China  (MOFTEC). 
The  purpose  of  the  interviews  was  to  get  opinions  about  the  EU's  current  antimdumping 
practice  towards  China,  including:  Chinese  official  standpoint  towards  the  EU  practice, 
real  difficulties  for  Chinese  exporters  to  get  the  conditional  MET,  the  EUs  response  and 
arguments  towards  these  issues,  prospects  of  China's  economy  and  the  development  of  its 
anti-dumping  legislation,  proposals  for  possible  adjustments  of  the  EU  policy  and 
strategies  suggested  to  Chinese  exporters. 
Information  thus  obtained  has  been  incorporated  into  relevant  sections  of  the  thesis  to 
support  my  argument.  In  particular,  original  analysis  was  extended  and  new  ideas  and 
issues  were  brought  out  through  interviews.  For  example,  chapter  six  examines  new 
issues  with  regard  to  the  EU's  anti-dumping  practice  towards  China  after  the  latter's 
accession  to  the  WTO.  It  also  proposes  necessary  strategies  for  China  and  enumerates 
potential  difficulties  that  it  may  encounter  at  that  time.  All  of  these  ideas  generated  from 
interviews  in  Brussels  with  experienced  anti-dumping  lawyers.  In  addition,  during 
interviews,  communication  with  professionals  and  experts  offered  me  opportunities  to 
17 test  my  argument  in  the  thesis  and  the  depth  of  my  research.  In  this  way,  interviews 
constitute  a  very  important  part  of  this  study. 
These  interviews  were  semi-structured  and  each  lasted  between  45  to  120  minutes.  A  list 
of  these  interviews  is  provided  in  tables  one  and  two  below.  In  the  course  of  some 
meetings,  certain  officials  provided  insights  relating  to  some  of  the  key  issues  discussed 
in  this  thesis.  They  also  requested  that  on  certain  sensitive  issues  I  did  not  attribute  the 
point  they  raised  directly  to  them.  Throughout  this  thesis,  I  have  incorporated  the  analysis 
where  relevant  without  attributing  the  points  raised  to  any  particular  individual. 
2.  Intemship  in  law  firm 
Anti-dumping  is  a  very  complex  and  technical  issue.  In  order  to  identify  the  unreasonable 
factors  of  the  EU's  current  anti-dumping  practice  towards  imports  from  China,  and  to 
understand  the  real  difficulties  that  Chinese  exporters  experience  when  they  apply  for  the 
conditional  MET  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  proceedings,  experience  of  positively 
involving  in  these  proceedings  is  necessary.  Therefore,  I  did  an  internship  under  the 
supervision  of  professionals  in  Hammond  Suddards  Edge,  Brussels.  The  law  firm  is 
famous  for  its  excellence  to  representing  exporters  from  NMEs  in  the  EU's  an&dumping 
investigations. 
The  internship  lasted  for  six  weeks,  during  which  I  participated  in  filling  an&dumping 
questionnaires  for  exporters  from  NMEs  and  MEs,  and  analysing  other  issues  of 
anti-dumping  arising  after  the  investigation  ended,  such  as  the  continuation  and 
reapplication  of  undertakings.  Particularly,  the  practical  issues  that  I  encountered  during 
my  internship  led  me  to  consider  new  disputes  that  might  arise  towards  the  EUs 
anti-dumping  practice  after  China's  accession  to  the  WTO 
. 
40  Therefore,  such  experience 
significantly  contributes  to  the  study  of  this  thesis. 
-40  This  issue  is  fully  analyzed  in  chapter  six. 
18 3.  Legislation  in  force. 
They  are  the  most  important  sources  needed  in  this  study.  They  include: 
-  GATT  rules 
The  'General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  1947'  and  the  'Agreement  on 
Implementation  of  Article  VI  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  1994.  Both 
will  be  considered  because  they  provide  the  basic  framework  for  GATT  Members' 
anti-dumping  laws'.  41 
-  The  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  42 
The  current  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  against  China  will  be  fully  analyzed  throughout 
this  thesis.  43  They  include:  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96,2331/96,905/98, 
2238/2000  and  1972/2002,44  and  other  legal  documents  establishing  criteria  to  grant  the 
individual  treatment.  45 
-  Other  developed  countries'  anti-dumping  legislation  relating  to  China.  46 
They  include  the  United  States,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan.  Anti-dumping 
legislation  of  these  countries  will  be  analyzed  and  compared  with  that  of  the  EU  in 
chapter  five. 
41  They  are  examined  in  chapter  two. 
42  Available  from  <http:  //europa.  eu.  int/comm/trade/policy/dumping/legis.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
43  The  legislation  is  addressed  in  chapter  two.  Legal  problems  and  issues  arising  from  it  are  analyzed 
in  chapter  three. 
44  Seefn  2  above. 
45  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  protection  against 
durnped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*COM/97/0677  final  - 
ACC.  OJ  1998  C70/15.  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on 
protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community 
/*COM/2000.0363  final  -  ACC  2000/0160. 
4"  These  legislation  is  available  by  searching  through  <http:  //docsoniine.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I 
December  2002). 
19 -  Chinese  Foreign  Trade  Law  and  the  Law  on  Joint  ventures. 
It  is  essential  to  study  them  when  we  consider  the  basis  to  calculate  the  normal  values  of 
products  imported  from  China  and  to  judge  the  nature  of  certain  Chinese  exporters  (i.  e. 
whether  they  are  State-trading  enterprises  or  not). 
4.  Typical  cases  of  recent  years  (case  studies).  47 
They  include  anti-dumping  cases  against  China  initiated  by  the  EU  and  other  developed 
countries  such  as  the  U.  S.,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan.  They  are  used  to  explain 
both  the  principles  used  by  anti-dumping  authorities  and  to  illustrate  vividly  the  key  ideas 
and  problems  outlined  in  the  thesis. 
5.  Literature  review. 
The  literature  review  needed  in  this  study  includes  the  research  of  anti-dumping 
textbooks,  articles  and  reports  from  journals,  websites  of  main  international  organisations, 
such  as  the  EU,  WTO  and  World  Bank.  All  of  these  supply  the  latest  information  and 
arguments  relating  to  the  issues  discussed  in  the  thesis.  They  are  listed  in  the 
Bibliography. 
Throughout  the  literature  search,  I  have  not  found  any  academic  opinions  opposite  to  my 
central  arguments  in  the  thesis.  In  fact,  except  for  the  EU's  own  analysis  in  its 
anti-dumping  regulations  and  legal  proposals,  most  of  the  literature  is  critical  of  the  EU's 
over  stringent  anti-dumping  practice  towards  imports  from  China.  The  secondary  sources 
cited  in  this  thesis  support  the  central  argument  that  the  anti-dumping  practices  of  the  EU 
have  the  effect  of  protecting  EU  industry  and  act  as  a  protectionist  device  rather  than 
correcting  the  specific  problem  for  which  the  anti-dumping  regulations  were  designed. 
47 
See  'Table  of  Cases'. 
20 Table  One:  Interview  details  (China) 
10  July  2001  Beijing  Jingchun  Shao,  Professor  of  Law,  University  of  Beijing. 
12  July  2001  Beijing  Weiping  Huang,  Professor  &  Dean,  School  of  Economics, 
Rerimin  University  of  China. 
13  July  2001  Beijing  Dawei  Chen,  School  of  Economics.,  Renmin  University  of  f 
China. 
17  July  2001  Beijing  Xiangjun  Gao,  Director  of  the  Legal  Department,  Chinese 
Chamber  of  Commerce  for  Import  and  Export  of  Machinery 
and  Electronic  Products  (CCCME).  48 
19  July  2001  Beijing  Yu  Ma,  Senior  Research  Fellow,  Chinese  Academy  of 
International  Trade  &  Economic  Cooperation  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation. 
23  July  2001  Beijing  Shuguang  Xia,  Bureau  of  Fair  Trade  for  Imports  and  Exports, 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation,  the 
People's  Republic  of  China. 
3  August  2001  Kunming  Pingwei  Wu,  Manager  to  the  Import  &  Export  Departmen 
Yunnan  Malong  Chemical  Construction  Community-,  LTD.  4 
Table  Two:  Interview  details  (Brussels) 
24  June  2002  Lingchen  Pu,  Counsel  and  Lawyer,  Eversheds. 
25  June  2002  Jing  Shen,  Attorney  at  Law,  Theodore  goddard. 
27  June  2002  Richard  King,  Lawyer,  White  &  Case. 
27  June  2002  Hui  Zhao,  Lawyer,  White  &  Case. 
12  July  2002  Martin  Lukas,  Administrator  of  the  Directorate-General  for  Trade, 
European  Commission. 
48  This  interview  was  carried  out  by  phone. 
49  Yunnan  Malong  Chemical  Construction  Community,  LTD  is  the  first  Chinese  company  which  got 
the  EU's  market  economy  treatment. 
21 Chapter  One 
The  GATT  Framework 
Introduction 
If  a  company  exports  a  product  at  a  price  lower  than  the  price  it  charges  on  its  home 
market  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade,  the  product  is  considered  as  being  dumped.  Since 
dumped  goods  are  likely  to  cause  material  injury  to  domestic  industries  of  the  importing 
country,  international  trade  policies  recognize  that  dumping  is  a  practice  to  be  condemned 
Therefore,  governments  of  the  importing  country  can  take  action  against  dumping  in 
order  to  protect  their  domestic  industries.  Today,  the  Agreement  on  the  implementation  of 
Article  VI  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  1994  (often  called  the 
'Anti-Dumping  Agreement')'  and  Article  VI  of  GATT  operate  together  and  provide  the 
framework  for  the  WTO  Members'  anti-dumping  legislation.  They  allow  governments  to 
take  action  against  dumping  where  there  is  genuine  ('material')  injury  to  the  competing 
domestic  industry.  Typically  the  action  is  to  impose  extra  import  duty  on  the  dumped 
product  from  the  exporting  country,  so  that  its  price  can  be  brought  closer  to  the  'normal 
value'  and  the  injury  to  the  domestic  industry  of  the  importing  country  can  be  removed. 
Though  the  rules  do  not  pass  any  specific  judgment  in  any  anti-dumping  case,  they 
discipline  the  Members'  anti-dumping  actions  and  regulate  how  their  governments  can  or 
cannot  react  to  dumping.  2 
1  'Anti-Dumping'  <http:  //www.  wto.  org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/antidum2.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
The  legislation  is  available  from  the  WTO  website. 
<http:  //www.  wto.  org/engIish/docs-e/iegal_e/legal-e.  htm#finalact>  (I  December  2002). 
24  Trade  into  the  Future:  the  Introduction  to  the  WTO  Agreement  on  Subsidies,  Safeguards: 
Contingencies,  etc'  <http:  //www.  wto.  org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif  e/agrm7_e.  htm>  (I 
December  2002). 
22 This  chapter  focuses  on  the  analysis  of  the  GATT  anti-dumping  legislation.  It  consists  of 
four  parts.  The  first  provides  a  concise  description  of  the  development  of  the  rules.  The 
rules  in  force  at  present  have  evolved  over  four  stages:  anti-dumping  rules  prior  to  GATT, 
Article  VI  of  GATT  1947,  the  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Code  and  The  Uruguay  Round 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement.  I  chart  the  progress  and  character  of  each  of  them.  Part  two  is 
the  key  section  of  this  chapter.  In  it  I  analyze  the  AntimDumping  Agreement  in  detail.  The 
nature  and  objective  of  the  Agreement,  its  main  contents,  key  concepts  and  procedural 
requirements  are  illustrated  in  this  part.  Since  this  study  is  about  the  EU  antirdumping 
legislation  against  China,  which  is  based  on  the  GATT  antimdumping  rules  with  regard  to 
state-trading  countries,  I  illustrate  provisions  dealing  with  state  trading  issues  in  the 
General  Agreement  in  part  three.  This  section  contains  two  types  of  rules:  one  is  Article 
XVII  of  the  GATT  1994  that  focuses  on  state  trading  enterprises  (STEs)  specifically, 
another  is  the  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  with  regard  to  state  trading  countries3.  Some  of 
the  issues  analyzed  are  not  relevant  to  the  theme  of  my  thesis,  but  they  are  discussed  here 
for  the  completeness  of  the  description  of  the  GATT  rules,  so  they  will  not  be  dealt  with 
further. 
In  the  last  part  of  the  chapter,  I  analyze  three  practical  problems  that  have  arisen  from  the 
GATT  anti-dumping  provisions  against  exports  from  state  trading  countries. 
1.  They  do  not  specify  whether  the  anti-dumping  authority  or  exporting  country  bears 
the  burden  of  proof  of  state  trading  issues. 
2.  The  rules  are  too  old  to  regulate  the  current  situation  properly. 
3.  They  are  too  simple  and  too  vague  to  be  applied  by  the  WTO  Members  fairly. 
These  problems  are  noticeable  because  they  leave  wide  discretion  to  the  WTO  Member's 
3  it  is  the  second  interpretative  note  to  paragraph  I  of  Article  VI  in  Annex  I  to  'General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  1994'. 
23 national  authorities  with  regard  to  NME  issues,  and  they  are  likely  to  lead  to  judgments 
which  are  particularly  adverse  to  the  so-called  state-trading  countries.  In  fact,  under  some 
WTO  Members'  NME  methodologies,  their  authorities  use  'nearly  unlimited  discretion 
to  detect  dumping  where  none  exists  and  calculate  related  dumping  margins  at  their 
Will.  14  It  no  doubt  undermines  the  fair  competition  principle  of  international  trade. 
In  summary,  this  chapter  analyzes  the  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  in  force,  which  provides 
the  framework  for  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  with  regard  to  China.  It  explains  and 
analyzes  key  concepts  and  general  procedural  requirements  for  anti-dumping  measures, 
and  thus  forms  the  conceptual  basis  for  the  dissertation. 
1.  The  development  of  GATT  anti-dumping  rules. 
'A  product  is  to  be  considered  as  being  dumped,  i.  e.  introduced  into  the  commerce  of 
another  country  at  less  than  its  normal  value,  if  the  export  price  of  the  product  exported 
from  one  country  to  another  is  less  than  the  comparable  price,  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
trade,  for  the  like  product  when  destined  for  consumption  in  the  exporting  country.  5 
Dumping  is  a  traditional  way  to  increase  exports  or  capture  a  new  market  for  a  particular 
product.  However,  it  is  likely  to  cause  material  injury  or  to  threaten  the  economic  benefits 
of  the  home  producers  in  the  importing  country.  Consequently,  the  latter  will  take 
corresponding  action  to  stop  this  dumping  practice  and  offset  the  injury. 
A.  Development  of  anti-dumping  rules  prior  to  GATT. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  last  century,  many  industrialized  countries  realized  the 
unfavorable  effects  of  dumping,  and  regarded  it  as  an  unfair  method  of  competition  that 
4  Alexander  Polouektov,  'Non-Market  Economy  Issues  in  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Law  and 
Accession  Negotiations,  Revival  of  a  Two-Tier  MernbershipT  (2002)  36  (1)  Journal  of  World  Trade  I 
at  p  3)  1. 
5  Art.  2  (1),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
24 should  be  curbed.  So,  it  was  held  that  the  importing  country  has  the  right  to  protect  itself 
by  taking  anti-dumping  measures.  In  order  to  protect  the  domestic  industry  and  limit  the 
foreign  exporter's  dumping  practice,  Canada  first  pointed  out  in  1904  that  an 
anti-dumping  duty  should  be  imposed  on  imported  products  whose  export  prices  was 
lower  than  its  fair  market  value  in  the  exporting  country.  6  Since  then,  many  other 
industrialized  nations  such  as  New  Zealand,  Australia,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
United  States  have  enacted  anti-dumping  laws.  The  purpose  of  the  legislation  was  to 
offset  the  injury  caused  by  dumped  goods  with  anti-dumping  duties. 
B.  Article  V1  of  the  GAM 
Due  to  the  increasing  volume  and  high  speed  development  of  global  trade,  dumping 
became  an  issue  calling  for  international  attention.  Consequently,  anti-dumping 
legislation  was  developed  as  binding  international  rules  for  the  first  time  within  the 
GATT  framework  when  the  latter  came  into  force  on  I  January  1948.  The  rules  on  the 
application  of  anti-dumping  measures  were  set  out  in  Article  VI.  They  establish  the 
criteria  to  determine  dumping,  7  state  the  purpose  for  which  anti-dumping  duties  may  be 
imposed  8,  and  prescribe  conditions  under  which  the  measures  can  be  taken. 
There  are  three  important  features  of  these  rules  which  confine  the  application  of 
anti-dumping  measures.  Article  VI  stipulates  that  anti-dumping  measures  may  only  be 
taken  when  products  are  introduced  into  an  importing  country  at  less  than  their  normal 
value.  So  the  definition  of  normal  value  is  crucial  to  the  appreciation  of  the  rules.  Article 
VI  enumerates  methods  for  the  application  of  'Normal  Value'  as: 
a.  'The  comparable  price,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade,  for  the  like  product 
6  J.  Viner,  Dumping  -A  Problem  in  International  Trade  (Chicago,  University  of  Chicago,  1923) 
(Reprints  of  Economic  Classics,  New  York,  Kelley,  1966),  192. 
7  Art.  VI  (1),  GATT. 
8  Art.  VI  (3)),  GATT. 
25 when  destined  for  consumption  in  the  exporting  country';  or 
b.  'The  highest  comparable  price  for  the  like  product  to  any  third  country  in  the 
ordinary  course  of  trade';  or 
C.  'The  cost  of  production  of  the  product  in  the  country  of  origin  plus  a 
reasonable  addition  for  selling  cost  and  profit'.  9 
Article  VI  then  provides  that  before  any  anti-dumping  or  countervailing  duty  may  be 
imposed  by  an  exporting  country,  the  importing  country  must  have  determined  that  the 
effect  of  the  dumping  'is  such  as  to  cause  or  threaten  material  injury  to  an  established 
domestic  industry  or  to  materially  retard  the  establishment  of  such  an  industry". 
Finally,  the  rules  state  the  maximum  level  of  the  antiýdumping  duty  that  can  be  levied,  i.  e. 
the  duties  imposed  on  dumped  products  may  not  be  greater  than  the  dumping  margin'  1. 
Based  on  these  points,  on  the  one  hand,  we  can  state  that  the  General  Agreement  set  forth 
ground  rules  at  the  international  level.  It  is  clear  that  these  rules  are  based  on  the  purpose 
of  anti-dumping  measures,  i.  e.  to  offset  injury  caused  by  dumping  and  restore  fair 
competition  rather  than  limit  norinal  exports.  So,  it  was  a  significant  step  forward. 
However,  practice  shows  that  the  rules  were  seriously  flawed  and  were  not  precise 
enough  to  achieve  the  aim  of  anti-dumping  legislation. 
First,  the  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  are  not  precise  and  complete  enough.  In  particula-, 
they  ignored  the  procedures  that  should  be  followed  when  anti-dumping  measures  are 
taken.  Therefore,  the  rules  actually  left  too  broad  a  scope  for  various  interpretation  and 
implementation  by  the  GATT  Contracting  Parties.  In  short,  they  were  not  well 
9  Art.  VI  (1),  GATT 
10  Art.  VI  (6)(a),  GATT. 
II  Art.  VI  (2),  GATT. 
26 implemented  according  to  their  purpose.  12 
Second,  as  one  of  the  original  Contracting  Parties  of  the  GATT,  the  United  States  took  the 
advantage  that  it  was  exempt  from  the  injury  requirement  under  the  GATT  'grandfather 
clause.  '  13  Under  it,  the  US  only  complied  with  part  11  of  the  Agreement  'to  the  fullest 
extent  not  inconsistent  with  existing  legislation.  '  Consequently,  Article  VI  was  not 
binding  on  one  of  the  main  Contracting  Parties.  It  reduced  the  effectiveness  of  Article  VI 
in  practice,  because  those  GATT  major  Contracting  Parties  applied  anti-dumping  and 
countervailing  measures  far  more  than  others.  From  this  point  of  view,  further 
improvement  to  Article  VI  of  GATT  was  needed. 
C.  The  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Code. 
Due  to  the  defects  of  the  rules  in  Article  VI,  negc)tiations  on  anti-dumping  issues  were 
highlighted  in  the  Kennedy  Round  which  began  in  1963.  The  conclusion  of  the 
'Agreement  on  Implementation  of  Article  VI  of  the  GATT'  (also  referred  to  as  the  'GATT 
Anti-Dumping  Code')  in  Geneva,  on  30  June  1967,  was  deemed  to  be  a  significant 
achievement.  At  first,  it  imposed  binding  obligations  on  all  Contracting  Parties,  who 
pledged  formally  to  revise  their  national  legislation  and  make  it  consistent  with  the  code  14 
. 
Thus,  the  rules  became  more  effective.  Besides,  it  provided  more  precise  rules  governing 
the  criteria  and  procedures  to  be  followed  when  determining  dumping  and  injury.  15  In 
addition  to  that,  the  Code  also  established  a  permanent  Committee  on  antýdumping 
practices,  whose  task  is  to  review  regularly  the  anti-dumping  legislation  of  the 
12  John  H.  Jackson,  The  World  Trading  System:  Law  and  Policy  of  International  Economic  Relations 
nd 
2  edn.,  (London  :  MIT  Press,  1997)  at  p  256. 
13  GATT,  Basic  Instruments  and  Selected  Documents  (hereinafter  cited  as  GATT,  BISD),  Vol.  1,  at  p. 
81  (Geneva,  1952). 
14  Art  14,1967  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Code. 
15  Arts.  2  and  3,1967  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Code. 
27 Contracting  Parties  and  the  measures  that  they  take  to  implement  it.  16 
The  1967  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Code  was  updated  during  the  Tokyo  Round  mainly 
because  of 
the  growing  dissatisfaction  of  the  European  Community  with  the  interpretation  of  the 
injury  requirement  by  US  authorities  and  the  simultaneous  realization  in  the 
Community  that  certain  Code  requirements,  notably  the  causation  standard,  might  be 
too  stringent.  17 
Consequently,  a  new  'Agreement  on  Implementation  of  Article  VI  of  GATT'  was 
concluded  on  30  June  1979.  Compared  with  the  former  Anti-Dumping  Code,  it  provided 
more  realistic  criteria  of  dumping  by  requiring  the  segregation  of  injury  caused  by 
dumping  from  injuries  caused  by  other  factors,  and  then  an  assessment  of  injury  caused 
by  the  dumped  products.  Furthermore,  the  new  code  stipulated  more  explicit  criteria  for 
assessing  the  injurious  effects  of  dumping  on  the  importing  country's  domestic  industry 
as  well  as  more  detailed  rules  about  price  undertakings.  18 
D.  Uruguay  Round  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
Anti-dumping  measures  were  an  important  subject  in  the  Uruguay  Round  which 
concluded  the  'Agreement  on  Implementation  of  Article  VI  of  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  1994'  (Anti-Dumping  Agreement).  It  was  included  in  Annex  IA  of  the 
WTO  Agreement  with  other  multilateral  agreements  automatically  binding  on  all  WTO 
Members.  It  revises  the  rules  governing  the  application  of  anti-dumping  measures 
contained  in  the  1979  Anti-Dumping  Code,  and  takes  over  the  proposals  from  two  major 
16  Art.  17,1967  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Code. 
17  Ivo  Van  Bael  &  Jean-Francois  Bellis,  Anti-Dumping  and  other  Trade  Protection  LaWs  Of  the  EC  3rd 
edn.  (Bicester:  CCH  Europe,  1996)  at  p  28. 
18  Art.  4.1979  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Code. 
28 groups  in  the  negotiation:  the  US  and  the  European  Community  (EC)19  as  well  as  'Japan 
20  and  most  of  the  newly  industrialized  countries  (NICs)' 
. 
Although  the  basic  foundations  remain  intact,  the  18  Articles  of  the  new  Agreement 
substantially  amend  most  of  the  16  Articles  of  the  1979  AntiýDumping  Code,  and  there 
are  two  new  annexes  dealing  with  verification  procedures  and  the  use  of  best  information 
available  in  cases  of  non-cooperation.  Provisions  dealing  with  issues  such  as  sales  below 
cost,  'symmetry'  and  'comparison  of  weighted  average  normal  values  to  weighted 
average  export  prices  or  duty  as  a  cost  in  refund  cases'  were  introduced  in  the  new 
agreement.  21  Besides,  it  changed  some  procedural  provisions  with  regard  to  provisional 
duties  and  reviews.  Finally  and  most  important  of  all,  a  new  Dispute  Resolution 
Understanding  ('DSU')  replaced  the  old  compromise  and  conciliation  system  of  GATT 
panels.  Compared  with  the  latter,  it  is  more  powerful  and  effective  in  solving  disputes 
through  the  new  Dispute  Settlement  Body  ('DSB). 
From  the  analysis  above,  we  can  see  that  the  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  were  revised 
better  to  meet  the  real  needs  of  international  trade.  They  were  developed  to  be  more 
precise  and  more  easily  applicable  than  before.  They  leave  less  scope  for  interpretation 
by  the  GATT  Contracting  Parties,  and  they  attempt  to  avoid  antýdumping  rules  being 
utilized  as  a  means  of  excluding  exports  from  other  countries  to  overprotect  domestic 
industry.  The  rules  have  been  revised  several  times  because  of  an  important  fact:  the 
GATT  legislators  stress  that  anti-dumping  rules  should  be  observed  as  a  tool  to  restore 
fair  trade  rather  than  eliminate  due  competitive  trade  practice  of  foreign  exporters.  This  is 
the  original  purpose  of  the  GATT  framework  of  anti-dumping  rules.  It  is  fundamental  for 
the  Contracting  Parties  to  bear  this  in  mind  when  they  later  codify  and  implement  their 
19  Here  I  use  'European  Community'  because  the  EU  was  not  established  until  the  Treaty  on 
European  Union  entered  into  force  on  I  November  1993. 
20  Bael  &  Bellis,  fn  17  above  at  p  29. 
21  Ibid. 
29 own  anti-dumping  legislation.  It  also  shows  that  according  to  the  purpose  of  restoring  fair 
trade,  anti-dumping  rules  should  be  developed  in  the  trend  to  better  accommodate  to  new 
conditions  and  issues  arising. 
IL  Current  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  in  force. 
A.  Nature  and  objectives  of  the  rules. 
At  present,  both  the  GATT  Article  VI  and  the  An&Dumping  Agreement  of  1994  operate 
together  to  standardize  anti-dumping  measures  according  to  their  nature:  a  too]  to  restore 
fair  competition  of  international  trade. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  rules  recognize  the  possible  adverse  effects,  i.  e.  material  injury  on 
22  industries  of  an  importing  country  caused  or  threatened  by  dumped  products.  Therefore, 
they  allow  importing  countries  to  take  action  against  such  practices  to  protect  domestic 
producers  and  restore  fair  competition.  These  countries  can  achieve  this  objective  by 
imposing  anti-dumping  duties  or  accepting  price  undertakings  from  exporters  on  a 
reasonable  basis. 
On  the  other  hand,  'the  important  feature  claimed  in  respect  of  antiýdumping  legislation  is 
that  it  does  not  restrict  trade  as  such,  but  merely  requires  trade  to  operate  fairly.  *2-  '  So  it 
regulates  an  importing  country's  anti-dumping  action  by  both  establishing  standards  to 
judge  key  factors  concerned  (such  as  the  fact  of  dumping  and  injury)  and  by  setting  up 
anti-dumping  procedures. 
Based  on  these  points,  the  rules  justify  importing  countries'  anti-dumping  action 
and  make  it  an  exception  to  the  GATT  basic  principles,  i.  e.  non-discrimination 
22 
Art.  VI  (1),  GATT 
23  J  Cunnane  &  C.  Stanbrook,  Dumping  and  Subsidies.  -  the  Law  and  Procedures  Governing  the 
ImpositiOn  of  Anti-Dumping  and  Countervailing  Duties  in  the  European  Community.  (London: 
Fluropean  Business  Publications,  1983)  at  p  2. 
30 with  regard  to  all  Contracting  Parties.  In  most  cases,  anti-dumping  measures  are  to 
impose  extra  import  duty  on  certain  product  from  the  particular  exporting  country 
so  as  to  remove  the  injury  to  domestic  industries  of  the  importing  country  and 
bring  the  dumped  product's  price  closer  to  its  normal  value. 
B.  Main  contents  of  the  rules. 
1.  Article  V1  of  the  GATT 
As  we  analyzed  in  Part  LB  above,  Article  VI  of  the  GATT  provides  preconditions  that 
have  to  be  met  before  the  importing  state  is  entitled  to  impose  an  an&dumping  duty.  The 
most  important  precondition  is  the  requirement  that  before  any  action  can  be  taken 
against  any  dumped  product,  the  importing  country  should  demonstrate  that  the  product 
'causes  or  threatens  material  injury  to  an  established  industry  in  the  territory  of  a 
"4  Contracting  Party  or  materially  retards  the  establishment  of  a  domestic  industry.  '  Also, 
Article  VI  stipulates  that  the  anti-dumping  duties  may not  be  greater  than  the  margin  of 
dumping  or  the  estimated  bounty  or  subsidy  determined  to  have  been  granted.  In  addition, 
it  provides  that  no  product  shall  be  subject  to  both  anti-dumping  and  countervailing  duties 
for  the  same  situation  of  dumping  or  export  subsidization,  25  and  these  duties  may not  be 
applied  if  the  price  difference  is  due  to  the  exemption  of  the  imported  product  from  duties 
or  taxes  which  would  have  been  borne  if  the  goods  had  been  destined  for  consumption  in 
the  country  of  origin  or  exportation,  or  due  to  the  refund  of  such  duties  or  taxes.  26 
2.  Agreement  on  implementation  of  Article  V1  of  the  GATT  1994. 
The  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  clarifies  and  expands  Article  VI.  It  provides  more  precise 
legal  definitions  and  procedures  governing  anti-dumping.  According  to  GATT  Article  VI, 
24 
Article  VI  (6)(a),  GATT. 
2s  Article  VI  (5)ý  GAIT. 
26 
Article  VI  (4),  GATL 
31 it  also  allows  the  goverrurnent  of  an  importing  country  to  act  against  dumping  where  there 
is  material  injury  to  the  competing  domestic  industry.  But  before  doing  that,  the 
government  has  to  show  much  more  evidence  that  dumping  is  taking  place.  In  addition  to 
that,  the  government  also  should  calculate  the  extent  of  dumping  (how  much  lower  the 
export  price  is  compared  to  the  exporter's  home  market  price),  and  show  the  definite 
causal  relationship  between  the  two  of  them.  Finally,  it  must  follow  the  an&dumping 
procedures  specified  in  the  Agreement,  which  is  the  most  significant  difference  compared 
with  the  Article  VI  of  GATT. 
In  this  way,  the  Agreement  comprises  three  kinds  of  rules:  first,  standards  to  judge  the 
facts  that  constitute  dumping;  second,  requirements  to  assess  injury;  third,  procedures 
that  governments  must  follow  when  they  determine  dumping  and  take  anti-dumping 
action. 
C.  Substantive  rules  and  key  concepts. 
Article  I  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  establishes  the  basic  principle  that  'an 
anti-dumping  measure  shall  be  applied  only  under  the  circumstances  provided  for  in 
Article  VI  of  GATT  1994  and  pursuant  to  investigations  initiated  and  conducted  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Agreement.  27  That  is  to  say,  an  importing  state  can 
take  anti-dumping  measures  only  after  it  determines  three  facts  according  to  the 
Agreement:  dumped  imports,  material  injury  to  domestic  industries  and  the  causal 
relationship  between  them. 
1.  Determination  of  dumping. 
Article  2  provides  detailed  rules  to  determine  dumping,  which  should  be  calculated  on  the 
(,  round  of  fair  comparison  between  the  export  price  of  goods  concerned  and  the  normal 
27  Article  1,  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
32 value.  The  latter  refers  to  the  price  of  the  imported  product  in  the  country  of  origin  or 
export  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade. 
It  provides  three  methods  to  calculate  a  product's  'normal  value'.  The  most  applicable 
one  is  based  on  the  price  in  the  exporter's  domestic  market.  When  this  cannot  be  applied, 
two  alternatives  are  available:  the  price  charged  by  the  exporter  in  another  country,  or  a 
calculation  based  on  the  combination  of  the  exporter's  production  costs,  other  expenses 
and  normal  profit  margins. 
2.  Determination  of  injury. 
Article  VI  of  GATT  provides  that  material  injury  includes  three  situations: 
a.  Material  injury  itself, 
b.  Threat  of  material  injury  to  an  established  industry  in  the  territory  of  a  Contracting 
Party; 
c.  Material  retardation  of  the  establishment  of  a  domestic  industry. 
Article  3  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  provides  more  detailed  rules  about  the 
determination  of  injury.  It  specifies  that  it  'shall  be  based  on  positive  evidence  and 
involve  an  objective  examination  of  both  (a)  the  volume  of  the  dumped  imports  and  the 
effect  of  the  dumped  imports  on  prices  in  the  domestic  market  for  like  products,  and  (b) 
the  consequent  impact  of  these  imports  on  domestic  producers  of  such  products.  -28  It  also 
contains  rules  as  to  the  key  factors  that  should  be  considered  when  the  government  of  an 
importing  country  determines  injury.  In  Article  3.5,  it  emphasizes  that  demonstration  of  a 
causal  relationship  between  the  dumped  imports  and  the  injury  to  the  domestic  industry 
shall  be  based  on  an  examination  of  all  relevant  evidence.  In  addition  to  dumped  imports, 
28  Article  33  (1),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
33 the  authorities  shall  also  examine  other  factors  that  may  cause  the  injury,  where  the 
adverse  effects  on  the  domestic  industry  of  the  importing  country  cannot  be  attributed  to 
dumped  imports. 
A  new  provision  in  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  is  Article  3.3  on  cumulative  evaluation. 
It  authorizes  cumulation  of  imports  from  countries  which  are  simultaneously  subject  to 
anti-dumping  investigations.  In  this  matter,  authorities  must: 
a.  determine  whether  the  volume  of  dumping  from  each  exporting  country  is  not 
negligible; 
carry  out  a  cumulative  assessment  on  the  effects  of  the  dumped  imports  'in  light  of 
conditions  of  competition  between  the  imported  products  and  the  conditions  of 
competition  between  the  imported  products  and  the  like  domestic  product.  ' 
3.  Definition  of  domestic  industry. 
In  Article  4  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement,  the  domestic  industry  is  interpreted  for  the 
purpose  of  assessing  injury  and  causation.  It  refers  to  'the  domestic  producers  as  a  whole 
of  the  like  products  29  or  to  those  of  them  whose  collective  output  of  the  products 
constitutes  a  major  proportion  of  the  total  domestic  production  of  those  products  except 
that: 
(i)  when  producers  are  related  to  the  exporters  or  importers  or  are  themselves  importers  of 
the  allegedly  dumped  product,  the  term  'domestic  industry'  may  be  interpreted  as  referring 
to  the  rest  of  the  producers; 
(ii)  in  exceptional  circumstances  the  territory  of  a  Contracting  Party  may,  for  the 
production  in  question,  be  divided  into  two  or  more  competitive  markets  and  the 
29  According  to  Article  2.6  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement,  in  the  absence  of  a  like  product,  the  one  that 
has  characteristics  closely  resembling  those  of  the  imported  dumped  products  will  be  considered. 
34 producers  within  each  market  may  be  regarded  as  a  separate  industry  if  (a)  the  producers 
within  such  market  sell  all  or  almost  all  of  their  production  of  the  product  in  question  in 
that  market,  and  (b)  the  demand  in  that  market  is  not  to  any  substantial  degree  supplied  by 
producers  of  the  product  in  question  located  elsewhere  in  the  territory.  In  such 
circumstances,,  injury  may  be  found  to  exist  even  where  a  major  portion  of  the  total 
domestic  industry  is  not  injured,  provided  there  is  a  concentration  of  dumped  imports  into 
such  an  isolated  market  and  provided  further  that  the  dumped  imports  are  causing  injury 
to  the  producers  of  all  or  almost  all  of  the  production  within  such  market.  '  30 
D.  Procedural  requirements. 
The  objective  and  original  purpose  of  the  GATT  anti-dumping  procedural  rules  is  to 
ensure  the  transparency  of  proceedings,  a  full  opportunity  for  both  the  exporting  and 
importing  state's  domestic  producers  to  defend  their  interests,  and  sufficient  explanations 
made  by  investigation  authorities  for  their  determination.  31 
1.  Initiation  and  subsequent  investigation. 
With  regard  to  anti-dumping  investigations,  the  detailed  procedural  requirements  of  the 
Agreement  focus  on  the  sufficiency  of  petitions,  establishment  of  time  limits  for 
investigations,  access  to  information  needed  by  all  parties  concerned  and  opportunities 
for  them  to  present  their  views  and  arguments. 
Article  5  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  stipulates  requirements  for  the  initiation  of  an 
investigation.  It  provides  that  such  investigations  should  be  initiated  with  a  written 
request  submitted  by  or  on  behalf  of  a  domestic  industry.  'If  it  is  supported  by  those 
domestic  producers  whose  collective  output  constitutes  more  than  50  per  cent  of  the  total 
30  Article  4  (1),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
31  .  Anti-Durnping'  <http:  //www.  wto.  org/french/tratop_f/adp_f/antidum2.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
35 ,  32  production  of  the  like  product  produced  by  that  portion  of  the  domestic  industry 
,  this 
application  can  be  regarded  as  the  request  which  is  made  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  domestic 
industry.  However,  no  investigation  can  be  initiated  if  domestic  producers  who  support 
the  request  are  less  than  25  per  cent  of  the  total  production  of  the  like  product  produced 
by  the  domestic  industry.  The  article  also  specifies  that  in  special  circumstances  without 
such  a  written  application,  the  authorities  concerned  can  decide  to  initiate  an  investigation 
only  if  they  have  sufficient  evidence  of  dumping,  injury  and  a  causal  link  to  justify  the 
initiation  of  an  investigation.  33  In  order  to  avoid  meritless  investigation  being  continued, 
Article  5.8  provides  for  immediate  termination  of  investigations  if  the  volume  of  dumped 
imports  is  negligible  34  or  the  dumping  margin  is  de  minimis.  35  As  well,  the  duration  of 
investigations  is  set  in  Article  5.10,  which  requires  the  authorities  concerned  to  complete 
investigations  within  one  year  or  no  more  than  18  months  after  the  procedure  is  initiated. 
Article  6  specifies  detailed  rules  on  the  process  of  investigation.  It  includes  rules  on  the 
notification  to  interested  parties  and  the  collection  of  evidence.  They  operate  together  to 
ensure  the  transparency  of  investigations  and  the  sufficiency  of  opportunities  for  patties 
concerned  to  comment.  Furthermore,  the  Article  stipulates  the  application  of  sampling. 
An  individual  dumping  margin  normally  should  be  determined  for  each  known  exporter 
or  producer,  but  when  the  number  of  exporters,  producers,  importers  or  types  of  products 
involved  is  too  large  to  be  determined  as  usual,  the  authorities  are  entitled  to  apply 
sampling  techniques.  36 
32  Article  5  (4),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
33  Article  5  (6),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
34  i.  e.  dumped  imports  from  a  particular  country  is  found  to  account  for  less  than  3  per  cent  of  imports  of 
the  like  product  in  the  importing  state.  Article  5  (8),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
35  Le.  durnping  't-nargin  is  less  than  2  per  cent,  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  export  price.  '  Article  5 
(8),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
36  Article  6  (10),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
'36 2.  Provisional  measures. 
Article  7  specifies  conditions  under  which  provisional  measures  can  be  imposed  and  the 
relevant  time  limits  that  should  be  observed.  Under  the  rule,  provisional  measures  may  be 
applied  only  after:  37 
a.  an  investigation  has  been  initiated  and  carried  out  lawfully  according  to  the 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement; 
b.  a  preliminary  affirmative  determination  on  dumping  and  consequent  injury  to 
domestic  industry  have  been  made; 
c.  such  measures  are  regarded  necessary  to  prevent  injury  caused  by  dumped  imports 
during  the  investigation. 
It  also  provides  that  provisional  measures  shall  not  be  applied  sooner  than  60  days  from  the 
date  of  initiation  of  the  investigation.  38 
3.  Price  undertakings. 
Article  8  relates  to  undertakings  to  revise  prices  or  cease  exports  at  dumped  prices,  which 
may  suspend  or  terminate  an  investigation  without  imposing  provisional  measures  or 
anti-dumping  duties 
. 
39However,  such  price  undertakings  can  be  accepted  only  after  a 
preliminary  affirmative  determination  of  dumping,  injury,  and  causality  has  been  made 
by  the  authorities  of  the  importing  state.  40  It  also  emphasizes  that  undertakings  suggested 
by  the  authorities  of  the  importing  state  should  be  made  by  the  exporter  on  a  voluntary 
37  Article  7  (1),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
38  Article  7  (3),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
39  Article  8  (1),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
40  Article  8  (2),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
37 basis.  41  After  a  satisfactory  undertaking  is  accepted  by  the  former,  the  investigation 
should  be  continued  at  the  request  of  the  exporter  or  the  authorities.  If  a  negative 
determination  of  dumping,  injury  or  causality  is  found  in  the  end,  the  undertaking  shall 
lapse  automatically.  42 
Imposition  and  collection  of  duties. 
Article  9  stresses  that  an  anti-dumping  duty  should  be  less  than  the  margin  of  dumping  if 
such  a  lesser  duty  is  adequate  to  remove  injury  of  the  domestic  industry  in  the  importing 
state  43.  In  order  to  ensure  that  the  anti-dumping  duties  do  not  exceed  the  dumping  margin 
calculated  during  the  investigation,  Article  9.3  introduces  a  new  method  to  be  applied  in 
respect  of  the  collection  of  duties  and  refunds  for  the  two  collection  systems  operated  in 
the  world  at  present:  the  retrospective  assessment  of  duties  and  the  prospective 
determination  of  duties.  Article  9.4  sets  forth  rules  for  the  authorities  of  an  importing 
state  to  calculate  the  amount  of  duties  by  using  sampling  according  to  Article  6.10. 
Finally,  an  accelerated  review  by  the  authorities  of  the  importing  state  to  calculate 
individual  margins  of  dumping  for  new  exporters  is  required  in  Article  9.5.  The  new 
exporters  refer  to  those  who  did  not  export  during  the  original  period  of  investigation  and 
is  not  related  to  any  exporter  subject  to  anti-dumping  duties. 
Article  10  states  that  both  provisional  and  final  anti-dumping  duties  cannot  be  imposed 
44 
unless  the  facts  of  dumping,  injury  and  their  causality  have  been  determined 
. 
It  specifies 
that  if  the  determination  of  the  anti-dumping  duty  is  based  on  the  fact  of  material  injury, 
the  anti-dumping  duty  may  be  collected  since  provisional  measures  were  imposed.  The 
difference  between  the  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  and  the  provisional  duty  should  be 
41  Article  8  (5),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
-12  Article  8  (4),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
13  Article  9  (1),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
44  Article  10  (1),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
38 refunded  if  the  former  is  less  than  the  latte  ý5 
. 
Article  10.6  also  stipulates  that  in  certain 
exceptional  situations  (such  as  massive  dumped  products  appear  within  very  short 
periods),  a  definitive  duty  'may  be  levied  on  products  which  were  entered  for 
consumption  not  more  than  90  days  prior  to  the  date  of  application  of  provisional 
measures9. 
5.  Duration,  termination,  and  review  of  antýdumpihg  measures. 
Article  II  addresses  the  duration  and  termination  of  anti-dumping  duties  as  well  as 
requirements  for  periodic  review  of  the  measure.  It  provides  that  any  interested  party  has 
the  right  to  request  the  authorities  to  examine  the  necessity  of  the  continued  imposition  of 
the  duty.  If,  as  the  result  of  such  a  review,  the  authorities  determine  that  the  injury  is 
unlikely  to  continue  if  the  anti-dumping  were  removed  or  varied,  then  it  shall  be 
terminated  immediately.  46  The  'sunset'  review  is  specified  in  Article  11.3  that  any 
definitive  anti-dumping  duties  are  to  be  terminated  no  later  than  five  years  after  they  are 
first  applied,  unless  the  authorities  determine  after  a  review  that  the  expiry  of  the  duty 
would  be  likely  to  lead  to  continuation  or  recurrence  of  dumping  and  injury.  Anyreview 
shall  be  carried  out  according  to  provisions  of  Article  6  and  shall  normally  be  concluded 
within  12  months  from  the  date  when  it  is  initiated  47 
. 
These  provisions  on  review  also  can 
be  applied  to  price  undertakingS48. 
6.  Public  notice. 
Article  12  provides  detailed  rules  on  public  notice.  Notice  is  given  by  the  authorities  of 
the  importing  countries,  and  shall  be  forwarded  to  exporters  concerned  and  other 
45  Article  10  (3),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
46  Article  11  (2),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
. 47  Article  11  (4),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
48  Article  11  (5),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
39 interested  parties  known  to  the  authorities.  This  is  intended  to  increase  the  transparency 
of  anti-dumping  procedures  and  the  determination  of  the  measures,  so  that  decisions  on 
49  the  imposition  of  anti-dumping  measures  can  be  based  on  sufficient  facts 
. 
When  an  anti-dumping  investigation  is  initiated,  the  authorities  shall  give  public  notice, 
and  the  GATT  Contracting  Parties  whose  products  are  subject  to  the  investigation  as  well 
as  other  interested  parties  will  be  therefore  notifiedo.  Public  notice  shall  also  be  given  of 
the  determination  of  preliminary  measures.  It  includes  detailed  explanations  for  the 
preliminary  determination  of  dumping  and  injury,  and  relevant  law  and  non--confidential 
facts  referred  t05  1.  When  an  investigation  is  concluded  with  a  negative  determination  of 
dumping,  public  notice  will  be  given.  If  an  affirmative  imposition  of  a  definitive 
anti-dumping  duty  is determined  or  a  satisfactory  price  undertaking  is  accepted,  a  public 
report  will  be  set  forth  to  notify  the  suspension  of  the  investigation.  Article  12.3  also 
stipulates  that  its  provisions  on  public  notice  'shall  apply  mutatis  mutandis  to  the 
initiation  and  completion  of  reviews  Pursuant  to  Article  II  and  to  decisions  under  Article 
10  to  apply  duties  retroactively'. 
7.  The  committee  and  dispute  settlement. 
Article  16  establishes  a  Committee  on  Anti-Dumping  Practice.  Its  composition,  time  for 
conference  and  responsibility  are  provided  in  the  first  paragraph  of  the  Article.  GATT 
Contracting  Parties  shall  report  all  its  preliminary  or  final  anti-dumping  actions  taken  to 
the  Committee  on  time,  and  semi-annual  reports  are  required  to  be  submitted  by  the 
Contracting  Parties  to  notify  anti-dumping  actions  taken  within  the  preceding  six months. 
Article  17  sets  forth  that  the  Dispute  Settlement  Understanding  is  applicable  to 
49  ,  Anti-Dumping',  seefn  31  above. 
50  Article  12  (1),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
51  Article  12  (2),  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
40 consultations  and  settlement  of  disputes  under  this  Anti-Dumping  Agreement.  If  a  GATT 
Contracting  Party  considers  that  its  due  benefit  under  this  Agreement  is  nullified  or 
impaired  directly  or  indirectly,  it  may  request  in  writing  consultations  with  the 
Contracting  Party(s)  concerned.  If  the  Contracting  Party  initiating  the  consultations 
considers  that  they  fail  to  achieve  a  mutually  agreed  solution,  and  final  actions  are  finally 
taken  by  the  importing  country,  it  may  refer  the  matter  to  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body 
(DSB).  According  to  paragraph  5  and  6  of  the  article,  the  DSB  shall  estaffish  a  panel  at 
the  request  of  the  complaining  party.  It  shall  examine  disputes  from  both  fact  and 
interpretation  of  the  Agreement.  A  special  standard  of  review  is  established  to  prevent 
dispute  settlement  panels  from  making  decisions  which  are  unreasonable. 
8.  Final  provisions. 
Article  18  stresses  that  GATT  Contracting  Parties  shall  take  anti-dumping  actions 
according  to  this  Agreement  strictly.  They  must  ensure  the  conformity  of  their 
anti-dumping  laws  with  the  Agreement,  and  they  shall  inform  the  Committee  of  any 
changes  in  their  anti-dumping  laws  and  regulations.  Meanwhile,  the  Committee  shall 
review  the  implementation  and  operation  of  the  Agreement  annually. 
Among  all  of  the  above  rules,  those  governing  the  determination  of  normal  value, 
undertakings  and  anti-dumping  duties  are  particularly  important  to  the  research  of  the  EU 
anti-dumping  legislation  towards  China.  Therefore,  they  will  be  further  discussed 
throughout  this  thesis. 
1/1.  GATT  rules  on  state  trading. 
Generally  speaking,  international  trade  is  based  on  the  theory  of  comparative  advantage, 
and  countries  can  reap  economic  benefits  by  expanding  their  international  trade.  In  the 
context  of  GATT  principles,  it  shall  be  carried  out  on  a  fair  and  non-discriminatory  basis. 
41 However,  if  a  government  controls  an  enterprise  directly  or  interferes  in  its 
decision-making  indirectly,  it  may  act  through  the  firm  to  provide  protection  against 
imports  or  to  advance  exports  to  the  detriment  of  foreign  producers.  As  a  result,  it  will 
influence  world  trade  in  an  uneconomic  direction  and  demolish  the  principles  observed  in 
the  GATT.  Thus,  the  drafters  of  the  General  Agreement  paid  special  attention  to  the  state 
trading  issue.  They  attempt  to  place  the  state  trading  enterprise  in  the  same  competitive 
position  with  private  traders,  and  thus  to  remove  the  possible  trade  distortion  resulting 
from  the  government  involvement  in  an  enterprise's  decision-making  and  trade 
activities.  52 
Consequently,  Article  XVII  of  the  GATT  1994  focuses  on  state  trading  enterprises  (STEs) 
specifically,  and  numerous  other  Articles  refer  either  directly  or  indirectly  to  state  trading 
under  different  topics.  They  are  essentially  to  ensure  that  STEs  'operate  on  the  basis  of 
commercial  considerations  and  in  a  non-discriminatory  manner',  and  'do  not  serve  to 
implement  otherwise  WTO-inconsistent  measures,  such  as  quantitative  restrictions  or 
subsidies 
5.53 
A.  Article  XVII  of  the  GATT  1994  and  the  definition  of  STEs. 
Article  XVII  is  the  principal  article  dealing  with  STEs  and  their  operations.  It  sets  out  the 
basic  idea  that  STEs'  purchases  or  sales  involving  either  imports  or  exports  should  be  in 
accordance  with  the  GATT  general  principles  of  non-discrimination  and  transparency. 
The  Article  does  not  attempt  to  make  an  actual  definition  of  STEs  but,  in  its  first 
paragraph,  it  enumerates  three  types  of  enterprises  that  they  refer  to: 
(i)  'State  enterprises'  (that  is,  owned  by  the  State); 
52  ,  STR:  Why  Regulate  State  Trading?  ' 
<http:  //www.  wto.  org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/eol/e/wto05/wto5_9.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
53  ,  STR:  The  Rules'  <http:,  I/www.  wto.  org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/eol/e/wtoO5/wto5_12.  htm>  (I 
December  2002). 
42 Enterprises  granted  special  privileges  by  the  State  (for  example  a  subsidy  or 
subsidy  equivalent); 
Enterprises  granted  exclusive  privileges  (i.  e.  a  monopoly  in  the  production. 
consumption  or  trade  of  certain  goods). 
From  this  point  of  view,  if  a  private  corporation  or enterprise  receives  some  special  right 
or privilege  from  the  State,  which  results  in  a  position  to  influence  the  level  or  direction  of 
trade,,  it  could  also  be  considered  as  a  state  trading  enterprise. 
In  order  to  increase  the  transparency  of  the  use  of  state  trading  to  implement  various 
trade-related  policies,  it  also  requires  that  GATT  Contracting  parties  shall  notify  their 
STEs  to  the  WTO  annually.  So,  a  clear  definition  of  a  state  trading  enterprise  which  is 
notifiable  is  necessary.  As  a  result  of  the  Uruguay  Round  of  multilateral  trade 
negotiations,  the  Understanding  on  the  Interpretation  of  Article  XVII  of  GATT  1994  was 
concluded.  One  of  its  main  features  is  the  'working  definition  of  state  trading  enterprise' 
contained  in  paragraph  2  of  the  text  as: 
'Governmental  and  non-governmental  enterprises,  including  marketing  boards, 
which  have  been  granted  exclusive  or  special  rights  or  privileges,  including  statutory 
or  constitutional  powers,  in  the  exercise  of  which  they  influence  through  their 
purchases  or  sales  the  level  or  direction  of  imports  or  exports'. 
From  this  definition,  we  can  once  again  infer  the  important  criteria  for  a  STE  are  that  it 
enjoys  exclusive  or  special  rights  or  privileges,  which  are  normally  unavailable  to  other 
private  enterprises  in  the  same  field.  These  rights  and  privileges  give  the  enterprise 
advantages  over  others,  and  thus  influence  imports  or  exports  by  its  buying  and  selling 
activities. 
Here,  we  should  also  stress  one  point  that  'the  WTO  does  not  seek  to  prohibit  or  even 
43 discourage  the  establishment  or  maintenance  of  STEs,  but  rather  to  ensure  that  they  are 
54  used  and  operated  in  a  manner  consistent  with  WTO  principles  and  rules' 
B.  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  with  regard  to  state  trading. 
In  addition  to  the  core  provisions  in  Article  XVII  and  the  Understanding,  a  number  of 
other  GATT  Articles  also  deal  with  state  trading  under  different  topics.  In  the  context  of 
the  GATT  anti-dumping  rules,  this  issue  is  taken  into  special  account  when  products 
exported  from  a  state  trading  country  are  initiated  with  an  anti-dumping  investigation  by 
an  importing  country's  domestic  industry.  In  that  case,  the  GATT  antimdumping  rules  are 
applied  to  state  trading  countries  and  non-state  trading  countries  in  a  similar  way  except 
that  the  methods  to  calculate  normal  value  of  products  exported  from  the  former  are 
different. 
The  second  interpretative  note  to  paragraph  I  of  Article  VI  in  Annex  I  to  the  GATT  1994 
states  that: 
It  is  recognized  that,  in  the  case  of  imports  from  a  country  which  has  a  complete  or 
substantially  complete  monopoly  of  its  trade  and  where  all  domestic  prices  are  fixed 
by  the  State,  special  difficulties  may  exist  in  determining  price  comparability  for  the 
purposes  of  Paragraph  1,  and  in  such  case  importing  Contracting  Parties  may  find  it 
necessary  to  take  into  account  the  possibility  that  a  strict  comparison  with  domestic 
prices  in  such  a  country  may  not  always  be  appropriate. 
This  provision  provides  the  basis  for  national  anti-dumping  laws  to  establish  the  rules 
with  regard  to  state  trading.  It  points  out  the  possible  difficulties  when  calculating  the 
normal  value  of  products  from  a  state  trading  country.  However,  it  does  not  specify 
-,  \,  -hether  the  anti-dumping  authority  or  the  exporting  country  bears  the  burden  of  proof  of 
state  trading  issues.  Furthermore,  it  is  too  simple  and  does  not  provide  any  alternative 
S4 
Ibid. 
44 criteria  or  methods  to  establish  it.  55  Unfortunately,  this  rule  remained  unattended,  was 
conveyed  by  negotiators  to  a  new  text  and  linked  to  Article  2.7  of  the  \ý70 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement.  56  Therefore,  the  GATT  rules  on  dumping  actually  give  the 
importing  country  the  discretion  to  determine  normal  value  of  allegedly  dumped  imports 
originating  in  state  trading  countries  in  the  way  that  they  like. 
When  we  refer  to  this  rule,  we  should  notice  that  it  is  applicable  only  'in  the  case  of 
imports  from  a  country  which  has  a  complete  or  substantially  complete  monopoly  of  its 
trade  and  where  all  domestic  prices  are  fixed  by  the  State'.  It  has  a  fundamental  problem 
with  the  implementation  of  this  provision  because  today,  no  country  would  practically 
qualify  under  the  criteria.  57so 
,  great  care  should  be  taken  when  determining  the  normal 
value  of  products  exported  from  countries  that  are  in  a  transitional  period  from  NMEs  to 
MEs.  That  is  to  say,  their  products'  normal  value  cannot  be  treated  exactly  in  the  same 
way  as  goods  exported  from  those  countries  described  above,  and  the  domestic  price 
should  be  the  main  reference  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  exports  from  these 
countries  in  this  case. 
IV.  Practical  problems  arising  when  the  GATT  anti-dumping 
rules  are  applied  to  state  trading  countries. 
Nowadays,  Article  VI  of  the  GATT  and  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  work  together  and 
govern  the  application  of  anti-dumping  measures  taken  by  Members  of  the  WTO.  They 
provide  a  framework  for  the  Member's  anti-dumping  legislation.  Considering  their 
effects  at  the  world  level,  the  most  noticeable  practical  problem  arising  when  the  GATT 
anti-dumping  rules  are  implemented  is  that  they  are  likely  to  be  used  by  an  importing 
5-S  These  issues  will  be  further  discussed  in  section  IV  of  this  chapter. 
56 
,  \Iexander  Polouektov,  fii  4  above  at  p  13. 
S7 
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45 country  as  a  way  to  protect  its  domestic  industry.  It  can  be  seen  that  some  countries  apply 
their  anti-dumping  laws  as  a  method  of  creating  a  new  barrier  to  trade.  58  For  example. 
when  a  provisional  duty  is  levied  after  an  investigation  is  initiated  by  an  importing 
country,  a  period  of  risk  and  uncertainty  to  exporters  of  certain  products  concerned  is 
created  at  the  same  time.  In  this  way,  anti-dumping  measures  can  virtually  cause 
restrictions  and  distortions  on  international  trade  flows.  However,  with  regard  to  exports 
from  state  trading  countries  which  are  involved  in  an  anti-dumping  investigation,  far 
more  practical  problems  appear  when  the  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  are  applied. 
A.  No  provision  identifies  the  burden  of  proof  of  state  trade  issues  in  the 
GATT. 
The  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  do  not  specify  which  side  in  antiýdumping  investigations 
bears  the  burden  of  proof  with  regard  to  state  trading  identification.  So,  GATT 
Contracting  Parties  with  relatively  stronger  economic  strength  such  as  the  EU  and  U.  S. 
introduce  a  unilateral  interpretation  of  this  sensitive  issue.  They  take  the  lead  to 
determine  which  economies  are  state-trading  countries  all  by  themselves.  In  this  way, 
they  transfer  the  burden  of  proof  to  these  so-called  state-trading  countries  or  NMEs.  As  a 
result,  according  to  the  current  anti-dumping  legislation  of  most  WTO  Members,  if  an 
exporter  from  an  NME  asks  for  MET  in  anti-dumping  investigations,  it  bears  the  very 
heavy  burden  of  proof  to  demonstrate  that  it  operates  under  market  principles  and  meets 
the  criteria  for  the  MET  established  by  the  authority  of  the  importing  country.  59 
This  gap  of  the  GATT  anti-dumping  rules,  therefore,  becomes  the  principal  factor 
resulting  in  the  discriminatory  treatment  towards  NMEs  and  transitional  economies  in 
anti-dumping  proceedings  of  today. 
58  Jackson,  fn  12  above  at  p  256. 
59  This  issue  is  fully  illustrated  in  section  11  of  chapter  three. 
46 B.  The  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  on  the  state  trading  issue  60  seem  to  be  oLt 
of  date  and  impractical. 
The  Protocol  was  enacted  together  with  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariff  and  Trade  1947. 
and  it  has  been  in  force  since  1948.  While  half  a  century  has  passed,  most  state  trading 
countries  of  these  early  days  have  turned  to  become  transitional  economies,  but  the 
Protocol  still  is  the  basis  for  WTO  Member's  anti-dumping  legislation  dealing  with 
exports  from  these  countries. 
Here,  state  trading  countries  have  the  same  meaning  as  non-market  economies  (NMEs), 
which  generally  refer  to  the  character  of  those  centrally  planned  and  state-controlled 
countries.  At  the  time  when  the  Agreement  was  concluded,  most  of  them  were 
developing  countries.  Compared  with  others,  they  were  less  developed,  and  their 
economic  development  was  completely  based  on  strict  government  control  and  budget. 
Free  market  and  fair  competition  principles  were  ignored,  and  products'  prices  were 
determined  by  the  state  rather  than  the  market.  Under  those  circumstances,  the  drafters  of 
the  GATT  took  these  issues  into  account  and  put  forward  corresponding  resolutions  to 
offset  the  unfair  trading  factors  that  may  arise  when  those  developing  countries 
participated  in  international  trade.  As  a  result,  they  enacted  the  provision  discussed 
above  61 
)  and  it  was  effective  indeed,  well  observing  the  international  trade  principles  (i.  e. 
fI  ree  trade  and  fair  competition)*. 
However,  after  more  than  50  years'  development,  the  world's  economy  has  undergone 
fundamental  changes,  especially  in  those  developing  countries  and  communist  countries, 
such  as  China  and  the  former  Soviet  controlled  states.  They  were  completely  NMEs  in  the 
1950's,  while  after  half  a  century's  reform  and  construction5  they  have  seen  tremendous 
progress  in  their  economic  field.  As  a  result,  most  of  them  are  now  in  a  transitional  period 
60  - 
I.  e.  the  second  interpretative  Note  to  Article  VI  of  the  GAIT. 
61 
Ibid. 
47 towards  market  economies  (MEs).  The  governments  do  not  impose  strict  control  and 
rigid  management  on  their  countries'  economy  anymore.  As  the  basic  rules  to  develop  the 
economy,  free  market  and  fair  competition  principles  have  gained  more  and  more 
attention  from  the  government.  They  are  better  respected  than  ever  before,  and  prices  of 
products  are  determined  by  them  rather  than  states.  With  regard  to  international  trade, 
their  export  prices  are  also  mostly  constructed  by  the  market. 
Here,  a  good  example  can  be  given  by  examining  the  economic  development  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  China,  of  which  dramatic  changes  have  taken  place  due  to  economic 
reform  policies  since  1979.  The  reform  was  designed  to  accelerate  the  transformation  of 
the  country  into  a  market-oriented  economy.  Consequently,  the  prices  of  over  90  percent 
of  its  final  goods  are  now  determined  by  market  forces  rather  than  government.  This  is  a 
62 
fact  which  has  been  confirmed  by  a  World  Bank  Report.  Furthermore,  China  entered 
the  WTO  on  II  December  200  1.  By  negotiating  and  offering  specific  commitments 
relating  to  all  WTO  disciplines,  including  trading  rights,  pricing  policies  and  state  trading, 
it  is  no  longer  a  state  trading  country  within  the  meaning  of  the  second  supplementary 
provision  to  Article  VI,  GATT.  Based  on  these  facts,  though  today  China  is  not  yet  a  fully 
rnarket-oriented  economy,  it  is  a  country  in  transition  from  a  centrally  government 
planned  economy  to  a  market-oriented  economy.  So,  it  definitely  cannot  be  regarded  and 
treated  as  a  state  trading  country  like  before. 
Generally  speaking,  countries  of  this  kind  are  defined  as  'transitional  economies'.  They 
have  the  characteristic  of  market  and  NMEs,  but  they  develop  to  the  direction  of  the 
former  and  have  much  less  control  on  the  economy  than  before.  This  definition  covers  a 
wide  spectrum  of  economic  structures.  Some  states  are  nearer  to  the  traditional  definition 
of  state  trading  than  others  who  are  closer  to  free  MEs.  Furthermore,  within  each 
62  'China:  Reform  and  Development  in  1992-1993',  World  Bank  Discussion  Paper  No.  215, 
-  -Iittp:  //www-wds.  worldbank.  org/servIet/WDS-1Bank_ServIet?  pcont=detaiIs&eid=000009265-3970 
716144524>  (I  December  2002). 
48 transitional  economy,  some  aspects  are  more  liberalized  than  others.  Thus,  the  situation  is 
highly  complex.  From  this  point  of  view,  these  states  cannot  be  simply  treated  as 
state-trading  countries  by  using  the  'analogue  country'  method  to  calculate  the  normal 
value  of  their  exports  when  judging  whether  the  products  are  dumped.  With  regard  to  this 
issue,  a  set  of  more  fair  and  reasonable  methods  and  rules  specifically  for  transitional 
economies  should  be  adopted. 
The  GATT  anti-dumping  legislation  towards  NMEs  was  enacted  in  1947.63  Instead  of 
being  dropped,  it  has  been  automatically  transposed  into  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping 
Agreement  in  1994.64  Therefore,  in  contrast  to  significant  advancements  in  many  other 
areas  covered  by  the  GATT  provisions,  it  is  almost  as  vague  as  it  was  50  years  ago. 
Reconsidering  the  current  GATT  anti-dumping  rules,  they  regulate  exports  from  either 
MEs  or  NMEs.  however,  they  have  nothing  to  say  with  regard  to  transitional  economies. 
This  is  a  gap  in  the  rules,  and  it  becomes  a  great  deficiency  which  results  in  intense 
disputes  these  days,  because  today  only  a  few  completely  state-trading  countries  exist 
while  more  and  more  transitional  economies  appear  on  the  world  stage.  From  this  point  of 
view,  the  GATT  rules  do  not  set  forth  new  provisions,  so  it  cannot  accommodate  these 
changes  of  the  transitional  economies.  Consequently,  the  gap  of  the  rules  leaves  too  broad 
a  scope  for  the  GATT  Contracting  Parties,  and  allows  them  to  apply  the  rules  for  NMEs  to 
transitional  economies.  In  this  way,  they  can  easily  reach  the  conclusion  that  exports  from 
those  countries  are  dumped.  Obviously,  it  is  neither  fair  nor  reasonable. 
C.  The  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  on  the  state  trading  issue  are  too  simple 
and  vague  to  be  applied  by  WTO  Members  properly. 
'rhe  second  interpretative  Note  to  Article  VI  of  the  GATT  is  the  only  rule  specially 
63  It  mainly  refers  to  the  second  supplementary  provision  to  paragraph  I  of  Article  VI  in  Annex  I  to 
GATT  1947. 
64  Article  2  (7),  Agreement  on  Implementation  of  Article  VI  of  GATT  1994. 
49 providing  for  exports  from  state  trading  countries  in  the  legal  context  of  the  GATT  and 
the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
From  the  definition  of  dumping  analyzed  above,  we  can  see  that  the  normal  value  of  a 
product  is  the  key  factor  to  judge  whether  it  is  dumped.  As  to  products  exported  from 
non-state  trading  countries,  their  normal  values  are  usually  decided  by  their  prices  in  their 
domestic  markets.  But  with  regard  to  state  trading  countries,  the  notd55  merely  provides 
that  'a  strict  comparison  with  domestic  prices  in  such  a  country  may  not  always  be 
appropriate'  without  giving  any  further  suggestion.  This  is  obviously  too  vague. 
A  simple  recognition  of  'inappropriateness'  of  a  strict  comparison  with  domestic  prices 
in  state-trading  countries  has  over  the  years  evolved  into  a  trade  policy  instrument  that 
not  only  is  absurd  from  the  economic  viewpoint,  but  also  eminent  in  its  unfairness.  66 
Besides,  the  rule  does  not  give  any  guidance  regulating  the  procedure  of  calculating  the 
normal  value  of  exports  of  these  countries.  As  a  result,  it  virtually  gives  the  WTO 
Members  the  freedom  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  allegedly  dumped  imports 
originating  in  state  trading  countries  and  corresponding  dumping  investigation 
procedures  in  the  way  that  they  regard  proper.  This  is  likely  to  result  in  unfair  judgement 
against  those  exporting  countries  indeed. 
For  example,  in  the  absence  of  a  GATT  regulation  on  how  to  determine  the  normal  values 
of  exports  from  a  state-trading  country,  the  EU  often  uses  the  analogue  third  country 
method  to  calculate  them  (i.  e.  select  an  ME  third  country  and  refer  to  its  domestic  sales 
price  of  the  like  product  concerned  to  determine  its  normal  value).  Article  2(7)(b)  of  the 
EU's  Anti-Dumping  Regulation  67  provides  that  the  exporters  in  a  state-trading  country 
65  i.  e.  the  second  interpretative  Note  to  Article  VI  of  the  GATT. 
66  Alexander  Polouektov,  fn  4  above  at  p7. 
67  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against  dumped  imports 
fi-on-i  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community,  OJ  1996  L056/1. 
50 are  only  granted  10  days  to  comment  on  the  selection  after  the  Commission's  notice 
indicates  the  reference  country  contemplated.  'Given  the  complexity  of  the  comparison 
of  production  processes  in  different  countries  and  the  difficulties  in  gaining  access  to 
detailed  information,  this  period  of  10  days  will  be  far  too  short  to  submit  meaningful 
comments.  ý68  It  will  definitely  decrease  the  chance  for  exporters  to  participate  in  the 
process  of  the  selection  of  the  analogue  third  country,  and  will  increase  the  discretionary 
power  of  the  EU  authorities  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  products  concerned.  As  a 
result,  a  dumping  practice  is  likely  to  be  found  under  this  circumstance,  and  it  is  definitely 
unfair  to  state-trading  countries. 
From  these  points  of  view,  the  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  with  regard  to  state-trading 
countries  have  some  practical  problems,  so  that  when  they  are  assimilated  by  the  WTO 
Members  into  their  own  legislation,  they  may  result  in  unfair  factors  which  are  adverse  to 
state-trading  countries  involved  in  anti-dumping  investigations.  This  violates  the  purpose 
and  the  trend  of  development  of  anti-dumping  rules  that  we  discussed  before. 
Consequently,  the  fair  competition  principle  of  international  trade  is  undermined  to  some 
extent,  and  it  is  harmful  to  the  world's  overall  economic  development. 
Conclusions 
This  chapter  analyzes  the  history,  purpose  and  provisions  of  the  GATT  antiýdumping 
rules,  which  provides  a  framework  for  its  Contracting  Parties'  an&dumping  legislation.  It 
especially  focuses  on  the  rules  regulating  exports  from  state  trading  countries. 
The  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  in  force  include  Article  VI  of  the  GATT  and  the 
Anti  -Dumping  Agreement.  They  work  together  and  govern  the  application  of 
68  P.  V.  Schueren,  'New  Anti-Dumping  Rules  and  Practice:  Wide  Discretion  Held  on  a  Tight  LeashT 
(1996),  33(2)  Common  Market  Law  Review,  282. 
51 anti-dumping  measures  taken  by  Members  of  the  WTO. 
The  rules  are  applied  to  state  trading  countries  and  non-state  trading  countries  in  a  similar 
way  except  that  the  methods  to  calculate  normal  value  of  their  exports  are  different.  69 
There  are  several  practical  problems  arising  from  the  current  GATT  anti-dumping 
legislation  with  regard  to  exports  from  state  trading  countries  arising  from  the  fact  that 
the  law  does  not  specify  who  bears  the  burden  of  proof  of  state-trading,  the  rules  are  too 
out  of  date  to  accommodate  the  current  situation  of  transitional  economies  properly,  and 
they  are  too  simple  and  vague  to  be  applied  by  the  WTO  Members  fairly.  In  that  case, 
they  sometimes  result  in  unfair  factors  when  the  WTO  Members  determine  dumping  and 
take  anti-dumping  actions  against  exports  from  the  so-called  state  trading  countries, 
which  consequently  undermine  the  fair  competition  principle  of  international  trade. 
In  this  chapter,  the  GATT  anti-dumping  rules  are  analyzed  as  a  base  to  discuss  one  of  its 
Contracting  Parties  -  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  later  on.  In  the  next  chapter,  the 
development  and  provisions  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  rules  with  regard  to  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  will  be  examined.  Due  to  the  legal  gap  of  the  GATT  an&dumping 
rules,  there  arise  some  problems  when  the  EU  takes  anti-dumping  measures  against 
exports  from  China.  These  issues  will  also  be  considered  in  the  next  chapter. 
69  The  second  interpretative  note  to  paragraph  I  of  Article  VI  in  Annex  I  to  the  GATT  1994. 
52 Chapter  Two 
The  European  Union's  Anti-Dumping  Legislation 
with  regard  to  the  People"s  Republic  of  China 
Introduction 
Though  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  antýdumping  rules  provide 
the  legal  framework  for  its  Member's  anti-dumping  legislation,  only  after  they  are 
incorporated  by  the  European  Union  (EU)  anti-dumping  rules,  will  they  have  binding 
effects  on  the  EU's  Member  States. 
I  elaborate  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  in  this  chapter.  The  chapter  focuses  on  three 
issues:  the  evolution  of  the  rules,  their  main  content  and  the  enforcement  of  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  rules  with  regard  to  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
In  the  first  section,  the  development  and  history  of  the  EU  anti-dumping 
legislation  will  be  analyzed.  This  anti-dumping  legislation  is  enacted  in  the 
form  of  Council  Regulations  by  the  European  Community  (EC)  1  and 
Commission  Decisions  by  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  (ECSC) 
respectively.  The  two  sets  of  rules  used  to  govern  different  imports.  The  EC 
anti-dumping  Regulations  are  applicable  to  dumped  imports  from  third 
countries  outside  the  EC,  and  the  ECSC  anti-dumping  Decisions  govern 
imports  listed  in  the  Annex  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Coal  and 
Steel  Community  (ECSC  Treaty)  2  and  related  instruments.  The  ECSC 
II  use  'European  Community'  here  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community. 
2  Annex  1,  ECSC  treaty. 
53 Decisions  have  been  progressively  amended  to  bring  them  into  line  with  EC 
anti-dumping  Regulations.  3  Therefore,  in  this  section,  I  will  discuss  the 
evolution  of  the  EC  anti-dumping  Regulations  first,  then  analyze  the 
amendments  made  for  the  rules  applicable  to  China  in  recent  years,  and 
finally  briefly  introduce  the  development  of  the  ECSC  anti-dumping 
Decisions. 
The  second  part  of  the  chapter  will  make  a  general  introduction  to  the  EU 
anti-dumping  legislation.  Since  the  ECSC  Treaty  expired  on  23  July  2002, 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  4  replaces  Commission  Decision  No 
2277/96/EC  SCI  5  and  governs  products  listed  in  the  Annex  to  the  ECSC 
Treaty 
.6 
That  is  to  say,  Regulation  384/96  is  the  EU's  current  anti-dumping 
legislation  in  force.  Therefore,  its  objectives,  key  concepts,  main  substantive 
rules  and  procedural  rules  will  be  explained  carefully  in  this  part. 
In  the  first  two  sections,  the  terms  'EC'  and  'Community'  are  used  instead  of 
'EU'  for  two  reasons.  First,  it  needs  to  be  distinguished  from  the  ECSC  when 
their  anti-dumping  legislation  is  compared.  Second,  since  the  EU  was  not 
3  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against  dumped  imports 
from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community,  OJ  1996  L  56/1,  amended  by  'Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  of  27  April  1998  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  protection 
against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community',  OJ  1998  L  128/18; 
'Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2238/2000  of  9  October  2000  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on 
protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community',  OJ 
2000  L  257/2;  and  'Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002  of  5  November  2002  amending 
Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  the  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of 
the  European  Community,  '  OJ  2002  L305/1. 
4  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against  dumped  imports 
from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community,  OJ  1996  L  56/1. 
5  Commission  Decision  No  2277/96/ECSC  of  28  November  1996  on  protection  against  dumped 
imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  OJ  1996  L  308/11. 
6  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  963/2002  of  3  June  2002  laying  down  transitional  provisions 
concerning  anti-dumping  and  anti-subsidy  measures  adopted  pursuant  to  Commission  Decisions  No 
2277/96/ECSC  and  No  1889/98/ECSC  as  well  as  pending  anti-dumping  and  anti-subsidy 
investigations,  complaints  and  applications  pursuant  to  those  Decisions.  OJ  2002  L  149/3. 
54 established  until  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  entered  into  force  on  I 
November  1993,,  1  use  the  term  'EC'  when  analyzing  its  Regulations 
published  before  that  date. 
The  last  section  of  this  chapter  is  about  the  enforcement  of  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  rules  with  regard  to  China.  In  this  part,  first,  the  general 
situation  relating  to  enforcement  will  be  introduced.  Second,  main  features  of 
the  enforcement  of  the  rules  will  be  summarised  and  analyzed.  Finally, 
problems  of  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  towards  China  will  be  indicated 
by  enumerating  three  inconsistencies  of  facts. 
With  regard  to  rules  analyzed  in  the  first  two  parts,  some  of  them  are  not  relevant  to  the 
central  argument  of  my  thesis.  They  are  discussed  here  for  the  completeness  of  the 
description  of  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation,  so  they  will  not  be  dealt  with  further. 
Those  applicable  to  non-market  economies  (NMEs)  and  China  are  the  highlights  of  this 
thesis,  and  they  will  be  fully  examined  in  the  next  chapters. 
In  short,  this  chapter  elaborates  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  by  analysing 
its  evolution,  key  concepts,  substantive  and  procedural  rules,  main 
f 
differences  between  provisions  applicable  to  market  economies  (MEs)  and 
those  for  NMEs.  Also,  the  current  situation  and  problems  of  the  enforcement 
of  the  rules  applicable  to  China  are  examined.  Thus,  it  provides  a  solid 
theoretical  base  for  the  next  chapters,  where  problems  and  issues  of  the 
current  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  towards  China  will  be  further  explored 
and  analyzed. 
/.  The  development  of  EU  anti-dumping  legislation. 
The  EU  is  committed  under  international  law  to  observe  the  rules  of  the  GATT, 
so  its  anti-dumping  legislation  is  based  on  GATT  provisions.  As  we  discussed 
55 in  the  first  Chapter,  relevant  provisions  include  Article  VI  and  the  Agreement 
on  the  implementation  of  Article  VI  of  GATT  1994  (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement).  However,  they  only  take  effect  to  the  extent  that  they  are 
incorporated  by  the  EU's  legislation.  7 
The  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  is  enacted  as  Council  Regulations  of  the  EC 
and  Commission  Decisions  by  the  ECSC  respectively.  But  since  the  latter 
Decision  has  been  codified  according  to  the  current  EC8  anti-dumping 
Regulation  9,  and  its  rules  are  quite  similar  to  the  provisions  of  the  latter,  so, 
in  the  following  section,  I  will  discuss  the  evolution  of  the  EC  anti-dumping 
Regulation  at  first,  then  explore  the  changes  of  the  rules  applicable  to  China, 
and  introduce  the  development  of  the  ECSC  Decision  briefly  afterwards. 
A.  The  evolution  of  the  EC  anti-dumping  rules.  10 
The  history  of  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  can  be  traced  as  early  as  1957, 
and  its  development  can  be  divided  into  two  stages. 
1.  The  transitional  period  from  1958  to  1968. 
In  1957,  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community  (Treaty  of  Rome) 
was  signed  in  Rome.  For  the  first  time,  it  established  a  customs  union  between 
Member  States,  which  aims  to  contribute  to  the  progressive  abolition  of 
restrictions  on  international  trade  and  the  lowering  of  customs  barriers.  "  It 
7J  Curmane  &  C.  Stanbrook,  Dumping  and  subsidies.  -  the  law  and  procedures  governing  the 
imposition  of  anti-dumpimg  and  countervailing  duties  in  the  European  Community.  (London: 
European  Business  Publications,  1983)  at  p  10. 
8,  EC'  is  used  here  to  be  distinguished  from  the  ECSC. 
()  Council  Regulation  384/96  as  amended. 
10  1  use  'EC'  in  this  section  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  the  ECSC. 
11  Article  1 
-3) 
1  (ex  Article  110),  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community. 
56 also  states  that  the  Common  Commercial  Policy  shall  be  based  on  uniform 
principles  to  take  measures  protecting  trade  in  case  of  dumping  or  subsidies.,  2  In  this 
way,  the  Treaty  of  Rome  provides  an  important  legal  base  for  the  development 
of  the  EC's  13  anti-dumping  legislation. 
According  to  the  Treaty,  the  transitional  period  was  from  1958  to  1972. 
Within  the  time  limit,  since  the  Community  did  not  have  a  uniform 
anti-dumping  regulation,  Member  States  took  protective  measures  against 
dumped  imports  according  to  their  own  anti-dumping  laws.  They  included 
rules  of  the  following  countries: 
Belgium-the  Import,  Export  and  Transit  of  Goods  Law  of  September  11, 
1962.14 
France-Article  19  of  the  Customs  Law.  '  5 
Germany-paragraph  21  of  the  Customs  Law.  '  6 
Italy-Law  No.  39  on  the  Imposition  of  anti-dumping  and  Countervailing 
Duties  of  January  11,1963.1' 
Luxembourg-the  Import,  Export  and  Transit  of  Goods  law  of  August  5, 
12  Article  133  (ex  Article  113),  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community:  'The  common 
commercial  policy  shall  be  based  on  uniform  principles,  particularly  in  regard  to  changes  in  tariff  rates, 
the  conclusion  of  tariff  and  trade  agreements,  the  achievement  of  unifon-nity  in  measures  of 
I  iberal  ization,  export  policy  and  measures  to  protect  trade  such  as  those  to  be  taken  in  case  of  dumping 
or  subsidies.  ' 
13  1  use  'EC'  here  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  the  ECSC. 
14  Moniteur  Belge  of  October  27,1962. 
15  Journal  Officiel  of  December  18,1966. 
16  See  Siebentes  Gesetz  zur  Anderung  des  Zollgesetzes  of  June  30,1966,  BGB  11542. 
17  Gazetta  Ufficiale  No.  40  of  February  12,1963,  at  p.  761. 
57 1963.18 
Netherlands-the  Import  and  Export  of  Goods  Law  of  July  5,1962.19 
However,  the  need  for  uniformity  of  laws  arose  soon  due  to  the  fact  that  any 
anti-dumping  duty  imposed  nationally  could  be  circumvented  by  indirect 
imports  from  other  Member  States,  because  there  is  free  movement  of  goods 
within  the  Community.  That  is  to  say,  imposition  of  anti-dumping  or 
countervailing  duties  by  individual  Member  States  was  inconsistent  with  the 
objectives  of  the  Customs  Union.  This  led  the  European  Commission  to 
submit  a  proposal  to  the  Council  in  May  1965  for  a  uniform  Regulation  on 
protection  against  dumped  or  subsidized  imports  from  countries  which  were 
not  members  of  the  EEC 
. 
20  Later,  the  European  Communities  concluded  the 
agreement  on  the  first  anti-dumping  Code  21  with  other  GATT  Contracting 
Parties  in  1967.22  The  provisions  thus  became  binding  on  individual  Member 
States.  At  the  end  of  1967,  the  Commission  revised  its  1965  proposal.  It  was 
approved  by  the  Council  as  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  459/68  23 
,  which  came  into 
to  force  on  July  1,1968. 
The  EC's  24  first  anti-dumping  Regulation  basically  incorporated  the  1967 
GATT  anti-dumping  Code  into  EC  law  and  allocated  the  task  of  enforcing  the 
18  Memorial  Lux.  of  August  10,1963. 
19  Staatsblad  No.  295/1962. 
20  Beseler  &  Williams,  anti-dumping  and  Anti-subsidy  Law.  -  The  European  Communities.  (London: 
Sweet  &  Maxwell,  1986)  at  p  22. 
21  The  first  Agreement  on  Implementation  of  Article  VI  of  the  GATT  (also  referred  to  as  the  'GATT 
Anti-Dumping  Code')  was  signed  in  Geneva  on  30  June  1967. 
22  68/041  UEEC:  Council  Decision  of  27  November  1967  concluding  multilateral  agreements  signed 
as  a  result  of  the  conference  on  trade  negotiations  of  1964-  1967  OJ  1968  L305/1. 
23  Replation  (EEC)  No  459/68  of  the  Council  of  5  April  1968  on  protection  against  dumping  or  the 
granting  of  bounties  or  subsidies  by  countries  which  are  not  members  of  the  European  Economic 
Community  OJ  1968  1_93/1.  Eng.  Spec.  Ed.  p.  80. 
24  ,  EC'  is  used  here  in  order  to  be  distinguished  with  the  ECSC.  In  addition,  the  EU  was  not 
established  until  1993. 
58 new  legislation  among  the  institutions.  25 
2.  The  development  of  the  EC's  antýdumping  legislation  from  July  1, 
1968  to  March  6,1996.26 
In  the  following  years,  the  Community's  first  anti-dumping  Regulation  was 
amended  several  times. 
The  first  amendment  was  made  by  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  2011/73  27  on  some 
procedural  points  in  order  to  intensify  the  role  of  the  Community  institutions 
in  this  area  and  to  supplement  the  procedure  for  consultation. 
The  rules  were  revised  with  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  1411/77 
28  for  the  second 
time  in  1977  following  the  accession  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Denmark  and 
29  Ireland  to  the  EC 
. 
In  1979,  significant  changes  were  made  to  Regulation  459/68.  Regulation 
1681/7  930gave  a  revised  interpretation  of  causality  and  introduced  new  rules 
to  determine  the  normal  value  of  imports  from  NMEs.  Following  the 
conclusion  of  the  Agreement  on  Interpretation  and  Application  of  Articles  VI, 
XVI  and  XXII  (Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures  Code)  as  a  result  of 
25  Ivo  Van  Bael  &  Jean-Francois  Bellis,  Anti-Dumping  and  other  Trade  Protection  Laws  of  the  EC  3rd 
edn.  (Bicester  :  CCH  Europe,  1996),  3  8. 
26  1  use  'EC'  in  this  section  because  the  EU  was  not  established  until  1993. 
27  OJ  1973  L206/3. 
28  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1411/77  of  27  June  1977  amending  Regulation  (EEC)  No  459/68  on 
protection  against  dumping  or  the  granting  of  bounties  or  subsidies  by  countries  which  are  not 
members  of  the  European  Economic  Community  OJ  1977  L  160/4. 
29  Beseler  &  Williams,  fn  20  above  at  p  23. 
Here  I  use  'EC'  because  the  EU  was  established  later. 
30  Regulation  1681/79,  OJ  1979  L  196/1. 
59 the  Tokyo  Round  negotiations,  the  new  Community  legislation-Regulation 
3017/7  93  1  not  only  consolidated  various  amendments  made  before,  but  also 
made  several  very  important  innovations  on  legislation  about  subsidy  and 
countervailing  duties.  Considering  the  experience  gained  by  the  Community 
and  other  major  trading  countries  in  an  anti-dumping  and  countervailing  field, 
it  brought  in  some  new  rules  to  determine  injury,  which  simply  required  that 
'dumped  or  subsidized  imports  were  causing  material  injury,  rather  than  proof 
that  they  were  the  major  cause  of  injury  as  required  under  Regulation 
459/68  532 
. 
Besides,  procedural  amendments  were  made  for  more  transparency 
of  anti-dumping  proceedings,  which  entitled  parties  to  the  right  to  acquire 
information  used  against  them.  In  addition,  the  procedure  for  extending 
provisional  duties  was  simplified.  33 
In  1982,  Regulation  3017/79  was  revised  to  stipulate  that  reviews  of 
anti-dumping  measures  could  not  be  held  until  one  year  after  the  conclusion 
34 
of  the  proceedings. 
The  Regulation  was  replaced  by  Regulation  2176/84  35  in  July  1984.  The  new 
rules  brought  in  a  'sunset  clause'  for  the  first  time,  i.  e.  anti-dumping  duties 
will  lapse  automatically  five  years  after  imposition. 
In  June  1987,  the  Regulation  was  amended  again  by  introducing  rules  on 
circumvention.  It  allowed  the  extension  of  anti-dumping  duties  to  products 
31  Regulation  3017/79,  OJ  1979  L339/1. 
32  Van  Bael  &  Bellis,  fn  25  above  at  p  39. 
33  Beseler  &  Williams,  fn  20  above  at  p  27. 
34  Regulation  1580/82,  OJ  1982  L178/9. 
3s  Regulation  2176/84,  OJ  1984  L201/1,  corrected  at  OJ  1984  1-227/35. 
60 assembled  within  the  Community  36  by  companies  related  to  an  exporter  who 
is  subject  to  anti-dumping  measures  at  that  time.  37 
Regulation  2176/84  was  replaced  by  Regulation  2423/88  in  July  1988,38  in 
which  several  changes  were  made.  One  of  them  was: 
The  introduction  of  the  possibility  of  increasing  the  duty  where  it  was 
proven  that  the  exporter  bore  the  cost  of  it  (the  anti-absorption  duty). 
Another  provision  clarified  the  treatment  of  discounts  and  rebates  when 
normal  value  and  export  prices  were  determined  on  the  basis  of  prices 
actually  paid.  39 
Other  changes  included  the  treatment  which  should  be  given  to  trading 
companies;  guidelines  to  grant  allowances  (i.  e.  the  adjustments  for 
differences  in  level  of  trade  and  quantities  were  formally  abolished).  In 
addition,  the  procedure  about  sunset  reviews  was  clarified  as  was  that 
concerning  the  calculation  of  refunds.  40 
Regulation  2423/88  was  amended  in  March  1994  from  two  aspects:  first,  it 
prescribed  that  definitive  anti-dumping  measures  would  be  adopted  by 
majority  vote  rather  than  by  a  qualified  majority  as  in  the  past.  41  Second, 
US-style  strict  time-limits  were  introduced.  42 
36  1  use  'Community'  here  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  the  ECSC- 
37  Regulation  1761/87,  OJ  1978  L167/9. 
38  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2423/88  of  II  July  1988  on  protection  against  dumped  or  subsidized 
imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Economic  Community  OJ  1988  L209/1, 
corrected  at  OJ  1988  L264/58. 
39  Van  Bael  &  Bellis,  fn  25  above  at  p  39. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Regulation  522/94,  OJ  1994  L66/1  0. 
4'  Regulation  521/94.  OJ  1994  L66/7. 
61 On  31  December  1994,  Regulation  3283/94  43  replaced  Regulation  2423/88.  It 
strengthened  amendments  made  before  and  incorporated  the  provisions  of  the 
Uruguay  Round  Agreement.  Experience  in  the  application  of  Regulation 
3283/94  showed  the  need  for  further  amendments  in  order  to  facilitate  its 
application.  These  amendments  were  incorporated  into  Council  Regulation 
384/96. 
In  March  1996,  the  new  Regulation  was  published  as  a  consolidated  version  of 
44 
anti-dumping  legislation  of  the  EC.  For  the  first  time,  the  new  Regulation 
separated  out  the  rules  relating  to  anti-dumping  from  those  relating  to 
subsidies.  It  also  introduced  several  significant  new  rules.  They  are:  the 
re-introduction  of  the  adjustments  for  differences  in  quantities  and  level  of 
trade  (abolished  in  1988),  the  re-introduction  of  anti-circumvention  rules  and 
the  elimination  of  anti-absorption  provisions.  45 
The  Regulation  took  effect  after  it  was  published  on  6  March  1996.  It  is  the 
basis  of  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  in  force,  and  I  will  analyze  its  main 
provisions  later  in  this  chapter. 
3.  Amendments  made  in  recent  years. 
a.  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2331/96.46 
On  2  December  1996,  the  E  C47  amended  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
43  Regulation  3283/94,  OJ  1994  L349/1,  as  amended  by  Council  Regulation  355/95,  OJ  1995  L41/2. 
44  1  use  'EC'  here  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  the  ECSC. 
45  Van  Bael  &  Bellis,  fn  25  above  at  p  41. 
-16  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2331/96  of  2  December  1996  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on 
protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community.  OJ  1996 
1-317/1- 
47  1  use  'EC'  here  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  the  ECSC. 
62 with  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  233  1/96.  It  mainly  revised  the  rules  applied 
to  comparison  of  normal  value  and  export  price.  These  amendments  need  not 
be  discussed  further  in  the  context  of  this  thesis  since  they  are  not  directly 
relevant  to  the  main  argument. 
b.  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98.48 
Considering  the  significant  progress  received  from  the  economic  reforms  of 
Russia  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  and  in  order  to  accommodate  these 
changes,  the  E  C49  issued  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  on  27  April 
1998.  It  deleted  the  two  states  from  the  list  of  NMEs,  and  agreed  to  determine 
the  normal  value  of  their  exports  with  rules  applicable  to  MEs,  if  the 
producer(s)  under  investigation  can  demonstrate  that  market  conditions 
prevail  by  meeting  criteria  set  in  the  new  rules.  50 
c.  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2238/2000.51 
Due  to  the  similar  reasons  mentioned  above,  the  EC  52  revised  Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  again  with  Regulation  (EC)  No  2238/2000  on  9 
October  2000.  The  rule  acknowledges  the  process  of  economic  reform  in  the 
Ukraine,  Vietnam,  Kazakhstan  and  countries  which  are  Members  of  the  World 
Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  at  the  date  of  the  initiation  of  the  relevant 
48  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  of  27  April  1998  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on 
protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community.  OJ  1998 
L  128/18. 
49  1  use  'EC'  here  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  the  ECSC 
50  This  issue  will  be  further  analyzed  in  the  next  section  -  The  development  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping 
rules  applicable  to  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
51  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2238/2000  of  9  October  2000  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
on  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community.  OJ 
2000  L257/2. 
52  1  use  'EC'  here  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  the  ECSC. 
63 anti-dumping  investigation  53,  and  grants  their  exports  similar  treatment  as 
that  which  is  applicable  to  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
Based  on  these  rules  in  force,  up  to  now,  only  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus, 
North  Korea,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan,  Uzbekistan  are  still  subject  to  strict 
canalogue  country  method'  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  their  exports. 
Other  countries  which  used  to  be  regarded  as  NMEs  now  have  the  opportunity 
to  be  treated  as  MEs,  provided  they  meet  the  conditions  set  in  the  new 
Regulation.  Regardless  of  their  actual  effects,  the  rules,  undoubtedly  are 
more  practical  and  flexible  than  ever  before. 
d.  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002.54 
On  5  November  2002,  EU  enacted  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002  amending 
Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96.  The  new  legislation  brings  several  significant  changes  to  the 
old  rules  relating  to  NME  issues.  First,  it  deletes  Russia  from  the  list  of  countries  that  are 
subject  to  the  conditional  MET  under  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98. 
Therefore,  Russian  exporters  are  entitled  to  the  MET  automatically  in  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  proceedings  afterwards.  Second,  it  formally  enumerates  the  criteria  of 
individual  treatment  in  the  EU  Regulation  for  the  first  time. 
In  addition,  it  explains  the  concepts  of  'related  parties'  and  'particular  market  situation'  in 
the  context  of  the  old  rules,  and  provides  guidelines  to  the  use  of  data  when  costs 
associated  with  the  production  and  sale  of  the  product  under  investigation  are  not 
reasonably  reflected  in  the  records  of  the  party  concerned. 
53  Today,  Albania,  China,  Georgia,  Kyrgystan  and  Mongolia  have  entered  into  the  World  Trade 
Organization. 
54  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002,  OJ  2002  1-305/1. 
64 B.  The  development  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  rules  applicable  to 
the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
Trade  cooperation  between  the  E  C55  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China  has 
increased  rapidly  since  the  establishment  of  official  diplomatic  relations  in 
1975.56  After  twenty  years  of  development,  China  has  become  the  EU's  fourth 
most  -important  supplier  in  the  world.  However,  unfortunately,  it  also  is  the 
EU's  primary  target  for  its  anti-dumping  practice  at  present. 
Following  the  first  EU-China  trade  agreement57  signed  in  1978,  the  EU  began 
to  initiate  anti-dumping  investigations  against  imports  from  China  frequently. 
From  1979  when  the  first  case  was  brought  against  saccharin  from  Chinaý  8  to 
March  2001,  there  have  been  91  anti-dumping  investigations  with  regard  to 
imports  from  China  initiated  by  the  EU  by  far.  59This  situation  results  from 
the  EU's  special  anti-dumping  rules  with  regard  to  the  People's  Republic  of 
China. 
The  development  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  rules  applicable  to  China  can  be 
divided  into  two  stages: 
55  1  use  'EC'  here  because  the  EU  was  not  established  until  1993. 
56  Jianyu  Wang,  'A  Critique  of  the  application  to  China  of  the  NME  Rules  of  Antidumping  Legislation 
and  Practice  of  the  European  Union'  (1993)  33(3)  J.  W.  T.,  117  at  p  117. 
57  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  946/78  of  2  May  1978  concerning  the  conclusion  of  the  Trade 
Agreement  between  the  European  Economic  Community  and  the  People'  s  Republic  of  China,  OJ 
1978  L  123/1. 
58  80/1116/EEC:  Commission  Decision  of  4  December  1980  accepting undertakings  offered  by  the 
exporters  of  saccharin  and  its  salts  originating  in  China  and  the  United  States  of  America  and 
terminating  the  proceedings  concerning  imports  of  saccharin  and  its  salts  from  China,  Japan  and  the 
United  States  of  America.  OJ  1980  L  331/  4  1. 
59  ,  Anti-Dumping  Statistics,  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and  Cooperation,  PRC' 
<http:  //www.  moftec.  gov.  cn:  7777/Detail.  wct?  ReclD=O&SelectlD=IO&ChanneIID=9428&Page=I> 
(I  December  2002). 
65 1.  China  was  regarded  as  an  NME. 
First  of  all,  as  the  legal  framework  of  EU  anti-dumping  legislation,  GATT 
provides  the  definition  of  dumping  and  establishes  relevant  rules  for 
transactions  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade,  where  prices  are  determined  by 
supply  and  demand  under  normal  competitive  conditions  in  free  and  open 
markets.  60  So,  difficulties  arise  when  determining  whether  imports  from 
state-trading  countries  (i.  e.  NMEs)  are  dumped  or  not.  In  those  countries, 
prices  as  well  as  exchange  rates  are  centrally  planned  by  governments 
regardless  of  free  market  and  fair  competition  principles.  The  methods  to 
determine  normal  value  in  anti-dumping  investigations  and  criteria  to  judge 
dumping  practices  are  not  applicable  to  those  countries.  Therefore,  it  states 
that  the  importing  parties  may  find  it  necessary  to  take  account  of  the  fact  that 
a  strict  comparison  with  the  domestic  price  in  the  exporting  country  may  not 
61 
always  be  appropriate. 
According  to  this  provision,  for  the  first  time,  the  Commission  introduced 
rules  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  imports  from  NMEs  in  197  9.62 
However,  since  the  GATT  suggests  no  alternative  criteria  applicable  to 
state-trading  countries,  the  EU  adopted  two  approaches. 
a.  The'analogue  country  method'  in  Regulation  384/9663 
In  this  case,  normal  values  of  exports  from  state-trading  countries  are 
determined  with  the  prices  of  like  products  from  a  third  ME.  As  to  the  concept 
60 
Art.  VI  (1)(a),  GATT. 
61  The  second  interpretative  note  to  paragraph  I  of  Article  VI  in  Annex  I  to  the  GATT. 
62  Regulation  1681/79,  OJ  1979  L196/1. 
63  Art  2(7),  Council  Regulation  384/96. 
66 of  state  trading  or  NME,  Regulation  384/96  did  not  give  a  clear  definition. 
Instead,  it  listed  a  number  of  third  States  outside  of  the  EU  as  NMEs  in 
Regulation  519/94,64  and  most  of  them  are  Communist  and  developing 
countries.  They  are:  Albania,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  the  People's 
Republic  of  China,  Georgia,  Kazakhstan,  North  Korea,  Kyrgystan,  Moldavia, 
Mongolia,  Russia,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan,  Ukraine,  Uzbekistan  and 
Vietnam. 
b.  One  country  one  duty  rule. 
It  is  presumed  that  in  an  NME,  all  production  and  natural  resources  are  fully 
controlled  by  the  State,  so  all  imports  from  the  country  are  considered  to 
emanate  from  a  single  producer.  For  this  reason,  once  dumping  practice  is 
confirmed  by  the  EU,  in  order  to  prevent  circumvention  65 
,a  single  rate  is 
applied  on  all  exports.  Based  on  this  theory,  the  EU  generally  imposes  a 
uniform  anti-dumping  duty  on  exporters  originating  in  the  NME.  66 
Following  the  process  of  economic  reform  in  these  NMEs,  which  led  to  the 
emergence  of  firms  in  which  market-economy  conditions  prevail,  some 
proposals  were  made  with  regard  to  the  application  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping 
regime.  The  one  of  1997  67  provides  an  exception  to  the  one  country  one  duty 
64  Regulation  519/94,  OJ  1994  L67/89. 
65  i.  e.  transfer  exports  through  the  exporter  with  the  lowest  duty  rate. 
66  Article  9(5)  of  the  Regulation  (EC)  No.  384/96  provides:  'An  anti-dumping  duty  shall  be  imposed  in 
the  appropriate  amounts  in  each  case,  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis  on  imports  of  a  product  from  all 
sources  found  to  be  dumped  and  causing  injury,  except  as  to  imports  from  those  sources  from  which 
undertakings  under  the  terms  of  this  Regulation  have  been  accepted.  The  Regulation  imposing  the 
duty  shall  specify  the  duty  for  each  supplier  or,  if  that  is  impracticable,  and  as  a  general  rule  in  the 
cases  referred  to  in  Article  2  (7),  the  supplying  country  concerned. 
67  Proposal  to  the  Council  Regulation  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  384/96,  COM/97/0677 
final  -  ACC,  OJ  1998  C70/15 
67 rule,  which  allows  the  Commission  to  grant  'individual  treatment  168  to  a 
company  which  can  demonstrate  that  it  operates  independently  from  the 
State  . 
69 
Exporters  should  meet  eight  criteria  to  qualify  for  individual 
70 
treatment  . 
Due  to  the  considerable  overlap  between  the  traditional  individual  treatment  criteria  and 
conditional  market  economy  treatment  (MET)  criteria,  71  only  exporting  producers  that 
can  fulfill  the  requirements  for  market  economic  status  can  qualify  for  individual 
treatment.  72  Therefore,  in  order  to  make  the  rules  more  logical  and  fair,  the  criteria  of 
68  i.  e.  the  company  who  can  demonstrate  that  it  operates  independently  from  the  State  will  receive 
individual  dumping  margin  based  on  its  own  export  prices  rather  than  based  on  that  of  third  ME. 
69  This  issue  will  be  analyzed  in  the  section  IV  of  chapter  three. 
70  Annex  I  of  Proposal  to  the  Council  Regulation  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  384/96, 
COM/97/0677  final  -  ACC,  OJ  1998  C70/15: 
i)  The  majority  of  the  shares  should  belong  to  genuinely  private  companies  and  no  State  officials 
should  appear  on  the  board  or  in  a  key  management  position  the  fact  that  the  company  concerned  is 
controlled  by  a  foreign  investor  will  be  considered  a  relevant  indication  of  independence. 
ii)  The  land  on  which  the  facilities  of  the  company  are  built  should  be  rented  from  the  State  at 
conditions  comparable  to  those  in  an  ME  or  purchased  (e.  g.  proper  contractual  lease). 
iii)  The  company  should  have  the  right  to  hire  and  dismiss  employees  and  the  right  to  fix  salaries. 
iv)  The  company  should  have  full  control  over  its  supply  of  raw  materials  and  inputs  in  general. 
v)  The  supply  of  utilities  should  be  guaranteed  on  the  basis  of  proper  contractual  terms. 
vi)  Proof  is  given  that  profit  can  be  exported  and  capital  invested  can  be  repatriated  (only  in  case  of 
foreign  investment,  e.  g.  joint  ventures). 
vii)  The  export  prices  should  be  determined  freely  the  fact  that  export  sales  are  made  to  a  related  party 
located  outside  the  country  in  question  will  be  a  decisive  factor. 
viii)  Freedom  to  carry  out  business  activities  should  be  guaranteed,  in  particular  in  respect  of  the 
following: 
there  should  be  no  restrictions  on  selling  on  the  domestic  market 
-  the  right  to  do  business  cannot  be  withdrawn  outside  proper  contractual  terms 
-  quantities  produced  for  export  should  be  determined  freely  by  the  company  in  accordance  with  the 
traditional  demand  of  its  export  markets. 
71  Criteria  for  market  economy  treatment  are  provided  in  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98. 
72  Recital  5.33,  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  protection 
against  durnped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*  COM/2000/0363 
final  -  ACC  2000/0160 
68 individual  treatment  were  amended  in  June  2000  to  refocus  on  those  areas  having  a  direct 
impact  on  the  export  activities  of  the  exporting  producer.  73  In  that  case,  the  exporter 
concerned  has  less  burden  of  proof  than  before,  and  he  needs  to  show  that  he  is  free  to 
determine  export  prices  and  quantities,  as  well  as  their  terms  and  conditions.  74 
However,  even  after  the  revision  was  made,  only  a  few  Chinese  exporters 
under  EU's  anti-dumping  investigations  were  granted  individual  treatment. 
This  reflects  the  fact  that  even  the  revised  Regulation  was  difficult  to  apply  in 
practice. 
Under  such  circumstances,  imports  from  China  were  still  subject  to  the 
analogue  country  method  and  one  country  one  duty  rule.  So  most  exports 
involved  in  anti-dumping  investigations  were  found  dumped  and 
consequently  high  anti-dumping  duties  were  imposed. 
The  latest  legislation  of  individual  treatment  was  enacted  in  November 
2002.75  For  the  first  time,  the  EU  provides  criteria  for  the  treatment  in  its  Council 
73 
ibid. 
74  Recital  54,  ibid,  provides  new  criteria  for  individual  treatment: 
i)  Exporters  are  free  to  repatriate  capital  and  profits  (applicable  to  wholly  foreign  owned  firms  orjoint 
ventures). 
ii)  Export  prices  and  quantities,  and  conditions  and  terms  of  sale  are  freely  determined,  and  the 
majority  of  the  shares  belong  to  genuinely private  companies.  State  officials  appearing  on  the  board  or 
in  key  management  positions  should  be  in  a  clear  minority.  The  presumption  is  that  a  State-  controlled 
company  cannot  guarantee  its  independence  from  State  interference,  and  the  burden  rests  with  the 
exporter  to  prove  otherwise. 
iii)  Exchange  rate  conversions  are  carried  out  at  the  market  rate. 
iv)  State  interference  is  not  such  as  to  permit  circumvention  of  measures  if  exporters  are  given 
different  rates  of  duty. 
75  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002  of  5  November  2002  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
on  the  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community. 
OJ  2002  1-305/1. 
69 Regulation. 
76 
Compared  with  the  old  rules,  the  criteria  given  in  Council  Regulation  (EC) 
No  1972/2002  are  more  specific.  In  particular,  it  added  an  additional  requirement  relating 
77  to  a  firm's  personnel  . 
However,  whether  this  idea  is  reasonable  and  whether  there  will 
be  more  Chinese  companies  get  the  individual  treatment  under  the  new  criteria  can  be 
known  only  after  the  law  is  fully  implemented. 
2.  Conditional  MET. 
The  practice  that  treats  China  as  a  complete  NME  is  not  consistent  with  the 
change  in  the  economic  status  of  China  due  to  her  economic  reform  since 
1979.  In  fact,  the  reform  enables  China  to  transfer  itself  into  a 
market-oriented  economy  country.  However,  the  inconsistency  not  only 
results  in  the  fact  that  most  Chinese  exporters  involved  in  anti-dumping 
investigations  will  have  high  duties  imposed  on  them,  but  it  also  impedes 
further  trade  cooperation  between  China  and  the  EU.  So,  the  Chinese 
government  called  for  revision  of  the  EU's  stringent  policy.  In  addition,  the 
fact  that  more  and  more  developed  countries  such  as  Australia  and  New 
Zealand  treat  China  as  a  transitional  economy  according  to  the  achievements 
of  its  economic  reform,  the  EU  proposed  to  amend  its  anti-dumping  rules 
76  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002  provides  five  criteria  for  individual  treatment: 
(a)  in  the  case  of  wholly  or  partly  foreign  owned  firms  orjoint  ventures,  exporters  are  free  to  repatriate 
capital  and  profits; 
(b)  export  prices  and  quantities,  and  conditions  and  terms  of  sale  are  freely  determined; 
(c)  the  majority  of  the  shares  belong  to  private  persons.  State  officials  appearing  on  the  board  of 
Directors  or  holding  key  management  positions  shall  either  be  in  minority  or  it  must  be  demonstrated 
that  the  company  is  nonetheless  sufficiently  independent  from  state  interference; 
(d)  exchange  rate  conversions  are  carried  out  at  the  market  rate;  and 
(e)  State  interference  is  not  such  as  to  permit  circumvention  of  measures  if  individual  exporters  are 
given  different  rates  of  duty. 
77  Art.  1  (6),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002. 
70 applicable  to  China  and  Russia  at  the  end  of  1997  . 
78As 
a  result,  Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  79  entered  into  force  on  27  April  1998. 
The  new  Regulation,  on  the  one  hand,  deletes  China  from  the  list  of  NMEs;  on  the  other 
hand,  establishes  five  conditions  to  assess  whether  the  Chinese  producers  operate  their 
business  under  market  economy  conditions.  To  benefit  under  the  rules  relating  to 
conditional  MET,  exporters  must  demonstrate  five  criteria.  80 
Only  when  the  exporter  meets  all  of  the  criteria,  will  it  be  treated  with 
provisions  applicable  to  MEs,  i.  e.  use  their  domestic  price  as  the  normal  value 
to  compare  with  its  export  price. 
On  paper,  the  new  policy  seems  to  be  much  more  reasonable  than  the  old  one. 
However,  in  fact  it  has  not  been  a  significant  change  in  the  approach  taken  by 
the  EU.  Most  Chinese  exports  treated  under  the  new  rule  are  still  found 
dumped  and  subsequently  high  anti-dumping  duties  are  imposed  on  them. 
Why?  There  are  two  crucial  reasons:  first,  the  criteria  set  in  the  new 
78  Lianyin,  Chen.  'Changes  and  Adjustments  Made  on  European  Union's  Anti-Dumping  Policy  with 
regard  to  China'  in  Chinese  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Metals,  Minerals  &  Chemicals  Importers  & 
Exporters  (ed.  ),  How  to  Respond  to  Foreign  Countries'  Anti-Dumping  Practice?  '  (Beijing,  China: 
Foreign  Economy  and  Trade  Publisher,  2001)  at  p  172. 
79  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98,  OJ  1998  L128/18. 
80  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  provides  that: 
'i.  Decisions  of  firms  regarding  prices,  costs  and  inputs,  including  for  instance  raw  materials,  cost  of 
technology  and  labour,  output,  sales  and  investment,  are  made  in  response  to  market  signals  reflecting 
supply  and  demand,  and  without  significant  State  interference  in  this  regard,  and  costs  of  major  inputs 
substantially  reflect  market  values; 
ii.  Firms  have  one  clear  set  of  basic  accounting  records  which  are  independently  audited  in  line  with 
international  accounting  standards  and  are  applied  for  all  purposes, 
iii.  The  production  costs  and  financial  situation  of  firms  are  not  subject  to  significant  distortions 
carried  over  from  the  former  NME  system,  in  particular  in  relation  to  depreciation  of  assets,  other 
write-offs,  barter  trade  and  payment  via  compensation  of  debts, 
iv.  The  firms  concerned  are  subject  to  bankruptcy  and  property  laws  which  guarantee  legal  certainty 
and  stability  for  the  operation  of  firms,  and 
v.  Exchange  rate  conversions  are  carried  out  at  the  market  rate.  ' 
71 Regulation  are  not  flexible  enough  to  accommodate  the  change  of  China's 
current  transitional  economic  status.  Second,  the  EU  enjoys  too  broad  a 
discretion  when  they  assess  dumping.  In  that  case,  both  factors  easily  result  in 
unfair  judgements  adverse  to  Chinese  exporters.  This  issue  will  be  further 
analyzed  in  the  next  chapter. 
C.  History  and  development  of  the  ECSC  anti-dumping  rules. 
Since  coal  and  steel  products  were  outside  the  scope  of  the  EC  Treaty,  they 
were  not  supervised  by  EC  anti-dumping  Regulations.  With  regard  to 
products  listed  in  the  annex  to  the  ECSC  Treaty,  81  they  were  governed  by  the 
Commission  Decision  on  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries 
not  members  of  the  ECSC. 
The  first  anti-dumping  duty  rule  codified  by  the  ECSC  is  Recommendation 
77/32  9.82  It  was  adopted  as  part  of  the  'Davignon  Plan'  to  help  the  ECSC  steel 
industry  cope  with  economic  crisis  at  that  time.  The  rules  were  based  on  the 
contemporary  E  C83  anti-dumping  Regulation  except  for  a  few  procedural 
modifications  which  were  made  to  accommodate  the  differences  in  the 
institutional  structure  of  the  ECSC  such  as  the  more  active  role  of  the 
Commission  (formerly  the  High  Authority)  in  the  decision-making  process 
compared  with  the  EC  Commission. 
The  first  amendment  to  the  Recommendation  was  made  by  Recommendation 
No.  3004/77/EC  SC84  in  December  1977.  It  introduced  some  provisions  to 
81  Annex  1,  ECSC  Treaty. 
82  Recommendation  77/329/ECSC,  OJ  1977  Ll  14/6. 
83  'EC'  is  used  in  this  section  in  order  to  be  distinguished  from  the  ECSC. 
84  Commission  Recommendation  No  3004/77/ECSC  , 
OJ  1977  L352/13. 
72 respond  to  'the  American  trigger  price  mechanism  and  laid  down  the 
ground-work  for  the  subsequent  Community  basic  price  system  for  iron  and 
steel  products.  '  85  The  second  amendment  was  made  by  Recommendation  No. 
158/79/EC  SC86 
,  which  provided  specific  rules  dealing  with  dumped  imports 
from  state-trading  countries. 
Following  the  enactment  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  3017/79,  the  ECSC 
published  its  Recommendation  No.  3018/79/ECSC  87 
. 
The  innovations  made 
mainly  concerned  subsidies  and  countervailing  duties.  This  Recommendation 
was  later  revised  in  1982.88  The  new  rules  provided  that  reviews  would  be 
held  only  one  year  later  after  the  termination  of  the  proceedings. 
Subsequently,  Recommendation  No.  3025/82/EC  S  C89  was  published  pursuant 
to  a  GATT  understanding  on  basic  price  systems.  In  1984,  Commission 
Decision  2177/84/ECSC90  replaced  the  previous  rule  in  order  to  strengthen 
the  enforcement  of  the  rules.  It  provided  that  anti-dumping  and 
countervailing  duties  may  be  imposed  by  legal  instruments  such  as  Decisions, 
85  Beseler  &  Williams,  fn  20  above  at  p  25. 
86  Commission  Recommendation  No  158/79/ECSC  of  29  January  1979  amending  recommendations 
77/329/ECSC  on  protection  against  dumping  or  the  granting  of  bounties  or  subsidies  by  countries 
which  are  not  members  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  OJ  1979  L21/14 
87  Commission  Recommendation  No  3018/79/ECSC  of  21  December  1979  on  protection  against 
dumped  or  subsidized  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community  OJ  1979  L339/15 
88  Commission  Recommendation  No  1995/82/ECSC  of  22  July  1982  amending  Recommendation  No 
3018/79/ECSC  on  protection  against  dumped  or  subsidized  imports  from  countries  not  members  of 
the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  OJ  1982  L215/28. 
89  Commission  Recommendation  No  3025/82/ECSC  of  12  November  1982  amending 
Recommendation  No  3018/79/ECSC  on  protection  against  dumped  or  subsidized  imports  from 
countries  not  members  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  OJ  1982  L317/17. 
90  Commission  Decision  No  2177/84/ECSC  of  27  July  1984  on  protection  against  dumped  or 
subsidized  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  OJ  1984 
1-201/17. 
73 which  have  similar  legal  effects  under  the  ECSC  Treaty  as  a  Regulation  has 
under  the  EEC  Treaty. 
Following  the  publication  of  Council  Regulation  2423/8891,  the  ECSC  issued 
its  Decision  2424/88/ECSC.  92  It  unified  amendments  made  by  the 
contemporary  EC  anti-dumping  Regulation. 
In  order  to  incorporate  the  rules  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement,  the  E  C93 
enacted  Regulation  384/96  as  its  consolidated  version  of  anti-dumping 
legislation.  Likewise,  the  ECSC  published  Commission  Decision  No 
2277/96/ECSC.  94 
According  to  the  amendments  95  made  by  the  EU  to  Article  2  of  its 
anti-dumping  Regulation  (rules  of  comparison  of  normal  value  and  export 
price  and  provisions  governing  dumped  imports  from  NMEs),  the  ECSC 
revised  its  former  Decision  in  May  199996  to  accommodate  these  changes. 
Due  to  the  great  progress  in  the  economic  status  in  those  so  called  NMEs.  the 
EU  once  again  amended  its  anti-dumping  legislation  with  Council  Regulation 
(EC)  No  2238/2000.97  Subsequently,  the  ECSC  also  enacted  Commission 
91  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2423/88  of  II  July  1988  on  protection  against  dumped  or  subsidized 
imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Economic  Community  OJ  1988  L209/1. 
92  Commission  Decision  No  2424/88/ECSC  of  29  July  1988  on  protection  against  dumped  or 
subsidized  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  OJ  1988 
L209/18  and  corrigendum  in  OJ  1988  L273/19. 
93  1  use  'EC'  here  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  the  ECSC. 
94  Commission  Decision  No  2277/96/ECSC.  OJ  1996  L  308/11. 
95  Council  Regulation  (EQ  No  905/98  and  Regulation  (EQ  No  2238/2000. 
96  Commission  Decision  No  1000/1999/ECSC,  OJ  1999  1-122/35. 
97  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2238/2000,  OJ  2000  L257/2. 
74 Decision  No  435/2001/ECSC  of  2  March  2001  amending  Decision  No 
2277/96/EC  SC.  98 
IL  Current  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  in  force. 
After  the  ECSC  Treaty  expired  on  23  July  2002,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/9e9 
replaces  Commission  Decision  No  2277/96/ECSC'OO  and  governs  products  listed  in  the 
Annex  to  the  ECSC  Treaty.  101  Therefore,  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  in  force 
currently  is  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  and  its  amendments  made--Regulation 
(EC)  No  2331/961  02 
, 
Regulation  (EC)  No  905/981  03 
, 
Regulation  (EC)  No  2238/20001  04 
and  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002.105  It  governs  imports  from  third  countries 
not  Members  of  the  EU. 
A.  Objectives  and  Principles  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  Regulation. 
As  a  Contracting  Party  to  the  GATT,  the  EC  established  its  anti-dumping 
legislation  under  the  GATT  legal  framework. 
Pursuant  to  the  objectives  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  to  restore  fair 
international  competition,  the  EU'  s  anti-dumping  Regulation  should  ensure 
98  Commission  Decision  No  435/2001/ECSC,  OJ  2001  L63/14.  These  amendments  were  made  to 
parallel  to  the  revised  anti-dumping  Regulation. 
99  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96,  OJ  1996  L56/1. 
100  Commission  Decision  No  2277/96/ECSC,  OJ  1996  L  308/11. 
101  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  963/2002  of  3  June  2002  laying  down  transitional  provisions 
concerning  anti-dumping  and  anti-subsidy  measures  adopted  pursuant  to  Commission  Decisions  No 
2277/96/ECSC  and  No  1889/98/ECSC  as  well  as  pending  anti-dumping  and  anti-subsidy 
investigations,  complaints  and  applications  pursuant  to  those  Decisions.  OJ  2002  L  149/3. 
102  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2331/96,  OJ  1996  L317/1. 
103  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98,  OJ  1998  L  128/18. 
104  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2238/2000,  OJ  2000  L257/2. 
105  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002,  OJ  2002  L305/1. 
75 Ca  level  playing  field  for  all  producers  on  EU  market'.  106  On  the  one  hand,  it 
restricts  or  punishes  manufacturers  outside  the  EU  who  undercut  their 
competitors  by  dumping,  which  will  boost  their  market  share  or  drive  the 
competition  from  the  market.  On  the  other  hand,  it  provides  the  norm  of 
anti-dumping,  so  that  anti-dumping  measures  will  not  be  abused  to  exclude 
reasonable  imports.  In  other  words,  its  impact  on  EU  trade  should  not  be 
exaggerated. 
In  the  EU's  anti-dumping  Regulation,  107  Article  I  establishes  four  principles 
to  be  observed  when  the  law  is  applied.  They  concern  the  scope  of  the 
Regulation  and  three  basic  concepts,  i.  e.  dumping,  exporting  country  and  like 
product. 
B.  Substantive  rules  and  key  concepts. 
1.  Determination  of  dumping. 
Article  2  provides  detailed  rules  to  determine  dumping.  First  of  all,  it  defines 
two  key  concepts: 
Normal  value  shall  normally  be  based  on  the  prices  paid  or  payable,  in 
the  ordinary  course  of  trade,  by  independent  customers  in  the  exporting 
country. 
Export  price  shall  be  the  price  actually  paid  or  payable  for  the  product 
when  sold  for  export  from  the  exporting  country  to  the  Community.  '  08 
106  ,  Trade  Policy  Instrument:  on  Guard  for  Unfair  Practice' 
<http:  //trade-info.  cec.  eu.  int/europa/2001newround/pol.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
107  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96,  OJ  1996  L  56/1. 
108  Art.  2(8),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96. 
76 The  rule  also  provides  principles  to  determine  normal  value  and  export  price 
when  there  is  no  direct  source  available.  However,  these  methods  to 
determine  normal  value  are  only  applicable  to  MEs.  As  far  as  NMEs  are 
concerned,  there  is  another  procedure:  selection  of  analogue  country,  which 
means  the  normal  value  of  imports  from  these  countries  should  be  determined 
by  that  of  a  like  product  in  a  third  ME.  As  to  the  selection  of  such  an  analogue 
country,  Article  2(7)  lays  down  that: 
an  appropriate  market  economy  third  country  shall  be  selected  in  a  not 
unreasonable  manner,  due  account  being  taken  of  any  reliable  information 
made  available  at  the  time  of  selection.  Account  shall  also  be  taken  of  time 
limits;  where  appropriate,  a  market  economy  third  country  which  is  subject 
to  the  same  investigation  shall  be  used. 
From  the  rule  quoted  above,  we  may  find  out  that  the  selection  of  an  analogue 
country  is  a  very  complex  issue  and  process.  Because,  today,  there  are  hardly 
two  different  areas  which  have  similar  economic  development  levels  as  well 
as  the  same  manufacturing  costs.  However,  the  rule  simply  stipulates  that 
such  a  selection  should  be  made  in  'a  not  unreasonable  manner'.  The  words 
here  are  rather  vague  and  leave  extremely  broad  discretion  to  relevant  EU 
authorities  to  make  judgement. 
Furthermore,  Article  2(7)  stipulates  that: 
the  parties  to  the  investigation  shall  be  informed  shortly  after  its  initiation 
of  the  market  economy  third  country  envisaged  and  shall  be  given  10  days 
to  comment. 
This  rule  seems  to  be  reasonable  at  first  glance.  However,  most  NMEs  are 
developing  countries.  So.  it  is  hard  to  imagine  that  a  developing  country  is 
77 able  to  collect  the  necessary  information  of  the  third  ME  and  then  make 
comment  within  such  a  short  period.  Even  a  developed  country  may  find  it 
difficult  to  achieve.  This  rule  is  obviously  unfair  to  the  NME. 
The  inappropriate  wording  and  the  time  limit  provided  in  the  rule  are  clearly 
unreasonable.  There  are  further  unfair  factors  in  the  rules  with  regard  to 
NMEs,  and  all  of  these  will  be  analyzed  carefully  and  logically  in  the  next 
chapter. 
In  addition  to  the  provisions  analyzed  above,  Article  2  also  specifies 
procedures  to  make  comparison  of  normal  value  and  export  value  and 
methods  to  calculate  dumping  margin. 
2.  Determination  of  injury 
Article  3  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  Regulation  covers  rules  to  assess  the 
injury  of  dumped  imports.  Injury  should  be  determined  by  two  factors:  the 
volume  of  dumped  imports  and  their  effects  on  prices  of  like  products  in  the 
EU;  the  actual  impact  of  those  imports  on  industry  of  the  EU.  Meanwhile,  the 
rules  emphasize  three  points: 
a.  The  existence  of  dumping:  whether  there  is  a  significant  increase  in 
dumped  imports  and  their  price.  109 
b.  Examination  of  the  injury:  other  factors  that  are  injuring  the  Community 
industry  shall  be  taken  into  account  separately  with  dumped  imports;  '10 
Determination  of  the  effect  of  the  dumped  imports  shall  be  based  on  solid 
109  Ail.  3(3),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96. 
110  Art.  3(7),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
78 facts.  "' 
c.  The  actual  causal  relationship  between  dumped  imports  and  injury  on  the  Community 
industry. 
3.  Definition  of  Community  industry. 
Article  4  provides  a  general  notion  of  Community  industry,  which  refers  to 
the  EU  producers  as  a  whole  of  the  like  products  or  those  whose  collective 
output  of  the  products  constitutes  a  major  proportion  of  the  total  EU 
production  of  the  like  product.  The  rule  also  identifies  exceptional  situations 
(when  producers  are  related  to  the  allegedly  dumped  product)  and  several 
criteria  to  examine  such  relationship. 
C.  Procedural  requirements. 
1.  Initiation  of  proceedings  and  subsequent  investigation. 
Article  5  identifies  the  requirement  to  initiate  an  anti-dumping  investigation, 
i.  e.  a  written  complaint  should  be  submitted  on  behalf  of  the  Community 
industry  to  the  European  Commission  or  to  a  Member  State.  '  12  Or,  in  the 
absence  of  any  complaint,  a  Member  State  that  possesses  relevant  sufficient 
evidence  shall  communicate  such  evidence  to  the  Commission  at  once. 
The  Article  also  sets  the  basic  content  of  a  complaint  113  to  determine  whether 
it  is  made  on  behalf  of  the  Community  industry 
114 
. 
Besides,  it  stresses  that  an 
investigation  can  be  initiated  only  when  there  is  sufficient  evidence  of  both 
III  Art.  3(8),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
112  Art.  5(1),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
113  Art.  5(2),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
1  14  Art.  5(4),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
79 dumping  and  injury  to  support  the  complaint. 
Article  6  focuses  on  the  anti-dumping  investigation.  It  specifies  time  limits 
for  an  investigation's  duration,  rules  on  notification  to  interested  parties  and 
collection  of  evidence. 
2.  Provisional  measures. 
Article  7  provides  prerequisites  to  adopt  anti-dumping  provisional  measures, 
the  amount  of  the  duty  that  should  be  imposed  and  time  limit  to  take 
anti-dumping  measures. 
It  is  noticeable  that  the  first  paragraph  of  the  Article  sets  five  prerequisites 
before  any  provisional  duty  can  be  imposed.  They  are: 
'proceedings  have  been  initiated  in  accordance  with  Article  5; 
notice  has  been  given  to  that  effect; 
interested  parties  have  been  given  adequate  opportunities  to  submit 
information  and  make  comments  in  accordance  with  Article  5  (10); 
-a  provisional  affirmative  determination  has  been  made  of  dumping  and 
consequent  injury  to  the  Community  industry; 
the  Community  interest  calls  for  intervention  to  prevent  such  injury.  '  115 
3.  Price  undertakings. 
Article  8  stipulates  that  during  the  course  of  an  anti-dumping  investigation,  if 
satisfactory  price  undertakings  are  offered  by  an  exporter  to  revise  its  prices 
115  Art.  7(l),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96. 
80 or  cease  exports  at  the  dumped  price  on  a  voluntary  base,  anti-dumping 
proceedings  may  be  terminated  without  the  imposition  of  provisional  or 
definitive  duties.  The  rules  also  set  criteria  on  acceptable  price  undertakings. 
In  case  of  breach  or  withdrawal  of  undertakings  by  any  exporter,  a  definitive 
duty  shall  be  imposed  in  accordance  with  Article  9.116 
4.  Imposition  and  collection  of  definitive  duties. 
Article  9  specifies  the  conditions  to  terminate  anti-dumping  investigations  or 
impose  definitive  duties.  Procedures  and  time  limits  to  make  such  decisions 
are  also  covered  by  the  rule.  Pursuant  to  the  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Agreement, 
an  anti-dumping  duty  should  be  less  than  the  margin  of  dumping  if  such  a 
lesser  duty  is  adequate  to  remove  injury  of  the  domestic  industry  in  the 
importing  state  1".  So,  the  EU's  anti-dumping  Regulation  emphasizes  two 
points  on  its  imposition  and  collection  of  definitive  duties. 
-A  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  can  be  imposed  by  the  Council  only  after 
the  fact  of  dumping  and  injury  caused  on  EU  interest  thereby  are  well 
established. 
118 
-  'An  anti-dumping  duty  shall  be  imposed  in  the  appropriate  amounts  in 
each  case  ... 
The  Regulation  imposing  the  duty  shall  specify  the  duty  for 
each  supplier. 
1195 
However,  in  accordance  with  Article  2.7  of  the  Regulation,  Article  9.5  states 
116  Art.  8(9),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
117  Art.  9(l),  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
118  Art.  9(4),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96. 
119  Art.  9(5),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96. 
81 that  the  second  point  (i.  e.  specific  anti-dumping  duty  for  individual  supplier) 
may  not  be  applicable  to  NMEs.  This  provides  the  legal  base  for  one  country 
one  duty  rule,  which  significantly  guide  the  EU's  anti-dumping  practice 
against  dumped  imports  from  China  nowadays. 
China's  effective  economic  reform  has  lasted  for  more  than  twenty  years 
(since  1979),  and  it  enables  most  Chinese  enterprises  to  manage  their 
business  by  themselves  with  much  more  rights  than  ever  before.  This  results 
in  the  situation  that  different  enterprises  have  different  market  economic 
development  levels,  which  means  that  Chinese  exporters  producing  the  same 
product  may  have  different  costs  and  export  prices  thereby. 
From  this  point  of  view,  the  EU's  one  country  one  duty  rule  is  neither 
practical  nor  fair  to  be  applied  to  imports  from  China.  This  issue  will  be 
further  analyzed  with  a  few  cases  in  the  next  chapter. 
Article  10  contains  rules  about  the  imposition  of  anti-dumping  definitive 
duties.  It  mainly  provides  that  the  difference  shall  not  be  collected  if  the 
definitive  duty  is  higher  than  the  provisional  duty.  While  if  the  former  is 
lower  than  the  latter,  the  duty  shall  be  recalculated  . 
120  Besides,  it  provides  the 
time  limit  to  impose  the  definitive  duties,  i.  e.  having  the  prerequisites  for 
their  imposition,  definitive  duties  can  be  imposed  retroactively  on  products 
imported  during  a  period  of  up  to  90  days  before  provisional  duties  enter  into 
force.  In  no  circumstances  may  they  be  imposed  on  products  imported  before 
the  initiation  date.  121 
120  Art.  10.3,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
12  1  Art.  10.4,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
82 5.  Duration,  reviews  and  refunds. 
Article  II  provides  for  the  duration  of  anti-dumping  measures  as  well  as 
detailed  procedures  of  reviews  and  refund. 
It  states  that  generally  speaking,  an  anti-dumping  measure  shall  expire 
automatically  five  years  after  its  imposition.  However,  if  there  is  any  request 
containing  sufficient  evidence  to  show  that  expiry  of  the  anti-dumping 
measure  will  lead  to  a  continuation  or  reoccurrence  of  dumping  or  injury,  an 
expiry  review  shall  be  initiated.  While  such  a  review  is  in  progress,  the 
anti-dumping  measure  shall  remain  in  force  pending  the  outcome  of  the 
review.  122 
Before  the  anti-dumping  measures  expire  automatically,  an  interim  review 
can  be  initiated  on  request  if  the  request  contains  sufficient  evidence  to  show 
that  the  measures  are  no  longer  necessary  to  offset  the  injury.  However,  such 
an  interim  review  can  only  be  accepted  after  at  least  one  year  since  the 
imposition  of  anti-dumping  duties. 
Since  the  position  of  an  exporter  who  did  not  export  to  the  EU  during  the 
investigation  period  is  problematic,  123  a  newcomer  review  shall  also  be 
carried  out  to  determine  the  exporter's  individual  margins  of 
dumping.  124  After  consultation  with  the  Advisory  Committee  and  comment  is 
made  by  EU  producers,  the  review  shall  be  initiated  and  carried  out  on  an 
accelerated  basis. 
Any  review  shall  be  terminated  within  one  year  from  the  date  of  its  initiation. 
122  Art.  11.2,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  3  84/96 
123  Van  Bael  &  Bellis,  fn  25  above  at  p  306. 
124  Art.  11  (4),  Counci  I  Regulation  (EC)  No  3  84/96. 
83 Depending  on  the  conclusion  of  the  review,  measures  shall  be  repealed  or 
maintained. 
Anti-dumping  measures  are  supposed  to  raise  the  prices  of  dumped  imports  so 
to  offset  the  injury  to  the  Community  industry.  However,  circumstances  may 
change  over  time.  Based  on  this  point,  Article  11.8  provides  a  refund 
procedure,  so  that  an  importer  may  request  reimbursement  of  duties  collected 
if  he  can  prove  that  the  dumping  margin  on  the  basis  of  which  duties  were  paid, 
has  either  been  eliminated  or  reduced  to  a  level  which  is  below  the  level  of  the 
duty  in  force. 
6.  Anti-absorption  review. 
Anti-dumping  measures  are  utilized  to  raise  the  price  of  dumped  imports  in 
order  to  offset  the  injury  to  the  Community  industry.  However,  even  after  the 
imposition  of  anti-dumping  duties,  effects  of  such  measures  may  not  be 
reflected  properly  if  exporters  sell  products  to  related  importers  at  the  same 
price  as  that  which  was  clarified  before  imposition  of  anti-dumping  duties  by 
further  reducing  their  export  prices.  Such  a  practice  is  defined  as  'absorption 
of  duties'.  125  In  that  case,  anti-dumping  measures  fail  to  reach  their  objective. 
To  deal  with  the  problem,  the  EU  provides  criteria  to  determine  such  practice 
and  procedures  for  an  anti-absorption  review  in  Article  12.  When  the 
Community  industry  demonstrates  with  sufficient  information  that  there  is  no 
change  in  the  price  of  exports  which  have  been  charged  anti-dumping  duty,  an 
investigation  will  be  reopened  to  examine  whether  the  anti-dumping 
measures  taken  are  effective  enough.  If  increased  dumping  is  confirmed  at  the 
conclusion  at  the  reinvestigation,  anti-dumping  measures  in  force  shall  be 
125  Van  Bael  &  Bellis,  fn  25  above  at  p  315. 
84 amended  pursuant  to  procedures  specified  in  this  Article. 
7.  Circumvention. 
Article  13  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  Regulation  focuses  on  circumvention  of 
anti-dumping  measures. 
First,  it  defines  circumvention  as: 
A  change  in  pattern  of  trade  between  third  countries  and  the  Community 
which  stems  from  a  practice,  process  or  work  for  which  there  is  insufficient 
due  cause  or  economic  justification  other  than  the  imposition  of  the  duty, 
and  where  there  is  evidence  that  the  remedial  effects  of  the  duty  are  being 
undermined  in  terms  of  the  prices  and/or  quantities  of  the  like  products  and 
there  is  evidence  of  dumping  in  relation  to  the  normal  values  previously 
established  for  the  like  or  similar  products.  126 
Second,  it  sets  criteria  to  judge  whether  an  assembly  operation  in  the  EU  or  a 
third  country  constitutes  circumvention  against  anti-dumping  measures. 
Third,  its  third  paragraph  provides  procedures  that  investigations  of 
circumvention  should  follow. 
With  regard  to  all  the  rules  analyzed  above,  some  of  them  are  not  relevant  to  the 
central  argument  of  my  thesis.  They  are  discussed  here  for  the  completeness  of  the 
description  of  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation,  so  they  will  not  be  dealt  further. 
However,  those  relating  to  NM[Es  and  China  are  the  highlights  of  this  thesis,  and  they 
will  be  fully  examined  in  the  next  chapters. 
12"  Art.  13)  (1),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96. 
85 M.  Enforcement  of  the  EUs  anti-dumping  rules  with  regard  to 
imports  from  the  People'ýs  Republic  of  China. 
A.  General  situation  regarding  enforcement. 
After  the  first  anti-dumping  case  (Saccharin)  about  exports  from  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  took  place  in  1979,127  more  than  twenty  years  passed,  and 
there  have  been  91  cases  in  total  initiated  by  the  EU  against  imports  from 
China  so  far  128.  Since  1988,  China  has  become  the  country  whose  exports  are 
subject  to  most  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigations.  129  Considering  the 
fact  that  those  initiated  by  the  EU  after  1990  account  for  70  percent  of  the 
total  91  cases,  there  is  a  trend  that  more  and  more  anti-dumping  investigations 
against  exports  from  China  will  be  carried  out  by  the  EU. 
Furthermore,  most  Chinese  exports  involved  in  these  anti-dumping 
investigations  were  found  to  have  been  dumped,  (up  to  now,  only  20  of  the  91 
cases  have  been  terminated  without  imposition  of  anti-dumping  measures  130), 
and  they  were  charged  with  rather  high  anti-dumping  duties  by  the  EU 
authority.  Among  69  of  the  91  cases,  Chinese  exports  were  found  to  have  been  dumped 
and  anti-dumping  measures  were  subsequently  taken  towards  them.  131  Most  of  the 
127  80/1116/EEC:  Commission  Decision  of  4  December  1980  accepting  undertakings  offered  by  the 
exporters  of  saccharin  and  its  salts  originating  in  China  and  the  United  States  of  America  and 
terminating  the  proceedings  concerning  imports  of  saccharin  and  its  salts  from  China,  Japan  and  the 
United  States  of  America.  OJ  1980  L  331/41. 
128  ,  Anti-Dumping  Reports  of  July  2001,  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation,  PRC'. 
<http:  //www.  cacs.  gov.  cn/text.  asp?  texttype=  I&  id=273  3  &power-->  (I  December  2002). 
129  Jingqi,  Wang,  Anti-Dumping  Legislation  and  Practice,  (Beijing:  People's  Court  Press,  2000)  at  p 
13)  6. 
130  c  Anti-Dumping  Reports  of  July  2001,  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation, 
PRC,  'fn  128  above. 
131  ,  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Statistics'  <http:  //www.  wto.  org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.  htm>  (I 
December  2002);  'EU's  Anti-Dumping  Statistics'  <http:  //www.  europa.  eu.  int>  (I  December  2002) 
86 anti-dumping  duties  imposed  in  these  cases  were  very  high  -  especially  when  the  one 
country  one  duty  method  was  applied.  132  There  are  only  8  cases  whose  rate  of  duty 
charged  were  under  20  percent.  133  Consequently,  the  Chinese  exporters  will  be 
much  less  competitive,  and  some  of  them  have  to  give  up  their  business  in  the 
European  market. 
From  this  point  of  view,  the  EU's  anti-dumping  regime  constitutes  a  very 
serious  barrier  to  Chinese  exports  to  access  the  European  market.  It  is  also 
very  harmful  to  the  development  of  trade  cooperation  and  sound  relationships 
between  the  EU  and  China. 
B.  Main  characters  regarding  enforcement. 
Considering  anti-dumping  cases  initiated  by  the  EU  towards  imports  from  the 
People's  Republic  of  China,  there  are  five  characteristics  of  the  enforcement 
of  the  rules. 
First,  the  number  of  anti-dumping  cases  towards  Chinese  exports  has  risen 
sharply  since  1990.  As  we  discussed  before,  those  that  took  place  after  1990 
account  for  70  percent  of  the  total  91  cases.  From  January  1999  till  July  2001, 
there  were  20  anti-dumping  investigations  carried  out  by  the  EU  against 
imports  from  China.  134  If  this  trend  is  followed,  it  is  likely  that  the  EU  will 
launch  more  and  more  anti-dumping  proceedings  against  Chinese  products  in 
future. 
Second,  there  are  fewer  anti-dumping  cases  which  are  terminated  with  price 
undertakings.  During  the  first  ten  years  from  1979  to  December  1989,24 
132  This  issue  will  be  examined  in  chapter  three. 
133  'WTO  Anti-Dumping  Statistics,  'fn  131  above. 
134 
Ibid. 
87 investigations  were  launched  against  Chinese  exports,  among  which  8  were 
terminated  with  price  undertakings.  However,  from  January  1990  till  now. 
price  undertakings  proposed  by  Chinese  exporters  were  seldom  accepted  by 
the  EU.  It  shows  that  nowadays,  the  EU  prefers  to  impose  anti-dumping  duties 
rather  than  accept  price  undertakings  on  dumped  Chinese  imports  as 
anti-dumping  measures. 
Third,  anti-dumping  duties  imposed  in  recent  years  are  much  higher  than  ever 
before.  From  August  1979  135  till  I  January  2002,  there  were  91  anti-dumping 
proceedings  launched  by  the  EU  against  Chinese  exports  within  that  period.  In  69  cases, 
Chinese  exports  were  found  to  have  been  dumped.  136  Subsequently,  anti-dumping 
measures  were  imposed  on  these  products.  In  particular,  the  duties  imposed  in  recent 
years  are  much  higher  than  ever  before.  Among  the  above  proceedings  initiated 
within  the  period  from  August  1979  to  I  January  1990,  there  are  4  cases  in  which  the  rates 
of  duties  were  above  40  percent.  While  with  regard  to  those  launched  between  I  January 
1990  to  I  January  2002,  the  number  of  such  cases  reaches  II-  almost  triples.  '  37 
Fourthly,  the  range  of  Chinese  exports  involved  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping 
investigations  has  gradually  extended  from  primary  products  to  finished 
products.  From  1979  to  1988,70  percent  of  Chinese  imports  subject  to 
anti-dumping  investigations  were  mineral  and  chemical  products.  While 
during  the  following  ten  years,  the  ratio  decreases  to  41.7  percent,  and  there 
are  more  finished  products  subject  to  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigations 
138  today 
135  The  first  anti-dumping  investigation  towards  China  initiated  by  the  European  Community  was 
Saccharin  (China,  Japan  and  U.  S.  ),  OJ  1980  L331/41. 
136 
Fn  131  above. 
137 
Ibid. 
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88 Finally,  the  EU  has  amended  its  anti-dumping  rules  applicable  to  Chinese 
exports  several  times  within  recent  years.  According  to  the  dramatic  progress 
obtained  from  China's  economic  reform,  the  EU  began  changing  its 
anti-dumping  rules  applicable  to  imports  from  China  gradually.  Since  the 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  384/96  entered  into  force  in  1996,  the  EU  has 
amended  it  several  times  to  accommodate  the  new  changes  occurring  in  those 
former  NMEs.  As  a  result,  China  was  eliminated  from  the  NME  list  in 
December  1997.139  The  amendment  gives  the  possibility  that  provisions 
determining  normal  value  of  imports  from  MEs  can  be  applied  to  Chinese 
exporters,  if  they  meet  the  five  conditions  set  in  the  new  rules. 
Though  there  still  are  significant  inflexible  or  unreasonable  factors  in  the 
EU's  anti-dumping  Regulation  with  regard  to  China,  the  amendment  is  no 
doubt  a  desirable  step  forward.  It  not  only  reflects  the  objectives  of 
anti-dumping  legislation,  (i.  e.  to  restore  fair  competition  in  international 
trade  rather  than  restrict  due  imports,  )  but  also  shows  the  EU's  wish  to 
develop  a  sound  commercial  relationship  with  China  to  a  certain  extent. 
C.  Problems  arising  in  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  with  regard 
to  imports  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
Examining  the  statistics  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  measures  taken  since  they 
were  first  utilized  in  1970,  we  may  find  the  following  inconsistencies: 
I.  The  increasing  anti-dumping  measures  taken  by  the  EU  do  not  agree 
with  China's  current  economic  status,  which  has  fundamentally  changed  after 
the  reform  within  this  decade. 
<http:  //www.  ec3286.  coi-n/report/zhengce/002.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
139  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98,  OJ  1998  L  128/18. 
89 The  methods  that  the  EU  adopts  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  products 
exported  from  China  were  based  on  China's  former  economic  structure  and  its 
government  policy  --  central  state  control  twenty  years  ago.  However,  since 
1992  when  China  officially  confirmed  its  current  policy  to  accelerate  the 
transformation  of  the  country  into  a  market-oriented  economy,  reforms  have 
been  designed  and  implemented  to  make  state-owned  enterprises  operate  as 
independent  economic  entities  and  to  be  fully  responsible  for  their  profits  and 
losses.  As  a  result,  dramatic  changes  in  China's  economic  structures  and 
development  took  place.  140  Prices  of  over  90  percent  of  final  goods  are  now 
determined  by  market  forces,  a  factor  which  has  been  confirmed  by  the  World 
Bank.  14  1  According  to  these  significant  changes,  most  countries  (such  as  the 
United  States  and  Japan)  who  used  to  regard  China  as  an  NME  have  changed 
their  anti-dumping  policies  towards  China  and  granted  individual  treatment 
to  Chinese  state-owned  enterprises  when  the  investigation  is  initiated.  142  This 
has  proved  to  be  more  rational  and  practical  in  later  cases.  However,  the  EU 
seems  to  respond  less  to  the  fundamental  changes  resulting  from  China's 
economic  reform.  Though  in  the  new  Council  Regulation  No.  905/98,  it 
deleted  China  from  the  list  of  NMEs  and  agreed  to  consider  individual 
investigation  to  Chinese  exporters  who  meet  certain  criteria.  This  is  no  doubt 
a  big  step  forward,  but  things  have  not  changed  because  the  criteria  set  in  the 
new  Regulation  are  too  severe  and  impractical  to  meet  the  need  of  actual 
situations  (as  will  be  illustrated  in  the  following  chapters).  As  a  result,  most 
Chinese  companies  involved  in  anti-dumping  proceedings  are  still  subject  to 
140  China's  economic  reforms  and  prospects  will  be  examined  in  chapter  four. 
141  'China:  Reform  and  Development  in  1992-1993',  World  Bank  Discussion  Paper  No.  215, 
<http:  //www-wds.  worldbank.  org/servlet/WDS-IBank_Serviet?  pcont--details&eid=000009265_3970 
716144524>  (I  December  2002). 
142  Alternative  anti-dumping  approaches  of  the  U.  S,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan  towards  China 
will  be  full),  analyzed  in  chapter  five. 
90 the  analogue  country  method  in  the  calculation  of  their  normal  value  and  one 
country  one  duty  rule  when  determining  anti-dumping  duties.  Furthermore, 
anti-dumping  investigations  initiated  by  the  EU  in  1999  reached  12,  which  is 
the  highest  compared  with  that  of  before'  43 
. 
The  fact  shows  that  the  EU's  new 
anti-dumping  policy  against  China  does  not  achieve  the  objective  to 
accommodate  the  changes  arising  from  China's  economic  reform,  and  this 
also  brings  about  the  following  two  inconsistencies. 
2.  Considering  the  past  twenty  years,  the  number  of  the  total  EU's 
anti-dumping  cases  has  gone  down,  while  those  against  China  has  risen 
sharply.  From  1979  to  1998,  the  number  of  EU's  anti-dumping  cases  against 
third  countries  is  decreasing.  The  average  cases  initiated  per  year  has 
declined  from  42  ten  years  ago  to  33  within  the  residual  ten  years,  while  cases 
concerning  Chinese  exports  increased  from  average  2.3  per  year  in  the  first 
ten  years  to  4.6  in  the  last  ten  years,  which  occupied  from  5.5  percent  of  the 
total  EU's  anti-dumping  cases  for  the  former  period  to  13.8  percent  for  the 
following  ten  years.  '  44 
3.  The  actual  effect  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  policy  against  China  is  not 
consistent  with  its  objective  (i.  e.  to  restore  fair  competition,  offset  the  injury 
and  limit  the  sharply  increasing  quantity  of  dumped  goods  rather  than  exclude 
them  from  the  EU).  But  in  fact,  statistics  of  imports  from  China  suffering 
from  the  effects  of  EU's  anti-dumping  measures  show  that  they  exceed  their 
original  purpose.  Due  to  the  unjustified  factors  discussed  above,  most 
Chinese  exporters  involved  in  the  investigation  suffer  very  high  anti-dumping 
143  ,  The  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  against  Imports  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China',  fn  138 
above. 
144 
Ibid. 
91 duties  so  that  they  are  virtually  excluded  from  the  European  market  since  then. 
For  example,  China  exported  more  than  200  million  bicycles  to  the  EU  in 
1991,  but  since  the  anti-dumping  duty  as  high  as  30.6  percent  was  imposed  in 
1993ý  it  has  been  excluded  from  the  European  market  gradually.  Similarly, 
colour  televisions  from  China  almost  disappear  from  the  European  market 
now  after  being  levied  44.6  percent  anti-dumping  duty  145 
. 
From  this  point,  it 
is  easy  to  see  that  the  actual  effects  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  policy 
obviously  deviate  from  its  objectives! 
These  inconsistencies  reflect  problems  existing  in  the  EU  anti-dumping 
legislation  towards  China.  They  will  be  analyzed  and  explained  in  detail  in 
the  next  chapter. 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  elaborates  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  by  analysing  its 
evolution,  key  concepts,  substantive  and  procedural  rules.  In  addition,  the 
main  differences  between  provisions  applicable  to  MEs  and  those  for  NMEs 
are  analyzed.  In  the  end,  the  current  situation  of  the  enforcement  of  the  rules 
applicable  to  China  is  introduced.  So,  it  provides  a  theoretical  basis  for  the 
EU's  anti-dumping  rules  with  regard  to  China,  which  enables  us  to  further 
explore  its  problems  and  issues  in  the  next  chapters. 
The  EU  applies  different  provisions  to  MEs  and  NMEs  when  it  determines 
normal  value  of  imports  under  investigations.  It  did  not  give  any  definition  of 
NME. 
) 
but  provided  a  relevant  list  in  1994.  Due  to  the  signi  ficant  progress 
14S  .  Anti-Dumping  Measures  against  China  Sharply  Decrease  Chinese  Exports  Volumes' 
<http:  //www.  peopledaily.  com.  cn/zcxx/2000/08/0821  I  O.  html>  (I  December  2002). 
92 obtained  from  these  so-called  NMEs'  economic  reforms  of  this  decade,  the 
EU  amended  its  anti-dumping  rules  in  order  to  accommodate  new  changes  of 
these  countries'  economic  status.  Thus,  a  number  of  countries  were  deleted 
from  the  NME  list.  China  is  one  of  these  countries.  According  to  the  revised 
provisions,  China  can  be  treated  as  an  ME  in  EU's  anti-dumping  proceedings 
if  exporters  can  demonstrate  that  they  operate  separately  from  the 
government,  i.  e.  they  meet  the  five  criteria  set  in  the  new  rules.  This  is  a 
desirable  step  forward.  However,  since  the  criteria  are  applied  in  an  inflexible 
way  in  practice,  most  Chinese  exports  under  the  EU's  anti-dumping 
investigations  are  found  to  be  dumped. 
Considering  the  data  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  measures,  we  find  some 
inconsistency  of  facts.  They  reflect  that  the  EU's  current  anti-dumping  rules 
with  regard  to  the  People's  Republic  of  China  are  problematic.  The  reasons 
for  this  will  be  analyzed  in  detail  in  the  next  chapter. 
93 Chapter  Three 
Unreasonable  Factors  in  the  Current  EU's 
Anti-Dumping  Policy  towards  the  People's 
Republic  of  China 
Introduction 
As  discussed  in  the  second  chapter,  the  EU  revised  its  an&dumping  legislation  applicable 
to  the  People's  Republic  of  China  due  to  the  latter's  dramatic  progress  achieved  by 
economic  reforms  during  the  past  twenty  years.  '  These  amendments  mainly  include  the 
adoption  of  a  conditional  market  economy  treatment  and  the  new  criteria  set  to  grant 
individual  treatment  to  Chinese  exporters. 
One  of  the  most  important  changes  was  made  towards  China's  economic  status.  The  EU 
used  to  regard  China  as  a  non-market  economy  (NME),  hence  it  used  the  analogue 
country  method  (apply  the  domestic  price  of  the  like  product  from  a  third  ME  to 
determine  the  normal  value  of  imports  from  an  NME).  Following  the  enforcement  of 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  905/98,2  if  the  required  conditions  are  satisfied,  producers  and 
exporters  from  China  would  be  allowed  to  use  their  domestic  sales  prices  to  calculate  the 
normal  value  in  an  anti-dumping  investigation. 
1  China's  economic  reforms  and  development  prospects  will  be  analyzed  in  chapter  four. 
2  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  of  27  April  1998  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on 
protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community.  OJ  1998 
L  128/18. 
94 Another  kind  of  amendment  was  made  to  individual  treatment.  It  means  that  an 
individual  dumping  margin  is  calculated  for  the  exporting  producer  by  comparing  the 
normal  value  from  the  analogue  country  with  the  producer's  own  export  prices.  It  is 
granted  where  an  exporting  producer  in  an  NME  can  show  that  its  export  activities  are  not 
subject  to  state  interference.  Individual  treatment  was  first  introduced  in  the  Small  Screen 
Televisions  (SCTVS)3  case  in  199  1.  The  criteria  for  application  of  the  approach  were  later 
revised  in  1997,4  20005  and  2002 
.6 
The  latest  legislation  was  made  on  5  November 
20029  7  which  set  out  five  criteria  for  exporters  from  NMEs  to  apply  for  individual 
treatment. 
Based  on  these  points,  there  are  four  separate  forms  of  treatment  which  are  applied 
against  Chinese  exporters  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigations  at  present: 
1.  Traditional  non-market  economy  treatment  -  analogue  country  method; 
11.  Conditional  market  economy  treatment  (conditional  MET); 
111.  One  country  one  duty  rule; 
3  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2093/91  of  15  July  1991  imposing  a  definitive  anti-  dumping  duty  on 
imports  of  small-screen  color  television  receivers  originating  in  Hong  Kong  and  the  People's  Republic 
of  China  and  collecting  definitively  the  provisional  duty  OJ  1991  L  195/1. 
4  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EQ  No  384/96  on  protection  against 
dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*COM/97/0677  final  - 
ACC.  OJ  1998  C70/15. 
5  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EQ  No  384/96  on  protection  against 
durnped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*  COM/2000/0363  final  - 
ACC  2000/0160. 
6  Council  Regulation  (EQ  No  1972/2002  of  5  November  2002  amending  Regulation  (EQ  No  384/96 
on  the  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community. 
OJ  2002  L305/1. 
7  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EQ  No  384/96  on  protection  against 
dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*COM/2000/0363  final  - 
ACC  2000/0160. 
95 IV.  Individual  treatment. 
The  analogue  country  method  and  the  one  country  one  duty  rule  are  the  forms  of 
treatment  traditionally  used  by  the  EU  in  its  anti-dumping  policy  towards  China.  They 
have  come  to  be  more  and  more  problematic  due  to  China's  economic  reform  during  the 
past  twenty  years.  Under  these  circumstances,  both  the  conditional  MET  and  individual 
treatment  have  been  introduced,  in  order  to  accommodate  the  remarkable  advances 
brought  about  by  the  economic  reform  in  China.  They  are  presumed  to  bring  more 
justification  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  practice.  However,  relevant  statistics  for  recent 
years  show  the  impact  of  the  new  approach  is  rather  discouraging.  It  also  makes  it  clear 
that  the  application  of  these  new  approaches  is  problematic,  at  least  from  a  statistical 
point  of  view. 
The  section  below  analyzes  the  four  different  approaches  applied  by  the  EU  in  its 
anti-dumping  investigations  against  imports  from  China  in  four  sections.  For  each  of 
them,  I  will  at  first  analyze  the  rule  from  both  a  theoretical  and  practical  basis,  then 
enumerate  why  each  can  be  considered  unreasonable  by  referring  to  some  typical  cases. 
In  short,  this  chapter  analyzes  and  comments  on  the  current  EU's  anti-dumping  rules 
towards  China,  and  therefore  constitutes  a  significant  part  of  the  whole  thesis. 
1.  Traditional  non-market  economy  treatment  (analogue  country 
method) 
The  analogue  country  method  is  the  traditional  method  to  determine  the  normal  value  of 
Chinese  exports  involved  in  anti-dumping  investigations  by  the  EU.  When  a  Chinese 
company  fails  to  reach  the  criteria  for  conditional  MET,  such  a  treatment  will  be  applied 
automatically. 
96 A.  Relevant  rules  in  force. 
In  the  current  EU  anti-dumping  legislation,  it  was  specified  in  Regulation  384/96  8  ('basic 
Regulation'  thereafter)  in  Article  2  (A)(7)  as: 
In  the  case  of  imports  from  NMEs  and,  in  particular,  those  to  which  Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  519/94  (5)  applied,  normal  value  shall  be  determined  on  the 
basis  of  the  price  or  countries,  including  the  Community,  or  where  those  are  not 
possible,  on  any  other  reasonable  basis,  including  the  price  actually  paid  or 
payable  in  the  Community  for  the  like  product,  duly  adjusted  if  necessary  to 
include  a  reasonable  profit  margin. 
An  appropriate  market  economy  third  country  shall  be  selected  in  a  not 
unreasonable  manner,  due  account  being  taken  of  any  reliable  information  made 
available  at  the  time  of  selection.  Account  shall  also  be  taken  of  time  limits;  where 
appropriate,  a  market  economy  third  country  which  is  subject  to  the  same 
investigation  shall  be  used. 
The  parties  to  the  investigation  shall  be  informed  shortly  after  its  initiation  of  the 
market  economy  third  country  envisaged  and  shall  be  given  10  days  to  comment. 
B.  Outcome  of  application  of  the  analogue  country  method. 
From  August  1979  when  the  first  anti-dumping  investigation  was  initiated  against 
Chinese  exports  by  the  European  Community'  till  April  1998  when  the  EU  introduced 
conditional  MET  for  both  China,  the  EU  adopted  the  analogue  country  method  to 
8  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against  dumped  imports 
frorn  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community,  OJ  1996  L  56/1. 
9  Here  I  use  'European  Community'  because  the  investigation  was  initiated  before  the  EU  was 
established  by  the  Treaty  on  European  Union,  which  entered  into  force  on  I  November  1993. 
97 determine  the  normal  value  of  all  imports  from  China.  There  were  72  antimdumping 
proceedings  launched  by  the  EU  against  Chinese  exports  within  that  period.  In  61  cases, 
Chinese  exports  were  found  to  have  been  dumped.  10  Subsequently,  the  EU  imposed 
anti-dumping  measures  in  all  these  cases.  In  most  cases,  the  anti-dumping  duties  imposed 
were  very  high  -  especially  when  one  country  one  duty  rule  was  applied,  i.  e.  a  single  duty 
rate  was  charged.  In  only  4  cases'  1  was  the  rate  of  duty  charged  under  20  percent.  12 
C.  Theoretical  and  practical  analysis  of  the  rule. 
1.  The  wording  of  the  rule  is  rather  vague. 
The  rule  merely  provides  that  the  selection  of  the  reference  country  shall  be  made  on  a 
reasonable  basis.  It  is  too  vague  to  regulate  such  a  complex  selection  of  a  third  ME.  Thus, 
) 
it  leaves  great  discretionary  powers  to  the  EU  authorities. 
Generally  speaking,  all  so-called  non-market  economies  are  developing  countries,  and 
market  economies  are  developed  countries.  Since  a  certain  field  or  industry  cannot 
flourish  isolated  from  others  in  a  country,  so  its  development  level  should  be  parallel  to 
that  of  the  country.  From  this  point  of  view,  it  is  unscientific  to  compare  an  industry  from 
10  ,  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Statistics'  <http:  //www.  wto.  org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.  htm>  (I 
December  2002); 
'Anti-Dumping  Statistics  of  the  EU'  <http:  //ww-w.  europa.  eu.  int>  (I  December  2002). 
11  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2093/91;  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3433/91  of  25  November 
1991  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  gas-fuelled,  non-refillable  pocket  flint 
lighters  originating  in  Japan,  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  the  Republic  of  Korea  and  Thailand  and 
definitively  collecting  the  provisional  anti-dumping  duty,  OJ  1991  L326/1; 
Council  Regulation  (EQ  No  3664/93  of  22  December  1993  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty 
on  imports  into  the  Community  of  photo  albums  in  bookbound  form  originating  in  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  and  collecting  definitively  the  provisional  anti-dumping  duty  OJ  1993  L333/67-, 
Council  Regulation  (EQ  No  5/96  of  22  December  1995  imposing  definitive  anti-  dumping  duties  on 
imports  of  microwave  ovens  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  the  Republic  of  Korea, 
Malaysia  and  Thailand  and  collecting  definitively  the  provisional  duty  imposed  OJ  1996  L211. 
12  ,  WTO  Anti-Durnping  Statistics'  and  statistics  of  the  EU  official  website,  fn  10  above. 
98 a  developing  country  with  that  of  a  third  developed  country.  Even  if  one  is  able  to  find  an 
industry  of  an  ME  which  has  similar  development  level  to  the  corresponding  industry  in 
an  NME,  such  selection  is  very  complex. 
Furthermore,  'analogue'  is  a  very  vague  concept,  and  the  EU  absolutely  has  no  rule  to 
specify  the  basis  of  'analogue'.  As  a  result,  it  leaves  the  following  important  question 
without  answer:  what  does  it  mean  in  the  context  of  the  analogue  country  method?  Is  it 
the  development  of  the  countries  concerned,  or  the  respective  production  process,  or  the 
comparability  of  the  products,  or  the  comparability  of  the  respective  industry? 
Without  detailed  rules  to  regulate  such  complex  practices,  the  EU  certainly  has  very 
broad  discretion  in  the  selection.  Thus,  a  conclusion  that  leads  to  possible  high  dumping 
margin  always  occurs,  and  it  is  rather  unfair  to  Chinese  exporters.  Before  April  1998,  in 
which  conditional  MET  was  provided,  72  anti-dumping  investigations  were  launched  by 
the  EU  against  China.  84.7  percent  of  them  concluded  that  Chinese  exports  had  been 
dumped.  Among  them,  when  a  single  duty  was  imposed  on  all  Chinese  exports  concerned 
under  one  country  one  duty  rule,  only  4  cases  get  a  relatively  low  anti-dumping  duty, 
which  was  under  20  percent.  13 
2.  The  time  limit  for  non-market  economies  to  comment  is  over  strict 
The  EU  allows  parties  to  the  investigation  10  days  to  comment  on  the  selection  of  the  ME 
third  country.  From  the  analysis  made  above,  we  may  understand  that  the  selection  of 
analogue  country  is  very  complex.  Even  the  EU  authority  itself  may  find  it  difficult  to 
gather  relevant  information,  so  that  in  many  cases,  its  decision  of  the  selection  is 
significantly  affected  by  the  availability  of  cooperation  of  the  ME.  However,  it  gives 
Chinese  exporters  a  mere  10  days  to  comment  on  the  EUs  selection  of  the  analogue 
13 
lbid 
99 country.  It  is  obviously  impossible  to  collect  the  necessary  information  to  do  so. 
Therefore,  'this  will  further  curtail  the  opportunities  of  exporters  to  control  the  process  of 
the  selection  of  the  reference  country  and  will  increase  the  discretionary  power  available 
to  the  Community  authorities.  '  14 
3.  The  analogue  country  method  makes  the  outcome  of  the  selection 
unpredictable. 
One  of  the  functions  of  law  is  to  make  the  outcome  of  certain  practices  predictable,  so  that 
similar  mistakes  and  the  corresponding  punishments  can  be  avoided  in  future  business. 
However,  the  analogue  country  in  an  anti-dumping  investigation  will  be  selected  by  the 
EU  on  different  bases,  which  vary  from  time  to  time.  Therefore,  it  is  never  foreseeable  to 
Chinese  exporters. 
Since  the  wording  of  the  provisions  which  regulate  the  selection  of  the  third  market 
economy  (ME)  is  very  vague,  the  EU  authority  makes  its  decision  based  on  variable 
factors  in  practice.  In  most  cases,  it  adopts  the  suggestions  of  the  complainant  in 
anti-dumping  investigations.  15  Though  this  can  be  hardly  seen  from  the  authority's 
anti-dumping  report,  it  was  found  during  my  interviews'  6  that  the  producers  of  the 
analogue  country  proposed  are  ready  to  cooperate  with  the  Commission  due  to  the 
arrangement  made  by  the  complainant  in  advance.  In  addition,  as  discussed  above, 
Chinese  exporters  can  hardly  propose  any  constructive  comment  on  the  selection  of  the 
analogue  country  due  to  the  tight  time  limit.  Therefore,  without  any  other  substantive 
suggestion,  the  Commission  will  consequently  adopt  the  third  ME  proposed  by  the 
14  P.  V.  Schueren,  'New  Anti-Dumping  Rules  and  Practice:  Wide  Discretion  Held  on  a  Tight  LeashT 
(1996),  33(2)  Common  Market  Law  Review,  271  at  p  282. 
15  John  H.  Jackson  &  Edwin  A.  Vermulst,  Anti-Dumping  Law  and  Practice.  -  A  Comparative  Study, 
(University  of  Michigan  Press:  1990),  77. 
16  Interviews  with  experienced  anti-dumping  lawyers  in  Brussels,  June  2002. 
loo complainant.  However,  in  order  to  support  its  own  argument  that  the  imports  concerned 
have  been  dumped,  the  complainant  normally  suggests  the  analogue  country  which  can 
lead  to  high  dumping  margins.  In  that  case,  the  complainant  will  definitely  never  consider 
whether  the  proposal  is  fair  and  reasonable  to  Chinese  exporters. 
In  addition  to  the  suggestions  of  the  complainant,  the  Commission  considers  the 
following  factors  to  select  analogue  countries.  17  They  are  the  cooperation  of  information 
in  the  analogue  country  concerned  is  available;  '  8  the  potential  analogue  is  also  accused  of 
dumping,  19  the  potential  analogue  is  the  only  other  producer  of  the  prodUCt;  20  the 
manufacturing  process,  technical  standards  and  the  scale  of  production  are  similar  21  and 
the  potential  analogue  is  the  largest  or  most  efficient  free  market  producer  22 
17  Jianyu  Wang,  'A  Critique  of  the  Application  to  China  of  the  Non-Market  Economy  Rules  of 
Antidumping  Legislation  and  Practice  of  the  European  Union.  '  J.  W.  T.  1999,33(3),  117  at  p  125. 
18  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  771/98  of  7  April  1998  imposing  a  definitive  anti-  dumping  duty  on 
imports  of  tungsten  carbide  and  fused  tungsten  carbide  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
OJ  1998  LI  11/1;  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  45/97  of  10  January  1997  imposing  a  provisional 
anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  sacks  and  bags  made  of  polyethylene  or  polypropylene  originating  in 
India,  Indonesia  and  Thailand  OJ  1997  L12/8 
19  When  anti-dumping  investigation  involves  in  both  MEs  and  NMEs,  the  Commission  tends  to  use 
one  of  the  MEs  as  the  analogue  country.  This  principle  was  established  in  Codeine  and  its  Salts  case 
(83/9/EEC:  Council  Decision  of  17  January  1983  terminating  the  anti-dumping  proceeding 
concerning  imports  of  codeine  and  its  salts  originating  in  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Poland  and 
Yugoslavia  OJ  1983  L  16/30). 
20  In  Dihydrostreptomycin  case  (Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2054/91  of  II  July  1991  imposing 
a  provisional  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  dihydrostreptomycin  originating  in  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  OJ  1991  L  187/23),  Japan  was  the  only  ME  outside  the  European  Community  to 
produce  the  kind  of  imports  concerned.  Therefore,  Japan  was  selected  as  an  analogue  country. 
21  In  Handbags  case  (Commission  Regulation  (EQ  No  209/97  of  3  February  1997  imposing  a 
provisional  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  certain  handbags  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  OJ  1997  L33/1  1).  Indonesia  was  selected  as  an  analogue  country  because  it  has  similar 
characteristics  and  production  process  with  the  Chinese  handbags. 
22  Silicon  metal  (Council  Regulation  (EQ  No  2496/97  of  II  December  1997  imposing  a  definitive 
anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  silicon  metal  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China  OJ  1997 
L345/1).  In  this  case,  Norway  was  selected  as  the  analogue  country,  because  the  Commission  regarded 
it  as  the  most  important  and  efficient  silicon  metal  producers  in  the  Nvorld  and  Norway  benefits  from 
low  energy  costs,  cheap  raw  material  and  good  exporting  conditions. 
101 From  the  above  analysis,  it  can  be  seen  that  only  the  last  two  bases  concern  the 
comparative  advantages  of  Chinese  exporters.  So,  they  can  be  regarded  to  be  more 
reasonable  than  others  to  a  certain  extent.  However,  neither  of  the  two  guidelines  is 
frequently  followed  by  the  Commission,  because  they  may  be  considered  only  after  the 
Commission  fails  to  find  an  analogue  country  with  all  other  methods.  Therefore,  in  most 
anti-dumping  investigations  relating  to  China,  the  EU  authority's  practice  is  likely  to 
maximize  the  inherent  flaws  of  the  analogue  country  method. 
As  a  result,  of  the  90  anti-dumping  investigations  against  Chinese  exports  from  August 
1979  till  I  January  2002,29  countries  have  been  selected  as  analogue  countries  by  the  EU 
authority  (See  Table  3.1).  Therefore,  it  is  impossible  for  Chinese  exporters  to  predict 
which  country  will  be  used  to  determine  the  normal  value  in  a  potential  an&dumping 
dispute.  As  a  result,  they  will  not  know  how  to  adopt  their  pricing  structures  to  avoid 
dumping  in  the  European  market.  From  this  point  of  view,  the  analogue  country  method 
causes  the  EU's  anti-dumping  law  to  fail  to  play  the  important  role,  i.  e.  to  predict  and  then 
avoid  unfavourable  outcomes. 
102 Table  3.1.  Selection  of  analogue  countries  for  Chinese  exports  by  the  Commission: 
1979-2001.  (Note:  GNI  per  capita  (2001)  of  China  is  $890). 
CountrY23  U.  S.  A  Korea  Hong  Kong  India  Spain  Yugoslavia 
Times  16 
-6  - 
3  5  1  1 
GNI  ($)24  345870 
1 
99400 
1 
255920 
1 
460 
1 
14,860 
1 
940 
Countiry  Thailand  Japan  Australia  Sri  Lanka  Austria  South  Africa 
Times  4  3  1  1  1  3 
GNI  1 
ý970 
35,990  19,770 
1 
830 
1 
23,940 
-  r2,900 
Country  Uruguay  Turkey  Singapore  Norway  Taiwan  Philippines 
Times  1  2  1  1  2  1 
GNI  ($)  5,670 
__ 
25540  2 24,740 
L 
3  5,5  30 
1  1 
19050 
Country  EU  Poland  Malaysia  Hungary  Brazil  Argentina 
Times  2  1  2  1  1  1 
GNI  49240 
- 
39640  4,80  0 
L 
3,060 
1 
6,960 
Country  Mexico  Canada  Indonesia 
Times  3  1  1 
GNI  5,540  21 
ý340 
680 
Source:  EU  Official  Journal,  various  years. 
23  Market  Economies  selected  as  analogue  countries  by  the  EU  in  anti-dumping  investigations  towards 
imports  from  China. 
24  GNI  is  gross  national  income  (gross  national  product,  or  GNP.  per  capita  (200  1),  Atlas  methodology 
(US  dollars),  World  Bank  Indicator,  available  from  <http:  //www.  worldbank.  org>  (I  December  2002). 
103 These  statistics  show  that  the  U.  S.  has  become  the  most  common  analogue  country  for 
China  chosen  by  the  European  Commission  in  anti-dumping  investigations,  although  the 
two  countries  have  the  largest  difference  (except  Japan  and  Norway)  with  regard  to  their 
GNI  per  capita.  With  almost  40  times  difference  of  GNI  per  capita,  it  is  apparent  that  the 
selection  of  analogue  countries  has  not  been  made  on  a  reasonable  basis.  This  is  because 
under  the  Commission's  guidelines,  analogue  countries  are  selected  mainly  based  on  the 
complainant's  suggestions  and  the  availability  of  cooperation  from  the  third  ME. 
However,  as  discussed  above,  neither  of  these  two  factors  can  be  justified  to  achieve  a  fair 
comparison  between  the  like  products  of  an  analogue  country  and  China  in  an&dumping 
investigations.  Since  Chinese  exporter's  comparative  advantages  are  not  considered  in 
that  case,  their  normal  values  based  on  the  analogue  country  method  are  normally  higher 
than  they  actually  are.  This  finally  leads  to  an  incorrect  determination  of  the  existence  of 
dumping. 
4.  Difficulties  may  arise  in  case  of  non-cooperation  of  a  third  ME. 
The  experience  of  application  of  the  analogue  country  method  shows  that  the 
Commission  cannot  always  get  cooperation  from  the  third  ME  which  it  considers  to  be 
the  most  appropriate  country  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  Chinese  exports  concerned. 
Unfortunately,  unwillingness  of  such  cooperation  tends  to  increase,  because  data  needed 
by  the  Commission  may  be  also  used  as  evidence  against  the  third  country's  own 
producers  and  exporters  in  any  future  anti-dumping  proceedings  initiated  by  the  EU. 
When  the  Commission  encounters  such  non-cooperation,  it  can  only  adopt  the 
information  provided  by  another  ME,  which  will  generally  result  in  a  higher  normal  value 
and  dumping  margin  of  exports  from  the  NME  concerned.  From  this  point  of  view,  the 
analogue  country  method  is  neither  reasonable  to  be  applied  by  the  Commission  nor  fair 
enough  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  Chinese  exports. 
104 5.  The  analogue  country  method  denies  the  fact  that  individual  countries  have 
comparative  advantages  in  intemational  trade,  and  it  restrains  nonmarket 
economies  from  taking  such  advantages. 
It  should  be  well  recognized  that  any  individual  country,  regardless  of  its  development 
level,  has  its  own  comparative  advantages  compared  with  others.  And  that  it  is  its  due 
right  to  take  such  advantages  in  international  trade.  However,  the  actual  consequence  of 
the  application  of  the  analogue  country  method  ignores  the  fact  and  the  right.  This 
statement  can  be  illustrated  by  the  outcome  that  most  Chinese  exports  involved  in  the 
EU's  anti-dumping  investigations  were  found  to  be  dumped  and  subsequently  high 
anti-dumping  duties  were  imposed.  Thus,  the  import  prices  increase  significantly,  and  the 
exporter  therefore  is  unable  to  take  its  comparative  advantage  in  international  trade. 
All  of  these  disadvantages  of  the  analogue  country  method  can  be  seen  in  the  following 
case,  which  is  a  typical  one  to  show  how  dumping  margins  are  artificially  maximized 
under  that  method. 
D.  Case  analysis. 
1.  Outline  of  the  case. 
In  November  1993,  the  Commission  received  a  complaint  lodged  by  the  European 
Chemical  Industry  Council  (Cefic)  representing  the  totality  of  the  EU  production.  The 
Commission  accordingly  announced  the  initiation  of  an  anti-dumping  proceeding 
concerning  imports  of  persulphates  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  The 
Commission  selected  Japan  as  the  third  ME  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  Chinese 
exports,  and  therefore  came  to  the  conclusion  that  persulphates  imported  from  China 
were  dumped,  which  caused  material  injury  to  the  EU  industry.  As  a  result,  a  high 
provisional  anti-dumping  duty  of  83  percent  was  imposed  on  imports  of 
105 peroxodisulphates  (persulphates)  originating  in  China  on  17  July  1995.25  Subsequently,  a 
definitive  anti-dumping  duty  of  the  same  rate  was  imposed  on  18  December  1995.26 
2.  Highlight  -  selection  of  the  third  ME  when  determining  the  normal  value  of 
Chinese  exports. 
The  Commission  officially  notified  the  complainants,  the  exporters  and  importers  known 
to  be  concerned  and  the  representatives  of  the  exporting  country  of  the  initiation  of  the 
proceeding  and  gave  the  parties  concerned  the  opportunity  to  make  their  views  known  in 
writing  and  to  request  a  hearing. 
When  determining  the  normal  value  of  the  Chinese  exports,  according  to  the  basic 
Regulation  at  that  time  (Article  2  (12)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2423/88),  27  the 
Commission  began  to  select  an  ME  as  a  reference  country.  The  Commission  sent 
questionnaires  to  known  producers  of  persulphates  i.  e.  in  the  United  States,  Taiwan, 
Turkey,  Japan,  India  and  Mexico.  However,  the  producer  in  the  USA  and  Mexico  refused 
to  cooperate  with  the  Commission,  and  the  producer  in  Taiwan  did  not  submit  sufficient 
information  and  refused  on-the-  spot  verifications.  Producers  in  Turkey  and  Japan  agreed 
to  cooperate  with  the  Commission.  Since  the  information  submitted  showed  that  the  total 
production  of  persulphates  by  the  sole  producer  in  Turkey  was  limited,  Japan  was 
selected  as  the  reference  country.  Although  the  Chinese  exporters  opposed  the  choice  of 
Japan  as  reference  country  and  requested  that  at  least  the  determination  of  normal  value 
for  Chinese  ammonium  persulphate  be  based  on  data  pertaining  to  Turkey,  the 
25  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  1748/95  of  17  July  1995  imposing  a  provisional  anti-dumping 
duty  on  imports  of  peroxodi  su  lp  hates  (persulphates),  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China  OJ 
1995  L169/15 
26  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2961/95  of  18  December  1995  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumPing 
duty  on  imports  of  peroxodisulphates  (persulphates),  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  OJ 
1995  1-308/61. 
27  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2423/88  of  II  July  1988  on  protection  against  dumped  or  subsidized 
imports  frorn  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Economic  Community  OJ  1988  L209/1. 
106 Commission  considered  the  advantages  of  Japan  as  a  suitable  reference  country,  on 
balance,  still  outweighed  the  arguments  presented  in  favour  of  Turkey.  Consequently,  the 
normal  value  of  persulphate  from  China  was  established  based  on  information  submitted 
by  the  two  Japanese  companies  willing  to  cooperate  with  the  Commission. 
Using  the  information  of  the  Japanese  company  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  Chinese 
products,  the  Commission  easily  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  normal  value  is  much 
higher  than  the  export  price.  Therefore,  the  imports  were  dumped,  and  an  anti-dumping 
duty  as  high  as  83  percent  was  imposed. 
3.  Problematic  points  that  should  be  noticed  in  the  above  case. 
First,  the  selection  of  the  third  ME  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  imports  from  NMEs 
is likely  to  deny  the  latter's  comparative  advantages  in  international  trade. 
It  is  well  known  that  labour  is  cheaper  in  developing  countries  than  developed  countries 
or  market  economies.  This  should  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  non-market  economies' 
comparative  advantages,  and  it  is  those  countries'  due  right  to  benefit  from  it  in 
international  trade.  In  the  persulphate  case,  if  we  consider  the  key  factor  involved  in 
manufacture,  we  may  find  out  that  the  EU's  comparison  is  absolutely  unfair. 
First  of  all,  persulphate  production  is  labour  intensive  and  is  a  high  energy  consuming 
industry.  It  means  that  the  cost  of  labour  is  the  most  important  element  to  constitute  the 
overall  manufacturing  cost  of  persulphate.  In  the  persulphate  case,  Japan  was  the 
analogue  country,  which  has  rather  high  domestic  price  of  persulphates.  Applying  it  to 
establish  the  normal  value  of  imports  from  China,  the  Commission  simply  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  normal  value  is  much  higher  than  the  export  price  of  persulphates 
from  China. 
107 However,  there  is  a  huge  difference  between  the  cost  of  labour  in  China  and  Japan. 
According  to  World  Bank  statistics,  28  the  average  labour  cost  per  worker  in 
manufacturing  in  China  between  1995-1999  is  $729  per  year,  while  that  of  Japan  is 
$31687  per  year,  which  is  43  times  higher  than  the  former.  So  it  is  ridiculous  to  select 
Japan  as  the  third  ME  in  the  persulphates  case.  Nevertheless,  the  EU  did  so,  and  as  a 
result,  Chinese  products  were  found  to  have  been  dumped  with  high  dumping  margin. 
From  this  point,  we  can  see  an  unscientific  element  existing  in  the  analogue  country 
method,  i.  e.  the  obvious  difference  between  the  labour  costs  from  China  and  Japan  results 
in  an  unfair  judgement.  Even  if  the  same  industry  of  the  two  countries  use  the  same 
technology  and  have  the  same  procedure  to  manufacture  persulphates,  the  cost  in  Japan  is 
still  higher  than  that  of  China.  In  that  case,  selection  of  Japan  as  the  analogue  country  to 
determine  the  normal  value  of  the  Chinese  exports  is  absolutely  unreasonable  and  unfair. 
Using  that  methodology,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Commission  finally  imposed  an 
anti-dumping  duty  as  high  as  83  percent  on  Chinese  exporters. 
Second,  selection  of  a  third  ME  whose  relevant  industry  is  the  major  rival  in  international 
trade  to  that  of  the  NME  concerned  may  be  improper  to  some  extent. 
Decisions  of  industries  in  different  countries  to  cooperate  or  not  with  the  Commission  in 
anti-dumping  investigations  are  usually  made  due  to  some  reasons.  These  reasons  should 
also  be  taken  into  account.  Especially  when  one  country  seems  to  be  eager  to  cooperate  in 
the  anti-dumping  investigation,  and  its  industry  is  the  very  major  competitor  of  that  from 
the  NME  in  international  trade,  then  the  information  supplied  by  the  former  should  really 
be  considered  carefully.  Data  adverse  to  the  NME  is likely  to  be  put  forward  at  that  time 
in  order  to  weaken  its  rival's  competition  capacity  in  future. 
28  World  Bank  Statistics  of  Labour  and  Employment. 
<http:  //www.  ignkeywords.  com/keyword/keyword.  aspx?  keyword=www.  worldbank-orgdatadatabytop 
icdatabytopic.  html>  (I  December  2002). 
108 In  the  above  case,  Japan  is  the  second  largest  persulphate  exporter  next  to  China  in  the 
world.  So,  the  reason  why  its  companies  agreed  to  cooperate  with  the  Commission  in  the 
anti-dumping  investigation  may  be  because  information  submitted  by  them  would 
obviously  result  in  unfavourable  consequences  for  its  biggest  rival  -  Chinese  persulphate 
producers  in  international  trade.  From  this  sense,  Japan  is  not  the  best  choice  to  be  taken 
to  determine  the  normal  value  of  persulphates  from  China. 
Third,  information  from  the  third  ME  available  to  the  Commission  does  not  always  mean 
it  is  the  best  data  to  establish  the  normal  value  and  to  make  a  fair  comparisonwith  export 
price  of  products  concerned.  In  the  persulphate  case,  we  may  find  out  that  Japan  was 
selected  as  the  analogue  country  mainly  because  the  Commission  did  not  have  any  other 
choice  except  that,  due  to  others  non-cooperation. 
Besides,  the  case  also  reflects  other  defects  of  the  rule  discussed  in  1.2  of  this  chapter.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  rule  is  rather  vague  considering  the  selection  of  the  third  country 
without  detailed  substantive  and  procedure  requirements.  On  the  other  hand,  due  to  the 
over  strict  time  limit,  the  Chinese  exporters  concerned  cannot  put  forward  significant 
opinion  about  the  selection  of  the  third  ME.  Under  this  circumstance,  the  EU  almost  has 
absolute  discretionary  power  to  judge  this  matter. 
According  to  the  above  analysis,  those  unscientific  factors  of  the  traditional  non-market 
economy  treatment  (analogue  country  method)  easily  let  the  EU  come  to  an  incorrect 
conclusion  that  deviates  from  the  facts,  and  therefore  result  in  the  judgment  which  is 
unfavourable  and  unfair  to  exporters  of  non-market  economies. 
109 I/.  Conditional  market  economy  treatment. 
A.  Relevant  rules  in  force. 
In  order  to  meet  the  need  in  anti-dumping  practice  and  reward  economic  reforms  taking 
place  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China  and  Russia,  the  EU  published  Council  Regulation 
(EC)  905/9  829  on  27  April  1998.  It  grants  market  economy  status  in  antýdumping 
investigations  to  individual  enterprises  of  the  two  countries.  That  is  to  say,  when 
exporters  of  China  meet  the  five  criteria  set  in  the  rule,  their  individual  dun-ping  margins 
could  be  based  on  their  own  domestic  sales  prices  rather  than  that  of  a  third  ME.  These 
five  criteria  are: 
Decisions  of  firms  regarding  prices,  costs  and  inputs,  including  for  instance  raw 
materials,  costs  of  technology  and  labour,  output,  sales  and  investment,  are  made  in 
response  to  market  signals  reflecting  supply  and  demand,  and  without  significant 
state  interference  in  this  regard,  and  costs  of  major  inputs  substantially  reflect  market 
values, 
Firms  have  one  clear  set  of  basic  accounting  records  which  are  independently  audited 
in  line  with  international  accounting  standards  and  are  applied  for  all  purposes, 
The  production  costs  and  financial  situation  of  firms  are  not  subject  to  significant 
distortions  carried  over  from  the  former  NME  system,  in  particular  in  relation  to 
depreciation  of  assets,  other  write-offs,  barter  trade  and  payment  via  compensation  of 
debts, 
The  firms  concerned  are  subject  to  bankruptcy  and  property  laws  which  guarantee 
29  Council  Regulation  (EQ  No  905/98,  OJ  1998  L  128/18. 
110 legal  certainty  and  stability  for  the  operation  of  firms,  and 
Exchange  rate  conversions  are  carried  out  at  the  market  rate. 
A  determination  whether  the  producer  meets  the  abovementioned  criteria  shall  be 
made  within  three  months  of  the  initiation  of  the  investigation,  after  specific 
consultation  of  the  Advisory  Committee  and  after  the  EU  industry  has  been  given  an 
opportunity  to  comment.  This  determination  shall  remain  in  force  throughout  the 
investigation.  30 
B.  Specific  procedures  for  the  new  approach. 
At  the  early  stage  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigation,  procedures  were  set  to  examine 
whether  the  conditional  MET  can  be  granted  to  relevant  individual  exporters.  First  of  all, 
a  special  claim  to  apply  for  MET  must  be  submitted  by  a  Chinese  enterprise.  The  deadline 
for  requesting  the  special  treatment  and  providing  necessary  information  at  the  same  time 
is  21  days  after  the  publication  of  the  Notice  which  initiates  the  investigation  in  the  EU's 
Official  Journal.  31  Within  three  months  after  that,  the  Commission  should  assess  the 
information  submitted  by  Chinese  exporters  and  decide  whether  they  meet  the  five 
criteria  for  the  MET.  If  the  outcome  of  the  assessment  is  positive,  the  individual  exporter 
will  be  granted  MET,  which  gives  the  exporter  specific  dumping  margin  at  both  the 
provisional  and  definitive  stages  of  the  investigation.  However,  if  the  application  is 
rejected,  the  exporters  will  be  subject  to  the  analogue  country  method  automatically. 
30  Art.  1,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98. 
31  Robert  M.  MacLean,  'Evaluating  the  Impact  of  the  E.  C.  's  Conditional  Market  Economy  Principle  in 
Chinese  and  Russian  Anti-Dumping  Cases'  (2001)  7(3),  Int.  T.  L.  R.  65  at  p  68. C.  Outcome  of  the  application  of  the  conditional  market  economy 
approach. 
In  order  to  identify  and  encourage  the  remarkable  advances  brought  about  by  economic 
reform  in  China,  the  EU  adopts  conditional  MET  to  imports  from  China  in  an&dumping 
investigations.  Hence,  'the  proposed  changes  will  be  a  recognition  of  the  efforts  made  so 
far  by  China  and  Russia  to  transform  their  economies.  '  32  The  new  approach  is  no  doubt  a 
big  step  forward.  However,  the  outcome  of  its  application  is  not  so  satisfactory  when  we 
look  at  the  following  statistics  and  facts: 
From  April  1998  when  the  revised  legislation  entered  into  force,  out  of  over  45 
applications  for  MET,  only  five  Chinese  companies  and  one  Russian  enterprise  met  the 
criteria  of  MET  according  to  the  EU's  assessment,  and  therefore  were  allowed  to  use  their 
domestic  price  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  exports.  The  rate  of  successful 
application  is  only  around  12  percent.  The  reason  for  such  a  low  rate  is  that  the  criteria  to 
grant  MET  have  proved  to  be  extremely  strict  and  difficult  for  Chinese  exporters  to 
satisfy  in  practice. 
33 
The  conditional  MET  was  supposed  to  reflect  the  actual  normal  value  and  dumping 
margin  of  imports  from  China.  However,  on  the  contrary,  the  number  of  fresh 
anti-dumping  investigations  initiated  against  China  in  particular  has  increased 
significantly  compared  to  the  period  preceding  the  change  in  policy.  That  is  to  say,  only 
one  anti-dumping  case  was  initiated  against  imports  from  China  in  1998,  while  it  jumped 
to  12  new  cases  in  the  following  year.  In  2000,6  new  investigations  were  launched.  In 
other  words,  18  new  cases  have  been  opened  against  imports  from  China  in  the  two-year 
32  Proposal  to  the  Council  Regulation  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  384/96,  COM/97/0677 
final  -  ACC,  OJ  1998  C70/15,  pp.  1-2. 
33  R.  M.  MacLean,  fn  31  above  at  p  65. 
112 period  immediately  following  the  new  approach  of  conditional  MET.  34 
Based  on  these  facts,  we  can  conclude  that  the  EU's  new  antýdumping  policy 
(conditional  MET)  towards  China  is  not  capable  of  achieving  its  goal,  i.  e.  to 
accommodate  the  dramatic  changes  of  the  economy  in  China,  and  to  be  more  reasonable 
to  apply.  Furthermore,  instead  of  encouraging  China's  economic  reform,  the  current 
situation  actually  has  had  a  negative  impact  on  it. 
D.  Unreasonable  factors  in  the  application  of  the  conditional  MET 
As  we  have  seen,  the  EU's  new  approach  of  conditional  MET  does  not  function  as  well  as 
it  is  supposed  to.  The  following  points  constitute  the  major  reasons  for  this. 
1.  Very  tight  time  limit  for  the  MET  application. 
The  Commission  requires  applicants  for  conditional  MET  to  provide  all  information 
needed  within  very  tight  time  limits.  Generally  speaking,  foreign  parties  in  antýdumping 
investigations  have  to  submit  necessary  documents  40  days  after  they  receive  the 
questionnaires.  35  However,  with  regard  to  Chinese  exporters  who  apply  for  MET,  the 
deadline  for  lodging  the  application  and  providing  necessary  information  is  only  21  days 
after  the  publication  of  notice  of  initiation  of  the  investigation  in  the  Official  Journaf  6 
Thus,,  the  burden  for  those  exporters  to  bear  is  extremely  tough. 
34  ,  Summary  of  the  European  Union's  Anti-Dumping  Investigation  against  Chinese  Exports  from 
1979',  <http:  //www.  cacs.  gov.  cn/infor/lszl/lszll  I.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
35  Art.  6  (2),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96. 
36 
fn  31  above. 
113 2.  The  Commission's  assessment  on  whether  applicants  for  conditional  MET 
meet  the  criteria  set  out  in  the  Regulation  is  too  strict  to  be  reasonable. 
The  Commission  requires  applicants  for  conditional  MET  to  meet  all  criteria  set  in  the 
Regulation  completely.  With  regard  to  the  five  criteria,  if  there  is  any  deficiency  or  flaw 
in  documents  given  by  a  Chinese  exporter,  he  will  be  given  an  absolute  objection  to  MET. 
In  that  case,  the  rate  for  successful  application  of  MET  is  as  low  as  12  percent  since  the 
new  approach  took  effect.  It  is  unfair  to  those  exporters  whose  requests  are  refused  to 
some  extent,  because  the  assessment  to  grant  MET  should  be  made  according  to  the  goal 
of  the  new  approach.  That  is  to  say,  if  a  Chinese  exporter  is  able  to  meet  most  of  the 
criteria  stipulated  in  the  Regulation,  and  he  can  show  that  the  overall  management  of  the 
business  is  independent  of  state  control,  he  should  then  be  granted  MET. 
3.  Use-out  Domestic  Data  Methodologl.  37 
In  practice,  even  if  a  Chinese  company  is  granted  MET  in  an  anti-dumping  investigation, 
its  domestic  price  cannot  be  used  as  the  normal  value  of  the  same  product  from  other 
companies  whose  application  for  MET  is  rejected.  This  is  called  Use-out  Domestic  Data 
Methodology.  An  anti-dumping  proceeding  concerning  imports  of  integrated  electronic 
compact  fluorescent  lamps  (CFL-i)  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China  was 
initiated  on  17  May  2000 
. 
38  Ten  Chinese  exporters  applied  for  MET,  and  two  of  theM39 
were  granted  the  new  approach  by  the  Commission.  One  of  the  exporting  producers  has 
37  This  issue  is  further  analyzed  in  chapter  six. 
38  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1470/2001  of  16  July  2001  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty 
and  collecting  definitively  the  provisional  duty  imposed  on  imports  of  integrated  electronic  compact 
fluorescent  lamps  (CFL-i)  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  OJ  2001  L195/8. 
Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  255/2001  of  7  February  2001  imposing  a  provisional  anti-dumping 
duty  on  imports  of  integrated  electronic  compact  fluorescent  lamps  (CFL-i)  originating  in  the  People's 
Republic  of  China.  OJ  2001  L38/8- 
39  Lisheng  Electronic  &  Lighting  (Xiamen)  Co.  Ltd,  Xiamen  and  Philips  &  Yaming  Lighting  Co.  Ltd, 
Shanghai. 
114 sufficient  domestic  sales  volume  '40SO 
its  normal  value  was  established  on  the  basis  of  the 
domestic  sales  prices  in  accordance  with  Article  2(l)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  However, 
as  to  other  Chinese  exporters  whose  application  for  MET  was  rejected,  they  were  still 
subject  to  the  analogue  country  method.  In  this  case,  the  normal  values  of  their  products 
was  determined  by  relevant  information  from  Mexico  rather  than  the  domestic  prices  of 
the  Chinese  company  which  was  granted  the  MET. 
With  regard  to  this  practice,  the  Commission  argued  that  it  is  consistent  with  Article 
2(7)(a)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  which  prefers  to  select  a  third  ME.  However,  making  use 
of  the  price  information  of  the  Chinese  company  who  gets  the  MET  to  establish  normal 
values  for  other  Chinese  producers  has  two  advantages  in  anti-dumping  investigations. 
First,  the  normal  values  thus  established  are  more  accurate  than  those  determined  by  the 
price  information  from  a  third  ME,  because  they  operate  under  the  same  economic 
conditions.  Second,  it  enables  the  Commission  to  be  free  of  the  troublesome  process  to 
gain  cooperation  and  information  from  a  third  ME.  Therefore,  the  Commission's 
argument  cannot  be  easily  justified. 
4.  Inappropriate  adjustment  made  towards  the  domestic  sales  prices  of  Chinese 
companies  which  already  get  the  MET 
In  a  few  cases,  even  if  a  Chinese  company  was  granted  MET,  and  it  had  sufficient 
domestic  sales  volume,  its  domestic  sale  prices  were  not  adopted  directly  to  establish  the 
normal  values  of  the  imports. 
40  Art.  2(2)  of  the  basic  Regulation  requires  that  the  domestic  sales  prices  can  be  adopted  to  establish 
normal  value  of  the  imports  concerned  only  when  the  sales  represented  5  percent  or  more  of  the  sales 
volume  of  the  product  concerned  exported  to  the  Community. 
115 In  the  Zinc  Oxide  case  of  September  2001,41  five  Chinese  exporters  applied  for  MET. 
After  verification,  the  Commission  granted  three  exporters  MET  because  they  have 
fulfilled  all  the  criteria.  In  addition,  all  of  them  have  sufficient  domestic  sales  volumes  in 
accordance  with  Article  2(2)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  Therefore,  their  domestic  sales 
prices  should  be  directly  adopted  to  establish  the  normal  value  of  the  exports.  However, 
the  Commission  argued  that  the  purchase  prices  of  the  basic  zinc  raw  materials  for  the 
production  of  zinc  oxide  appeared  to  be  below  market  prices  by  comparing  actual  prices 
paid  by  the  three  companies  and  zinc  quotations  on  the  London  Metal  Exchange 
42  (LME).  For  that  reason,  it  made  adjustments  towards  the  domestic  sales  prices  of  the 
three  Chinese  companies  before  using  them  to  establish  normal  values.  As  a  result,  all  of 
them  were  found  to  have  dumped  their  exports. 
However,  the  conclusion  of  the  anti-dumping  investigation  might  have  been  different  if 
no  adjustment  was  made.  Here  the  question  is:  whether  or  not  the  adjustment  should  be 
made  towards  the  domestic  sales  prices  in  accordance  with  international  price  reference 
such  as  the  LME?  In  my  opinion,  the  reference  of  the  LME  should  not  be  taken  into 
account  in  this  case.  Otherwise,  there  is  no  sense  for  the  Commission  to  assess  whether  a 
Chinese  exporter  fulfils  the  criteria  of  the  MET.  43  In  other  words,  once  a  Chinese  exporter 
gets  the  MET,  it  is  a  fact  that  it  operates  under  free  market  conditions.  So,  no  adjustment 
41  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  408/2002  of  28  February  2002  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping 
duty  and  collecting  definitively  the  provisional  duty  imposed  on  imports  of  certain  zinc  oxides 
originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  OJ  2002  L  62/7.  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1827/2001  of  17  September  2001  imposing  a  provisional  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  certain  zinc 
oxides  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  OJ  2001  L248/17. 
42  LME  provides  reference  prices  for  the  world-wide  pricing  of  activities  relating  to  non-ferrous 
metals,  in  this  case  zinc  materials  and  related  zinc  products. 
43  One  of  the  MET  criteria  is: 
Decisions  of  firms  regarding  prices,  costs  and  inputs,  including  for  instance  raw  materials,  cost  of 
technology  and  labour,  output,  sales  and  investment,  are  made  in  response  to  market  signals 
reflecting  supply  and  demand,  and  without  significant  state  interference  in  this  regard.  and  costs 
of  major  inputs  substantially  reflect  market  values. 
116 should  be  made  to  establish  the  normal  values  of  the  Chinese  products. 
5.  Chinese  exporters  cannot  apply  for  MET  during  the  sunset  review. 
With  regard  to  imports  from  China,  the  Commission  refuses  to  introduce  the 
methodology  of  the  conditional  MET  in  sunset  reviews  carried  out  after  the  new 
legislation  came  into  force.  In  the  Magnetic  Disks  cases  in  2002,44  the  Commission 
refused  to  consider  Chinese  exporter's  application  for  the  MET  during  the  sunset  review, 
and  continued  to  adopt  the  analogue  country  method.  It  indicated  that  during  a  sunset 
review,  pursuant  to  Article  11.2  of  the  basic  Regulation,  measures  must  either  be 
maintained  or  repealed,  but  not  modified.  45  In  the  meantime,  it  suggested  that  the 
exporters  could  ask  for  other  methods  to  establish  the  normal  values  only  during  interim 
review  under  Article  11.3.  However,  the  criteria  to  initiate  an  interim  review  are  very 
stringent.  Under  Article  11.3,  such  proceedings  can  be  carried  out  only  if  the  Commission 
finds  'the  circumstances  with  regard  to  dumping  and  injury  have  changed  significantly', 
or  the  'existing  measures  are  achieving  the  intended  results  in  removing  the  injury 
previously  established'.  Therefore,  it  is  very  difficult  for  Chinese  exporters  to  persuade 
the  Commission  to  initiate  an  interim  review. 
This  puts  the  Chinese  companies  into  a  dilemma,  where  they  normally  cannot  apply  for 
the  new  approach  of  the  MET  in  proceedings  with  regard  to  the  existing  an&dumping 
measures.  It  is  particularly  unfair  to  these  exporters,  because  like  others  companies,  most 
of  them  have  obtained  great  progress  from  China's  economic  reforms.  Therefore,  they 
should  have  the  same  right  to  apply  for  the  conditional  MET,  and  if  they  are  able  to  meet 
the  five  criteria  of  the  treatment,  the  Commission  should  use  their  domestic  sales  prices  to 
44  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  312/2002  of  18  February  2002  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping 
duty  on  imports  of  certain  magnetic  disks  (3,5  microdisks)  originating  in  Japan  and  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  and  terminating  the  proceeding  in  respect  of  imports  of  3,5  microdisks  originating 
in  Taiwan.  OJ  2002  L  50/24. 
45 
Para.  19,  Ibid. 
117 establish  the  normal  values. 
46 
Based  on  the  above  point,  in  order  to  ensure  that  all  Chinese  exporters  have  the  same  right 
to  apply  for  the  MET,  the  Commission  should  provide  more  flexible  criteria  to  initiate 
interim  reviews  for  those  whose  exports  are  currently  subject  to  anti-dumping  measures. 
In  summary,  the  proposal  for  conditional  MET  is  a  favourable  step  forward  as  to  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  policy  against  imports  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  However,  how 
the  new  approach  and  the  basic  criteria  are  applied  by  the  Commission  is  crucial  to  the 
actual  outcome  of  the  policy.  Based  on  this  idea  and  the  analysis  made  above,  the  new 
policy  is  being  implemented  in  a  way  that  effectively  excludes  the  large  majority  of  MET 
applicants  from  being  successful. 
1/1.  One  country  one  duty  rule. 
A.  Relevant  rules  in  force. 
Article  9.5  of  the  EU's  basic  anti-dumping  Regulation  47  stipulates  that 
An  anti-dumping  duty  shall  be  imposed  in  the  appropriate  amounts  in  each  case,  on  a 
non-discriminatory  basis  on  imports  of  a  product  from  all  sources  found  to  be  dumped 
and  causing  injury,  except  as  to  imports  from  those  sources  from  which  undertakings 
under  the  terms  of  this  Regulation  have  been  accepted.  The  Regulation  imposing  the 
duty  shall  specify  the  duty  for  each  supplier  or,  if  that  is  impracticable,  and  as  a  general 
rule  in  the  cases  referred  to  in  Article  2(7),  the  supplying  country  concerned. 
In  practice  since  the  early  1990s,  the  Commission  has  stressed  repeatedly  that  in 
46  Proposal  relating  to  this  issue  is  suggested  in  the  Conclusions  of  the  thesis. 
. 17  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96. 
118 anti-dumping  proceedings  with  regard  to  imports  from  NMEs,  it  will  generally  impose  a 
single  anti-dumping  duty  on  all  exports  from  such  countries  on  a  country-by-country 
basi  S. 
48 
B.  Concept  and  rationale  for  one  country  one  duty  rule. 
Generally  speaking,  imports  from  non-market  economies  are  subject  to  two 
disadvantages  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigation.  One  of  them  is  the  analogue 
country  method,  another  is  'one  country  one  duty  rule'.  In  the  case  of  maAet  economies, 
individual  duties  are  determined  for  each  exporter  automatically,  however,  a  single 
average  rate  of  duty  is  established  on  all  imports  from  an  NME  in  an&dumping 
investigations.  With  regard  to  imports  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  'save  in 
exceptional  cases,  all  such  exports  will  be  subject  to  the  same  general  rate  of 
anti-dumping  duty. 
49 
The  rationale  for  the  policy  is  that  all  imports  from  non-market  economies  are  centrally 
controlled  by  the  state,  so  there  is  the  possibility  for  them  to  channel  exports  through  the 
exporter  with  the  lowest  duty  rate.  Therefore,  a  single  rate  is  applied  in  order  to  avoid 
such  circumvention  of  anti-dumping  duties. 
C.  Unreasonable  factors  existing  in  the  one  country  one  duty  rule. 
Unreasonable  factors  existing  in  the  one  country  one  duty  rule  can  be  analyzed  from  two 
aspects. 
First,  it  is  extremely  unfair  to  exporters  of  non-market  economies,  since  most  of  them 
48  Jianyu  Wang,  fn  17  above  at  p  124. 
49  Sebastian  Farr,  'Individual  Treatment  for  Exporters  in  Anti-Dumping  Cases:  the  China  Syndrome'. 
(1997)  3(3)  Int.  T.  L.  R.,  105-107. 
119 have  undergone  economic  reforms  and  restructuring  during  the  last  decade.  As  a  result  of 
such  reforms,  producers  and  exporters  from  these  countries  have  the  decisive  right  to 
manage  their  business  rather  than  being  subject  to  strict  state  control.  Therefore,  they 
decide  their  own  export  price  according  to  their  individual  operation  situation.  However, 
the  one  country  one  duty  rule  means  that  the  EU  Commission  will  impose  the  same 
anti-dumping  duty  on  an  NME  exporter  as  others  though  it  does  not  practise  dumping  at 
all.  So,  such  a  practice  at  the  present  stage  is  unfair  and  out  of  date,  especially  to  countries 
like  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  whose  favourable  outcomes  of  economic  reform 
including  enterprise  self-management  reform  is  well  recognized  in  the  world. 
Besides,  the  worry  of  one  country  one  duty  (i.  e.  circumvention  of  the  duties  after  different 
anti-dumping  duties  were  determined  according  to  different  exporters  from  an  NME)  can 
be  eliminated  by  detecting  import  volumes  of  the  individual  companies  before  and  after 
the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigation.  If  imports  from  the  company  which  was  imposed 
with  a  low  duty  increased  sharply  without  due  reasons  after  the  anti-dumping  proceeding 
was  terminated,  circumvention  can  be  found.  In  that  case,  individual  treatment  can  be 
withdrawn  or  necessary  punitive  measures  can  be  taken  towards  specific  exporters. 
IV.  Individual  treatment 
A.  Rules  in  force. 
Originally,  there  are  eight  separate  criteria  to  grant  individual  treatment.  However,  due  to 
the  recognition  of  unreasonable  factors  existing  in  the  one  country  one  duty  rule  as  we 
analyzed  above,  reviewing  the  outcome  of  the  application  of  individual  treatment  after 
50 
1997  (when  the  old  provision  was  issued),  the  latest  legislation  was  updated  in  Council 
50  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EQ  No  384/96  on  protection  against 
dumped  imports  frorn  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*COM/97/0677  final  - 
ACC.  OJ  1998  C70/15. 
120 Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002 
. 
51  It  sets  five  criteria  for  the  conditional  individual 
treatment: 
(a)  in  the  case  of  wholly  or  partly  foreign  owned  firms  or  joint  ventures,  exporters  are 
free  to  repatriate  capital  and  profits; 
(b)  export  prices  and  quantities,  and  conditions  and  terms  of  sale  are  freely  determined-, 
(c)  the  majority  of  the  shares  belong  to  private  persons.  State  officials  appearing  on  the 
board  of  Directors  or  holding  key  management  positions  shall  either  be  in  minority  or 
it  must  be  demonstrated  that  the  company  is  nonetheless  sufficiently  independent  from 
state  interference; 
(d)  exchange  rate  conversions  are  carried  out  at  the  market  rate;  and 
(e)  State  interference  is  not  such  as  to  permit  circumvention  of  measures  if  individual 
exporters  are  given  different  rates  of  duty.  52 
B.  Problems  of  substance  in  the  practical  application  of  the  regime 
According  to  the  EU's  anti-dumping  rules  in  force,  individual  treatment  means  that: 
For  companies  in  NMEs  who  can  prove  that  their  exporting  activities  are  determined 
by  market  forces  and  not  affected  by  state  influence  (based  on  criteria  set  by  the 
Commission),  an  individual  dumping  margin  is  calculated  for  them  based  on  a 
comparison  of  their  own  export  prices  with  the  normal  value  from  the  analogue 
coun  ry. 
53 
51  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002 
52  Art.  1(6),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002. 
53  Recital  8  of  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  protection 
121 That  is  to  say,  with  regard  to  exporters  from  non-market  economies  (especially  from 
China)  in  an  anti-dumping  investigation,  when  their  application  for  the  conditional  MET 
is  rejected  by  the  Commission,  they  still  have  chance  to  be  granted  individual  treatment. 
If  they  meet  the  five  criteria  to  show  that  its  export  activities  are  not  subject  to  state 
interference,  anti-dumping  duties  will  be  determined  on  an  individual  basis  according  to 
their  export  prices. 
However,  even  the  Commission  itself  has  to  admit  the  overlap  in  the  criteria  for 
individual  treatment  has  resulted  in  the  fact  that  only  those  exporters  that  can  fulfil  the 
requirements  for  full  MET  are  able  to  qualify  for  individual  treatment.  54 
C.  Main  reasons  for  the  problem. 
Like  the  situation  of  conditional  MET,  there  are  mainly  two  reasons  for  the  problem  of 
individual  treatment  when  it  is  applied  by  the  Commission. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  criteria  to  grant  individual  treatment  are  not  reasonable  enough  to  be 
applied  to  Chinese  exporters.  For  example,  the  first  criteria  to  apply  for  the  treatment  is 
only  applicable  to  wholly  foreign  owned  firms  or  joint  ventures.  That  is  to  say,  all  state 
owned  firms  are  excluded  from  enjoying  the  approach.  Also,  in  practice,  state  owned 
firms  usually  are  subject  to  the  highest  anti-dumping  duties  by  the  Commission.  This  is  a 
discriminatory  policy,  and  it  is  very  harmful  to  Chinese  exporters  considering  the 
significant  ratio  of  state  owned  enterprises  in  all  Chinese  companies.  However,  we  should 
make  it  clear  that  in  China,  a  state-owned  firm  is  not  necessarily  a  state-controlled  firm. 
The  former  has  self-management  rights,  but  the  latter  has  not  and  its  operation  is 
against  durnped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*COM/2000.0363 
final  -  ACC  2000/0160. 
54  Recital  53,  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  protection 
-against  durnped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*  COM/2000/036-3 
final  -  ACC  2000/0160. 
122 substantially  interfered  by  the  government.  The  existence  of  state-owned  enterprises  in 
China  is  mainly  due  to  China's  special  historical  and  political  reasons.  However,  the 
reform  and  reconstruction  of  such  enterprise  is  a  key  area  in  China's  economic  reform 
from  last  decade  till  now.  It  was  carried  out: 
through  privatisation,  closures  and  mergers,  shedding  of  excess  labour,  improvements 
in  the  financial  situation  of  state-owned  enterprises  and  the  financial  sector  through 
debt  write  off,  the  setting  up  off  Asset  management  companies  and  the  banking  sector 
being  instructed  to  make  lending  decisions  on  the  basis  of  market  forces  and  not  policy 
considerations.  55 
All  of  these  actually  emphasize  that  local  government  and  institutions  cannot  interfere  in 
the  management  of  the  firms;  management  rights  have  been  transferred  to  the  enterprise 
itself.  In  addition,  the  firms  are  not  entitled  to  any  privileges  granted  by  the  Chinese 
government.  As  a  result  of  the  reform,  like  wholly  foreign  owned  firms  and  joint  ventures, 
today,  most  state-owned  enterprises  manage  their  business,  take  responsibilities  as  an 
individual  legal  person  and  compete  with  others  fairly  in  market-economy  oriented 
environment.  From  this  point  of  view,  Chinese  state-owned  firms  which  have  sound 
management  and  performance  should  also  be  given  the  opportunity  to  apply  for 
individual  treatment. 
On  the  other  hand,  another  reason  that  results  in  problems  of  the  application  of  the  regime 
is  that  it  is  applied  over  strictly  by  the  Commission.  Anti-dumping  investigations  in  Small 
Screen  Televisions  (SCTVS)56  and  BicycleS57  are  generally  regarded  as  the  foundation  of 
55  Recital  15  of  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EQ  No  384/96  on  protection 
against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*COM/2000.0363 
final  -  ACC  2000/0160. 
56  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2093/91. 
57  Counc.  11  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2474/93  of  8  September  1993  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping 
duty  op  irn  orts  into  the  Community  of  bicycles  orynating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China  and 
collecting 
Tefinitively 
the  provisional  anti-  dumping  duty  OJ  1993  L228/1. 
123 the  EU  policy  on  individual  treatment  for  NME  exporters.  In  the  case  of  SCTVs,  the 
Commission  set  up  relevant  rules  to  grant  eligible  Chinese  exporters  individual  treatment. 
As  a  result,  two  China-Japanese  joint  ventures  were  granted  individual  treatment  on  the 
ground  that: 
In  so  far  as  the  other  two  Chinese  exporters  are  concerned  (i.  e.  the  two 
China-Japanese  joint-ventures)  the  Commission  was  able  to  establish  to  its 
satisfaction  that  these  companies,  even  if  they  did  not  operate  fully  on  a  market 
economy  basis,  enjoyed  a  high  degree  of  independence  in  their  operations,  basically 
because  they  were  able  to  import  components  and  export  finished  products  without 
control  from  the  Chamber  or  from  any  other  body.  Furthermore,  the  fact  that  these 
companies  were  able  to  transfer  their  profits  subject  to  certain  administrative 
requirements,  out  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  ensured  that  these 
profit-oriented  companies  enjoyed  a  sufficient  degree  of  independence  which 
justifies  their  individual  treatment.  58 
This  approach  was  later  strengthened  in  the  Video  Tapd9  and  Certain  Polyester  YarriS60 
cases.  However,  individual  treatment  was  refined  and  tightened  up  in  the  EU's 
58 
lbid,  Recital  20,  pp.  5-6. 
59  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  1034/91  of  23  April  1991  imposing  a  provisional  anti-dumping 
duty  on  imports  of  video  tapes  in  cassettes  originating  in  the  P.  E.  of  China,  O.  J.  L106,26  April  1991, 
p.  15. 
Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  3091/91  of  21  October  1991  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping 
duty  on  imports  of  video  tapes  in  cassettes  originating  in  the  P.  E.  of  China  and  definitively  collecting 
the  provisional  duty,  O.  J.  1,293,24  October  1991,  p.  4. 
60  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2904/91  of  27  September  1991  imposing  a  provisional 
anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  certain  polyester  yams  (man-made  staple  fibers)  originating  in 
Taiwan,  Indonesia,  India,  the  People'  s  Republic  of  China  and  Turkey  and  terminating  the 
anti-dumping  proceeding  in  respect  of  imports  of  these  yams  originating  in  the  Republic  of  Korea  OJ 
1991  L318/48. 
Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  830/92  of  30  March  1992  imposing  a  definitive  anti-  dumping  duty  on 
imports  of  certain  polyester  yams  (man-made  staple  fibers)  originating  in  Taiwan,  Indonesia,  India, 
the  People's  Republic  of  China  and  Turkey  and  collecting  definitively  the  provisional  duty  OJ  1992 
L88/1. 
124 anti-dumping  investigation  of  Bicycles  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  61 
Application  for  individual  treatment  from  Chinese  companies  has  been  systematically 
refused  since  then.  In  the  bicycle  case,  the  Commission  refused  to  grant  individual 
treatment  to  Chinese  companies  including  foreign  joint  ventures.  It  gave  the  following 
reasons: 
First,  it  reiterated  its  fear  of  circumvention  of  the  duties,  i.  e.  if  individual  treatment  was 
granted,  exports  could  be  channelled  by  the  state  authorities  through  whichever  exporter 
has  the  lowest  anti-dumping  duty.  However,  as  we  have  discussed  before,  such 
circumvention  can  be  avoided  and  detected  by  examining  the  export  volumes  of  a 
Chinese  company  before  and  after  the  anti-dumping  investigation  is  terminated. 
Second,  the  Commission  stressed  that  individual  treatment  is  not  required  by  the  basic 
dumping  Regulation.  This  argument  is  not  reasonable  enough  because  the  basic  dumping 
Regulation  also  does  not  have  any  provision  to  prohibit  the  EU  to  determine  individual 
export  prices,  individual  dumping  and  injury  margins  for  suppliers  in  NMEs.  So,  whether 
to  grant  individual  treatment  to  a  Chinese  exporter  should  be  determined  from  a  more  fair 
and  reasonable  point  of  view. 
Third,  the  Commission  concluded  that  none  of  the  companies  involved  had  been  able  to 
demonstrate  that  it  was  enjoying  and  will  go  on  enjoying  the  necessary  degree  of 
commercial  autonomy.  Since  it  holds  that  the  power  of  the  state  or  a  representative  of  the 
state  to  block  certain  key  decisions  of  the  company  prevents  it  from  acting  in  a  truly 
autonomous  manner,  62  so  it  cannot  be  granted  individual  treatment.  However,  as  early  as 
61  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2474/93  of  8  September  1993  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping 
duty  on  imports  into  the  Community  of  bicycles  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China  and 
collecting  definitively  the  provisional  anti-  dumping  duty  OJ  1993  L228/1. 
62  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  550/93  of  5  March  1993  imposing  a  provisional  anti-dumping 
duty  on  imports  of  bicycles  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  OJ  1993  L58/12.  paragraph 
34. 
125 the  1980's,  Chinese  foreign  joint  venture  law  stipulated  that  the  company  has  the  right  to 
manage  its  own  business  without  any  outer  interference  from  the  state.  The  rule  provides 
that  according  to  the  contract  establishing  the  joint  venture,  the  board  of  directors  will 
make  decisions  on  crucial  issues  such  as  development  strategy,  income  and  expenditure 
budget,  profit  distribution  and  personnel  recruitment.  Under  such  provisions,  the  EU 
should  not  conclude  that  the  State  exercises  a  dominant  influence  on  foreign  joint 
ventures  like  those  in  the  bicycle  case. 
Based  on  the  above  points,  the  strict  substantive  and  procedural  criteria  to  grant 
individual  treatment  to  exporters  from  NNIEs  and  the  too  broad  discretion  enjoyed  by  the 
EU  institution  make  it  very  difficult  for  Chinese  companies  to  satisfy  the  requirements. 
Consequently,  very  few  of  them  can  be  granted  individual  treatment.  Therefore,  the 
treatment  is  the  exception  to  one  country  one  duty  rule  rather  than  a  dominant  rule  in 
practice. 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  examines  four  separate  forms  of  treatment  which  are  applied  against 
Chinese  exporters  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigation  at  present: 
1.  Traditional  non-market  economy  treatment  (analogue  country  method); 
II.  Conditional  MET. 
111.  One  country  one  duty  rule. 
I  V.  Individual  treatment; 
126 The  first  two  treatments  are  applied  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  imports  from  NMEs 
in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigation.  While  the  one  country  one  duty  rule  and 
individual  treatment  are  methods  to  impose  anti-dumping  measures. 
Both  conditional  economy  treatment  and  individual  treatment  have  been  introduced  to 
accommodate  the  remarkable  advances  brought  about  by  the  economic  reform  in  China. 
They  are  presumed  to  bring  more  justification  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  practice. 
However,  relevant  statistics  for  recent  years  shows  the  impact  of  the  new  approaches  is 
rather  discouraging: 
Among  over  45  applications  for  MET,  only  five  Chinese  companies  and  one  Russian 
enterprise  have  managed  to  successfully  pass  through  the  Commission's  assessment  for 
the  status.  This  means  that  the  success  rate  is  about  12  percent.  With  regard  to  individual 
dumping  margins  awarded  to  applicant  enterprises  that  have  successfully  established 
their  eligibility  for  MET,  there  is  no  significant  decline  in  individual  dumping  margins 
than  would  otherwise  have  been  the  case.  However,  over  the  same  period  since  the  new 
approaches  were  introduced,  the  number  of  new  anti-dumping  investigations  against 
Chinese  exporters  has  increased  sharply,  from  only  one  anti-dumping  case  in  1998  to  18 
new  cases  in  1999-2000.  The  facts  show  that  the  changes  of  the  EU's  antiýdumping 
policy  towards  China  actually  have  had  a  negative  impact  rather  than  any  tangible  reward 
to  its  favourable  outcome  of  economic  reform.  It  also  makes  it  clear  that  the  application 
of  these  new  approaches  is  problematic,  at  least  from  the  statistical  point  of  view. 
The  main  reasons  for  the  problems  of  the  new  approaches  mainly  include  two  points. 
First,  the  criteria  for  both  conditional  MET  and  individual  treatment  are  not  reasonable 
enough  for  Chinese  exporters  to  meet  in  anti-dumping  investigations.  The  change  of  the 
rules  was  structured  to  allow  the  Commission  to  interpret  the  law  as  it  saw  fit  on  a 
127 case-by-case  basis.  63  In  this  way,  the  amended  policy  ensures  that  the  Commission  would 
have  ample  discretion  to  determine  the  existence  of  dumping  in  anti-dumping 
proceedings  against  imports  from  NMEs.  Second,  the  policy  is  implemented  over  strictly 
by  the  European  Commission  so  that  it  actually  excludes  the  large  majority  of  applicants 
from  being  successful.  'Commission  officials  admit  that  the  formal  rule  change  was  more 
in  name  than  in  substance,  and  they  had  no  intention  of  administering  the  more  beneficial 
rules  to  Chinese  and  Russian  firms.  64 
Therefore,  it  is  no  surprise  that  as  a  result  in  practice,  the  conditional  MET  and  individual 
treatment  seem  to  be  exceptions  to  the  traditional  rules  towards  imports  from  China  in  the 
EU's  anti-dumping  investigations  rather  than  the  main  principle  to  accommodate 
favourable  changes  obtained  in  China's  economic  reform. 
In  summary,  this  chapter  analyzes  and  comments  on  the  current  EU's 
anti-dumping  rules  towards  China,  and  therefore  constitutes  a  significant  part  of 
the  whole  thesis.  In  the  next  chapter,  I  will  analyze  the  actual  impacts  of  China's 
economic  reform  for  the  past  twenty  years,  so  that  we  can  make  corresponding 
suggestions  to  remedy  the  defects  of  the  current  EU's  anti-  dumping  policy  towards 
China. 
63  Cynthia  M.  Horne,  'Belief  Stasis  as  an  Impediment  to  Policy  Implementation:  Non-Market 
Economies  and  Western  Trade  Laws'  (University  of  Washington,  prepared  for:  American  Political 
Science  Association  Conference  San  Francisco,  CA,  August  30  -  September  2,2001).  p  24. 
64 
Ibid. 
128 Chapter  Four 
An  Analysis  of  China's  Economic  Reform 
Introduction 
This  chapter  is  an  analysis  of  China's  economic  reform.  As  discussed  in  the  last  chapter, 
there  are  many  unreasonable  factors  in  the  current  EU's  anti-dumping  policy  with  regard 
to  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  '  and  the  very  reason  which  brings  out  these  problems 
and  makes  the  rules  unfair  enough  to  be  applied  is  the  progress  achieved  in  China's 
economic  reform  and  the  changes  in  its  economic  status.  China  has  become  a  transitional 
economy  and  is  quite  close  to  an  ME  in  many  fields,  but  the  EU  still  applies  traditional 
NME  treatment  to  Chinese  exports  in  most  cases,  the  proportion  of  Chinese  exports 
subject  to  the  EU's  anti-dumping  measures  are  extremely  high.  Based  on  this  point,  I  will 
demonstrate  the  fundamental  progress  achieved  in  China's  economy  by  analysing  the 
development  in  four  important  sections,  which  include  reform  in  foreign  trade,  enterprise, 
pricing  and  financial  fields. 
Since  foreign  trade,  enterprise,  pricing  and  financial  systems  are  the  key  areas  in  China's 
economic  reforms,  I  will  discuss  their  development  respectively.  For  each  of  them,  first,  I 
give  a  brief  introduction  to  their  pre-reform  conditions.  Second,  I  enumerate  progress 
made  after  the  reform.  Third,  I  abstract  and  explain  relevant  Chinese  national  legislation. 
This  is  not  only  because  these  laws  embody  the  favourable  outcomes  of  the  reforms  and 
support  them  in  turn,  but  also  because  they  relate  to  the  requirements  of  EU's  conditional 
MET.  There,  the  basic  consistency  between  the  Chinese  legislation  and  the  criteria  to  get 
I  The  EU's  anti-dumping  policy  against  imports  China  are  mainly  traditional  non-market  economy 
treatment  (analogue  country  method),  one  country  one  duty  rule  and  occasionally  use  of  market 
economy  treatment  and  individual  treatment.  They  are  examined  in  more  detail  in  chapter  three. 
1,19 MET  is  emphasized  in  order  to  propose  some  practical  suggestions  to  the  EU  in  the  end. 
Four,  I  analyze  commitments  made  on  China's  accession  to  the  World  Trade  Organization 
(WTO),  which  ensures  that  further  reform  will  be  carried  out  towards  a  market  economy 
direction  in  future. 
After  the  above  issues  have  been  examined,  the  illegal  and  unreasonable  aspects  of  the 
EU's  anti-dumping  practice  towards  China  are  analyzed.  Based  on  the  above  study, 
suggestions  for  the  EU  are  proposed  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 
The  analysis  in  this  chapter  is  based  on  a  variety  of  sources.  It  deals  with  the  legislative 
changes  that  have  taken  place  since  China  embarked  on  its  period  of  economic 
transformation  in  the  1980s.  These  legislative  changes  are  discussed  in  the  context  of  the 
economic  analyzes  that  have  been  conducted  by  the  World  Bark,  the  WTO  and  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  in  relation  to  each  stage  of  economic  reform 
wherever  such  reports  are  available. 
Of  crucial  importance  in  this  respect  is  the  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  China's 
Accession  to  the  WTO 
.2 
This  report  provides  the  analysis  -  economic  and  legal  -  which 
corroborates  the  central  argument  of  this  thesis  that  the  EU,  by  failing  to  take  into  account 
the  very  real  changes  that  have  occurred  in  China's  economy,  is  acting  unreasonably  in  its 
application  of  its  anti-dumping  regime.  In  many  respects,  the  Report  of  the  Working  Party 
can  be  said  to  be  a  definitive  statement  of  the  true  position  of  China's  economy  at  the  time 
of  accession  to  the  WTO  in  late  200  1.  Its  conclusions  formed  the  basis  of  China's 
accession  and,  as  such,  clearly  should  be  seriously  considered  by  EU  policy  makers  in 
determining  its  trade  arrangements  with  China. 
2,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China',  I  October  2001.  WTO  document  code: 
WT/ACC/CHN/49.  Available  by  searching  through  <http:  //docsonline.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I 
December  2002). 
130 1.  China's  foreign  trade  regime. 
China's  foreign  trade  regime  has  undergone  fundamental  changes  through  continuous 
reform  since  1979,  when  trade  development  was  dominated  through  monopolies 
controlled  by  the  Chinese  central  government.  As  the  outcome  of  the  reform,  the  foreign 
trade  system  has  seen  great  progress  in  both  the  import  and  export  sectors,  so  that  it  was 
able  to  meet  the  commitments  when  China  entered  the  WTO  in  November  200  1. 
A.  A  brief  introduction  to  the  pre-reform  foreign  trade  regime  in  China. 
China's  foreign  trade  system  before  economic  reform  was  completely  controlled  by  the 
Chinese  government.  It  was  dominated  by  less  than  17  foreign  trade  corporations  with 
monopoly  trading  rights.  3  Ignoring  the  important  role  played  by  the  market,  planners 
determined  both  import  and  export  volumes  by  projected  demand  and  supply  for 
particular  goods.  At  that  time,  the  old  regime  had  three  characteristics.  On  the  one  hand, 
conventional  policy  instruments  including  tariffs,  quotas  and  licences  were  seldom 
applied.  Instead,  there  were  a  series  of  complicated  procedures  and  formalities  to  manage 
the  foreign  trade  system.  On  the  other  hand,  the  government  regulated  foreign  trade 
activities  mainly  with  administrative  measures  which  lacked  transparency  and  therefore 
were  unpredictable.  Furthermore,  there  was  no  institution  to  monitor  the  planners'  work. 
Under  such  circumstances,  the  foreign  trade  regime  was  inefficient,  thus  China  lost  its 
advantages  in  international  trade. 
B.  Process  and  progress  of  the  reform  of  China's  foreign  trade  regime. 
In  order  to  bring  new  energy  to  the  old  regime,  China  took  four  significant  strategies  in 
3  Elena  lanchovichina  &  Will  Martin,  'Trade  Liberalization  in  China's  Accession  to  World  Trade 
Organization'  at  p  3.  World  Bank  Policy  Research  Working  Paper,  No:  WPS  2623,2001/06/30. 
<http:  //www-wds.  worldbank.  org/serviet/NkDS-IBank_Serviet?  pcont--details&eid=000094946_0107 
1704024384>  (I  December  2002). 
131 the  reform,  including:  enlarging  foreign  trade  rights,  reforming  trade  policy,  reforming 
the  exchange  system  and  reforming  prices  to  let  market  prices  guide  resource  allocation. 
1.  Enlarged  foreign  trade  rights. 
Since  1979,  China  has  granted  a  large  number  of  enterprises  foreign  trade  rights  rather 
than  restrict  such  rights  to  the  limited  monopoly  of  foreign  trade  corporations  as  was  done 
in  the  past.  As  a  result,  external  trade  is  now  conducted  through  more  than  200,000 
importers  and  exporters  in  China. 
From  I  January  1999,  if  private  companies  can  prove  that  they  can  meet  certain  basic 
requirements  provided  by  law,  they  will  obtain  foreign  trading  rights  for  their  own 
products.  At  a  later  stage,  big  manufacturing  firms  can  also  get  direct  foreign  trade  rights 
for  their  products  automatically  without  ratification  from  the  state  once  they  meet  the 
legal  requirements.  That  is  to  say,  today,  not  only  state  trading  enterprises,  but  also  private 
companies  and  joint  ventures  are  entitled  to  participate  in  foreign  trade  transactions.  In 
addition,  they  enjoy  the  same  level  of  rights  and  obligations  before  the  law. 
Besides,  all  these  enterprises  have  been  granted  more  rights  to  decision-making  and 
self-management  than  ever  before.  5  Since  1984,  they  have  been  legally  independent 
economic  entities.  6  Especially  state  owned  enterprises  which  were  completely  under 
government  control  before,  operate  mainly  along  commercial  lines  now.  7  Based  on  this 
4  Deepak  Bhattasali  &  Masahiro  Kawai,  'Implications  of  China's  Accession  to  the  World  Trade 
Organization',  <http:  //www.  worldbank.  org.  cn/English/content/wto-implications.  pdf>  (I  December 
2002). 
5  Except  for  a  few  commodities  which  the  number  of  firms  entitled  to  engage  in  trade  is  tightly 
restricted  by  state,  such  as  crude  oil,  cotton,  rubber,  timber,  steel  etc. 
E.  lanchoviChina  &  W.  Martin,  fn  3  above  at  p  5. 
6  Deepak  Bhattasali  &  Masahiro  Kawai,  fn  4  above  at  p  4. 
7  Rozelle,  S.,  Park,  A.,  Huang,  Jikun  and  Hehui,  Jin.  'Bureacrat  to  Entrepreneur:  the  Changing  Role  of 
the  State  in  China's  Transitional  Commodity  Economy'  (Stanford  University:  Mimeo,  1996). 
132 point,  an  individual  enterprise  can  take  its  advantages  in  foreign  trade  business  according 
to  its  development  level  and  competition  capabi  lity.  8 
All  of  these  represent  a  relatively  open  foreign  trade  regime  compared  with  before.  Since 
the  number  of  the  enterprises  and  the  trade  rights  that  they  enjoyed  vvere  largel.  N  expanded, 
import  and  export  volumes  greatly  increased.  Consequently,  China's  trade  (imports  and 
exports)  as  a  share  of  GDP  rose  from  13  percent  in  1980  to  44  percent  in  19999 
2.  Reform  of  trade  policy. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  reform,  China's  foreign  trade  system  developed  the  conventional 
policy  instruments  including  tariff  and  non-tariff  barriers  on  imports.  However,  since 
1990,  in  order  to  be  consistent  with  the  global  trade  principle,  (i.  e.  eliminate  tariff  and 
non-tariff  barriers  to  restore  fair  competition  in  international  trade)  and  integrate  with  the 
world  trade  system,  China  made  great  efforts  to  reduce  tariffs  and  remove  non-tariff 
barriers.  The  average  weighted  tariff  rate  for  the  economy  was  estimated  to  be  16.4 
percent  in  200010  from  40.6  percent  in  1992  (See  Table  4.1).  Several  significant  tariff 
reforms  from  October  1997  to  2001  further  reduced  tariffs  on  a  wide  range  of 
commodities.  As  to  non-tariff  barriers,  these  are  estimated  to  have  fallen  to  a 
tariff-equivalent  level  of  9.3  percent  in  the  mid-1990s,  "  and  the  number  of  products 
Subject  to  quotas  and  licences  fell  from  1247  tariff  lines  in  1992  to  261  in  1999.12 
I  lang  Lin,  'China's  Foreign  Trade  System  towards  Its  Accession  to  the  WTO'  (Chinese) 
<http:  l"www.  C  hi  nare  form.  org.  c  n/cgi-  bin/B  BS-Read.  asp?  Topi  c_  I  D=620>  (I  Dccember  2002). 
D  Bhattasali,  fii  4  above  at  p  2. 
10  Para  89,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
World  Bank  1997b.  China  Engaged:  Integration  with  the  World  Economy.  Washington  D.  C..  World 
Bank. 
fii  3  above  at  p  6.  12  E  lanchovlChina, 
-1 
1  '33 Table  4.1.  Average  tariff  rates  in  China  from  1992  to  1998.  (Percenty  3 
Year  Sample  Weighted 
1992  42.9  40.6 
1993  39.9  38.4 
1994  36.3  35.5 
1996 
1997 
1998 
23.6 
17.6 
17.5 
22.6 
18.2 
18.7 
ýýource:  world  t3anK  1999.  World  Development  Indicator. 
All  of  these  reforms  of  the  old  trade  regime  have  greatly  stimulated  the  development  of 
China's  foreign  trade.  As  a  result,  China's  foreign  trade  volume  (exports  and  imports)  as  a 
share  of  GDP  (Gross  Domestic  Product)  rose  from  13  percent  in  1980  to  44  percent  in 
1999.14  Also,  China  has  become  the  second  largest  country  with  on-shore  foreign 
currency  deposits  in  the  world  after  the  United  Kingdom.  '  5  Thus,  it  wins  more  andmore 
shares  in  international  trade  transactions. 
C.  Relevant  laws  which  support  the  reform; 
China  provides  a  series  of  laws  regulating  its  foreign  trade  system,  in  order  to  ensure  that 
it  operates  under  legal  and  market  economy  principles.  On  the  one  hand,  it  encourages 
normal  trade  activities,  supporting  and  defending  the  outcome  of  the  reform.  From  this 
13  World  Bank  1999.  World  Development  Indicators.  World  Bank,  Washington  DC.  Available  from  the 
World  Bank  website:  <http:  //www.  worldbank.  org>  (I  December  2002). 
14  D  Bhattasali,  fn  4  above  at  p  2. 
15  ,  With  on-shore  foreign  currency  deposits  of  US$128  billion,  the  second  largest  in  the  world  after 
the  United  Kingdom,  China's  economy  is  more  open  than  generally  believed.  ' 
D  Bhattasali,  fin  4  above  at 
134 point,  relevant  laws  include  the  Foreign  Trade  Law  16  and  Current  Policy  &  Conditions 
for  the  Qualification  of  Foreign  Trade  Management.  17  On  the  other  hand,  to  maintain  a 
fair  foreign  trade  order,  it  punishes  any  behaviour  which  is  destructive  to  the  system.  For 
example,  with  regard  to  the  issue  of  dumping,  China  enacted  its  Interim  Regulation  for 
the  Punishment  of  Enterprises  which  Export  Products  with  Low  Price  sl  8  on  20  March 
1996.  From  this  point  of  view,  laws  of  different  purpose  perform  together  to  keep  a  better 
foreign  trade  order  in  China.  These  different  regulatory  approaches  should  be  analyzed  to 
help  us  understand  to  what  extent  they  ensure  the  system  operates  towards  the  market 
economy  direction. 
1.  Foreign  Trade  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
This  law  was  enacted  on  I  July  1994.  It  provides:  a.  the  basic  principles  and  orders  that 
foreign  trade  operators  should  observe,  b.  a  list  of  a  small  range  of  goods  which  it  is 
prohibited  to  import,  c.  export  and  legal  responsibilities  for  operators. 
First  of  all,  Article  4  provides:  The  State  adopts  a  unified  foreign  trade  regime  and 
exercises  a  fair  and  free  trade  order.  The  State  shall  encourage  every  effort  in  trade 
development,  help  to  bring  the  initiative  of  the  localities  into  play,  and  safeguard  the 
autonomy  of  trade  operators  in  trade  operation. 
Article  II  stipulates  that  foreign  trade  operators  shall  operate  independently  according  to 
law  and  be  responsible  for  their  own  profits  or  losses. 
16  Chinese  Foreign  Trade  Law  was  promulgated  by  the  State  President  on  12  May  1994.  It  was  enacted 
to  govern  foreign  trade  dealer,  goods  imports  and  exports,  technology  imports  and  exports, 
international  service  trade,  foreign  trade  order,  and  promotion  of  foreign  trade.  The  Law  went  into 
effect  on  July  1,1994. 
17  This  Regulation  was  issued  by  the  Foreign  Trade  Department,  MOFTEC.  It  has  binding  effects  on 
all  types  of  enterprises  conducting  foreign  trade  in  China.  Available  from 
<http:  //www.  i-noftec.  gov.  cn/article/200207/20020700032855_1.  xml>  (I  December  2002). 
18  it  was  enacted  on  20  March  1996  by  MOFTEC. 
135 In  this  way,  the  law  confirms  its  objective  to  develop  a  sound  foreign  trade  regime 
towards  market  economy  orientation.  In  the  meantime,  it  ensures  the  rights  of  operators 
in  trade,  so  that  they  are  able  to  make  decisions  for  themselves  according  to  market 
supply  and  demand. 
2.  Current  Policy  &  Conditions  for  the  Qualification  of  Foreign  Trade  Companies 
in  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
This  was  promulgated  by  the  Foreign  Trade  Department  of  the  Ministry  ofForeign  Trade 
and  Economic  Cooperation,  PRC  (MOFTEC)  in  June  2001.  It  specifies  basic  conditions 
and  application  procedures  for  enterprises  which  are  potentially  entitled  to  trade  in  China. 
The  preface  of  the  rule  reiterates  three  points.  First  of  all,  the  law  was  published  to 
increase  and  improve  transparency  of  China's  foreign  trade  regime.  In  addition,  the  limit 
for  the  company's  economic  status  permitted  to  do  foreign  trade  business  in  China  has 
been  completely  eliminated,  i.  e.  non-public  ownership  (non-state-control)  enterprises 
have  the  same  rights  with  state  trading  companies  at  this  point.  In  addition,  the  range  of 
goods  to  be  transacted  under  the  regime  is  getting  broader  and  broader. 
3.  Interim  Regulation  for  the  Punishment  of  Enterprises  which  Export  Products 
with  Low  Prices.  19 
It  was  enacted  on  20  March  1996  by  MOFTEC.  It  indicates  that  the  Ministry  is  the  body 
to  implement  this  Regulation,  20  and  identifies  the  concept  of  export  at  low  price,  21  i.  e. 
19  This  regulation  is  applicable  to  all  foreign  trade  enterprises  in  China.  Available  (in  Chinese)  from: 
<http:  //www.  people.  com.  cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/1/1-2-39.  html>  (I  December  2002). 
20  Art.  3,  Interim  Regulation  for  the  Punishment  of  Enterprises  which  Export  Products  with  Low 
Prices. 
21  Art.  5,  Interim  Regulation  for  the  Punishment  of  Enterprises  which  Export  Products  with  Low 
Prices. 
136 when  the  export  price  is  lower  than  the  price  that  should  be  paid.  22  In  order  to  prevent 
Chinese  exporters  competing  with  each  other  unfairly  by  decreasing  the  prices  of  their 
exports,  the  Ministry  encourages  individuals  and  units  to  report  such  practices  to  the 
authority.  Within  30  days  of  the  report  being  received,  the  Ministry  will  decide  whether  to 
launch  an  investigation  or  not.  23  As  to  the  enterprises  which  export  at  low  price,  they  will 
24  receive  an  economic  or  administrative  punishment.  In  this  way,  unfair  competition  in 
the  foreign  trade  system  is  curbed  by  the  government  to  some  extent. 
From  the  above  analysis,  it  can  be  seen  that  China  has  realized  the  significance  of  market 
economy  principles  in  international  trade.  So,  today,  it  is  making  efforts  to  build  a  free 
and  fair  environment  for  its  foreign  trade  development  within  a  legal  framework. 
D.  Commitments  made  on  China's  accession  to  the  WTO  and  prospects  for 
the  future. 
1.  Commitments  made  on  China's  accession  to  the  WTO. 
According  to  the  principles  of  international  trade  given  in  the  GAT-r,  the  Chinese 
government  made  the  following  commitments  in  the  foreign  trade  field  on  its  accession  to 
the  WTO. 
a.  Commitment  on  enterprise's  qualification  of  foreign  trade. 
Within  a  three  years'  transition  period,  China  will  liberalize  the  scope  and  availability  of 
22  ,  Price  that  should  be  paid'  comprises:  production  cost,  transportation  cost,  insurance  cost, 
management  cost  and  reasonable  profit  of  an  export. 
23  Art.  8,  Interim  Regulation  for  the  Punishment  of  Enterprises  which  Export  Products  with  Low 
Prices. 
24  Art.  6&  12,  Interim  Regulation  for  the  Punishment  of  Enterprises  which  Export  Products  with  Low 
Prices  (20  March  1996). 
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25  foreign  trading  rights.  It  undertook  that. 
With  regard  to  wholly  Chinese-invested  enterprises.  it  would  reduce  the  minimum 
registered  capital  requirement  to  obtain  trading  rights  to  RMB26  5,000,000  (around  US 
Dollar  $604,000)  for  year  one,  RMB  3,000,000  (around  US  Dollar  $362,400)  for  year 
two,  RMB  1,000,000  (around  US  Dollar  $120,800)  for  year  three  and  would  eliminate  tile 
examination  and  approval  system  at  the  end  of  the  phase-in  period  for  trading  rights.  As 
to  foreign-invested  enterprises,  it  would  liberalize  the  scope  and  availability  of  tradifig 
rights  gradually. 
Beginning  one  year  after  accession,  joint-venture  enterprises  with  minority  share 
foreign-  investment  would  be  granted  full  rights  to  trade  and  beginning  two  years  after 
accession  ma  ority  share  foreign-investedjoint-ventures  would  be  granted  full  rights  to 
27  trade  . 
Within  three  years  after  accession,  all  enterprises  in  China  would  be  granted  the  right  to 
trade  automatically.  As  a  result,  all  enterprises  in  China,  foreign  enterprises  and 
individuals  would  be  allowed  to  export  and  import  throughout  the  customs  territory  of 
China.  28 
b.  Commitment  on  designated  trading29 
The  Chinese  government  undertook  to  phase  out  the  limitation  on  the  grant  of  trading 
rights  for  goods  specified  in  Annex  2B  of  its  Draft  Protocol  within  three  ý'ears  after 
25  Para.  83  &  84,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
26  RMB  is  'Reni-ninbi'  for  short.  Chinese  curreilcý. 
27  Para.  83  (c),  Report  of  the  Working  Part),  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
28  Fxcept  for  the  share  of  products  listed  in  Annex  2A  to  the  Draft  Protocol  reserwd  for  importation 
and  exportation  bý  state  trading  enterprises. 
29  Pam.  86,  Report  of  the  Working  PartN  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
1,18 accession.  t  would  liberalize  the  right  to  trade  in  such  goods  by  increasing  the  number  of 
imports  progressively  during  the  transition  period.  All  Chinese  and  foreign  enterprises 
and  individuals  would  be  permitted  to  import  and  export  such  goods  throughout  the 
customs  territory  of  China  in  the  end. 
c.  Commitment  on  tariff  reduction. 
China  has  made  substantial  tariff  reductions  in  many  sections  within  the  past  few  years,  a 
fact  which  is  acknowledged  by  other  WTO  members  . 
30  After  it  entered  into  the  WTO, 
China  has  made  further  commitments  on  this  issue.  For  example,  China  signed  the 
Information  Technology  Agreement  on  its  accession  to  the  WTO,  so  it  would  eliminate 
tariffs  and  charges  on  all  information  technology  products  as  set  out  in  the  schedule.  31 
Besides,  China  has  agreed  to  reduce  the  average  tariffs  for  all  imports.  Tariffs  on 
agricultural  products  will  be  reduced  from  20  percent  in  1998  to  17  percent  by  2004,  and 
the  average  tariffs  on  all  manufactures  will  fall  from  18.5  percent  in  1998  to  9.4  percent 
by  2005.  (See  Table  4.2)32 
30  Para.  87,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
31  Para.  92,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
32  Deepak  Bhattasali  &  Masahiro  Kawai,  fn  4  above  at  p  4. 
139 33  Table  4.2:  Summary  of  Important  Features  of  the  China-LJS  Agreement 
. 
Sector  Agreements 
Agriculture  Average  tariffs  reduced  from  20  percent  to  17  percent  by  January 
2004. 
A  tariff-rate  quota  (TRQ)  system  established  for  bulk 
commodities,  with  quota  quantities  increasing  over  time,  and 
subject  to  tariffs  between  1-3  percent.  Export  subsidies  on  cotton 
and  rice  eliminated. 
Foreign  exporters  given  the  right  to  sell  and  distribute  their 
products  directly  to  consumers. 
Manufacturing  Average  tariffs  reduced  from  18.5  percent  in  1998  to  9.4  percent 
by  2005,  phased  in  linearly,  with  large  cuts  for  automobiles,  high 
tech  products,  wood,  and  paper. 
Quotas  and  non-tariff  restrictions  eliminated  within  5  years  (and 
most  in  2002-2003).  Foreign  firms  given  full  trading  and 
distribution  rights  for  imported  goods. 
Textiles  and  Import  quotas  on  China's  textiles  and  clothing  exports 
Clothing  eliminated  by  end-2005,  subject  to  anti-surge  provisions  through 
1  2008. 
Source:  International  Monetary  Fund. 
d.  Commitments  on  elimination  of  nonAariff  trade  barriers  (quotas  and  licences). 
China  established  a  tariff-rate  quota  (TRQ)  system  on  its  accession  to  the  WTO.  China 
undertakes  that  the  system  will  be  transparent,  predictable,  uniform,  fair  and 
non-discriminatory  with  clearly  specified  timeframes,  administrative  procedures  and 
requirements,  which  reflects  consumer  preferences  and  end-user  demand.  China  will 
apply  TRQs  according  to  WTO  principles  and  the  provisions  set  out  in  China's  Schedule 
33  WTO  most-favored-nation  (MFN)  treatment  enables  the  commitments  made  in  China-US 
Agreement  available  to  all  other  members. 
'Surnmary  of  U.  S.  -  China  Bilateral  WTO  Agreement  I, 
<http:  Hwww.  usChina.  org/public/991115a.  html>  (I  December  1,2002). 
140 of  Concessions  and  Commitments  on  Goods.  34 
As  to  the  TRQ  provisions  applied  to  state-trading  enterprises.  China  ensures  that  it  WOUld 
implement  consistent  allocation  and  reallocation  policies.  Besides,  all  these  decisions 
will  be  made  by  a  single,  central  authority  according  to  consumer  preferences  and 
end-user  demand  of  the  commercial  market.  35 
In  addition,  China  has  submitted  a  list  of  goods  with  non-tariff  measures  to  phase  out 
contained  in  Annex  3  of  the  Draft  Protocol.  36  China  will  eliminate  the  measures 
according  to  the  schedule  provided  in  the  Annex.  China  confirmed  that  the  application 
and  administration  of  those  measures  ,  i.  e.  quotas  and  import  licences,  would  be 
consistent  with  the  WTO  Agreement.  The  quotas  will  be  allocated  and  the  licence  %%ill  be 
issued  through  simple  and  transparent  procedures.  As  long  as  the  products  are  within  the 
relevant  quota  category,  the  quota  holder  has  absolute  rights  to  dispose  of  thern,  includinp 
to  decide  their  specifications,  pricing  and  packaging.  37  All  of  these  policies  are  targeted  to 
meet  potential  need  in  the  market  and  minimize  the  adverse  effect  of  non-tariff  measures 
on  trade. 
Based  on  these  principles,  all  quotas  and  non-tariff  trade  barriers  %\ill  be  eliminated 
\vithin  5  years  after  China's  accession  to  the  WT 
- 
38 
2.  Prospects  for  China's  foreign  trade  in  future. 
China's  entry  into  the  WTO  had  significant  impact  on  its  economic  status  in  the  ýwrld 
Para.  116,  Report  of  the  Working  Parly  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
. 15  Para.  119,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
36  ,  The  Draft  Protocol  of  the  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China',  Repon  ofthe 
Working  llartý  on  the  Accession  of  China  at  p  731- 
37  Para.  13  1,  Report  of  the  Working  Part),  on  the  Accession  of  Cluna. 
38  Deepak  13hattasali  &  Masahiro  KaNN  a,.  fin  4  above  at  p  5. 
141 economy.  With  the  implementation  of  the  accession  offer,  its  share  of  world  export 
markets  are  estimated  to  rise  from  3.7  percent  in  1995  to  6.8  percent  in  2005,  and  from 
3.4  percent  in  1995  to  6.6  percent  in  2005  of  world  import  markets.  With  regard  to  its 
impact  on  developed  regions,  Western  Europe  can  benefit  most  due  to  China!  s  accession 
to  the  WTO.  Its  exports  to  China  will  increase  from  $28,571  Million  in  1995  to  $50,182 
Million  in  2005,  while  those  from  North  America  will  grow  from  $19,019  Million  to 
$28,638  Million  during  the  same  period  of  time.  39  China  is  likely  to  be  the  second  largest 
trading  partner  only  after  the  US  twenty  years  later,  rather  than  the  16  h  largest  partner  of 
40  today  . 
Considering  these  facts  and  analysis,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  after  years  of  reform,  China's 
foreign  trade  system  operates  mainly  under  market  economic  conditions  today. 
Following  China's  accession  to  the  WTO,  it  will  make  further  progress  at  this  point 
through  continuous  reform.  Therefore,  both  the  outcome  and  prospects  of  the  reform 
should  be  taken  into  account  when  determining  China's  economic  status  in  international 
trade  issues  such  as  anti-dumping. 
IL  Chinese  enterprise  reform. 
Chinese  enterprises  can  be  divided  into  four  categories  according  to  their  ownership: 
state-owned  enterprises,  collective-owned  enterprises,  individual-owned  enterprises,  and 
'other'  ownership  forrns.  Among  them,  collective-owned  enterprises  include  urban 
collectives,  township  enterprises,  village  enterprises,  and  cooperatives.  Individual-owned 
firms,  which  account  for  about  80  percent  of  the  more  than  7  million  enterprises  in  China, 
are  privately  owned  firms  that  employ  no  more  than  seven  workers.  'Other'  ownership 
39  Deepak  Bhattasali  &  Masahiro  Kawai,  fn  4  above  at  p  18. 
40  Yukon  Huang,  'Realizing  China's  Potential', 
<http:  //www.  worldbank.  org.  cn/english/content/529z6l4659  I.  shtml>  (I  December  2002). 
142 firms  include  domestic  joint  ventures,  privately  owned  enterprises.  fore  i  gri.  -funded  joint 
ventures,  overseas-funded  joint  ventures.  foreign-funded  \ýhollý  owned  firms. 
overseas-funded  wholly  owned  firms,  foreign-funded  cooperatives.  oýcrseas-funded 
cooperatives,  and  share-holding  enterprises  .4 
'Fundamental  changes  took  place  m 
Chinese  enterprises  due  to  China's  economic  reform,  especially  the  self-management 
rights  enjoyed  by  enterprises  of  different  ownerships.  These  changes  are  examined  below. 
A.  Brief  introduction  to  Chinese  enterprise  before  reform. 
Before  China's  economic  reform,  the  Chinese  government  fully  controlled  China's 
economy  by  dominating  the  country's  enterprises.  The  large  majority  of  invcstmcnt  funds 
and  resources  were  allocated  by  the  state  from  state  resources.  '2  There  was  hardly  am 
other  ownership  except  state-owned  and  collective-owned  cnterprises.  F'or  cmunple,  in 
1980. 
) 
China  had  only  400  'other'  ownership  firms,  but  83,400  state-o\\ned  and  29'),  100 
collective-owned  enterprises,  which  accounts  for  99.89  percent  of  the  total  at  that  tim  C. 
43 
B.  Process  and  Progress  of  the  Chinese  enterprise  reform. 
Following  China's  economic  reform  in  1978,  several  kcy  strate(gies  were  taken  by  the 
government,  and  tremendous  changes  took  place  in  Chinese  enterprises. 
First,  non-state-ownership  was  introduced  and  increasingly  expanded.  The  merall 
number  of  enterprises  in  China  rose  from  377,000  in  1980  to  nearly  8  million  in  1999. 
(Table  4.3)  Arnong  them,  State-owned  enterprises  decreased  from  83,400  in  1980  to 
41  G,  -iry  II.  Jefferson  &  Thomas  G.  Rawski,  'Ownership  Change  in  Chinese  lndustr--,  '  in  Garv  If. 
Jef't'c'-son  and  Inderjit  Singh  (eds.  ),  Enterprise  reorm  in  China,  0ývncrshP,  Transition,  aml 
Av-1brmance.  (Oxford  Universit-,  Press:  1999)  at  p  2-3). 
42  GarN  II.  Jefferson,  Albert  G.  Z.  Hu,  and  Indedit  Singh.  'Industrial  IMestment,  Finance.  and 
Enterprise  Perforniancein  Chinese  lndustD,  '.  in  Gary  I-I.  Jefferson  and  lnderjit,  -,  ingh  (eds.  ).  Ewerl)rist., 
"clol-in  in  ('hina,  Oivnership,  Transition,  und  Performance.  (Oxford  Unk  ersitý  Press:  1999).  223. 
4.1  Garv  I  I.  Jefferson  K,  Thomas  G.  Rawski, 
'fiz 
41  abo\c  at  p  25- 
143 61,300  in  1999.  The  number  of  collective-owned  enterprises  increased  from  293,500  in 
1980  to  1,659,200  in  1999,  with  most  of  the  growth  coming  from  village  or  joint 
township-village  enterprises.  The  most  extraordinary  growth  existed  in  individual-owned 
enterprises,  w  ich  rose  sharply  from  3,347,800  in  1985  to  6,126,800  in  1999.  All  of  the 
changes,  especially  the  rapid  expansion  of  non-state-owned  firms,  reflect  the  relatively 
free  market  environment  in  China  compared  with  before.  44 
Table  4.3.  Number  of  enterprises  (thousand),  selected  years  (1980-99). 
Type  of 
enterprise 
1980  1985  1990  1995  1998  1999 
State-owned  83.4  93.7  104.4  118.0  64.7  61.3 
Collective-owned  293.5  367.8  15668.5  15475.0  1,797.8  1,659.2 
Individual-owned  --  3,347.8  6!,  176.0  5,688.2  6,033.8  6,126.8 
Other  0.4  1.7  8.8  60.3  85.7  91.8 
[Total 
377.3  3,811.0  7,957.8  7,341.5  7,974.6  7,929.9 
Note:  --  Not  available. 
Source:  China  State  Statistical  Bureau  2000.45 
Second,  at  the  beginning,  the  reform  was  carried  out  by  decentralizing  public  ownership 
through  devolution  of  the  control  of  state  industry  to  provincial  and  local  governments. 
This  decentralization  of  control  was  reinforced  by  the  policy  that  the  state  increasingly 
leaves  the  disposition  of  all  except  the  largest  enterprises  to  provincial  and  local  levels  of 
government.  It  had  a  strong  impact  on  the  large  number  of  state-owned  enterprises  at  that 
time.  Although  public  ownership  still  dominates  Chinese  industry,  the  state  could  no 
longer  monopolize  production  and  pricing,  except  in  certain  natural  resource  and  defense 
sectors.  As  a  result,  these  enterprises  gained  more  flexibility  in  their  individual 
44  Ibid. 
45  From  China  State  Statistical  Bureau  official  website: 
<http:  //www.  stats.  gov.  cn/sjjw/ndsj/zgnj/2000/MOlc.  htm>  (26  March  2002). 
144 development,  and  became  more  competitive  than  before.  46 
Another  approach  to  Chinese  enterprise  reform  is  corporate  restructuring.  A  rapidly 
growing  number  of  Chinese  state  owned  enterprises  have  been  corporatized,  generally  as 
joint  ventures  or  joint  stock  companies  in  which  the  state  remains  the  majority 
shareholder.  The  incentive  to  the  conversion  is  the  low  productivity  of  state-owned 
47 
enterprises,  which  declined  at  an  annual  rate  of  3.42  percent  between  1988  and  1992. 
An  important  reason  for  the  frequently  poor  performance  of  these  enterprises,  and  of 
difficulties  experienced  by  foreign  partners  investing  in  or  with  them,  has  been  their  lack 
of  a  corporate  structure.  Due  to  this  reason,  by  the  end  of  1997,  more  than  400  of  China's 
larger  state  enterprises  had  been  converted  into  joint  stock  companies  and  listed  on  public 
exchanges.  Labour  productivity  in  these  enterprises  was  highly  improved  in  this  way. 
(See  table  4.4).  In  2000,2800  bankruptcy  and  merger  proposals  were  approved,  among 
which  1504  were  carried  out,  with  a  total  writing-off  of  RMB81  billion  (around  US 
Dollar  $9.79  billion).  By  the  end  of  2000,  more  than  81  percent  of  the  63,490  smalýsized 
state-owned  enterprises  existed  at  end-1996  had  been  reformed  (mainly  through  sales).  48 
As  a  result  of  corporate  restructuring,  these  enterprises  enjoy  a  substantial  expansion  of 
property  rights  and  decision-making  rights,  which  bring  out  much  higher  productivity 
and  stronger  competitive  capability  compared  with  before. 
46  Gary  H.  Jefferson  and  Thomas  G.  Rawski,  fn  41  above  at  p  29. 
47  Gary  H.  Jefferson,  Inderjit  Singh,  XingJunling,  and  Zhang  Shouqing.  'China's  Industrial 
Performance:  A  Review  of  Recent  Findings'  in  Gary  H.  Jefferson  and  Inderj  it  Singh  (eds.  ),  Enterprise 
reform  in  China,  Ownership,  Transition,  and  Performance.  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press  1999), 
147. 
48  ,  World  Bank  Report  on  China's  Economic  Management,  '  September  2001, 
<http:  //www.  worldbank.  org.  cn/english/Knowledge/update9-200  I.  pdf>  (I  December  2002). 
145 Table  4.4  Labour  productivity  by  ownership,  selected  years,  1985-96.  (Chinese  Yuan 
RMB  per  worker;  I  US  Dollar  is  roughly  equivalent  to  8.28  WB  in  December  2002f  9 
Yi  eear 
rprI  Type  of  enterrpprrii'ýý 
1980  1988  1990  1993  1996 
State  enterprise  15309  24477 
- 
29933  50522  66295 
Collective  enterprise  5042  8721 
_ 
11444  22581  42234 
Other  enterprises  32636 
1 
63_0  18 
1 
76297 
1 
120888 
Source:  China  State  Statistical  Bureau. 
In  short,  Chinese  enterprise  reform  has  been  carried  out  towards  market  orientation  since 
1978.  It  results  in  less  and  less  interference  from  the  state  or  local  government  in  these 
enterprises'  operations.  It  brings  them  (especially  state  owned  enterprises)  many  more 
rights  to  manage  themselves  than  ever  before,  so  that  today  they  can  make  crucial 
decisions  according  to  their  individual  advantages  and  market  demand.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  state  applies  a  unified  set  of  rules  to  regulate  companies  with  different  ownerships  and 
treats  them  without  discrimination.  Under  such  circumstances,  all  types  of  enterprises  are 
able  to  compete  fairly  under  market  principles. 
C.  Main  laws  regulating  Chinese  enterprises. 
China  has  enacted  a  number  of  laws  to  ensure  that  the  Chinese  enterprise  reform  is 
carried  out  towards  market  orientation.  They  include  General  Principles  of  the  Civil 
Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  50  Company  law,  51  Enterprise  Bankruptcy 
49  Source:  China  State  Statistical  Bureau  1986,1989,1991,1994,1997;  China  Labour  Statistics 
Yearbook  1993  (pp.  193,349,413);  China  Industrial  Economy  Statistical  Yearbook  1988at  p.  27; 
China  State  Statistical  Bureau  enterprise  data  set. 
50  General  Principles  of  the  Civil  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China  was  Promulgated  by  the  State 
President  on  April  12,1986. 
51  The  translation  of  the  law  is  available  from  <http:  //www.  qis.  net/Chinalaw/lawtranl.  htm>  (I 
December  2002). 
146 Law,  "  Laws  for  enterprises  of  different  ownerships. 
1.  General  Principles  of  the  Civil  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
This  is  a  very  important  statute  which  identifies  the  basic  legal  status  of  Chinese 
enterprises.  Coming  effect  on  January  1,1987,  it  provides  general  rights  and  obligations 
of  a  legal  person  in  China. 
According  to  the  law,  a  legal  person  shall  be  an  organization  that  has  capacity  for  civil 
rights  and  capacity  for  civil  conduct  and  independently  enjoys  civil  rights  and  assumes 
civil  obligations.  53  An  enterprise  as  a  legal  person  shall  bear  civil  liability  for  the 
operational  activities  of  its  legal  representatives  and  other  personnel.  54  A  state-owned 
enterprise  (enterprise  owned  by  the  whole  people),  collective  enterprise,  China-foreign 
equity  joint  venture,  China-foreign  contractual  joint  venture  or  foreign-capital  enterprise 
as  a  legal  person  shall  bear  civil  liability  with  the  property  it  owns,  except  as  stipulated 
otherwise  by  law.  55 
2.  Chinese  Company  Law. 
Chinese  Company  law  was  enacted  on  29  December  1993  for  the  first  time  and  revised  on 
25  December  1999.  Compared  with  the  provisions  in  the  General  Principles  of  the  Civil 
Law  of  PRC,  it  is  more  specific,  governing  a  company's  foundation,  structure,  rights  and 
obligations,  functioning,  stock  issue,  dissolution  and  so  on.  However,  for  the  purpose  of 
this  section.  ) 
56  here  we  may  just  examine  the  provisions  with  regard  to  a  company's 
52  It  was  promulgated  by  the  State  President  on  2  December  1986  and  took  effect  on  I  October  1988. 
53  Art.  36,  General  Principles  of  the  Civil  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
54  Art.  43,  General  Principles  of  the  Civil  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
55  Art.  48,  General  Principles  of  the  Civil  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
56  This  section  aims  to  prove  that  Chinese  enterprises  of  today  enjoy  broad  self-management  rights,  so 
that  they  are  able  to  operate  and  compete  with  each  other  under  fair  market  conditions. 
147 self-management  rights,  obligations  and  responsibilities  that  it  bears  for  its  decisions. 
a.  Liabilities  of  a  company. 
According  to  the  Law,  'company'  refers  to  a  limited  liability  company  or  a  company 
limited  by  shares  established  within  the  Chinese  territory.  57  Both  types  of  companies  are 
enterprise  legal  persons. 
In  the  case  of  a  limited  liability  company,  a  shareholder  is  liable  to  the  company  to  the 
extent  of  the  amount  of  the  shareholder's  capital  contribution.  A  limited  liability  company 
is  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  company  with  all  its  assets.  In  the  case  of  a  company  limited 
by  shares,  its  entire  capital  is  divided  into  shares  of  equal  value  and  shareholders  shall  be 
liable  to  the  company  to  the  extent  of  the  shares  held  by  them.  A  company  limited  by 
shares  is  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  company  with  all  its  assets.  58 
The  above  provisions  stress  that  companies  of  different  types  are  responsible  for  their 
debts  with  their  assets.  They  are  very  important  because  they  are  the  prerequisite  to 
provide  a  company's  self-management  rights  subsequently  in  this  law. 
b.  Basic  rights  and  general  principles  of  self-management. 
The  shareholders  of  a  company,  as  capital  contributors,  have  the  right  to  enjoy  the 
benefits  of  the  assets  of  the  company,  make  major  decisions,  choose  managers  etc.  in 
accordance  with  the  amount  of  capital  they  have  invested  in  the  company.  A  company 
enjoys  all  legal  person  property  rights  constituted  by  the  shareholders'  investment,  enjoys 
civil  rights  and  assumes  civil  liabilities  in  accordance  with  the  law.  59 
57  Art.  2,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
58  Art.  3,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
59  Art.  4,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
148 With  respect  to  all  its  corporate  property,  a  company  conducts  its  business  autonomously 
in  accordance  with  the  law  and  is  responsible  for  its  own  profits  and  losses.  Under  the 
state's  macro  regulation  and  control  adjustment,  a  company  organizes  its  production  and 
operations  autonomously  according  to  market  demand  with  the  objectives  of  raising 
economic  efficiency  and  labour  productivity  and  preserving  and  increasing  the  value  of 
assets.  60  A  company  implements  an  internal  management  structure  with  a  clear  division 
of  rights  and  responsibilities,  scientific  management  and  combined  incentives  and 
restrictions.  61 
The  above  rules  ensure  a  company's  self-management  rights  without  state  interference 
with  regard  to  decision-making,  profit  and  loss,  and  production.  All  of  these  are 
consistent  with  the  first  criterion  of  the  EU's  conditional  MET.  62 
The  law  also  provides  that  a  state  owned  enterprise  which  is  being  reorganized  as  a 
company  shall  replace  its  system  of  operation,  gradually  and  systematically  take 
inventory  of  its  assets  and  verify  its  capital,  determine  property  rights,  clear  creditors' 
rights  and  indebtedness,  value  assets  and  set  up  a  standardized  internal  management 
structure  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  conditions  and  requirements  of  administrative 
regulations.  63 
This  rule  is  basically  the  same  as  the  third  criterion  of  the  EU's  conditional  MET,  which 
60  Art.  5,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
61  Art.  6,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
62  6  Decisions  of  firms  regarding  prices,  costs  and  inputs,  including  for  instance  raw  materials,  cost  of 
technology  and  labour,  output,  sales  and  investment,  are  made  in  response  to  market  signals  reflecting 
supply  and  demand,  and  without  significant  State  interference  in  this  regard,  and  costs  of  major  inputs 
substantially  reflect  market  values',  Art.  2(7)(c)  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98,  OJ  1998  L 
128/18. 
The  five  criteria  of  the  conditional  MET  are  analyzed  in  more  detail  in  chapter  three  and  section  V  of 
this  chapter. 
63  Art.  7,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
149 requires  that  'the  production  costs  and  financial  situation  of  firrns  are  not  subject  to 
significant  distortions  carried  over  from  the  former  non-market  economy  system,  in 
particular  in  relation  to  depreciation  of  assets,  other  writo-offs,  barter  trade  and  payment 
via  compensation  of  debts'. 
c.  Management  rights  of  a  limited  liability  company. 
China's  Company  Law  strengthens  a  limited  liability  company's  self-management  rights 
by  specifying  the  powers  exercised  by  its  shareholder's  meeting,  board  of  directors, 
manager  and  board  of  supervisors. 
Under  the  Law,  a  shareholder's  meeting  of  a  limited  liability  company  will  be  made  up  of 
all  shareholders  . 
64  It  is  the  company's  authoritative  organization,  and  exercises  the 
powers  to  decide  on  the  company's  operational  policies  and  investment  plans;  to  elect  and 
replace  directors  and  decide  on  matters  relating  to  the  remuneration  of  directors;  to  elect 
and  replace  the  supervisors  who  are  representatives  of  the  shareholders,  and  decide  on 
matters  relating  to  the  remuneration  of  supervisors;  to  examine  and  approve  reports  of  the 
board  of  directors;  to  examine  and  approve  reports  of  the  board  of  supervisors  or  any 
supervisor(s);  to  examine  and  approve  the  company's  proposed  annual  financial  budget 
and  final  accounts;  to  examine  and  approve  the  company's  plans  for  profit  distribution 
and  recovery  of  losses;  to  decide  on  increases  in  or  reductions  of  the  company's  registered 
capital;  to  decide  on  the  issue  of  bonds  by  the  company;  to  decide  on  transfers  of  capital 
contribution  by  shareholders  to  a  person  other  than  a  shareholder;  to  decide  on  issues 
such  as  merger,  division,  change  in  corporate  form  or  dissolution  and  liquidation  of  the 
company;  and  to  amend  the  company's  articles  of  association.  65 
The  board  of  directors  is  set  up  with  3-13  members  of  the  company,  and  has  one  chairman 
64  Art.  337,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
65  Art.  38,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
150 and  may  have  one  or  two  vice-chairmen  who  are  elected  according  to  the  articles  of 
association.  The  chairman  of  the  board  of  directors  is  the  legal  representative  of  the 
66 
company  . 
The  board  of  directors  is  responsible  to  the  shareholders'  meetings  and 
exercises  the  powers  to  be  responsible  for  convening  shareholders'  meetings  and  is 
accountable  to  the  shareholders'  meeting;  to  implement  the  resolutions  of  the 
shareholders'  meeting;  to  decide  on  the  operational  plans  and  investment  plan  of  the 
company;  to  formulate  the  company's  proposed  annual  financial  budget  and  final 
accounts;  to  formulate  plans  for  profit  distribution  and  recovery  of  losses;  to  formulate 
plans  for  increases  in  or  reductions  of  the  company's  registered  capital;  to  prepare  plans 
for  merger,  division,  change  in  corporate  form  and  dissolution  of  the  company;  to  decide 
on  the  set  up  of  the  company's  internal  management  structure;  to  appoint  or  dismiss  the 
company's  manager  (general  manager)  (the  'manager')  and  pursuant  to  the  manager's 
nominations  to  appoint  or  dismiss  the  deputy  manager  and  the  financial  officers  of  the 
company  and  decide  upon  their  remuneration;  and  to  formulate  the  company's  basic 
management  system.  67 
A  limited  liability  company  has  a  manager  who  is  appointed  or  dismissed  by  the  board  of 
directors.  The  manager  is  responsible  to  the  board  of  directors  and  exercises  the  powers  to 
be  in  charge  of  the  company's  production,  operations  and  management  and  organize  the 
implementation  of  the  resolutions  of  the  board  of  directors;  to  organize  the 
implementation  of  the  company's  annual  business  plan  and  investment  plan;  to  propose 
plans  for  the  putting  in  place  of  the  company's  internal  management  structure;  to  propose 
the  company's  basic  management  system;  to  formulate  specific  rules  and  regulations  for 
the  company;  to  propose  the  appointment  or  dismissal  of  the  company's  deputy 
manager(s)  and  financial  officers;  to  appoint  or  dismiss  management  officers  other  than 
66  Art.  45,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
67  Art.  46,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
151 those  required  to  be  appointed  or  dismissed  by  the  board  of  directors;  and  other  powers 
conferred  by  the  company's  articles  of  association  and  the  board  of  directors.  The 
manager  is  present  at  meetings  of  the  board  of  directors.  68 
The  board  of  supervisors  is  made  up  of  representatives  of  shareholders  and  a  reasonable 
proportion  of  representatives  from  the  company's  staff  and  workers  according  to  the 
Company's  Articles  of  Association.  The  directors,  manager  and  financial  officers  of  the 
company  shall  not  act  concurrently  as  supervisors  . 
69  The  board  of  supervisors  as 
supervisor  (s)  exercises  the  powers  to  inspect  the  company's  financial  situation;  to 
exercise  supervision  over  the  acts  of  the  directors  and  manager  carried  out  while 
performing  their  corporate  functions  which  violate  laws,  regulations  or  the  company's 
articles  of  association;  to  demand  remedies  from  a  director  or  manager  when  the  acts  of 
such  director  or  manager  are  harmful  to  the  company's  interests;  to  propose  the  convening 
of  an  interim  shareholders'  meeting;  and  other  powers  specified  in  the  company's  articles 
of  association.  The  supervisors  are  present  at  meetings  of  the  board  of  directors  70 
Other  provisions  about  a  company's  decision-making  right  include:  when  considering 
and  deciding  on  major  issues  relating  to  the  company's  production  and  operations  and 
formulating  important  rules  and  regulations,  the  company  shall  solicit  and  consider  the 
opinions  and  proposals  of  the  company's  trade  union  and  staff  and  workers.  71  In  addition, 
state  civil  servants  shall  not  act  concurrently  as  a  company's  director,  supervisor  or 
manager. 
72 
68 
Art.  50,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
69 
Art.  52,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
70 
Art.  54,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
71 
Art.  56,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
72 
Art.  58,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
152 d.  Management  rights  of  a  company  limited  by  shares. 
Based  on  the  provisions  of  Chinese  Company  Law,  a  company  limited  by  shares  enjoys 
similar  broad  management  rights  as  a  limited  liability  company.  Like  the  latter,  a 
shareholder's  general  meeting,  73  board  of  director  s74  and  board  of  supervisor  s75  will  be 
made  up,  and  a  board  chairman  and  a  manage  r76  will  be  appointed  according  to  the 
Company's  Articles  of  Association.  Besides,  in  case  of  consulting  and  making  decisions 
on  crucial  issues  relating  to  the  company's  production  and  operation,  also  when 
formulating  important  rules  and  regulations,  the  company  is  required  to  solicit  and 
consider  the  opinions  or  proposals  of  the  company's  trade  union  and  the  staff  and 
workers. 
77 
All  of  the  above  detailed  provisions  of  the  Company  Law  ensure  a  company's 
self-management  rights  with  regard  to  its  operation  and  development.  Therefore,  it  is  safe 
to  say  that  under  these  rules,  there  is  no  significant  state  interference  towards  most  of  the 
companies  today. 
e.  Financial  Affairs  and  Accounting. 
Chinese  Company  Law  requires  every  company  to  have  its  financial  and  accounting 
systems  according  to  the  laws,  administrative  regulations  and  the  regulations  of  the 
78 
responsible  finance  department  of  the  State  Council 
. 
At  the  end  of  each  fiscal  year,  the  company  shall  prepare  a  financial  statement  which  shall 
73  Art.  102  &  103,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
74  Art.  112,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
75  Art.  124,126,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
76  Art.  119,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
77  Art.  122,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
78  Art.  174,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
153 be  examined  and  verified  as  provided  by  law.  The  company's  financial  statements  shall 
include  the  following  accounting  statements  and  schedules:  balance  sheet,  profit  and  loss 
statement,  statement  of  financial  changes,  explanation  of  financial  condition,  and  profit 
distribution  statement.  79 
Together  with  other  laws  regulating  enterprises'  accounting  and  financial  system  which 
will  be  illustrated  later,  these  provisions  are  in  line  with  the  second  criterion  of  the  EU's 
conditional  MET,  which  requires  that  'firms  have  one  clear  set  of  basic  accounting 
records  which  are  independently  audited  in  line  with  international  accounting  standards 
and  are  applied  for  all  purposes'. 
f.  Insolvency,  dissolution  and  liquidation  of  a  company. 
In  the  case  of  a  company  legally  declared  bankrupt  because  it  is  unable  to  repay  debts  due, 
the  People's  Court  shall,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  relevant  laws,  organize  the 
shareholders,  relevant  organizations  and  relevant  professional  personnel  to  establish  a 
liquidation  group  to  carry  out  bankruptcy  liquidation  procedures  with  respect  to  the 
company. 
80 
A  company  may  dissolve  in  any  of  the  following  situations:  (1)  Pursuant  to  the  provisions 
of  the  company's  articles  of  association,  the  term  of  the  company  has  expired  or  one  of  the 
other  events  which  are  grounds  for  dissolution  has  occurred;  (2)  A  resolution  for 
dissolution  is  passed  by  a  shareholders'  meeting;  (3)  Dissolution  is  necessary  due  to  a 
merger  or  division  of  the  company.  81 
After  putting  the  company's  property  in  order  and  preparing  a  balance  sheet  and  an 
79  Art.  175,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
80  Art.  189,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
81  Art.  190,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
154 inventory  of  property  in  connection  with  liquidation  of  the  company  resulting  from 
dissolution,  if  the  liquidation  group  discovers  that  the  company's  assets  are  insufficient  to 
repay  the  company's  debts,  the  liquidation  group  shall  immediately  apply  to  the  People's 
Court  for  a  bankruptcy  declaration.  82 
The  rules  of  insolvency,  dissolution  and  liquidation  of  a  company  are  consistent  with  the 
fourth  criterion  of  the  EU's  conditional  MET,  which  requires  that  the  firms  concerned  be 
'subject  to  bankruptcy  and  property  laws  which  guarantee  legal  certainty  and  stability  for 
the  operation  of  firms'. 
3.  Laws  for  enterprises  of  different  forms  of  ownerships. 
They  mainly  include:  State-Owned  Enterprise  Law;  83  Law  on  Urban  Collective-owned 
Enterprise;  84  Law  on  TownshipNillage-owned  Enterprise;  85  Individual-owned 
Enterprise  Law;  86  Law  on  Chinese-Foreign  Equity  Joint  Venture;  87  Foreign-Capital 
Enterprise  Law;  88  Law  on  Chinese-Foreign  Contractual  Joint  Venture.  89 
82  Art.  196,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
83  It  went  into  effect  on  I  August  1988,  providing  s  state-owned  enterprise's  establishment,  rights  and 
obligations,  management,  legal  responsibilities. 
84  It  took  effect  on  I  January  1992. 
85  It  went  to  effect  on  I  January  1997. 
86  It  governs  the  establishment,  basic  rights  and  obligations,  dissolution,  liquidation  and  legal 
responsibilities  of  Individual-Owned  Enterprises.  It  took  effect  on  I  January  2000. 
87  It  governs  the  establishment,  organization  form,  financial  and  accounting  affairs  of  Chinese-Foreign 
Equity  Joint  Ventures.  The  Law  went  into  effect  on  July  1,1979  with  amendments  on  April  4,1990 
and  March  15,2001. 
88  It  is  enacted  to  encourage  the  establishment  of  foreign-capital  enterprises  in  China  by  foreign 
investors  and  protect  the  lawful  rights  and  interests  of  foreign-capital  enterprises.  The  Law  went  into 
effect  on  April  12,1986,  and  was  amended  on  October  31,2000. 
89  It  is  enacted  to  expand  China-foreign  economic  co-operation  and  technical  exchange  and  to 
promote  foreign  enterprises  and  other  economic  organizations  or  individuals  to  establish 
China-foreign  contractual  joint  ventures.  The  Law  went  into  effect  on  April  13,1988,  and  was 
amended  on  October  31,2000. 
155 Though  they  are  laws  governing  enterprises  with  different  forms  of  ownerships,  all  of 
them  insist  on  the  same  basic  principle  that  all  enterprises  should  observe  laws  and  be 
responsible  for  their  own  profits  and  losses.  The  legislation  ensures  that  different  types  of 
Chinese  enterprises  today  enjoy  broad  freedom  and  operate  under  legal  and  market 
conditions. 
4.  Laws  regulaUng  enterprises'  accounting  and  financial  system. 
They  are  mainly  Accounting  Law,  Enterprise  Accounting  Standards  and  General 
Principles  on  Financial  Affairs  of  Enterprises. 
a.  Accounting  Law.  90 
Accounting  Law  of  China  regulates  accounting  behaviours,  ensures  accounting 
information  to  be  truthful  and  complete,  strengthens  economic  management  and  financial 
management,  and  improves  economic  benefits.  The  law  covers  general  provisions, 
accounting  calculation,  special  provisions  on  accounting  calculation  of  companies  and 
enterprises,  accounting  supervision,  accounting  organs  and  accounting  personnel,  legal 
liability  and  supplemental  provisions.  The  law  entered  into  force  on  July  1,2000. 
b.  Enterprise  Accounting  Standards.  91 
They  govern  the  common  principles,  assets,  liabilities,  equities  of  the  owner,  revenue, 
expenses,  profits,  and  accounting  statements  of  enterprises.  The  standards  went  into 
effect  on  July  1,1993. 
90  Chinese  Accounting  Law  was  firstly  promulgated  by  the  State  President  on  January  21,1985.  It  was 
arnended  in  1993  and  most  recently  on  October  31,1999. 
91  It  was  enacted  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  People's  Republic  of  China  on  30  November  30,1992, 
and  went  into  effect  on  July  1,1993. 
156 c.  General  Principles  on  Financial  Affairs  of  Enterprises.  92 
It  regulates  financing,  working  capital,  fixed,  intangible  and  deferred  assets,  investment, 
costs  and  expenses,  business  income,  profits  and  their  distribution,  foreign  currency 
operations,  enterprise  liquidation,  and  financial  statements  and  evaluation.  The  principles 
went  into  effect  on  July  1,1993. 
The  three  laws  operate  together  governing  the  accounting  and  financial  system  of 
Chinese  enterprises.  According  to  the  detailed  provisions  of  the  laws,  basic  accounting 
principles  observed  by  Chinese  enterprises  are  the  same  as  international  accounting 
93 
standards  in  nature.  This  is  consistent  with  the  second  criteria  for  MET  in  the  current 
EU's  anti-dumping  policy  applicable  to  China.  94 
5.  Chinese  Enterprise  Bankruptcy  Law. 
It  was  enacted  on  2  December  1986  and  took  effect  on  I  October  1988.  It  regulates 
bankruptcy  of  state-owned  enterprises.  When  such  an  enterprise  is  unable  to  repay  debts 
due  because  of  the  failure  of  management,  it  will  be  legally  declared  to  be  bankrupt 
pursuant  to  this  law.  It  provides  detailed  procedures  on  bankruptcy  liquidation  and 
allocation  of  residual  assets  of  the  enterprise  concerned. 
According  to  the  law,  state-owned  enterprises  will  be  declared  bankrupt  as  a  result  of 
92  It  was  promulgated  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  People's  Republic  of  China  on  November  30,1992, 
and  went  into  effect  on  July  1,1993. 
93  Lei  Wang,  'The  Twenty  Years  of  EU's  Anti-Dumping  Practice  with  regard  to  the  People's  Republic 
of  China'  in  Chinese  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Metals,  Minerals  &  Chemicals  Importers  & 
Exporters  (ed.  ),  How  to  Respond  to  Foreign  Countries'  Anti-Dumping  Practice?  '  (Beijing,  China: 
Foreign  Economy  and  Trade  Publisher,  2001). 
94  'firms  have  one  clear  set  of  basic  accounting  records  which  are  independently  audited  in  line  with 
international  accounting  standards  and  are  applied  for  all  purposes,  '  Art  2(7)(c),  Council  Regulation 
(EC)  No  905/98  of  27  April  1998  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  protection  against  dumped 
imports  from  countries  not  inembers  of  the  European  Community.  OJ  1998  L  128/18. 
157 failure  in  market  competition,  unless  they  are  essential  to  the  national  economy  and 
unless  the  livelihood  of  people  is  threatened,  then  they  may  be  supported  by  government. 
That  is  to  say,  considering  the  conditions  governing  bankruptcy,  state-owned  enterprises 
do  not  have  privileges  compared  with  those  of  other  ownerships.  All  of  them  compete 
with  each  other  fairly  under  market  economy  conditions  according  to  laws  and 
regulations. 
From  the  above  analysis  of  laws,  we  can  see  the  favourable  outcomes  of  the  reform  of 
Chinese  enterprises  and  companies.  First,  the  reform  realizes  the  separation  of 
government's  administrative  rights  and  company/enterprise's  decision-making  rights.  95 
Second,,  enterprises  enjoy  many  more  self-management  rights  compared  with  before. 
Third,  enterprises  with  different  forms  of  ownership  enjoy  the  same  level  of  rights  and 
obligations  and  compete  fairly  under  market  principles. 
D.  Commitments  about  Chinese  enterprise  made  on  China's  accession  to 
the  WTO. 
As  we  have  discussed  above,  China  has  made  remarkable  progress  on  its  enterprise 
reform.  The  reform  will  go  even  deeper  now  that  CHna  has  entered  into  the  WTO.  This 
can  be  ensured  by  the  commitments  made  on  its  accession  to  the  WTO.  According  to  the 
'Report  of  the  WTO  working  party  on  the  accession  of  China',  96  emphasis  is  put  on  issues 
of  state  ownership,  where  enterprise  decision-making  process  is  most  likely  to  be 
interfered  with  by  the  state.  The  commitments  ensure  the  maximum  decision-making 
rights  of  state-owned  enterprises  and  the  minimum  possible  interference  from  Chinese 
central  government. 
95  Art.  58.  State  civil  servants  shall  not  act  concurrently  as  a  company's  director,  supervisor  or  manager. 
Chinese  Company  Law. 
96  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China,  WT/ACC/CHN/49,  I  October  2001. 
Available  from:  http:  //www.  wto.  org 
158 1.  China  states  that  Chinese  state-owned  enterprises  operate  under  rules  of  market 
economy  without  direct  government  interference  in  the  human,  finance  and  operational 
activities  such  as  production,  supply,  and  marketing.  Production  resources  are  allocated 
by  the  market,  and  the  price  of  products  from  the  enterprises  are  determined  by  the 
enterprises  themselves  based  on  market  demand.  The  state-owned  banks  had  been 
commercialized,  and  their  transactions  with  state-owned  enterprises  are  carried  out 
exclusively  under  market  conditions.  97 
2.  China  ensures  that  all  state-owned  and  state-invested  enterprises'  decisions  will  be 
made  based  solely  on  commercial  considerations  without  government  influence. 
Enterprises  of  other  WTO  members  have  equivalent  opportunities  to  compete  for  sales 
and  purchases  from  these  state  enterprises  on  non-discriminatory  terms  and  conditions.  98 
Based  on  the  above  point,  it  is  easy  to  deduce  that  as  the  result  of  continuous  reform,  with 
the  commitments  that  China  has  made  as  a  member  of  the  WTO,  Chinese  enterprises  of 
different  ownerships  will  operate  more  freely  and  compete  more  fairly  under  market 
economy  principles  in  the  future. 
Ill.  Price  reform. 
According  to  economic  theory,  prices  are  essential  to  establish  the  correct  signals  for 
resource  allocation.  Especially  when  combined  with  reforms  that  give  enterprises 
autonomy  and  the  incentive  to  respond  to  price  signals,  they  ensure  that  allocative 
efficiency  will  be  improved.  From  this  point  of  view,  the  most  critical  and  basic 
requirement  in  any  reforming  planned  economy  (RPE)  is  the  establishment  of 
market-based  relative  prices  for  commodities  and  factors  of  production.  Due  to  this 
97  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China,  para  43. 
98  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China,  para  46. 
159 reason,  China  has  regarded  price  reform  as  a  key  area  in  its  economic  reform  since  1979. 
A.  A  brief  introduction  to  the  pricing  system  in  China  before  reform. 
Prior  to  the  reform,  China's  economy  was  dominated  by  mandatory  planning,  so  prices 
were  set  by  the  central  government.  According  to  a  World  Bank  report,  in  1978,97 
percent  of  retail  prices,  94.4  percent  of  farm  prices  and  99.7  percent  of  raw  material 
prices  were  state  controlled  in  China.  99  Even  in  the  early  1980s,  I  10  agricultural 
commodities  were  subject  to  state  price.  100  In  that  case,  they  reflect  neither  the  value  of 
commodities,  nor  supply  and  demand  of  the  market. 
B.  Outcome  of  price  reform  in  China. 
China  has  carried  out  reform  of  its  price  system  gradually  since  1979.  The  price  reform 
aims  to  reduce  the  scope  of  state  controlled  price  and  apply  both  floating  prices  and 
market  prices  to  goods  circulating  in  the  market.  The  reform  has  lasted  for  more  than 
twenty  years  so  far,  and  it  has  received  favourable  outcomes. 
By  the  early  1990s,  the  reform  had  reached  a  fairly  advanced  stage.  Nearly  70  percent  of 
all  consumer  goods,  in  terms  of  sales  value,  had  been  deregulated  and  price  controls  had 
been  relieved  except  on  III  intermediary  goods.  At  the  end  of  1991,  only  17  agricultural 
commodities  remained  subject  to  state  price  controls.  '  01  Reform  by  that  time  had  enabled 
the  most  important  economic  factors  such  as  resource  allocation  to  be  increasingly 
subject  to  market  prices.  It  also  accelerated  the  growth  of  productivity  in  industrial 
99  Page  7,  Council  Regulation  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  384/96,  COMJ97/0677  final  - 
ACC,  OJ  1998  C70/15. 
100,  China:  the  Achievement  and  Challenge  of  Price  Reform'.  (World  Bank  Report  No:  11772,  March 
1993),  vii. 
<http:  //www-wds.  worldbank.  org/servIet/WDS-1Bank_ServIet?  pcont--detaiIs&eid=000  17883098  10 
191119204>  (I  December  2002). 
101  lbid 
160 sectors. 
After  achieving  primary  macroeconomic  stability,  China  began  another  round  of  price 
adjustments  in  the  late  1980.  These  adjustments  covered  transport  tariffs,  and  the  prices 
of  industrial  raw  materials,  agricultural  commodities  and  grain.  By  1992,  'They  have 
successfully  exploited  the  opportunities  provided  by  a  relatively  benign  macro 
environment,  in  substantially  reducing  relative  price  distortions  in  critical  sectors  and 
brought  Chinese  prices  close  to  international  ones.  '  102  Crude  oil  and  steel  prices  were 
liberalized  in  1993. 
In  the  past  few  years,  price  reform  in  China  has  been  further  deepened.  According  to  the 
World  Bank,  in  1996,90  percent  of  retail  prices  and  80  percent  of  prices  for  agriculture 
and  raw  materials  were  determined  by  the  market.  103  In  2001,  the  number  of  products 
with  regulated  prices  has  dropped  to  13,  as  against  144  in  1992.1  04 
By  October  2001  when  China  successfully  entered  into  the  WTO,  data  105  shows  that  in 
respect  of  social  retailing  products,  the  share  of  government  prices  was  about  4  per  cent, 
that  of  government  guidance  prices  1.2  per  cent,  and  that  of  market-regulated  prices  94.7 
per  cent.  For  agricultural  products,  the  share  of  government  prices  was  9.1  per  cent, 
government  guidance  prices  7.1  per  cent,  and  market-regulated  83.3  per  cent.  For 
production  inputs,  the  share  of  government  prices  was  9.6  per  cent,  that  of  government 
guidance  prices  4.4  per  cent,  and  market-regulated  prices  86  per  cent.  Above  is  the 
fundamental  progress  made  in  the  price  reform  of  China  so  far. 
102  Ibid. 
103  Proposal  to  the  Council  Regulation  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  384/96,  COM/97/0677 
final  -  ACC,  OJ  1998  C70/15. 
104  ,  Country  update,  Economic  Management  of  China',  World  Bank  Report.  September  27,2001. 
Page  2.  <http:  //www.  worldbank.  org.  cn/english/Knowledge/update9-200  I.  pdf>  (I  December  2002). 
105  Para  55,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
161 Based  on  these  facts,  we  can  say  that  the  share  of  direct  government-controlled  prices  has 
been  largely  reduced  so  far,  and  China's  price  system  has  become  increasingly 
rationalized.  Today,  the  majority  of  prices  in  China  are  determined  by  the  market,  and 
state-controlled  prices  have  been  eliminated  in  all  areas  except  a  few  relating  to  the 
national  economy  and  livelihood  of  people,  such  as  gas,  water  and  electricity  for  civil 
use.  106 
C.  Chinese  Price  Law.  107 
China  promulgated  its  Price  Law  on  May  1,1998.  It  is  enacted  to  regulate  price 
behaviours,  stabilize  the  general  level  of  market  price,  and  protect  legitimate  rights  and 
interests  of  consumers  and  operators.  It  governs  pricing  by  operators,  pricing  by 
government,  price  supervision,  inspection  and  legal  liabilities.  The  law  protects  business 
operator's  basic  pricing  rights  on  the  one  hand.  On  the  other  hand,  it  prohibits  undue 
pricing  behaviours.  These  can  be  shown  by  examining  specific  provisions  of  the  Price 
Law. 
General  Principles. 
108 
The  State  shall  introduce  and  gradually  improve  the  mechanism  of  regulation  of  prices 
mainly  through  market  forces  and  under  a  kind  of  macroeconomic  control.  Under  such  a 
mechanism,  pricing  should  be  made  to  accord  with  the  value  law  with  most  of  the 
merchandise  and  services  to  adopt  market  -regulated  prices'09  while  only  a  few  of  them 
106  Proposal  to  the  Council  Regulation  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  384/96,  COM/97/0677 
final  -  ACC,  OJ  1998  C70/15- 
107  It  was  promulgated  by  the  State  President  on  December  29,1997  and  went  into  effect  on  May  1, 
1998. 
108  Ail.  3&4.  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
109  Market-regulated  prices  refer  to  prices  fixed  independently  by  business  operators  through  market 
competition. 
162 are  to  be  put  under  government-set'  10  or  guided  prices.  '  11 
Pricing  rights  of  business  operators. 
According  to  the  law,  prices  of  merchandise  and  services  shall  be  subject  to  market 
regulation  to  be  fixed  by  business  operators  independently.  1  12  Under  fair,  lawful,  honest 
and  trustworthy  principles,  business  operators  should  fix  their  prices  based  on  the  cost  of 
production  or  operation,  market  supply  and  demand.  '  13 
Prohibited  pricing  behaviour.  '  14 
On  the  one  hand,  the  law  protects  business  operator's  basic  pricing  rights.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  prohibits  undue  pricing  behaviours,  which  include: 
1.  Working  collaboratively  with  others  to  control  market  prices  to  the  detriment  of 
the  lawful  rights  and  interests  of  other  business  operators  or  consumers; 
2.  Engaging  in  dumping  sales  (except  the  cases  of  sales  of  fresh  and  live 
merchandise,  seasonal  merchandise  and  stockpiled  merchandise  at  discount)  at 
below  cost  prices  in  order  to  attain  an  upper  hand  over  rivals  or  dominate  the 
market  and  disrupt  the  normal  production  and  operation  order  to  the  great 
detriment  to  the  interests  of  the  State  or  the  lawful  rights  and  interests  of  other 
business  operators; 
110  Government-set  prices  are  fixed  by  the  government  department  in  charge  of  prices  or  related 
departments  within  their  term  of  reference  according  to  the  provisions  of  this  law. 
1  ''  Government-guided  prices  refer  to  prices  as  fixed  by  business  operators  according  to  benchmark 
prices  and  range  of  the  prices  as  set  by  the  government  department  in  charge  of  price  or  other  related 
departments  within  their  terrn  of  reference. 
112  Art.  6.  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
113  Art.  6&7.  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
114  Art.  14.  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
163 3.  Fabricating  and  spreading  price  rise  information  to  push  up  prices  to  excessively 
high  levels; 
4.  Resorting  to  deceitful  or  misleading  means  in  terms  of  prices  to  entice  consumers 
or  other  business  operators  into  trading  in  terms  of  prices; 
5.  Discriminating  in  terms  of  prices  as  between  the  same  kinds  of  merchandise  or 
services  offered  by  certain  business  operators  under  the  same  trading  conditions; 
6.  Disguisedly  raising  or  lowering  prices  at  irrational  ranges  by  artificially  raising 
or  lowering  grades  of  merchandise  or  services; 
7.  Seeking  exorbitant  profits  in  violation  of  laws  and  regulations;  and 
8.  Affecting  other  illicit  price  behaviours  that  are  forbidden  by  law  or  administrative 
decrees. 
-  Government  pricing  behaviour. 
The  law  limits  government  pricing  behaviours  to  a  few  areas  based  on  the  price 
catalogues,  which  are  issued  by  the  central  and  local  governments  following  strict 
administrative  procedures.  115  The  government  shall  issue  govemment-set  or  guided 
prices  for  the  following  merchandise  and  services:  116 
1.  The  few  merchandise  that  are  of  great  importance  to  development  of  the  national 
economy  and  the  people's  livelihood; 
2.  The  few  merchandise  that  are  in  shortage  of  resources; 
3.  Merchandise  of  monopoly  in  nature; 
115  Art.  19.  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
116  Art.  18.  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
164 4.  Important  public  utilities; 
5.  Important  services  of  public  welfare  in  nature. 
In  fixing  government-set  and  guided  prices,  price  departments  and  other  related 
departments  should  carry  out  investigations  into  prices  and  costs  and  collect  views  from 
consumers,  business  operators  and  other  quarters.  '  17  After  the  govemment-set  and  guided 
prices  are  determined,  they  shall  be  made  public  by  the  price  departments!  18  The  scope 
and  level  of  the  government-set  and  guided  prices  shall  properly  be  adjusted  in  the  light 
of  the  operation  of  the  national  economy  and  recommendations  from  consumers  and 
business  operators.  '  19 
-  Monitoring  and  checking  of  prices 
In  order  to  keep  the  price  system  in  good  order,  the  Price  Departments  of  the  People's 
Governments  at  and  above  the  county  level  exercise  monitoring  and  checking  over 
pricing  activities  according  to  law  and  mete  out  administrative  punishments  on  acts  that 
violate  the  law.  120  Business  operators  or  government  departments  concerned  in  that  case 
will  take  legal  responsibilities  for  their  behaviours.  1  21 
In  this  way,  the  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China  substantially  defends  the 
favourable  outcomes  of  the  reform,,  and  ensures  the  ongoing  reform  is  deepened  towards 
the  market  economy  direction. 
117  Art.  22.  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
118  Art.  24.  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
119  Art.  25.  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
120  Art.  33.  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
121  Chapter  6.  Price  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
165 D.  Commitments  and  prospects  after  China's  accession  to  the  WTO 
Price  reform  will  be  carried  out  in  more  areas  and  at  a  deeper  level  towards  the  market 
economy  direction  after  China's  entry  into  the  WTO.  This  can  be  confirmed  in  the 
'Report  of  the  WTO  working  party  on  the  accession  of  China'.  122  According  to  the 
document,  China  has  made  the  following  commitments  that  aim  to  limit  government 
power  to  interfere  in  pricing  decisions. 
1.  Range  of  products  subject  to  govemment  pricing.  123 
China  currently  adopts  a  mechanism  of  market-based  pricing  under  macro-economic 
adjustment,  and  national  treatment  is  observed  in  the  areas  of  government  pricing  for  all 
imported  goods.  Only  a  few  products  and  services  are  subject  to  government  pricing.  124 
They  are  those  having  a  direct  bearing  on  the  national  economy  and  the  basic  needs  of  the 
people's  livelihood,  including  those  products  that  were  scarce  in  China.  125  As  the  result  of 
the  continued  reform  of  China's  price  system,  the  share  of  government  prices  is 
decreasing,  and  that  of  market-regulated  prices  will  go  on  increasing. 
2.  Factors  taken  into  account  in  case  of  govemment  pricing. 
All  the  enterprises  and  individuals  enjoyed  the  same  treatment  in  terms  of  participating  in 
the  process  of  setting  government  prices  and  government  guidance  prices.  126  While 
formulating  government  prices  and  government  guidance  prices,  crucial  pricing  factors 
should  be  taken  into  account.  They  include  normal  production  costs,  supply  and  demand 
122  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
123  Annex  4  of  the  Draft  Protocol  contained  a  comprehensive  listing  of  all  products  and  services 
presently  subject  to  government  guidance  pricing  and  government  pricing. 
124  i.  e.  government-set  or  guided  prices  explained  in  China's  Price  Law.  They  have  the  same  meaning 
as  the  terrns  'government  prices  and  government  guidance  prices'. 
125  Para  52,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
126  Para  53,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
166 situation,  relevant  government  policies  and  prices  of  related  products.  127 
3.  Transparency  of  the  pricing  policies. 
China  will  publish  the  list  of  goods  and  services  subject  to  state  pricing  and  changes, 
together  with  price-setting  mechanisms  and  policies  in  an  official  journal.  128  It  is  'Pricing 
Monthly  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China',  a  monthly  magazine  listing  all  products  and 
services  priced  by  the  State. 
4.  Other  Commitments. 
China  assures  that  it  will  continue  to  deepen  its  price  reform,  adjusting  the  catalogue 
subject  to  state  pricing  and  further  liberalizing  its  pricing  policies.  "'  It  confirms  that 
price  controls  will  not  be  used  for  purposes  of  affording  protection  to  domestic  industries 
or  services  providers,  130  and  they  will  not  limit  or  impair  China's  market-access 
commitments  in  goods  and  services.  In  addition,  after  China's  entry  into  the  WTO,  it  will 
take  account  of  the  interests  of  exporting  WTO  Members  as  provided  for  in  paragraph  9 
131 
of  Article  III  of  the  GATT  1994. 
IV.  Reform  of  the  financial  system. 
Both  economic  theory  and  practical  experience  suggest  that  financial  liberalization  can 
stimulate  economic  development.  So  since  1978  when  China  commenced  its  economic 
reform,  great  efforts  have  been  made  in  the  financial  sector.  After  more  than  twenty  years' 
127  Para  55,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
128  Para  60,6  1,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
129  Para  6  1,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
130  Para  63,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
131  Para  64,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
167 reconstruction,  fundamental  changes  took  place  -  various  types  of  government  control  in 
this  area  have  been  abolished  gradually.  As  a  result,  today  China's  financial  market  has 
been  greatly  liberalized  compared  with  before.  For  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  I  will 
focus  on  foreign  exchange  issue  in  China's  financial  reforyn. 
A.  Brief  introduction  to  China's  pre-reform  financial  system. 
Like  most  developing  countries,  extensive  government  intervention  was  the  norm  in  their 
financial  markets  before  reform.  In  that  case,  'ceilings  were  imposed  on  bank  interest 
rates;  credit  was  allocated  by  administrative  decision  rather  than  market  criteria;  and 
inflows  of  foreign  capital  were  strictly  controlled.  5132 
As  a  substantial  part  of  financial  operation,  foreign  exchange  always  has  close 
relationships  with  a  country's  international  trade  volume.  So,  before  we  examine  China's 
pre-reform  financial  system,  it  is  important  to  examine  the  foreign  trade  regime  in 
operation  at  that  time.  As  stated  earlier  in  this  chapter,  before  China's  open  economy 
policy,  all  foreign  trade  transactions  in  the  country  were  conducted  strictly  in  accordance 
with  government  plans.  In  determining  these  import  and  export  plans,  the  authority 
sought  to  achieve  a  balance  in  foreign  exchange  requirements.  As  the  result  of  such  heavy 
reliance  on  mandatory  plans,  the  foreign  exchange  rate  had  very  little  influence  on  the 
level  and  the  pattern  of  foreign  trade.  In  other  words,  it  was  essentially  an  accounting 
device  used  in  the  formulation  of  foreign  trade  plans.  Consequently,  before  financial 
reform,  the  exchange  rate  played  no  direct  role  as  a  price  signal  in  either  foreign  trade  or 
in  the  allocation  of  resources  in  China.  '  33 
132  Huw  Pill  &  Mahmood  Pradhan,  'Financial  Indicators  and  Financial  Change  in  Africa  and  Asia,  ' 
IMF  Working  Paper  No.  95/123  (Washington:  IMF,  November  1995) 
--littp:  //www.  worldbank.  org/fandd/english/0697/articles/01  10697.  htm#author>  (I  December  2002). 
133  YC  Richard  Wong  and  ML  Sonia  Wong  (University  of  Hong  Kong),  'Removing  Regulatory 
Barriers  in  China:  Changing  the  Foreign  Exchange  Regime.  '  Paper  Prepared  for  the  Conference  of 
China  as  a  Global  Economic  Power:  Market  Reforms  in  the  New  Millennium,  Shanghai,  June  15-18, 
1997.  <http:  //www.  cato.  org/events/China/papers/wong.  html>  (I  December  2002). 
168 B.  Process  and  outcomes  of  China's  financial  reform. 
Reform  in  the  financial  sector  should  follow  the  track  of  the  industrial  sector  in  China. 
Since  1978,  China  has  allowed  the  non-state  sector  to  compete  with  state-owned 
enterprises  (SOEs).  It  decentralized  foreign  trade  authority  to  localities  and  enterprises, 
and  the  role  of  the  exchange  rate  began  to  change  in  the  meantime. 
When  foreign  trade  corporations  were  given  increasing  freedom  to  conduct  foreign  trade, 
the  exchange  rate  began  to  act  as  a  signal  to  motivate  importing  and  exporting  decisions. 
Because  the  domestic  currency  was  overvalued  at  that  time,  foreign  trade  corporations 
had  little  incentive  to  expand  exports.  To  recover  the  incentive  effects  of  the  exchange 
rate  on  exports,  China  began  to  modify  its  foreign  exchange  policy  shortly  after  its 
foreign  trade  decentralization. 
The  modifications  were  made  in  several  steps.  First,  the  official  exchange  rates  were 
steadily  devalued  so  as  to  compensate  for  the  rising  costs  of  exports.  Second,  the  foreign 
exchange  retention  scheme  was  launched,  which  allows  exporting  enterprises  and  local 
governments  to  retain  a  certain  portion  of  their  foreign  exchange  earnings  to  finance  their 
own  imports.  Third,  foreign  exchange  swap  markets  were  established  in  1988,  where 
exporters  could  convert  their  retained  foreign  exchange  earnings  at  more  favourable 
exchange  rates.  As  the  results  of  the  retention  scheme  and  the  swap  markets,  they  not  only 
provided  incentives  to  exporters,  but  also  helped  to  increase  the  convertibility  of  China's 
domestic  currency. 
On  January  1,1994,  official  RMB  exchange  rates  were  unified  with  the  market  rates.  The 
banking  exchange  system  was  adopted  and  a  nationwide  unified  inter-bank  forex  market 
was  established,  with  conditional  convertibility  of  the  RMB  on  current  accounts.  134  The 
134  Para  28,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
169 1994  reform  was  a  significant  step  towards  current  account  convertibility.  Afterwards, 
exports,  tourism,  and  foreign  direct  investment  grew  briskly,  at  rates  of  31.9  percent,  56.4 
percent,  and  22.7  percent,  respectively.  Foreign  exchange  reserves  increased  by  114.5 
135  percent  in  1994  and  42.6  percent  in  1995 
.  In  1996,  China  introduced  full  convertibility 
for  current  restrictions  on  current  account  transactions,  forgoing  the  right  ever  to 
reimpose  any  currency  restrictions  on  current  account  activities  without  the  approval  of 
the  International  Monetary  Fund.  136  Before  China's  accession  to  the  WTO,  'it  was 
confirmed  by  the  IMF  in  its  Staff  Report  on  Article  IV  Consultations  with  China  in  2000 
that  China  had  no  existing  forex  restrictions  for  current  account  transactions.  137 
C.  Relevant  laws  in  force. 
China  has  enacted  a  number  of  laws  to  regulate  foreign  exchange  operations  in  its 
process  of  reform.  The  most  important  laws  specifically  for  forex  are  the  'Regulations 
on  Foreign  Exchange  Control  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China',  138  'Regulations  on 
the  Control  of  Banking  Operations  of  Foreign  Exchange',  139  'Regulations  on  the 
Control  of  Settlement,,  Sale  and  Payment  of  Exchange'.  140  In  addition,  legislation 
governing  the  allocation  of  forex  earned  by  joint  ventures  is  provided  in  the 
China-Foreign  Equity  Joint  Venture  Law  141  and  China-Foreign  Contractual  Joint 
135  YC  Richard  Wong  and  ML  Sonia,  fn  133  above. 
136  Proposal  to  the  Council  Regulation  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  384/96,  COM/97/0677 
final  -  ACC,  OJ  1998  C70/15. 
137  Para  28,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
138  The  law  was  first  promulgated  by  the  State  Council  on  December  18,1980,  and  was 
re-prornulgated  by  Decree  No  211  of  the  State  Council  on  January  14,1997. 
139  It  was  issued  by  the  State  Administration  of  Foreign  Exchange  on  September  27,1997.  It  entered 
into  force  on  January  1,1998. 
140  The  Regulations  went  into  effect  on  July  1,1996.  The  Provisional  Regulations  on  the  Control  of 
Foreign  Exchange  Settlement,  Sale  and  Payment  promulgated  on  March  26,1994  were  annulled  on 
the  same  date. 
141  The  Law  was  promulgated  by  the  State  President.  It  went  into  effect  on  July  1,1979  with 
amendments  on  April  4,1990  and  March  15,2001. 
170 Venture  Law  142  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  We  can  find  out  how  these  laws  keep 
foreign  exchange  operations  in  order  under  market  economy  conditions  by  examining 
them  respectively. 
1.  Regulations  on  Foreign  Exchange  Control  of  the  PRC 
It  governs  foreign  exchange  on  current  account  and  on  capital  account,  RMB  exchange 
rate  and  foreign  exchange  market.  According  to  the  regulation,  a  unitary  and 
well-managed  floating  exchange  rate  system  based  on  market  supply  and  demand  is 
implemented  for  the  exchange  rates  of  RMB.  The  People's  Bank  of  China  shall  publish 
the  exchange  rates  of  RMB  against  major  foreign  currencies  according  to  the  prices  fixed 
at  inter-  bank  foreign  exchange  swap  centers.  143  Transactions  at  foreign  exchange  swap 
centers  shall  be  governed  by  the  principle  of  being  open,  fair,  impartial,  and  honest.  144 
2.  Regulations  on  the  Control  of  Banking  Operations  of  Foreign  Exchange. 
The  law  was  adopted  in  accordance  with  the  Law  on  Commercial  Banks  and  the 
Regulation  on  the  Control  of  Foreign  Exchange.  It  was  formulated  to  enhance  the  control 
of  banking  operations  of  foreign  exchange,  to  ensure  the  healthy  development  of  foreign 
exchange  business  and  to  maintain  the  stability  of  the  financial  order. 
3.  Regulations  on  the  Control  of  Settlement,  Sale  and  Payment  of  Exchange. 
The  Regulations  are  enacted  to  standardize  the  acts  in  foreign  exchange  settlement,  sale 
and  payment,  and  realize  the  convertibility  of  RMB  under  current  account.  They  govern 
these  transactions  under  capital  account;  supervision  and  control  of  foreign  exchange 
142  The  Law  was  promulgated  by  the  State  president  on  April  13,1988.  It  was  later  amended  on 
October  31,2000. 
143  Art.  33,  Regulations  on  Foreign  Exchange  Control  of  the  PRC. 
144  Art.  34,  Regulations  on  Foreign  Exchange  Control  of  the  PRC. 
171 settlement,  sale  and  payment. 
4.  Provisions  goveming  the  allocation  of  forex  eamed  byjoint  ventures. 
China-Foreign  Equity  Joint  Venture  Law  145  and  China-Foreign  Contractual  Joint 
Venture  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China  146  contain  some  provisions  relevant  to 
foreign  exchange. 
The  net  profit  which  a  foreign  joint  venture  receives  as  its  share  after  performing  its 
obligations  under  the  laws,  and  the  agreements  or  the  contract,  the  funds  it  receives 
upon  the  expiration  of  the  venture'  term  of  operation  or  its  early  termination,  and  its 
other  funds  may  be  remitted  abroad  in  accordance  with  foreign  exchange  control 
regulations  and  in  the  currency  or  currencies  specified  in  the  contract  concerning  the 
equity  joint  venture.  147 
The  wages,  salaries  or  other  legitimate  income  earned  by  a  foreign  worker  or  staff 
member  of  an  equity  joint  venture,  after  payment  of  the  individual  income  tax  under 
the  tax  laws  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  may  be  remitted  abroad  in  accordance 
with  foreign  exchange  control  regulations.  148 
From  the  above  analysis  of  the  laws,  it  can  be  seen  that  China's  foreign  exchange 
regulation  has  been  liberalized.  Compared  with  before,  there  are  less  government 
restrictions  on  the  use  and  allocation  of  forex.  Today,  all  legal  forex  transactions  are 
encouraged  to  be  carried  out  under  market  economy  conditions. 
145  The  Law  was  promulgated  by  the  State  President.  It  went  into  effect  on  July  1,1979  with 
amendments  on  April  4,1990  and  March  15,2001. 
146  The  Law  was  promulgated  by  the  State  president  on  April  13,1988.  It  was  later  amended  on 
October  31,2000. 
1.17  Art.  11,  China-Foreign  Equity  Joint  Venture  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
148  Art.  12,  China-Foreign  Equity  Joint  Venture  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
172 D.  Commitments  and  prospects  for  foreign  exchange  after  China's 
accession  to  the  WTO. 
Since  foreign  exchange  plays  a  very  important  role  in  a  country's  economic  development 
and  its  international  trade,  China  has  made  commitments  in  this  field  on  its  accession  to 
the  WTO.  They  can  be  summarized  into  the  following  points. 
1.  Purpose  of  the  reform. 
It  indicates  that  the  purpose  of  China's  forex  reform  is  to  reduce  administrative 
intervention  and  increase  the  role  of  market  forces.  It  assures  that  further  reform  will  be 
carried  out  towards  the  market  economy  direction.  149 
2.  Enterprises'rights  to  purchase  and  debit  forex. 
With  regard  to  forex  payments  under  current  accounts,  domestic  entities  (including 
foreign  investment  enterprises)  could  purchase  forex  at  market  exchange  rates  from 
designated  banks  or  debit  their  forex  accounts  directly  upon  presentation  of  valid 
documents.  150 
3.  Exchange  rate  regime. 
Since  the  unification  of  exchange  rates  on  I  January  1994,  China  has  adopted  a  single  and 
managed  floating  exchange  rate  regime  based  on  supply  and  demand 
. 
15  1  Designated 
forex  banks  are  the  major  participants  in  forex  transactions,  and  they  deal  on  the 
inter-bank  market  according  to  the  turnover  position  limit  on  banking  exchange 
stipulated  by  State  Administration  of  Foreign  Exchange  (SAFE)  and  covered  the  position 
149  Para  28,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
150  Para  30,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
151  Para  3  1,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
173 on  the  market.  ' 
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4.  Rights  that  foreign  investment  enterprises  enjoy  with  regard  to  foreign 
exchange  transaction. 
In  order  to  encourage  foreign  direct  investment,  China  has  granted  national  treatment  to 
foreign  investment  enterprises  (FlEs)  in  exchange  administration.  Since  I  MY  1996, 
forex  dealing  of  the  FlEs  has  been  carried  out  through  the  banking  exchange  system. 
FlEs  are  allowed  to  open  and  hold  forex  settlement  accounts  to  retain  receipts  under 
current  accounts,  up  to  a  maximum  amount  stipulated  by  the  SAFE.  No  restrictions  are 
maintained  on  the  payment  and  transfer  of  current  transactions  by  FlEs,  and  FlEs  could 
purchase  forex  from  designated  forex  banks  or  debit  their  forex  accounts  for  any 
payment  under  current  transactions,  upon  the  presentation  of  valid  documents  to  the 
designated  forex  banks  or  SAFE  for  the  bona  fide  test.  FlEs  could  also  open  forex 
accounts  to  hold  foreign-  invested  capital,  and  they  could  sell  from  these  accounts  upon 
the  approval  of  SAFE.  FlEs  could  also  borrow  forex  directly  from  domestic  and 
overseas  banks,  but  were  required  to  register  with  SAFE  afterwards,  and  obtain 
approval  by  SAFE  for  debt  repayment  and  services.  FlEs  could  make  payments  from 
their  forex  accounts  or  in  forex  purchased  from  designated  forex  banks  after 
liquidation,  upon  approval  by  SAFE  according  to  law.  153 
5.  Commitments  made  with  regard  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF). 
China  has  accepted  Article  VIII  of  the  IMF's  Articles  of  Agreement,  which  provides  that 
ýno  member  shall,  without  the  approval  of  the  Fund,  impose  restrictions  on  the  making  of 
payments  and  transfers  for  current  international  transactions'.  According  to  these 
152  Para  32,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
153  Para  33,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
174 obligations,  China  would  not  resort  to  any  laws  or  other  measures  to  restrict  the 
availability  to  any  individual  or  enterprise  of  forex  for  current  international  transactions 
within  its  customs  territory  to  an  amount  related  to  the  forex  inflows  attributable  to  that 
individual  or  enterprise,  unless  otherwise  provided  for  in  the  IMF's  Articles  of 
Agreement.  154 
From  the  above  commitments  made  on  China's  accession  to  the  WTO,  we  can  see  the 
significant  progress  made  in  the  foreign  exchange  section  of  China's  finamial  reform  so 
far.  With  regard  to  the  future  development,  the  commitments  and  relevant  laws  in  force 
will  operate  together  to  ensure  that  further  reform  can  be  carried  out  towards  a  more 
liberalized  market  economy  direction. 
V.  Findings  of  the  economic  analysis. 
From  this  analysis  of  China's  economic  reform,  we  can  derive  two  important  findings 
which  shake  the  basis  of  the  current  EU's  anti-dumping  policy  against  imports  from  the 
People's  Republic  of  China. 
A.  The  illegal  aspect  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  practice  against  China. 
China  is  no  longer  an  NME  or  state-control  country  after  more  than  twenty  years  of 
economic  reform.  Plus  the  fact  that  China  has  entered  into  the  WTO,  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  practice  against  China  can  be  regarded  as  illegal. 
Based  on  the  dramatic  progress  obtained  from  China's  economic  reform  and  the  solid 
legislation  which  defends  the  outcomes,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  fundamental  changes  have 
taken  place  in  China's  economic  status,  i.  e.  it  is  not  an  NME  or  state-trading  country  any 
more.  This  fact  is  widely  accepted  and  has  been  further  confirmed  by  China's  accession 
154  Para  35,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
175 to  the  WTO.  Since  the  WTO  was  established  on  fair  competition  and  free  market 
principles,  considering  China's  huge  size  and  influence  on  the  world  economy,  it  would 
not  be  accepted  as  a  member  of  the  organization  if  it  were  an  NME.  Based  on  this  point, 
China  is  a  transitional  ME,  and  is  quite  close  to  market  economies  in  many  areas  of  its 
economy  which  are  highly  developed. 
According  to  the  GATT,  during  an  anti-dumping  investigation,  if  there  is  a  sufficient 
volume  of  sales  of  the  like  product  in  the  domestic  market  of  the  exporting  country,  155  the 
normal  value  of  the  import  concerned  is  normally  based  on  its  domestic  price  except 
when  the  import  comes  'from  a  country  which  has  a  complete  or  substantially  complete 
monopoly  of  its  trade  and  where  all  domestic  prices  are  fixed  by  the  State.  '  156 
Referring  to  recent  statistics,  the  EU  adopts  the  traditional  NME  treatment  157  when 
determining  the  normal  value  of  imports  from  China  in  most  cases.  As  a  member  of  the 
WTO,  the  legal  basis  of  the  EU's  practice  is  the  GATT  provision  analyzed  above. 
However,  due  to  the  change  of  China's  economic  status,  the  provision  is  no  longer 
applicable  in  that  case.  Furthermore,  the  EU's  practice  can  be  regarded  as  illegal  and 
could  be  challenged  by  China  under  the  GATT  because  China  is  now  a  member  of  the 
WTO. 
155 
Art.  2  (2),  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
156  Para.  I  of  Art.  VI  in  Annex  I  to  the  GATT  1994  states:  'It  is  recognized  that,  in  the  case  of  imports 
frorn  a  country  which  has  a  complete  or  substantially  complete  monopoly  of  its  trade  and  where  all 
dornestic  prices  are  fixed  by  the  state,  special  difficulties  may  exist  in  determining  prices 
comparability  for  the  purposes  of  Paragraph  1,  and  in  such  case  importing  contracting  parities  may 
find  it  necessary  to  take  into  account  the  possibility  that  a  strict  comparison  with  domestic  prices  in 
such  a  country  may  not  always  be  appropriate.  ' 
157  - 
i.  e  .  analogue  country  method. 
176 B.  Unfair  aspects  underlying  the  EUIs  antimdumping  practice  towards 
China. 
According  to  the  analysis  of  China's  economic  reform of  foreign  trade,  enterprise,  pricing 
and  forex  systems,  the  criteria  for  Chinese  exporters  to  apply  for  EU's  MET  when 
deciding  their  exports'  normal  values  are  very  unfair. 
In  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  of  27  April  1998  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
384/96  on  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the 
European  Community,  the  following  criteria  are  provided  for  Chinese  exporters  to  apply 
for  MET: 
Decisions  of  firms  regarding  prices,  costs  and  inputs,  including  for  instance  raw 
materials,,  cost  of  technology  and  labour,  output,  sales  and  investment,  are  made  in 
response  to  market  signals  reflecting  supply  and  demand,  and  without  significant  state 
interference  in  this  regard,  and  costs  of  major  inputs  substantially  reflect  market 
values; 
Firms  have  one  clear  set  of  basic  accounting  records  which  are  independently  audited 
in  line  with  international  accounting  standards  and  are  applied  for  all  purposes, 
The  production  costs  and  financial  situation  of  firms  are  not  subject  to  significant 
distortions  carried  over  from  the  former  NME  system,  in  particular  in  relation  to 
depreciation  of  assets,  other  write-offs,  barter  trade  and  payment  via  compensation  of 
debts. 
The  firms  concerned  are  subject  to  bankruptcy  and  property  laws  which  guarantee 
legal  certainty  and  stability  for  the  operation  of  firms,  and 
177 Exchange  rate  conversions  are  carried  out  at  the  market  rate.  158 
As  we  discussed  before,  the  new  method  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  imports  in 
anti-dumping  proceedings  is  proposed  to  match  the  fundamental  change  of  China's 
economic  status.  Unfortunately,  within  two  years  after  the  new  method  was  proposed,  it 
was  granted  to  three  Chinese  companies,  only  accounting  for  about  10  percent  of  the  total 
applicants.  159The  reason  is  that  it  is  too  strict  and  unfair  to  be  applied  in  practice,  because 
applicants  have  to  bear  very  heavy  burden  of  proof  within  extremely  tight  time  limit.  Now, 
) 
I  will  examine  the  unreasonable  factors  in  the  criteria. 
1.  Criterion  one  requires  that  firm's  decisions  are  made  by  itself  based  on  market 
principles.  State  does  not  interfere  in  the  firm's  operations  such  as  pricing,  production 
costs  and  inputs. 
From  the  analysis  of  legislation  of  Chinese  enterprises  and  companies,  it  is  clear  that  it  is 
a  firm's  right  to  make  decisions  and  organize  its  production  autonomously  according  to 
market  demand.  160  Even  state-owned  enterprises  have  this  self-management  right.  In  the 
Report  of  the  WTO  working  party  on  the  accession  of  China,  it  is  recognized  that 
State-owned  enterprises  of  China  basically  operated  in  accordance  with  rules  of  market 
economy.  The  government  would  no  longer  directly  administer  the  human,  finance  and 
material  resources,  and  operational  activities  such  as  production,  supply  and  marketing. 
The  prices  of  commodities  produced  by  state-owned  enterprises  were  decided  by  the 
market  and  resources  in  operational  areas  were  fundamentally  allocated  by  the 
158 
OJ  1998  L  128/18. 
159  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  protection  against 
dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*COM/2000/0363  final  - 
ACC  2000/0160. 
160  Art.  5,  Company  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
178 market.  ' 
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With  regard  to  production  costs  including  labour  cost  and  input  cost  etc,  the  government 
does  not  interfere  in  their  prices  in  general.  Today,  the  majority  of  prices  in  China  are 
determined  by  the  market,  and  state-controlled  prices  have  been  eliminated  in  all  areas 
except  a  few  relating  to  the  national  economy  and  the  livelihood  of  the  people,  such  as  gas, 
water  and  electricity  for  civil  use.  162 
Most  Chinese  firms  actually  meet  this  criterion.  However,  considering  the  heavy  burden 
of  proof  that  applicants  bear,  only  a  few  are  able  to  prove  it  within  the  very  tight  time 
limit 
2.  The  second  criterion  emphasizes  that  applicants  should  have  a  set  of  accounting 
records,  which  is  in  accordance  with  international  accounting  standards. 
In  fact,  this  is  exactly  the  same  requirement  that  China  puts  on  its  enterprises  and 
companies.  It  can  be  seen  from  the  relevant  accounting  laws  that  detailed  rules  and  basic 
accounting  principles  observed  by  Chinese  enterprises  comply  with  international 
accounting  standards  in  nature. 
3.  Criterion  three  is  that  the  firm  is  liable  for  its  own  debts,  and  its  production  costs  and 
financial  situation  not  be  subject  to  significant  distortions  carried  over  from  the 
tormer  NME  system.  In  fact,  Article  7  of  Chinese  Company  Law  puts  the  similar 
requirement  on  companies  which  are  being  reorganized  from  state-owned 
161  Para  43,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
162  Proposal  to  the  Council  Regulation  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  384/96,  COM/97/0677 
final  -  ACC,  OJ  1998  C70/15. 
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4.  Criterion  four  is  that  Companies  should  be  subject  to  bankruptcy  and  property  law. 
Both  the  Company  Law  and  the  Enterprise  Bankruptcy  Law  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  have  detailed  provisions  on  this  point.  Chinese  Company  Law  states  clearly  that 
various  types  of  companies  are  all  responsible  for  their  own  debts,  and  they  will  be 
legally  declared  bankrupt  when  they  are  unable  to  repay  debts  due.  Likewise,  the  Chinese 
Enterprise  Bankruptcy  Law  provides  that  state-owned  enterprises  will  be  declared 
bankrupt  as  a  result  of  failure  in  the  market,  except  those  essential  to  the  national 
economy  and  the  livelihood  of  people,  these  may  be  supported  by  the  government.  In  this 
situation,  China  has  a  similar  policy  to  most  developed  countries. 
5.  The  last  criterion  is  about  exchange  rate  conversions,  which  should  be  carried  out  at 
market  rate. 
As  to  this  criterion,  China's  current  foreign  exchange  regime  is  consistent  with  the  EU's 
requirements.  It  is  confirmed  in  the  'Report  of  the  WTO  working  party  on  the  accession 
of  China'  that  'since  the  unification  of  exchange  rates  on  I  January  1994,  China  had 
adopted  a  single  and  managed  floating  exchange  rate  regime  based  on  supply  and  demand. 
PBC  published  the  reference  rates  of  RMB  against  the  US  dollar,  the  HK  dollar  and 
Japanese  yen  based  on  the  weighted  average  prices  of  forex  transactions  at  the  interbank 
forex  market  during  the  previous  day's  trading  ... 
Designated  forex  banks  could  deal  with 
their  clients  at  an  agreed  rate...  The  exchange  rates  for  other  foreign  currencies  were 
163  It  provides  that  a  state  owned  enterprise  which  is  being  reorganized  as  a  company  shall  replace  its 
system  of  operation,  gradually  and  systematically  take  inventory  of  its  assets  and  verify  its  capital, 
determine  property  rights,  clear  creditors'  rights  and  indebtedness,  value  assets  and  set  up  a 
standardized  internal  management  structure  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  conditions  and 
requirements  of  administrative  regulations. 
180 based  on  the  rates  of  RMB  against  the  US  dollar  and  cross-exchange  rates  of  other  foreign 
currency  on  the  international  market.  The  permitted  margin  between  the  buying  and 
selling  rate  could  not  exceed  0.5  per  cent. 
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We  can  therefore  conclude  that  most  Chinese  firms  actually  operate  under  free  market 
principles  and  therefore  should  be  granted  the  conditional  MET  by  the  EU.  This  argument 
is  based  not  only  on  the  existence  of  an  extensive  legal  regime  in  China,  but  also  because 
the  economic  analysis  supports  it.  Assessments  made  by  authorized  international 
organisations  such  as  the  WTO  and  the  World  Bank  demonstrate  that  China's  economic 
reforms  have  not  been  just  a  paper  exercise.  Nevertheless,  the  European  Commission  has 
refused  to  grant  conditional  MET  to  most  Chinese  exporters  on  a  case-by-case  basis  by 
insisting  that  they  do  not  operate  under  ME  conditions. 
This  thesis  will  not  explore  whether  the  EU's  argument  is  true  or  not.  However,  it  is 
noticeable  that  the  'Commission  officials  admit  that  the  formal  rule  change  was  more  in 
name  than  in  substance,  and  that  they  had  no  intention  of  administering  the  more 
beneficial  rules  to  Chinese  and  Russian  firms.  '  165  This  probably  is  the  most  explicit 
answer  to  the  puzzle  that  within  three  years  after  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  was 
amended,  only  around  12  percent  of  applications  for  conditional  MET  were  successful.  166 
Based  on  the  economic  and  legal  analysis  made  in  this  chapter,  one  way  to  make  the  EU's 
164  Para  3  1,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China. 
165  Cynthia  M.  Horne,  'Belief  Stasis  as  an  Impediment  to  Policy  Implementation:  Non-Market 
Economies  and  Western  Trade  Laws'  (University  of  Washington,  prepared  for:  American  Political 
Science  Association  Conference  San  Francisco,  CA,  August  30  -  September  2,200  1).  p  24. 
166  R.  M.  MacLean.  'International  Trade  Evaluating  the  Impact  of  the  E.  C's  Conditional  Market 
Economy  Principle  in  Chinese  and  Russian  Anti-Dumping  Cases',  65. 
181 new  method  to  be  fair  to  implement  is  to  reduce  the  exporter's  burden  of  proof  when  they 
apply  for  the  conditional  MET.  Since  all  of  the  five  criteria  are  basically  consistent  with 
Chinese  laws,  practice  required  for  the  MET  is  governed  and  has  been  ensured  by  the 
national  legislation  to  a  large  extent.  Therefore,  the  Commission  should  adopt  a  more 
flexible  and  less  stringent  approach.  In  other  words,  a  Chinese  exporter's  application  for 
the  MET  should  not  be  rejected  simply  because  it  cannot  meet  one  of  the  five  criteria. 
As  a  possible  result  of  this  suggestion,  a  reasonable  number  of  Chinese  companies  will 
successfully  get  conditional  MET,  and  their  domestic  sales  prices  will  be  adopted  to 
determine  the  normal  values  of  their  exports.  Therefore,  the  purpose  of  the  EU's  new 
approach  can  be  fulfilled,  and  the  outcomes  of  its  anti-dumping  investigations  will  be  fair 
enough  to  Chinese  exporters  as  well. 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  enumerates  the  achievements  made  through  China's  economic  reform  in 
foreign  trade,  enterprise,  pricing  and  financial  sections,  and  analyzes  the  country's 
economic  prospect  in  future  based  on  existing  legislation  and  commitments  made  on 
China's  accession  to  the  World  Trade  Organisation. 
Though  it  only  provides  a  theoretical  analysis  from  the  economic  point  of  view  for  the 
purpose  of  the  thesis,  it  brings  out  more  significant  issues  to  us.  It  can  be  seen  that  China 
has  made  dramatic  progress  in  its  economic  reform  so  far,  and  this  is  well  acknowledged 
by  the  WTO.  However,  considering  the  EU's  anti-dumping  policy  against  imports  from 
China  and  its  outcomes,  there  arise  several  questions: 
Since  China  no  longer  can  be  regarded  as  an  NNE,  what  is  the  legal  basis  for  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  policy,  especially  its  use  of  traditional  NME  treatment,  which  is  applied 
to  Chinese  exports  in  most  cases? 
182 2.  Is  the  EU's  current  practise  still  legal  since  China  has  already  become  a  member  of 
WTO? 
3.  Based  on  the  analysis  in  the  chapter  from  the  economic  point  of  vievv,  state  related 
enterprises  or  transactions  do  not  necessarily  mean  governmental  interference  in 
China.  Then  shall  the  EU  also  consider  the  application  for  MET  for  Chinese  state 
related  enterprises? 
4.  To  what  extent  should  the  EU's  policy  be  revised  to  be  fair  enough  to  meet  the  actual 
situations? 
With  regard  to  the  above  issues,  all  of  them  will  be  discussed  in  the  last  chapter,  which 
will  propose  possible  resolutions  to  the  EU  for  its  anti-dumping  policy  applicable  to 
China. 
18  33 Chapter  Five 
Alternative  Approaches  to  Anti-Dumping 
Legislation  Applicable  to  the  People's  Republic  of 
China 
Introduction 
This  chapter  analyzes  the  anti-dumping  legislation  of  the  United  States  (U.  S.  ),  Australia, 
New  Zealand  and  Japan.  It  focuses  on  the  differences  between  the  EU  and  these 
countries'  anti-dumping  legislation  towards  China,  especially  the  different 
methodologies  adopted  to  determine  the  normal  values  of  Chinese  exports  in 
anti-dumping  investigations. 
For  the  purpose  of  the  thesis,  these  four  developed  countries  are  selected  for  analysis 
because  of  two  reasons.  First,  most  of  them  (except  Japan)  are  the  main  and  traditional 
users  of  anti-dumping  measures  among  the  developed  countries  of  the  world.  (See  Table 
5.2-5.4  on  pages  230-232)  Second,  all  of  them  have  adjusted  their  antimdumping 
legislation  applicable  to  China  as  a  transitional  economy,  and  their  approaches 
accommodate  the  changes  of  China's  economic  status  better  than  the  EU  in  practice.  In 
other  words,  their  legislation  is  more  flexible  and  specific,  under  which  antimdumping 
authorities  can  assess  the  normal  value  of  the  imports  from  China  impartially  without 
wide  discretion.  This  can  be  seen  from  case  studies  later  in  this  chapter. 
The  EU9  U.  S. 
) 
Australia,,  New  Zealand  and  Japan  are  all  Members  of  the  World  Trade 
Organization  (WTO).  So,  their  anti-dumping  legislation  is  established  under  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  legal  framework,  i.  e.  Article  VI  of  the  GATT 
184 and  the  Uruguay  Round  Anti-Dumping  Code.  '  Under  the  GATT,  each  Member  codifies  its 
anti-dumping  legislation  to  interpret  and  implement  the  guidelines.  2  All  of  these  countries 
delegate  anti-dumping  investigations  to  special  authorized  bodiesq  though  the  extent  to 
which  these  units  are  isolated  from  political  pressure  and  independent  of  Executive 
authority  varies.  3  Under  such  circumstances,  they  have  the  freedom  to  develop  a  set  of 
anti-dumping  rules  specific  to  non-market  economies  (NMEs),  but  they  normally  apply 
different  methods  rather  than  use  domestic  sales  price  to  deten-nine  the  product's  normal 
value. 
According  to  China's  economic  reform  and  its  well-acknowledged  progress  obtained,  4 
most  WTO  Members  have  adjusted  their  anti-dumping  policies  to  accommodate  the 
changes.  However,  compared  with  the  EU,  the  updated  antýdumping  rules  towards  China 
adopted  by  the  other  four  countries  are  more  reasonable  and  practical  considering  their 
implementation  in  practice. 
Here,  'reasonable'  means  that  the  rules  enable  the  anti-dumping  authority  to  assess  the 
normal  values  of  imports  concerned  impartially  based  on  facts  and  subsequently  impose 
anti-dumping  measures  on  dumped  goods  proportionately  according  to  their  dumping 
margins.  In  practice,  an  accurate  assessment  of  dumping  facts  needs  three  principles.  First, 
the  investigation  authority  should  grant  market  economy  treatment  (METý  to  an  exporter 
who  has  a  sound  management  record  and  operates  independently  in  a  transitional  economy. 
Second,  due  to  the  discrepancy  in  the  level  of  economic  development  of  different  exporters, 
individual  treatment  should  be  applied  automatically.  That  is  to  say,  dumping  margins  of 
c.  Agreement  on  Implementation  of  Art.  VI  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs,  and  Trade  1994. 
2  GATT  anti-dumping  legislation  is  analyzed  in  chapter  one. 
3  Bruce  A.  Blonigen  &  Thomas  J.  Prusa,  'Anti-Dumping'  at  p  7,  <http:  //www.  nber.  org/papers/w8398  - 
(I  December  2002). 
4  This  issue  has  been  illustrated  in  chapter  four. 
5  i.  e.  use  the  domestic  sales  prices  to  determine  the  normal  values  of  the  products. 
185 the  dumped  imports  and  rates  of  anti-dumping  duties  for  different  exporters  should  be 
determined  on  an  individual  basis.  Third,  in  a  few  cases  where  the  analogue  country 
method  is  applied  due  to  complete  state  control  in  the  industry  of  the  export  country 
concerned,  a  third  country  should  be  selected  properly.  In  other  words,  the  side  effects  of 
the  analogue  country  method  should  be  minimised.  In  that  case,  the  selected  third  economy 
should  have  similarities  with  the  export  country  in  three  aspects.  1)  They  have  similar 
comparative  advantages  in  the  same  industry  concerned.  2)  They  have  similar  procedures 
and  methods  to  produce  the  same  products.  3)  They  have  similar  costs  of  key  production 
factors,  such  as  labour  costs  and  raw  material  costs.  Only  if  the  above  three  principles  are 
observed,  can  an  accurate  judgement  be  made  in  anti-dumping  investigations  towards 
imports  from  transitional  economies. 
A  sound  legislation  not  only  should  be  reasonable,  but  also  should  be  practical  enough  to  be 
applied  in  practice.  With  regard  to  anti-dumping  rules  towards  transitional  economies,  the 
authority  assesses  the  economic  status  of  foreign  exporters  before  granting  them 
conditional  MET.  State  control  is  the  main  reason  to  reject  the  application  for  MET.  So,  the 
way  that  the  authority  distinguishes  state  control  from  state-related  behaviour  can  lead  to 
quite  different  outcomes  of  assessment  about  an  exporter's  economic  status.  In  that  case, 
practical  rules  lead  to  the  conclusion  of  state  control  only  when  state  interference  has 
substantial  and  significant  effect  on  the  enterprise's  decision-making  proceedings.  In  short, 
practical  rules  grant  the  authority  less  discretion  and  ask  for  more  consideration  of  facts  in 
anti-dumping  investigations. 
Based  on  the  above  points,  differences  of  anti-dumping  legislation  between  the  EU  and  the 
U.  S.,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan  will  be  examined  in  this  chapter.  They  will  help  us 
understand  the  most  appropriate  approaches  to  determine  normal  values  and  anti-dumping 
duties  for  Chinese  exports  in  anti-dumping  investigations. 
186 The  above  issue  will  be  analyzed  through  four  parts  of  this  chapter.  Part  one  briefly 
introduces  the  anti-dumping  legislation  of  the  four  countries.  Alternative  methods  to 
identify  NME  in  the  context  of  anti-dumping  legislation  will  be  examined  in  part  two. 
Though  the  EU  eliminated  China  from  its  list  of  NME  in  1998,6  it  still  treats  China  as  an 
NME  in  most  of  its  anti-dumping  proceedings.  Focusing  on  this  issue,  part  three  will 
identify  different  NME  treatments  under  the  GATT  anti-dumping  legal  framework.  Due  to 
the  fundamental  changes  arising  in  China's  economy  because  of  its  reforms  since  1979,  EU 
and  the  four  countries  amended  their  anti-dumping  legislation  to  try  to  accommodate  these 
changes.  These  new  approaches  adopted  to  determine  the  normal  values  of  Chinese 
exports  will  be  illustrated  in  part  four.  Finally,  part  five  will  analyze  different 
methodologies  to  determine  anti-dumping  duty  rates  for  imports  from  China. 
/.  Brief  introduction  to  the  anti-dumping  legislation  of  other 
developed  countries. 
A.  The  U.  S. 
The  US  anti-dumping  law  aims  to  protect  American  industries  from  supposedly  unfair 
7  import  competition.  The  first  legislation  passed  by  the  Congress  was  the  AntiDumping 
Act  of  1916,  which  provides  for  damages  through  the  Federal  court  against  parties  who 
dumped  foreign  goods  in  the  U.  S.  In  1921,  an  AntýDumping  Act  was  adopted,  which 
8 
forms  the  basis  of  the  current  US  legislation.  Following  the  AntiDumping  Agreement 
reached  in  the  Tokyo  Round  of  trade  negotiations,  the  Trade  Agreement  Act  of  1979 
6  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  of  27  April  1998  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on 
protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community.  OJ 
1998  L  128/18. 
7  Brink  Lindsy,  'The  U.  S.  Ant,  -Dumping  Law  Rhetoric  versus  Reality'  at  pI 
<http:  //www.  freetrade.  org/pubs/pas/tpa-007.  pdf  >  (I  December  2002). 
8  Holmes,  Peter,  Kempton,  Jeremy;  Stevenson,  Cliff,  'The  Globalisation  of  Anti-Dumping  and  the 
EU,  '  at  p  2.  --ýlittp:  //www2.  cid.  harvard.  edu/cidtrade/Issues/holmes.  pdf>  (I  December  2002). 
187 repealed  the  Anti-Dumping  Act  of  1921  with  Title  I  and  added  a  new  Title  VII  to  the 
Tariff  Act  of  1930.  Today,  the  U.  S  anti-dumping  law  in  force  is  the  Uruguay  Round 
Agreement  Act  (URAA),  which  implemented  changes  required  by  the  1994 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement.  9 
The  U.  S.  anti-dumping  institution  is  quite  different  from  that  of  the  EU.  First,  it  has 
different  administrative  authorities  that  make  key  decisions.  The  U.  S.  authorizes  one 
agency  to  handle  dumping  determination,  and  another  to  handle  injury  determination. 
The  Department  of  Commerce  (Commerce)  and  the  International  Trade  Commission 
(ITC)  have  the  joint  responsibility  of  administering  U.  S.  anti-dumping  law.  10  According 
to  Title  19  of  the  Code  of  Federal  Regulations  (CFR),  after  a  company  or  a  coalition  of 
companies  files  a  dumping  petition,  Commerce  makes  a  preliminary  decision  as  to 
whether  the  product  is  being  sold  at  less  than  a  normal  value  in  the  U.  S.,  and  calculates  an 
ad  valorem  dumping  margin  equal  to  the  percentage  difference  between  the  price  it  is 
being  sold  at  in  the  U.  S.  and  the  normal  value.  '  1  After  that,  the  ITC  makes  a  preliminary 
decision  as  to  whether  the  relevant  U.  S.  domestic  industry  has  been  materially  injured  or 
is  threatened  with  injury  due  to  the  imports  under  investigation.  12  If  both  aWncies  make 
an  affirmative  final  decision  of  dumping,  then  Commerce  will  issue  a  permanent 
anti-dumping  order,  under  which  a  duty  equal  to  the  estimated  dumping  margin  is  levied 
on  imports  of  the  product  from  the  subject  countries. 
Second,,  compared  with  the  EU,  the  U.  S.  adopts  different  approaches  to  identify  NMEs 
and  to  calculate  normal  values  for  their  exports.  In  order  to  accommodate  the  progress 
9  Anti-Dumping  and  Countervailing  duty  Handbook,  U.  S.  International  Trade  Commission. 
Washington,  DC  20436.  November  1997,  available  from: 
<ftp:  //ftp.  usitc.  gov/pub/reports/studies/PUB312I.  PDF>  (I  December  2002). 
10  Anti-Dumping  and  countervailing  duty  handbook,  ibid. 
I  The  Commerce  regulations  are  set  at  Section  353  of  the  Code  of  Federal  Regulations  (CFR). 
12  The  ITC  regulations  are  contained  in  Section  207  of  the  CFR. 
188 obtained  from  economic  reforms  of  former  NMEs  such  as  China,  it  also  provides  a  set  of 
criteria  to  grant  conditional  MET  to  its  exporters,  which  is  also  different  from  that  of  the 
EU.  All  of  these  will  be  analyzed  later  in  this  chapter. 
B.  Australia 
The  Customs  Act  1901  and  the  Customs  Tariff  (Anti-Dumping)  Act  1975  are  the 
principal  legislative  instruments  of  Australian  Anti-Dumping  Law.  The  current 
legislation  was  the  implementation  of  the  GATT,  the  Anti-Dumping  Code  (the 
Agreement  on  Implementation  of  Article  VI  of  GATT)  and  the  Agreement  on 
Interpretation  and  Application  of  Article  VI,  XVI  and  XXIII  (the  Code  on  Subsidies  and 
Countervailing  Duties).  13  It  was  achieved  by  way  of  wholesale  amendment  and  addition 
to  Part  XV13  of  the  Customs  Act,  plus  some  minor  changes  to  other  legislation.  They 
include  the  Customs  Legislation  Bill  (World  Trade  Organisation  Amendments)  and  the 
Customs  Tariff  Bill  (Anti  -Dumping)(WTO  Amendments).  They  were  passed  by  the 
Australian  Parliament  on  6  December  1994,  and  came  into  force  on  I  January  1995.14 
The  Australian  Customs  Service  (Customs)  is  the  key  body  administering  antiýdumping 
and  countervailing  measures.  After  an  anti-dumping  application  is  lodged,  Customs  will 
investigate  it  and  make  preliminary  detenninations  on  provisional  measures.  If  dumping 
is  concluded  as  the  determination,  Customs  will  submit  the  essential  facts  and 
recommendations  on  final  measures  to  the  Minister  for  Justice  and  Customs,  who  is 
empowered  to  impose  anti-dumping  duties. 
The  anti-clumping  institutions  of  Australia  and  the  EU  have  many  similarities.  First,  both 
13  John  Carroll,  'Australian  Anti-Dumping  and  Countervailing  Measures,  '  for  the  Lex  Mundi  Asian 
Pacific  Conference  on  Saturday,  May  20,2000,1. 
<http:  //www.  lexmundi.  org/committees/confinaterial/carroll.  pdf>  (I  December 
-1002). 
14  Daniel  Moulis,  Freehill  Hollingdale  &  Page,  Canaberra,  'Australia'  in  Keith  Steele  (ed.  ), 
-Inli-Dumping  under  the  K70.  -  .4 
Comparative  Review.  (London:  Kluwer  Law  International  and 
International  Bar  Association,  1996).  35. 
189 of  them  have  a  single  agency  to  make  decisions  on  injury  and  dumping.  Second.  they 
allow  only  investigation  authorities  to  have  access  to  all  pertinent  information.  Third, 
both  of  them  use  more  price  undertakings  than  the  U.  S.  In  addition,  both  of  them  require 
that  the  anti-dumping  duty  be  lower  than  the  dumping  margin  if  lesser  duties  would  be 
sufficient  to  remove  the  injury  caused  by  the  dumping.  " 
Despite  these  similarities,  Australian  anti-dumping  law  is  quite  different  from  that  of  the 
EU.  The  differences  can  be  summarized  in  three  points:  methods  ID  identify  NMEs,  rules 
to  determine  normal  values  of  imports  from  NMEs,  and  most  important  of  all,  provisions 
for  Economies  in  Transition  (EIT).  This  will  be  further  analyzed  in  the  following 
sections. 
C.  New  Zealand 
New  Zealand  was  one  of  the  first  countries  to  adopt  anti-dumping  legislation.  As  early  as 
1905,  the  Agricultural  Implement  Manufacture,  Importation  and  Sale  Ac  t16  was  passed  as 
the  first  anti-dumping  legislation  of  New  Zealand.  According  to  its  obligations  as  a  WTO 
Member,  under  the  GATT  1994  Anti-Dumping  Code,  the  current  New  Zealand  laws  are 
the  Dumping  and  Countervailing  Duties  Act  1988  (Dumping  Act)  and  the  Temporary 
Safeguard  Authorities  Act  1987.17 
Compared  with  the  EU,  the  most  significant  difference  of  the  New  Zealand's  current 
anti-dumping  legislation  is  the  removal  of  the  special  approach  towards  NMEs  and  EIT. 
15  Blonigen  &  Prusa,  fn  3  above  at  p  8. 
16  ,  In  1905  domestic  and  British  manufacturers  of  agricultural  implements  complained  about  the 
efforts  of  an  American  harvester  trust  to  monopolise  the  New  Zealand  market  by  systematic 
price-cutting  to  New  Zealand  purchasers.  '  Under  that  circumstance,  the  Act  applied  a  special  duty  to 
the  unfairly  trade  imports.  'Anti-Dumping  Law  and  Practice  in  New  Zealand.  ' 
<httP:  //www.  med.  govt.  nz/busIt/trade  - 
rem/otherdoc/adlpinz.  html>  (I  December  2002). 
17  Russell  McVeagh  McKenzie.  Bartleet  &  Community,  Auckland.  'Nexv  Zealand'.  in  Keith  Steele 
(ed.  ),  Anti-Dwnpi7W  under  the  WTO.  -  A  Comparative  Revieýi'.  (London:  Kluwer  Law  International 
and  International  Bar  Association,  1996),  185. 
190 That  is  to  say,  its  authority  normally  adopts  the  domestic  sales  prices  of  Chinese  products 
to  determine  their  normal  values.  Price  and  cost  information  from  analogue  countries 
only  will  be  used  as  an  exception  rather  than  the  rule.  18  This  brings  out  a  completely 
different  outcome  in  its  anti-dumping  investigations  about  imports  from  China  -  no 
dumping  has  been  found  since  January  1994.19 
D.  Japan 
As  a  Member  of  the  WTO,  Japan's  current  anti-dumping  legislation  is  compiled  under  the 
GATT  anti-dumping  framework,  and  it  consists  of  the  following  laws: 
1.  Article  8  of  the  basic  Customs  Tariff  Act  (ex  Article  9),  amended  in  1994  in  accordance 
with  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
2.  Cabinet  Order  Relating  to  Anti-Dumping  Duty  (the  Cabinet  Order),  adopted  in  1980  to 
implement  the  Law.  It  was  completely  amended  in  accordance  with  the  amendments  to 
the  Customs  Tariff  Act. 
3.  'Guidelines  for  Procedures  Relating  to  Countervailing  and  AntýDumping  Duty'  of  24 
December  1986  (the  Guidelines),  issued  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance  as  well  as  the 
Ministry  of  International  Trade  and  Industry  (MITI),  the  Ministry  of  Health  and  Welfare, 
the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fisheries  and  the  Ministry  of  Transport,  to 
clarify  anti-dumping  procedures  and  strengthen  the  implementation  of  the  above  ruleS.  20 
Like  the  EU,  the  Japanese  anti-dumping  legislation  provides  special  methods  to 
determine  the  normal  values  of  imports  from  NMEs.  According  to  Article  1(2)  of  the 
18,  Anti-Dumping  Law  and  Practice  in  New  Zealand',  seefn  16  above. 
19,  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Statistics', 
-littp:  ///xN,  \v-Nv.  wto.  org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab2_e. 
htm>  (I  December  2002). 
20  Shintaro  Hagiwara,  'Japan'  in  Keith  Steele  (ed.  ). 
. 4nti-Dumping  under  the  WTO.  -  .4 
COmparati  vC, 
Reviciv.  (London:  Kluwer  Law  International  and  International  Bar  Association,  1996)  at  p  12  1. 
191 Cabinet  Order,  the  Japanese  authority  may  determine  normal  values  of  imports  frorn 
NMEs  based  on  price  information  of  the  like  products  in  a  third  market  economy  (ME). 
The  economic  development  stage  of  the  selected  country  should  be  the  closest 
comparable  to  that  of  the  NME  eoneemed. 
However,  the  authorities  of  the  two  countries  interpret  and  apply  the  rule  in  different 
ways  in  practice.  First,  unlike  the  EU,  Japan  does  not  frequently  apply  its  antirdumping 
instrument  as  a  protectionist  measure  for  its  domestic  industry  against  imports  from 
NMEs.  Though  Japan  compiled  its  anti-dumping  law  a  long  time  ago,  it  seldom  uses  it. 
Up  to  I  June  2001,  only  six  anti-dumping  petitions  had  been  filed  against  foreign 
products,  and  three  of  them  were  finally  withdrawn.  21  Second,  the  Japanese  authority  in 
practice  adopts  fairly  flexible  methods  to  assess  normal  values  of  imports  from 
transitional  economies  like  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
Both  of  the  two  facts  bring  out  quite  different  outcomes  of  the  legislaticn  of  Japan  and  the 
EU  with  regard  to  their  anti-dumping  measures  taken  towards  transitional  economies. 
This  will  be  illustrated  through  a  case  study  later. 
/I.  Different  methods  to  Identify  non-market  economy  (NME). 
Generally  speaking,  NME  refers  to  the  country  where  goods  and  resources  are  allocated 
by  government  planning  agencies  rather  than  by  prices  freely  set  in  a  market.  22  The 
classification  of  NME  and  ME  is  not  scientific  nor  reasonable  in  the  reality  of  today, 
because  there  is  no  purely  free  market  nor  totally  centrally  controlled  economy.  23  Further 
and  worse,  since  the  GATT  did  not  provide  any  definition  of  MEs  and  NMEs  nor  any 
21  ,  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Statistics',  fn  19  above. 
22  J.  H.  Jackson  (co-editor),  Legal  Problems  of  International  Economic  Relations  3  Id  edn.,  (New  York: 
West  Publishing,  1995),  1139. 
23  This  issue  is  analyzed  in  more  detail  in  section  IV  of  chapter  one. 
192 guidance  as  to  the  categorization,  Members  of  its  current  successor,  the  WTO,  categorize 
MEs  and  NMEs  according  to  their  own  criteria. 
Since  former  Communist  countries  used  to  have  severe  state  control  towards  their 
economy,  they  are  regarded  as  having  been  NMEs,  while  the  developed  western  countries 
are  viewed  as  being  MEs.  24  As  a  result,  EU  defined  China  as  an  NME  in  the  EU 
anti-dumping  legislation  in  1994.25  Though  it  eliminated  China  from  the  list  of  NMEs  in 
1998 
'26 
it  currently  still  applies  traditional  NME  treatment  towards  Chinese  exports  in 
most  of  its  anti-dumping  proceedings.  27 
A.  The  U.  S. 
The  EU  does  not  have  any  clear  standard  to  determine  what  constitutes  a  market-oriented 
country,  28  while  the  U.  S.  sets  several  criteria  to  determine  whether  a  country  should  be 
treated  as  an  ME  or  NME,  and  China  is  regarded  as  an  NME  under  the  criteria.  They 
include:  29 
I)  The  extent  to  which  the  currency  of  the  country  is  convertible; 
2)  The  extent  to  which  wage  rates  are  determined  by  free  bargaining  between  labour 
and  management; 
24 
Ibid. 
25  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  519/94,  OJ  1994  L67/89. 
26  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98. 
27  This  issue  has  been  further  examined  in  chapter  three. 
28  In  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  519/94,  the  EU  considers  following  countries  as  NMEs  for  the 
purpose  of  the  EC  anti-dumping  laws:  Albania,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  China,  Estonia, 
Georgia,  Kazakhstan,  North  Korea,  Kyrgystan,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Moldova,  Mongolia,  the  Russian 
Federation,  TaJikistan,  Turkmenistan,  Ukraine,  Uzbekistan  and  Vietnam.  OJ  No  L67.10.3.1994, 
p.  89. 
29  Section  1677b  (c)  (1),  Title  19,  U.  S.  Code.  Available  from 
<http:  //Iaw2.  house.  gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.  exe?  getdoc+uscview+tl  7t2O+2200+14++%28anti-dumpi 
ii(l",  o29%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20> 
(I  December  2002). 
193 3)  The  extent  to  which  joint  ventures  or  other  investments  by  firms  of  other  foreign 
countries  are  permitted; 
4)  The  extent  of  government  ownership  or  control  over  the  means  of  production: 
5)  The  extent  of  government  control  over  the  price  and  output  decisions  of 
enterprises; 
6)  The  degree  of  centralized  governiment  control  over  the  allocation  of  resources  or 
inputs. 
30 
No  single  criterion  can  conclusively  indicate  a  market  or  an  NME.  In  considering 
criterion  I  and  3,  the  Department  of  Commerce  has  stated  that  both  currency 
convertibility  and  degree  of  foreign  investment  are  macroeconomic  indicators  and  have 
little  effect  on  internal  market  forces.  Therefore,  it  is  acknowledged  that  such  indicators 
cannot  serve  as  definitive  tests  of  ME  status.  However,  compared  with  the  EU,  such 
identification  will  benefit  transitional  economies  to  be  reclassified  as  market 
economies,  31  since  it  is  more  reasonable  and  practical  in  application. 
B.  Australia. 
Unlike  the  EU,  Australian  legislation  provided  two  criteria  to  define  a  country  as  an 
NME: 
1)  'The  government  has  a  monopoly,  or  substantial  monopoly  of  the  trade  of 
the  country;  and 
30  Petroleum  Wax  Candles  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China:  Anti-Dumping  Final  Determination 
of  Sales  at  Less  Than  Fair  Value  and  Suspension  of  Liquidation,  51  Fed.  Reg.  25085,  July  10,1986. 
31  Cynthia  Horne,  'The  Politics  Behind  the  Application  of  Anti-Dumping  Laws  to  Nonmarket 
Econornies:  Distrust  and  Informal  Constraints'  (paper  prepared  for  graduate  student  retreat  for 
cornparative  research,  Society  for  Comparative  Research,  UCLA),  pp  32  &  34. 
<Iittp:  //www.  sscnet.  ucla.  edu/soc/groups/scr/horne.  pdf>  (I  December  2002). 
194 2)  The  government  determines  or  substantially  influences  the  domestic  price 
of  goods  in  that  country.  532 
Before  China  was  reclassified  as  a  transitional  economy  in  1999,  Australia  regarded  it  as 
an  NME,  under  which  traditional  NME  Treatment  was  applied  to  Chinese  exports  in 
anti-dumping  investigations.  33 
C.  Japan 
Japan  has  no  definition  of  NME  in  its  anti-dumping  legislation.  However,  in  accordance 
with  the  second  interpretative  note  to  paragraph  I  of  Article  VI  in  Annex  I  to  the  GATT 
1994,  Japan  provides  a  set  of  special  ruleS34  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  imports 
from  'a  country  which  has  a  complete  or  substantially  complete  monopoly  of  its  trade  and 
where  all  domestic  prices  are  fixed  by  the  State'.  35  Therefore,  whether  a  country  is  an 
NME  and  whether  to  apply  the  special  rules  to  the  exporters  under  investigation  will  be 
determined  on  a  case-by-case  basis. 
D.  New  Zealand. 
New  Zealand  has  no  classification  of  NMEs  any  more  since  it  has  removed  specific 
provisions  determining  normal  values  of  imports  from  NMEs  and  EIT.  36  Recognizing  the 
dramatic  progress  gained  in  economic  reforms  of  these  countries  in  the  past  decades, 
New  Zealand  consider  it  difficult  to  meet  the  conditions  provided  in  the  Interpretative 
32  ,  Australia's  Anti-Dumping  and  Countervailing  Administration'  at  p6 
<http:  //www.  customs.  gov.  au/resources/files/antidumping.  pdf>  (I  December  2002). 
33  'Ministerial  Price  Control  Guidelines  -  Economies  in  Transition', 
--http:  //www.  customs.  gov.  au/site/index.  cfi-n?  area_id=5&nav_id=296>  (I  December  2002). 
34  Art.  2,  Cabinet  Order  Relating  to  Anti-Dumping  Duty. 
35  Para.  I  of  Art.  VI  in  Annex  I  to  the  GATT  1994. 
36  ,  Anti-Dumping  Law  and  Practice  in  New  Zealand',  fn  16  above. 
195 Note  2  37  to  paragraph  I  of  Article  VI  of  GATT  1994.  Therefore,  in  case  of  dcmestic 
prices  or  factor  costs  of  the  products  concerned  might  not  be  based  on  market 
considerations,  standard  provisions  of  the  Dumping  Act  will  be  applied  case  by  case.  Its 
current  legislation  applicable  to  EIT  will  be  analyzed  with  case  later  in  this  chopter. 
III.  Different  NME  Treatments  under  the  GATT  anti-dumping  legislative 
framework 
Under  the  GATT  anti-dumping  legislative  framework,  WTO  Members  are  allowed  to 
adopt  price  factors  from  an  ME  rather  than  domestic  prices  to  determine  the  normal 
values  of  imports  from  an  NME.  This  is  the  NME  Treatment.  Today,  exporters  from 
NN4Es  who  fail  to  get  conditional  MET  in  anti-dumping  investigations  are  still  subject  to 
the  traditional  NME  Treatment.  In  that  case,  the  anti-dumping  authority  will  adopt 
different  methods  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  imports  from  an  NME  with  the  price 
factors  from  an  ME.  It  may  be  analogue  country  method  and  constructed  value  method. 
Such  practice  has  the  following  significant  disadvantages  in  making  accurate  judgements 
in  anti-dumping  investigations. 
1)  It  will  inflate  the  actual  normal  value  of  the  imports  from  an  NME; 
2)  In  most  cases,  the  NME  concerned  has  certain  comparative  advantages  for  its 
exports  in  international  trade,  while  the  selected  ME  does  not  have; 
3)  The  choice  of  an  analogue  producer  is  very  unpredictable  and  often  depends  on 
practical  considerations  which  have  little  to  do  with  the  purpose  of  anti-dumping 
37  GATT  Ad  Art.  VI  Paragraph  1.2  provides:  'It  is  recognized  that,  in  the  case  of  imports  from  a 
country  which  has  a  complete  or  substantially  complete  monopoly  of  its  trade  and  where  all  domestic 
prices  are  fixed  by  the  State,  special  difficulties  may  exist  in  deten-nining  price  comparability  for  the 
purposes  of  paragraph  1,  and  in  such  cases  importing  contracting  parties  may  find  it  necessary  to  take 
into  account  the  possibility  that  a  strict  comparison  with  domestic  prices  in  such  a  country  may  not 
always  be  appropriate' 
196 investigations,  i.  e.  accurate  judgements  of  dumping  determination.  An  example  of 
such  considerations  is  finding  a  producer  who  is  willing  to  cooperate. 
Though  there  are  unreasonable  factors  in  the  traditional  NME  Treatment  as  analyzed 
above,  the  specific  institutions  that  the  U.  S.  applies  (constructed  value  method)  will  lead 
to  more  accurate  judgements  than  that  of  the  EU  (analogue  country  method)  in 
anti-dumping  investigations  for  imports  from  NMEs.  As  to  other  countries  such  as 
Australia,  though  it  also  contains  the  traditional  NME  Treatment  for  NMEs  in  its 
anti-dumping  legislation,  it  provides  more  specific  guidelines  for  such  practice.  All  of 
these  will  be  examined  country  by  country  through  the  following  analysis. 
A.  The  EU's  analogue  country  method. 
According  to  the  current  EU  anti-dumping  legislation,  the  normal  value  of  imports  from 
NMEs  shall  be  determined  on  the  basis  of- 
The  price  or  constructed  value  in  an  ME  third  country,  or  the  price  from  such  a  third 
country  to  other  countries,  including  the  Community,  or  where  those  are  not  possible, 
on  any  other  reasonable  basis,  including  the  price  actually  paid  or  payable  in  the 
Community  for  the  like  product.  38 
In  that  case,  the  selection  of  the  third  country  is  crucial  to  the  outcome  of  an  an6durnping 
investigation.  However,  the  selection  process  undertaken  by  the  EU  authority  is 
essentially  empirical.  The  law  only  stipulates  that 
An  appropriate  ME  third  country  shall  be  selected  in  a  not  unreasonable  manner,  due 
account  being  taken  of  any  reliable  information  made  available  at  the  time  of  selection. 
Account  shall  also  be  taken  of  time  limits;  where  appropriate,  a  market  economy  third 
38  Art.  2.7  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96. 
197 country  which  is  subject  to  the  same  investigation  shall  be  used.  39 
Under  the  rule,  the  authority  should  select  an  ME,  in  which  the  like  product  is  produced 
with  the  same  manufacturing  processes  and  technical  standards  as  in  the  NME  concerned. 
However,  in  fact,  many  other  factors  determine  the  selection. 
In  most  cases,  the  analogue  country  is  selected  by  common  arrangement  between  the 
parties,  most  often  expressed  on  a  tacit  basis,  for  instance,  where  suggestions  made  by  the 
complainant  or  the  Commission  are  not  objected  to  by  the  other  side.  40 
In  some  cases,  the  selection  of  an  analogue  country  is  affected  by  the  attitude  of  the 
producers  in  the  third  country  under  consideration;  if  they  refuse  to  cooperate,  another 
country  will  have  to  be  used; 
In  cases  involving  both  MEs  and  NMEs,  the  Commission  often  tends  to  use  one  of  the 
MEs  concerned  as  an  analogue  in  order  to  reduce  its  workload; 
A  mere  perusal  of  the  list  of  market  economy  countries  selected  as  analogues  shows 
that  the  relative  level  of  economic  development  or  GNP  per  capita  plays  virtually  no 
role  in  an  EEC  anti-dumping  proceeding.  Countries  at  all  levels  of  economic 
development  have  been  chosen  as  analogues  for  any  particular  non-market  economy 
country. 
41 
Due  to  the  randomness  of  the  selection  by  the  EU,  the  dumping  determinations  can  reach 
a  peak  of  artificiality.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  virtually  impossible  for  exporters  in  NMEs 
to  determine  how  to  avoid  dumping. 
39 
Ibid. 
40  John  H.  Jackson  &  Edwin  A.  Vermulst,  Anti-Dumping  Law  and  Practice:  A  Comparative  Stliql,. 
(University  of  Michigan  Press:  1990),  77. 
41 
Ibid. 
198 B.  The  U.  S.:  constructed  value  method  +  surrogate  country  method 
Unlike  the  EU,  the  U.  S.  mainly  adopts  the  constructed  value  method  for  NME  exporters 
who  fail  to  meet  the  criteria  of  conditional  MET  in  anti-dumping  investigations.  Only  in 
exceptional  cases  when  there  is  not  sufficient  information  available  for  constructed  value 
method,  surrogate  country  method  (which  is  similar  to  the  EU's  analogue  country 
method)42  will  be  applied. 
1.  Constructed  value  method  or  factor  test 
As  early  as  1988,  in  Section  1316  of  its  Omnibus  Trade  and  Competitiveness  Act,  the  U.  S. 
made  an  effort  to  alleviate  the  unfairness  inherent  in  surrogate  country  method  by 
adopting  the  Constructed  Value  or  Factor  Test  as  the  preferred  method  of  calculating 
normal  value  of  imports  from  NMEs.  43  Under  the  factor  test,  the  Department  of 
Commerce  must  use  the  value  of  the  factors  of  production  used  in  producing  the 
merchandise  in  the  NME.  So  the  Factor  Test  is  a  two-step  approach.  At  first,  it  needs  to 
identify  and  qualify  the  factors  of  production  used  in  the  NME  in  producing  the  products 
under  investigation.  Then,  it  will  evaluate  these  factors  in  an  appropriate  ME. 
In  the  current  U.  S.  anti-dumping  legislation,  the  rule  is  provided  in  Section  1677b  (c)  (1), 
Title  19  of  the  U.  S.  Code.  It  stipulates  that: 
The  administering  authority  shall  determine  the  normal  value  of  the  subject 
merchandise  on  the  basis  of  the  value  of  the  factors  of  production  utilized  in  producing 
the  merchandise  and  to  which  shall  be  added  an  amount  for  general  expenses  and  profit 
plus  the  cost  of  containers,  coverings,  and  other  expenses.  Except  as  provided  in 
42  Both  methods  use  the  third  country  price  proxies  for  NMEs.  However,  the  U.  S.  authority  tends  to 
stress  the  importance  of  having  surrogates  at  similar  levels  of  developing  while  the  EU  authority 
does  not  consider  it  at  all.  This  will  be  further  examined  in  the  next  part.  Factors  that  the  EU 
considers  when  it  selects  analogue  countries  have  been  analyzed  in  the  previous  section. 
43  John  H.  Jackson  &  Edwin  A.  Vermulst,  fn  40  at  p  450. 
199 paragraph  (2),  the  valuation  of  the  factors  of  production  shall  be  based  on  the  best 
available  information  regarding  the  values  of  such  factors  in  an  ME  or  MEs  considered 
to  be  appropriate  by  the  administering  authority.  44 
The  factors  of  production  utilized  in  producing  merchandise  include: 
a.  hours  of  labor  required, 
b.  quantities  of  raw  materials  employed, 
c.  amounts  of  energy  and  other  utilities  consumed,  and 
d.  representative  capital  cost,  including  depreciation.  45 
The  administering  authority,  in  valuing  factors  of  production  shall  utilize,  to  the  extent 
possible,  the  prices  or  costs  of  factors  of  production  in  one  or more  MEs  that  are: 
a.  at  a  level  of  economic  development  comparable  to  that  of  the  nonmarket  economy 
country,  and 
b.  significant  producers  of  comparable  merchandise.  46 
For  purposes  of  valuing  the  factors47  with  the  constructed  value  method,  the  U.  S.  authority 
observes  the  following  rules:  48 
44  Section  1677b  (c)  (1),  Title  19  of  the  U.  S.  Code. 
45  Section  1677b  (c)  (3),  Title  19  of  the  U.  S.  Code. 
46  Section  1677b  (c)  (4),  Title  19  of  the  U.  S.  Code. 
4-1  They  include  factors  of  production,  general  expenses,  profit,  and  the  cost  of  containers,  coverings, 
and  other  expenses. 
48  Section  351.408(c)(4),  19  CFR.  Document  No:  G/ADP/N/l  /USA/l/SuppI.  2, 
<http:  //docsonline.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I  December  2002). 
200 a.  Information  used  to  value  factors. 
If  a  factor  or  a  portion  of  the  factor  is  purchased  fiom  an  ME  supplier  and  the  remainder 
from  an  NME  supplier,  the  authority  normally  will  value  the  factor  using  the  price  paid  to 
the  ME  supplier. 
b.  Valuation  in  a  single  country. 
Except  for  labour  which  is  provided  in  the  next  paragraph,  the  ýuthority  normally  will 
value  all  factors  in  a  single  surrogate  country. 
c.  Labour. 
For  labour,  the  authority  uses  regression-based  wage  rates  -  essentially  an  average  of  the 
wage  rates  in  MEs  viewed  as  being  economically  comparable  to  the  NME.  It  used  to 
utilize  the  wage  and  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  data  of  at  least  45  market  economies 
collected  from  publicly  available  sources  such  as  the  International  Labour  Organization 
and  the  World  Bank/Intemational  Monetary  Fund.  However,  beginning  with  May  2000, 
it  chose  to  use  per  capita  gross  national  product  (GNP)  instead  of  GDP  . 
49The  data  is 
available  to  the  public  via  the  Import  Administration's  (IA)  website5o  and  also  at  IA's 
Central  Records  Unit. 
d.  Manufacturing  overhead,  general  expenses,  and  profit. 
41)  ,  Expected  Wages  of  Selected  Non-Market  Economy  Countries',  <http:  //ia.  ita.  doc.  gov/wages>  (I 
December  2002). 
so  ,  Expected  Wages  of  Selected  Non-Market  Economy  Countries  1998  Income  Data  Revised  May 
2000',  <http:  //ia.  ita.  doc.  gov/wages/98wages/gdpOOweb.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
201 For  manufacturing  overhead,  general  expenses,  and  profit,  the  Secretary  normally  vAII 
use  non-proprietary  information  gathered  from  producers  of  identical  or  comparable 
merchandise  in  the  surrogate  CoUntry.  51 
In  short,  the  major  difference  between  the  U.  S.  constructed  value  method  and  the  EU 
analogue  country  method  is  that  after  selecting  a  third  MIE,  the  U.  S.  values  the  factor 
inputs  individually  while  the  EU  utilizes  the  actual  price  of  the  like  product  in  the 
analogue  as  a  price  proxy  for  the  NME  under  investigation.  In  particular,  the  U.  S.  takes 
the  GNP  and  labour  costs  of  the  third  ME(s)  into  account.  As  a  result  of  this  methodology, 
the  comparative  advantages  of  developing  countries  in  international  trade  will  be 
considered  in  anti-dumping  investigations.  It  undoubted  increases  the  fairness  and 
accuracy  of  the  authority's  anti-dumping  practice. 
2.  Surrogate  country  method 
Surrogate  country  method  uses  the  price  proxies  in  a  third  ME  to  calculate  the  normal 
values  of  imports  from  an  NME,  which  is  similar  to  the  EU's  analogue  country  method. 
However,  the  U.  S.  authority  applies  the  methodology  less  frequently  than  the  EU,  and  it 
follows  different  criteria  to  select  the  third  country. 
With  regard  to  imports  from  NMEs,  only  when  there  is  not  adequate  information 
available  to  adopt  the  constructed  value  method,  the  U.  S.  authority  will  determine  their 
normal  values  on  the  basis  of  the  domestic  prices  of  the  like  products  of  a  third  ME. 
In  that  case,  the  merchandise  whose  price  will  be  referred  is  required  to  be  comparable  to 
the  subject  merchandise.  Besides,  it  should  be  produced  in  one  or  more  ME  countries  that 
are  at  a  level  of  economic  development  comparable  to  that  of  the  NME,  and  it  is  sold  in 
51  Section  351.408(c)(4),  19  CFR. 
202 other  countries,  including  the  United  States.  52 
In  determining  whether  a  country  is  at  a  level  of  economic  development  comparable  to  the 
NME,  the  U.  S.  places  primary  emphasis  onper  capita  GDp53  as  the  measure  of  economic 
comparability.  The  International  Trade  Administration  (ITA)  in  the  Commerce  54 
implements  the  surrogate  country  method,  and  it  has  five  criteria  to  govern  such  practice: 
per  capita  GNP,  growth  rate  of  per  capita  GNP,  significance  as  a  producer  of  a  like 
product,  and  the  distribution  of  labor  between  the  agricultural  and  non-agricultural 
sectors.  55 
The  above  analysis  shows  that  the  U.  S.  evaluates  the  individual  factor  inputs  rather  than 
the  actual  price  of  the  like  product  in  third  MEs,  and  it  tends  to  stress  the  importance  of 
having  surrogates  at  similar  levels  of  development  in  anti-dumping  investigations  against 
NMEs.  The  overall  level  of  economic  development  is  the  key  consideration  for  the 
selection  of  the  surrogate.  This  is  helpful  to  get  a  better  evaluation  of  labour  cost,  which  is 
an  important  comparative  advantage  of  developing  countries  such  as  China  in 
international  trade.  As  a  result,  the  U.  S.  methodologies  not  only  increase  the  fairness  and 
accuracy  of  determination  of  the  existence  of  dumping  in  anti-dumping  investigations, 
but  also  provide  a  more  predictable  standard  for  exporters  from  NMEs  to  avoid  dumping. 
From  this  point,  such  methodologies  towards  NMEs  are  more  scientific  and  flexible  than 
the  EU's  analogue  country  method,  which  is  mainly  based  on  the  availability  of 
information  and  cooperation,  similarities  of  manufacturing  process  and  technical 
52  Section  1677b  (c)  (2),  Title  19  of  the  U.  S.  Code. 
53  From  May  2000,  the  U.  S.  authority  chose  to  use  per  capita  gross  national  product  (GNP)  instead  of 
GDP. 
54  i.  e.  U.  S.  Department  of  Commerce. 
55  56  FR  60969.1991.  'Final  Results  of  Anti-Dumping  Duty  Administrative  Review:  Shop  Towels 
of  Cotton  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  '  United  States  Federal  Register  November  29. 
203 standards.  56  Therefore,  the  U.  S.  antýdumping  practice  towards  NMEs  is  a  step  forward  in 
the  right  direction. 
C.  Australia:  domestic  selling  prices  or  constructed  prices. 
According  to  Australian  anti-dumping  legislation,  if  a  country  is  regarded  as  an  NME,  the 
normal  value  of  its  exports  will  be  determined  by  reference  to  domestic  selling  prices  or 
to  constructed  prices  based  on  cost  of  production  or  third  country  sales.  57  However, 
compared  with  the  EU,  Australia  has  more  specific  guidelines  of  the  selection  of  the  third 
country. 
Under  the  law,  the  normal  value  from  an  NME  is  decided  according  to  whichever  is  the 
most  appropriate  of  the  following  methods. 
A  value  of  like  goods  sold  in  another  (or  analogue)  country  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
trade  and  at  arms  length; 
A  value  of  like  goods  sold  by  the  analogue  country  to  another  country  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  trade  and  at  arms  length; 
A  value  equal  to  the  cost  to  make  and  sell  like  goods  in  the  analogue  country,  including 
any  determined  profit  rate;  or 
A  value  of  like  goods  produced  and  sold  in  Australia  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade  and 
at  arms  length. 
58 
As  to  the  selection  of  an  analogue  country,  Customs  provides  the  following  guidelines: 
56  EU's  guidelines  to  select  analogue  countries  are  analyzed  in  more  detail  in  chapter  three. 
57  Moulis,  Hollingdale  &  Canaberra,  fn  14  above  at  p  54. 
58  ,  Australia's  Anti-Dumping  and  Countervailing  Administration',  fn  32  above  at  p  6. 
204 When  selecting  a  third  country,  it  should  have  a  similar  costing  structure  and,  if 
possible,  be  at  a  similar  stage  of  economic  development  to  the  country  concerned, 
particularly  in  regard  to  the  industry  under  inquiry.  In  making  a  comparison,  factors 
such  as  gross  national  product,  infrastructure  development,  manufacturing  processes, 
technical  standards  and  scales  of  production  may  be  taken  into  account. 
Where  there  is  a  selection  of  market  and  NMEs  already  included  in  the  complaint,  the 
Australian  Customs  Service  (ACS)  may  consider  using  one  of  the  market  economy 
countries  already  involved.  59 
D.  Japan:  surrogate  country  method. 
According  to  Article  2.2  of  the  Cabinet  Order,  the  Japanese  authority  may  determine 
normal  values  of  imports  from  NMEs  based  on  price  information  of  the  like  products  in  a 
third  ME.  Like  the  U.  S.,  Japan  stresses  that  the  economic  development  stage  of  the 
selected  country  should  be  the  closest  comparable  to  that  of  the  NME  under  investigation. 
IV.  Legislative  amendments  made  or  new  approach  adopted  due  to  China"s 
economic  reform. 
A.  The  EU:  stringent  approach  to  the  conditional  MET. 
In  order  to  match  the  progress  obtained  from  economic  reforms  of  the  former  NMEs,  the 
EU,  the  U.  S.,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan  have  adopted  new  an6clumping 
approaches  -  conditional  MET.  However,  compared  with  the  EU,  the  criteria  provided  by 
these  countries  for  conditional  MET  in  anti-dumping  investigations  are  less  stringent. 
Furthermore,  their  new  approaches  have  been  applied  in  a  more  flexible  way  by  the 
authorities  in  anti-dumping  investigations. 
59  Moulis,  Hollingdale  &  Canaberra,  fn  14  above  at  p  55. 
205 According  to  the  depth  of  economic  reform,  the  EU  gradually  eliminated  the  following 
countries  from  its  NME  list:  China,  Russia,  60  Ukraine,  Vietnam,  Kazakhstan  and 
countries  currently  classed  as  NMEs  for  anti-dumping  purposes  but  who  are  Members  of 
the  WTO.  Exporters  from  these  countries  will  be  granted  conditional  MET,  i.  e.  domestic 
prices  of  their  exports  can  be  used  to  determine  their  normal  value  if  they  are  able  to  meet 
the  five  criteria  provided  in  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98. 
B.  The  U.  S:  the  Market  Oriented  Industry  (MOI)  Test. 
Compared  with  the  EU,  the  similar  regime  in  the  U.  S.  is  more  positive  and  practical.  Both 
the  U.  S.  Department  of  Commerce  and  the  U.  S.  Congress  acknowledge  the  possibility 
that  certain  sectors  or  regions  in  a  transitional  economy  will  face  market  prices  or  begin  to 
operate  under  hard  budget  constraints  more  quickly  than  others:  'attempts  by  traditional 
NMEs  to  evolve  towards  market-oriented  economies  may  result  in  a  situation  in  which  a 
sector  of  an  NME  may  be  sufficiently  free  of  NME  distortions  so  that  the  actual  prices 
and/or  costs  incurred  in  the  NME  could  be  used  in  dumping  calculations  and  render 
meaningful  results.  61  Therefore,  in  order  to  make  more  accurate  and  fair  judgement  in 
anti-dumping  investigations,  the  sectors  could  potentially  be  treated  differently  from 
other  exporters  in  the  country. 
Based  on  this  reason,  in  1988,  the  U.  S.  Congress  amended  the  anti-dumping  law  with 
section  773(c)(1)(b)  permitting  standard  ME  methodologies  in  NME  cases  under  limited 
circumstances,  and  the  Congress  began  to  consider  the  situation  of  a  'bubble  of 
capitalism'  within  an  NME.  In  that  case,  if  an  industry  in  an  NME  is  able  to  prove  that  its 
inputs  and  pricing  structures  are  completely  market  determined,  it  would  be  subject  to 
60  Russia  was  recognized  as  an  ME  for  the  purpose  of  anti-dumping  by  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1972/2002  of  5  November  2002  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  the  protection  against 
dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community.  OJ  2002  L305/1. 
61  ,  Final  Negative  Countervailing  Duty  Determination:  Oscillating  Ceiling  Fans  from  the  People's 
Republic  of  China',  57  Fed.  Reg.  24018,  June  5,1992. 
206 anti-dumping  procedures  similar  to  those  for  market  economies.  In  the  case  of  Sparklers 
from  the  People's  Republic  of  ChindS2  and  Oscillating  Fans  From  the  People's  Republic 
of  China,  63  the  U.  S.  Department  of  Commerce  clarified  its  position  on  bubbles  of 
capitalism. 
64 
In  1992,  ITA  announced  certain  criteria  to  determine  whether  an  industry  in  an  NME  is 
sufficiently  market-oriented.  They  include  : 65 
1.  The  virtual  absence  of  government  involvement  in  setting  prices  or  production  levels; 
2.  The  industry  is  characterised  by  private  or  collective  ownership;  and 
3.  The  industry  pays  market  prices  for  all  significant  input. 
Under  the  MOI  test,  industries  in  a  transitional  economy  like  China  could  have  more  fair 
and  predictable  treatment  in  anti-dumping  investigations.  The  enterprise  which  passes  the 
test  will  be  allowed  to  use  the  domestic  price  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  its  exports. 
As  a  result  of  the  MOI  test  method,  the  number  of  positive  final  deten-ninations  of 
dumping  against  NME  industries  has  decreased.  66  Therefore,  the  comparative  advantages 
of  the  industry/enterprise  are  affirmed  in  international  trade. 
C.  Australia:  Special  rules  for  Economies  in  Transition  (EIT). 
This  is  the  most  significant  difference  between  Australian  and  the  EU  antirdumping 
legislation  towards  China  and  other  EIT.  Australia  has  added  and  amended  relevant  rules 
62  56  Fed.  Reg.  20588,  May  6,1991. 
63  56  Fed.  Reg.  55274,  October  25,1991. 
64  Cynthia  Horne,  fn  31  above  at  p  24. 
65  Jianyu  Wang,  'A  Critique  of  the  Application  to  China  of  the  Non-Market  Economy  Rules  of 
Antidumping  Legislation  and  Practice  of  the  EU.  '  (1999)  33(3)  J.  W.  T.,  117  at  p  139. 
66  Cynthia  Horne,  fn  31  above  at  p  25. 
207 according  to  the  changes  of  economic  status  in  China's  and  other  EIT  since  1998.  As  we 
will  find  out  from  a  recent  case  later  in  this  chapter,  the  current  legislation  matches  these 
changes  very  well.  Compared  with  the  corresponding  rules  of  the  EU,  it  is  not  only  more 
specific,  but  also  more  reasonable  and  realistic  in  practice. 
1.  The  Customs  Tariff  (Anti-Dumping)  Act  1975  as  amended  by  the  Customs 
(Anti-dumping  Amendments)  Act  1998. 
The  Customs  Tariff  (Anti-Dumping)  Act  1975  as  amended  by  the  Customs 
(Anti-dumping  Amendments)  Act  1998  introduced  an  alternative  approach  to  determine 
normal  values  of  allegedly  dumped  goods  for  countries  in  the  process  of  a  transition  from 
a  centrally  controlled  economy  to  an  ME. 
Australia's  legislation  provides  for  normal  values  to  be  assessed  through  a  hierarchy 
of  methodologies  with  Customs  working  progressively  through  each  until  a  point  is 
reached  where  the  normal  value  can  be  determined.  67 
The  revised  law  is  more  flexible  and  practical  than  the  old  one  when  determining  normal 
values  for  imports  from  transitional  economies. 
Considering  the  possibility  that  EIT  may  have  some  sectors  which  have  already  moved  to 
the  ME  level,  Australian  Customs  admit  that  it  is  inappropriate  to  apply  the  same  rules  for 
NMEs  to  imports  in  these  sectors  of  EIT.  According  to  the  law,  an  assessment  of  the 
influence  or  control  a  government  has  over  domestic  selling  prices  and  the  method  used 
for  determining  normal  values  is  made  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  Based  on  the  different 
economic  development  level  of  an  economy  in  transition,  Customs  may  use  alternative 
methods  to  calculate  its  normal  values.  There  will  be  one  of  the  two  situations. 
67 
John  Carroll,  fn  13  at  p  2. 
208 a.  When  it  finds  out  in  the  process  of  an  anti-dumping  investigation  that  the  domestic 
selling  prices  of  such  products  concerned  are  subject  to  price  control,  the  normal 
values  will  be  determined  on  a  basis  of  information  obtained  from  both  an  analogue 
country  and  a  transitional  economy. 
b.  If  the  Customs  find  there  is  no  price  control,  it  may  proceed  to  examine  the  cost  of 
production  of  the  imports  from  EIT.  In  case  of  raw  materials  being  supplied  by  a  state 
wholly  owned  enterprise,  68  a  substitute  raw  material  cost  may  be  used  in  the 
calculation  of  the  normal  value. 
The  method  of  determining  the  substitute  raw  material  cost  will  depend  on  the 
circumstances  of  each  case.  The  legislation  provides  for  the  substitute  raw 
material  cost  to  be  based  on  one  of  the  following  options:  the  raw  material  price  in 
the  domestic  market  of  a  analogue  country;  the  raw  material  export  price  from  a 
analogue  country  to  an  appropriate  third  country;  the  cost  to  make  and  sell  the  raw 
material  in  a  analogue  country;  or  the  selling  price  of  the  raw  material  in 
Australia. 
The  normal  value  for  goods  that  are  found  to  incorporate  raw  materials  from  a 
state  wholly  owned  enterprise  may  be  determined  having  regard  to  all  relevant 
information.  This  can  include  the  sum  of:  the  cost  of  the  substitute  raw  material; 
the  actual  costs  of  production  of  the  exported  goods  (excluding  the  actual  costs  for 
the  affected  raw  material);  and  the  administrative,  selling  and  general  costs  and 
profit  associated  with  the  export  sale.  69 
2.  More  specific  rules  for  EIT  -  Australian  Customs  Dumping  Notice  No. 
68  i.  e.  a  raw  material  input  to  the  manufacture  of  the  exported  goods,  that  accounts  for  more  than  10% 
of  the  costs  of  production,  is  supplied  by  a  state  wholly  owned  enterprise. 
69  &  Australia's  Anti-Dumping  and  Countervailing  Administration',  fn  32  at  p  7. 
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On  7  December  2000,  the  Minister  for  Justice  and  Customs  issued  the  following 
guidelines  in  relation  to  a  price  control  situation  in  an  economy  in  transition.  Under  this 
law,  exporters  in  such  a  country  have  the  opportunity  to  submit  claims  to  establish  that  a 
price  control  situation  does  not  apply  to  the  goods  under  consideration.  In  that  case,  the 
producer  or  exporter  bears  the  burden  of  proof,  and  should  provide  the  information  to 
show  that  a  price  control  situation  does  not  exist.  There  are  four  criteria  to  judge  whether 
a  price  control  situation  exists. 
a.  Decisions  of  the  relevant  producers  or  exporters  relating  to  prices,  costs, 
inputs,  sales  and  investments  are  made  in  response  to  market  signals  and 
without  significant  state  interference.  71 
To  meet  this  criterion,  four  factors  should  be  found: 
i)  genuinely  private  companies  or  parties  hold  the  majority  shareholding  of  the 
relevant  producer  or  exporter;  ii)  state  or  provincial  officials  appearing  on  the 
board  or  in  key  management  positions  are  in  a  clear  minority;  iii)  the  relevant 
producer  or  exporter  has  the  guaranteed  freedom  to  carry  on  business  activities 
as  evidenced  by  the  following:  there  is  no  restriction  on  selling  on  the  domestic 
market,  the  right  to  do  business  cannot  be  withdrawn  outside  proper  contractual 
terms,  and  in  the  case  of  joint  venture  companies,  profits  can  be  exported  and 
capital  invested  can  be  repatriated;  iv)  major  production  inputs  of  the  relevant 
producer  or  exporter  are  not  supplied  by  state  owned  or controlled  enterprises  at 
prices  which  do  not  substantially  reflect  free  market  conditions.  Inputs  shall 
70  4  Ministerial  Guidelines  -  Section  269tac(5e),  Customs  Act  1901',  available  from: 
<http:  //www.  customs.  gov.  au/notices/acdnOO/acdnOO60.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
71  Ibid. 
210 include,  inter  alia,  raw  materials,  labour,  energy  and  technology  costs. 
b.  One  clear  set  of  basic  accounting  records  is  kept  by  the  relevant  producer  or 
exporter  and  is  independently  audited  and  is  maintained  in  accordance  with 
either  generally  accepted  accounting  principles  in  the  country  of  export  or  in 
line  with  international  accounting  standards. 
c.  The  production  costs  and  financial  situation  of  the  relevant  producer  or 
exporter  are  not  subject  to  any  significant  distortions  carried  over  from  the 
non-market  economy  system. 
d.  The  relevant  producer  or  exporter  is  subject  to  bankruptcy  and  property  laws, 
which  guarantee  legal  certainty  and  stabil  ity.  72 
According  to  the  Notice,  the  following  factors  should  be  taken  into  account  before 
determining  whether  a  price  control  situation  exists. 
i)  The  relevant  producer  or  exporter  of  the  goods  under  consideration  forms  part  of  a 
broader  market  or  sector  in  which  the  presence  of  a  State  owned  enterprise  or 
enterprises  has  influenced  prices;  ii)  The  supply  of  utilities  should  be  guaranteed  on 
the  basis  of  contracts  that  reflect  normal  commercial  terms  and  prices  which  are 
generally  available  throughout  the  economy;  iii)  The  land  on  which  facilities  of  the 
company  are  built  should  be  rented  from  the  State  at  conditions  comparable  to  those 
in  an  ME  (e.  g.  Proper  contractual  leases);  iv)  The  company  should  have  the  right  to 
hire  and  dismiss  employees  and  the  right  to  fix  salaries.  73 
The  above  legislation  towards  EIT  shows  that  Australian  anti-dumping  authority  is  fully 
72 
Ibid. 
73 
Ibid. 
211 aware  of  the  important  fact  that  in  the  broad  spectrum  of  economic  development, 
different  sectors  in  EIT  may  be  at  different  economic  development  levels.  Since  the  law 
provides  different  rules  applicable  to  these  different  levels,  it  well  matches  this  feature  of 
the  EIT.  In  addition,  because  it  is  more  specific,  the  anti-dumping  authority  has  less 
discretion  when  it  judges  the  facts  about  dumping.  As  a  result,  it  enables  the  assessment 
of  dumping  towards  imports  from  Chinese  to  be  impartial  and  fair.  This  can  be  perceived 
from  the  following  case  study. 
3.  Case  study 
a.  Brief  introduction  to  the  case. 
This  is  a  recent  Australian  anti-dumping  case  against  imports  from  the  People's  Republic 
of  China.  It  is  a  typical  case  to  analyze  because  the  investigation  was  initiated  soon  after 
the  rules  for  EIT  was  enacted.  Therefore,  it  shows  how  the  Australian  Customs  utilize  the 
updated  legislation  to  determine  the  normal  values  of  imports  from  China  as  a  transitional 
economy,  and  thereafter  arrive  at  a  reasonable  conclusion  in  anti-dumping  investigations. 
On  14  May  2001  Monsanto  Australia  Limited  (Monsanto),  the  predominant 
manufacturer  of  glyphosate  in  Australia,  lodged  a  Customs  application  for  a  dumping 
duty  notice  in  respect  of  glyphosate  exported  to  Australia  from  China.  74  Monsanto 
claimed  that  the  goods  had  caused  material  injury  to  the  Australian  industry  producing 
like  goods.  It  also  claimed  that  the  glyphosate  market  in  China  was  subject  to  price 
control  and  was,,  for  this  and  other  reasons,  unsuitable  to  assess  normal  values  with 
Chinese  domestic  prices.  It  asked  that  Customs  assess  normal  values  using  India  as  an 
analogue  country. 
74  6  Australian  Custorns  Dumping  Notice  -  2002/12  -  Wednesday  27  February  2002,  Customs  Act 
1901  -  part  xvb  Notice  pursuant  to  Section  269TL  Finding  on  Glyphosate  Exported  from  the  People's 
Republic  of  China'.  Available  from 
<Iittp:  //www.  customs.  gov.  aul'site/index.  cfm?  area_id=5&content_id=  13  3972>  (I  December  2002). 
212 Customs  initiated  its  investigation  into  Monsanto's  allegations  on  12  June  2001.  After 
assessing  the  information  submitted  by  Chinese  exporters  and  consulting  with  the 
Chinese  government  and  representatives  of  the  Chinese  glyphosate  industry,  Customs 
concluded  that  the  Chinese  glyphosate  market  was  not  subject  to  price  controls. 
Therefore,  it  decided  that  the  domestic  market  prices  were  suitable  for  assessing  normal 
values.  As  a  result  of  the  investigation,  the  Chinese  products  were  not  dumped,  and  no 
anti-dumping  measure  would  be  taken. 
b.  Detailed  analysis  of  the  procedures  and  methods  taken  to  determine  the 
normal  value  of  the  case. 
i.  Legal  basis. 
In  this  case,  the  legal  basis  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  Chinese  products  include 
Subsection  269TAC(5D),  Subsection  269TAC(5E)  and  Subsection  269TAC(5G)  of  the 
Customs  Act  1901  (Act). 
Subsection  269TAC(5D)  covers  price  control  situations  in  EIT.  Subsection  269TAC(5E) 
of  the  Act  defines  a  price  control  situation  in  relation  to  the  domestic  price  of  like  goods 
as  where  exporters  or other  sellers  of  like  goods  and  the  domestic  prices  of  the  like  goods 
in  the  country  are  controlled  or  substantially  controlled  by  the  government  of  that 
country. 
If  the  domestic  sales  of  like  goods  by  the  exporter  or  other  sellers  in  the  country  of  export 
do  not  exist,  Subsection  269TAC(5D)  of  the  Act  can  not  be  applied.  In  that  case,  Customs 
will  examine  the  source  of  raw  materials  used  in  the  production  of  the  exported  good  and 
their  costs  according  to  269TAC(5G)  of  the  Act.  Where  the  supply  of  raw  materials  used 
in  producing  the  exported  goods  is  affected  by  the  government  of  the  export  country,  and 
the  cost  actually  incurred  by  that  producer  in  procuring  that  raw  material  so  supplied 
exceeds  10  percent  of  the  costs  actually  incurred  by  the  producer  in  producing  the 
213 exported  goods,  the  normal  value  of  the  goods  must  be  constructed  in  accordance  with  the 
method  set  out  in  paragraphs  (f)  to  (h)  of  s.  269TAC(5G)  of  the  Act. 
ii.  Findings  of  the  investigation. 
After  receiving  exporter  questionnaires  from  Chinese  glyphosate  manufacturers  and 
exporters,  Australian  Customs  visited  five  of  them  to  verify  the  information  provided.  It 
also  sought  information  about  the  economic  development  level  of  the  country  and  the 
industry  from  the  Chinese  government  and  various  Chambers  of  Commerce  and  industry 
representative  organisations,  including  MOFTEC  (Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and 
Economic  Cooperation)  and  CCPIT  (China  Council  for  the  Promotion  of  International 
Trade  Sub-Council  of  Chemical  Industry).  Based  on  the  facts,  Customs  arrived  at  the 
following  conclusions. 
-  No  price  control  situation  exists  in  respect  of  China's  domestic  market  for 
agricultural  chemicalS.  75 
-  There  were  insufficient  sales  of  like  goods  on  the  domestic  market  in  China  that 
would  be  relevant  for  determining  normal  values  under  Subsection  269TAC(l)  of 
76 
the  Act. 
-  No  raw  materials  which  accounted  for  more  than  10  percent  of  production  costs 
incurred  in  manufacturing  the  exported  product  were  supplied  by  an  enterprise  that 
was  wholly  owned  by  any  level  of  government.  77 
Therefore,  under  Subsection  269TAC  of  the  Act,  provisions  for  determining  normal 
values  in  respect  of  economies  in  transition  are  not  applicable  in  this  case.  That  is  to  say, 
75  8  (3)(7)  'Customs'  Conclusions  re  price  control',  ibid. 
76  8  (3)(8)  'Domestic  Sales  of  Like  Goods',  ibid. 
77  8  (3)(9),  'Source  of  Significant  Inputs',  ibid. 
114 the  corresponding  methods  for  Market  Economies  will  be  adopted  here.  Customs 
calculated  weighted  average  export  prices  and  normal  values  for  the  five  Chinese 
companies,  and  then  determined  dumping  margins  for  each  of  them.  As  a  result  of  the 
investigation,  four  companies  had  negative  dumping  margins,  and  the  other  had  a  slight 
dumping  margin  of  5.81  percent.  78 
In  addition,  Customs  examined  reasons  for  the  injury  claimed  by  Monsanto  (Monsanto 
Australia  Limited)  in  its  anti-dumping  investigation  application,  and  confirmed  that  it 
was  not  the  alleged  dumped  goods  that  caused  the  material  injury.  Based  on  the  above 
facts,  Customs  recommends  that  the  Minister  shall  not  publish  a  dumping  duty  notice  in 
respect  of  the  goods. 
It  is  noticed  that  Australian  Customs  findings  differ  from  those  of  the  EU  in  its  recent 
investigation  of  alleged  dumping  of  glyphosate  exported  from  China.  The  significant 
difference  in  the  two  findings  is  that  Australian  Customs  used  information  verified  in 
China  to  establish  normal  values  and  the  EU  used  an  analogue  (surrogate)  country.  This 
difference  arose  as  a  result  of  differences  between  relevant  EU  and  Australian  legislation 
in  respect  of  the  treatment  of  economies  in  transition. 
Both  the  Australian  and  EU  authorities  will  examine  the  economic  status  of  relevant 
Chinese  companies  respectively  before  they  determine  the  method  to  calculate  normal 
value  of  Chinese  imports  concerned.  However,  the  Australian  Customs  have  a  better  and 
correct  understanding  of  this  issue.  It  can  be  shown  by  another  case  study. 
A  very  important  factor  to  assess  the  economic  status  of  a  company  is  substantial 
interference  by  government  or  state.  In  this  case,  a  Chinese  joint  venture  Is  investment  up 
to  Renminbi  (RMB)  50m  was  approved  by  the  provincial  government,  over  RMB  200m 
78 
fii  74  at  p  25. 
215 by  the  State  Council  and  RMB  50m  to  RMB  200m  by  State  Planning  and  Development 
Commission.  The  Customs  found  out  through  investigation  that  these  approvals  only 
related  to  investment  and  did  not  restrict  production  quantities.  For  approval  of 
investment  the  parties  must  submit  a  business  plan.  Such  a  business  plan  may  include 
projected  production,  but  did  not  restrict  production.  The  purpose  of  the  plan  was  to 
demonstrate  that  the  proposed  investment  was  sound.  Based  on  this  fact,  it  did  not 
become  the  barrier  for  the  joint  venture  to  obtained  MET  in  the  antýdumping 
investigation. 
However,  such  an  approval  of  investment  by  the  state  may  lead  to  different  judgement 
under  the  EU  institutions.  It  can  be  regarded  as  substantial  state  interference  and  NME 
behaviour  by  the  EU  according  to  its  conventional  practice  towards  Chinese  exporters. 
Therefore,  the  joint  venture's  application  for  MET  is  likely  to  be  rejected  by  the  EU.  That 
is  to  say,  prices  from  a  third  ME  rather  than  the  domestic  sales  prices  will  be  used  to 
determine  the  normal  value  of  the  joint  venture's  exports.  Afterwards,  a  very  high 
anti-dumping  duty  will  be  imposed  following  the  artificially  maximized  dumping  margin 
as  the  result  of  the  investigation. 
From  the  above  case  analysis,  we  can  perceive  the  most  important  differences  between 
the  Australian  and  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  towards  the  People's  Republic  of 
China.  The  former  has  more  detailed  and  reasonable  provisions  to  determine  normal 
values  of  imports  from  China.  Therefore,  its  authorities  (Customs)  enjoy  less  discretion 
when  determining  dumping  and  injury  in  an  anti-dumping  investigation.  Besides, 
Customs  calculate  dumping  margins  for  each  exporter  concerned,  which  means  that 
individual  treatment  is  applied  in  every  case.  All  of  these  can  meet  the  needs  in  reality,  i.  e. 
the  great  complexity  of  anti-dumping  cases  involving  economies  in  transition.  Therefore, 
compared  with  the  EU  law,  the  Australian  legislation  ensures  a  more  accurate  and  fair 
judgement  of  dumping  and  injury  in  such  anti-dw-nping  investigations. 
216 D.  New  Zealand 
Unlike  the  EU,  New  Zealand  has  removed  specific  provisions  determining  normal  values 
of  imports  from  NMEs  and  EIT.  Recognizing  the  dramatic  progress  gained  in  economic 
reforms  of  these  countries  in  the  past  decades,  New  Zealand  considers  it  difficult  to  meet 
the  conditions  provided  in  the  Interpretative  Note  2  79  to  paragraph  I  of  Article  VI  of 
GATT  1994.  Therefore,  in  case  of  domestic  prices  or  factor  costs  of  the  products 
concerned  might  not  be  based  on  market  considerations,  standard  provisions  of  the 
Dumping  Act  will  be  applied  case  by  case.  On  a  few  occasions,  price  and  cost 
information  from  analogue  countries  might  still  be  used  where  exports  from  an  NME  is 
under  anti-dumping  investigation.  However,  such  a  situation  will  be  the  exception  rather 
than  the  rule  . 
80  Besides,  in  cases  of  recent  years,  81  Chinese  companies  were  granted 
individual  treatment  by  the  New  Zealand  authority  automatically.  Thus,  dumping 
margins  of  dumped  goods  are  calculated  on  an  individual  basis.  In  addition,  the  authority 
pays  great  attention  to  explore  the  exact  reasons  of  depression  of  its  domestic  industry  in 
anti-dumping  investigations,  so  that  the  injury  caused  by  dumped  goods  can  be  examined 
properly. 
All  of  these  are  helpful  to  get  an  accurate  assessment  of  dumping  facts  without 
overestimating  them  in  anti-dumping  investigations.  Therefore,  they  bring  out 
79GATT  Ad  Art.  VI  Paragraph  1.2  provides:  'It  is  recognized  that,  in  the  case  of  imports  from  a  country 
which  has  a  complete  or  substantially  complete  monopoly  of  its  trade  and  where  all  domestic  prices  are 
fixed  by  the  State,  special  difficulties  may  exist  in  determining  price  comparability  for  the  purposes  of 
paragraph  1,  and  in  such  cases  importing  contracting  parties  may  find  it  necessary  to  take  into  account 
the  possibility  that  a  strict  comparison  with  domestic  prices  in  such  a  country  may  not  always  be 
appropriate' 
80  Anti-Dumping  Law  and  Practice  in  New  Zealand',  fn  16  above. 
81  Glass,  Clear  Float;  from  China,  Indonesia  and  Thailand'  (New  Zealand  anti-dumping  case, 
completed  on  12  May  1998),  <http:  //www.  med.  govt.  nz/busIt/trade_rem/reports/gIass.  htm1>  (I 
December  2002). 
'Lead  Acid  Batteries  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China',  (New  Zealand  anti-dumping  case, 
completed  on  22  July  1999),  <http:  //www.  med.  govt.  nzlbusIt/trade_rem/reports/cbatterm.  htmI>  (I 
December  2002). 
217 completely  different  judgments  towards  Chinese  companies,  which  shows  the  very 
difference  between  New  Zealand  and  the  EU  anti-dumping  legislation  towards  NMEs 
and  EIT.  It  will  be  illustrated  further  in  the  following  case. 
Case  Study. 
This  is  a  New  Zealand  anti-dumping  case  against  imports  from  the  People's  Republic  of 
China.  During  the  investigation,  the  authority  specifically  examined  Chinese  domestic 
cement  market  and  concluded  that  it  is  not  significantly  affected  by  the  government  at  any 
level.  Therefore,  it  is  a  typical  case  to  show  how  the  New  Zealand  authority  of  today 
determines  the  normal  values  of  the  Chinese  products  according  to  the  latter's  economic 
status  as  a  transitional  economy.  As  a  result  of  such  practice,  the  authority  is  able  to  get  a 
right  conclusion  of  dumping  facts  in  anti-dumping  investigations. 
1.  Brief  introduction  to  the  case. 
On  8  October  1997,  Golden  Bay  and  Milburn  (the  New  Zealand  Portland  Cement 
industry)  submitted  an  anti-dumping  investigation  application  to  the  Ministry  of 
Commerce.  It  stated  that  imports  of  Portland  cement  from  China  were  being  dumped,  and 
threatening  to  cause  material  injury  to  the  New  Zealand  industry.  82 
In  accordance  with  section  10  of  the  Dumping  and  Countervailing  Duties  Act  1988  ("the 
Act"),  on  20  November  1997,  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  formally  initiated  an 
investigation.  Both  the  existence  and  effect  of  the  alleged  dumping  of  Portland  cement 
from  China  were  found  as  a  result.  Therefore,  the  New  Zealand  industry  requested  in  its 
application  that  provisional  measures  be  imposed.  However,  on  18  February  1998  the 
Minister  of  Commerce  declined  the  request  on  the  ground  that  action  under  section  16 
was  not  necessary  to  prevent  material  injury  being  caused  during  the  remaining  period  of 
82,  Portland  Cement  from  China',  (New  Zealand  anti-dumping  case,  completed  on  14  May  1998), 
<http:  //www.  med.  govt.  nz/buslt/trade_rem/chinacement/final/index. 
html>  (I  December  2002). 
218 the  investigation,  and  even  further  imports  were  unlikely  to  cause  material  injury  to  the 
New  Zealand  industry  during  this  period.  Consequently,  no  anti-dumping  measures  were 
taken  towards  imports  from  China. 
2.  Methods  taken  to  determine  the  normal  value  of  Chinese  products  in  the  case. 
During  the  anti-dumping  investigation,  the  authority  found  the  following  facts:  first,  sales 
of  Portland  cement  on  the  Chinese  domestic  market  are  not  set  or  influenced  by  the 
Government  (at  any  level),  and  that  prices  are  established  according  to  the  market. 
Second,  sales  are  not  made  at  a  loss,  and  are  made  in  sufficient  quantities  to  be  used  to 
establish  normal  values.  Based  on  above  points,  Normal  values  are  determined  in 
accordance  with  section  5  of  the  Act  which  states  (inter  alia)  as  follows: 
Subject  to  this  section,  for  the  purposes  of  this  Act,  the  normal  value  of  any  goods 
imported  or  intended  to  be  imported  into  New  Zealand  shall  be  the  price  paid  for  like 
goods  sold  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade  for  home  consumption  in  the  country  of 
export  in  sales  that  are  arm's  length  transactions  by  the  exporter  or,  if  like  goods  are 
not  so  sold  by  the  exporter,  by  other  sellers  of  like  goods. 
Therefore,  the  domestic  sales  prices  of  Chinese  cement  were  adopted  to  calculate  the 
normal  values  and  dumping  margins.  Dumping  margins  have  been  calculated  on  a  per 
tonne  basis  for  cement  packed  in  40kg  bags  and  in  one  tonne  bags  for  the  export  shipment 
made  to  New  Zealand  during  the  period  of  investigation  of  I  October  1996  to  30 
September  1997.  As  a  result,  the  cement  in  40kg  bags  was  found  to  be  dumped  with  a 
dumping  margin,  i.  e.  5  percent  of  export  price. 
However,  in  the  injury  investigation,  the  New  Zealand  authority  concluded  that  there  is 
no  evidence  that  material  injury  is  being  threatened  as  a  result  of  the  probable  volume 
effects  of  further  imports.  There  is  evidence  of  a  likely  loss  of  market  share,  decline  in 
219 profits,  a  reduction  in  utilization  of  production  capacity,  a  decline  in  employment  levels, 
and  a  reduction  of  cash  flow,  but  the  likely  impact  is  not  so  significant  as  to  threaten 
material  injury.  Therefore,  no  anti-dumping  measure  was  taken  towards  the  Chinese 
goods. 
In  this  case,  methods  that  the  New  Zealand  authority  adopted  to  determine  the  normal 
value  of  imports  from  China  is  high-lighted,  because  it  is  crucial  to  determine  the  dumping 
margin  and  assess  the  actual  effect  of  the  dumped  goods  on  the  New  Zealand  industry. 
After  making  sure  of  the  non-  interference  from  government  to  Chinese  domestic  cement 
market,  the  authority  applied  MET  to  determine  normal  values  and  dumping  margins  of 
the  goods  concerned.  Consequently,  the  effects  of  the  dumped  goods  to  New  Zealand 
industry  were  assessed  in  a  proper  manner,  and  no  anti-dumping  measure  was  taken. 
On  the  contrary,  if  it  were  the  EU  who  would  decide  this  case,  it  would  make  a 
completely  different  judgement  towards  Chinese  companies.  According  to  its  routine 
practice,  it  is  likely  to  adopt  the  analogue  country  method  (i.  e.  refer  to  the  domestic  sales 
prices  of  a  third  ME)  to  calculate  the  normal  values  of  Chinese  goods.  As  a  result,  normal 
values  and  dumping  margins  of  the  imports  concerned  can  be  artificially  enhanced.  Thus, 
the  injury  caused  by  the  dumped  goods  will  be  maximized.  In  the  meantime,  under  'one 
country  one  duty'  principle  of  the  EU,  a  unified  and  high  anti-dumping  duty  will  be 
imposed  on  all  Chinese  companies  related  to  the  dumped  goods. 
E.  Japan:  less  stringent  and  more  practical  approach  towards  Chinese 
exports. 
Japan  1)  s  anti-dumping  policy  towards  NMEs  seems  similar  to  that  of  the  EU  in  words. 
However,,  there  are  two  significant  differences  in  practice. 
First,  unlike  the  EU,  Japan  does  not  frequently  apply  its  antýdumping  instrument  as  a 
protectionist  measure  for  its  domestic  industry  against  imports  from  NMEs.  Though 
220 Japan  compiled  its  anti-dumping  law  a  long  time  ago,  it  seldom  uses  it.  Up  to  I  June  200  1. 
only  six  anti-dumping  petitions  had  been  filed  against  foreign  products,  and  three  of  them 
were  finally  withdrawn.  83 
Second,  the  Japanese  authorities  in  practice  adopt  fairly  flexible  methods  to  assess 
normal  values  of  imports  from  transitional  economies  like  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
This  can  be  seen  in  the  following  case. 
Both  of  the  two  facts  bring  out  quite  different  outcomes  of  the  legislation  of  Japan  and  the 
EU  with  regard  to  their  anti-dumping  measures  taken  towards  EIT. 
Ferro-  si  I  ico-manganese  was  the  first  case  leading  to  anti-dumping  measures  by  the 
Japanese  government.  84  It  is  also  a  typical  case  which  can  show  how  the  Japanese 
government  determines  normal  value  of  imports  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China  as  a 
transitional  economy. 
1.  Brief  introduction  to  the  Ferro-silico-manganese  case. 
On  8  October  199  1,  the  Japanese  Ferro-Alloy  Association  initiated  anti-dumping 
petitions  against  ferro-silico-manganese  imported  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China, 
the  Kingdom  of  Norway  and  the  Republic  of  South  Africa,  because  the  Japanese  industry 
of  ferro-silico-manganese  argued  that  it  was  threatened  by  the  low  priced  imports.  The 
anti-dumping  investigation  was  carried  out  on  29  November  1991.  As  a  result  of  a 
positive  dumping  finding,  anti-dumping  measures  were  taken  towards  different  Chinese 
companies  respectively. 
2.  Method  to  calculate  the  normal  value  of  imports  from  Chinese  companies- 
83  'WTO  Anti  -Dumping  Statistics',  fn  19  above. 
84  Ministry  of  Finance,  Customs  Weekly  Reports,  12  February  1993,  No  2089,  pp.  1-3. 
221 conditional  MET 
In  the  process  of  the  dumping  investigation,  the  Japanese  government  determined  the 
normal  value  of  the  Chinese  products  with  the  same  method  applicable  to  MEs  (i.  e.  use 
domestic  price)  due  to  two  facts.  85 
-  Ferro-silico-manganese  is  one  of  the  'free  items'  exempt  from  State  control. 
-  Though  Chinese  producers  concerned  are  province-owned  or  collective-corporate 
operated,  they  decide  the  sales  prices  and  pay  a  corporate  tax  independently. 
After  an  on-the-spot  investigation,  the  Japanese  authority  considered  the  direct  domestic 
sales  prices  were  reliable.  Therefore,  normal  value  of  the  imported 
ferro-silico-manganese  was  calculated  at  a  direct  sales  level  from  producers  to  domestic 
users  in  China. 
3.  Methods  to  determine  dumping  margin  and  anti-dumping  duty  rates  - 
individual  treatment. 
Since  the  domestic  sales  prices  adopted  to  calculate  the  normal  value  were  different  and 
were  supplied  by  several  Chinese  exporters,  the  Japanese  authority  determined  dumping 
margin  and  duty  rates  for  those  companies  respectively.  Here,  different  methods  were 
taken  towards  three  groups  of  Chinese  exporters. 
a.  Considering  seven  Chinese  exporters  who  have  cooperated  to  supply  information 
during  the  investigation,  anti-dumping  dutY  rates  were  determined  on  an  individual 
basis,  i.  e.  4.5-19.1  percent 
b.  As  to  non-co-operators,  dumping  margins  and  duty  rates  were  based  on  best  available 
85  Norio  Komuro,  'Japan's  First  Anti-Dumping  Measures  in  the  Ferro-  Si  li  co-Managanese  Case', 
1993)  27  J.  W.  T.,  6  at  p  18. 
222 information,  which  exceeded  the  highest  rates  in  the  former  case,  i.  e.  27.2  percent. 
c.  As  to  new  producers  who  began  to  manufacture  the  same  products  after  the 
anti-dumping  investigation,  dumping  margin  was  the  weighted  average  margin  for 
co-operators  in  the  first  case,  i.  e.  8.9  percent. 
Here,  the  method  adopted  by  the  Japanese  government  to  determine  normal  value  and 
dumping  margin  of  the  Chinese  products  is  noticeable,  because  the  EU  would  take 
different  methodology  in  that  case.  The  ownership  of  the  Chinese  producers  concerned 
(province-owned  and  collective-corporate  operated)  will  become  the  trigger  for  the  EU  to 
apply  traditional  NME  treatment  to  them  mechanically.  In  EU  practice,  the  normal  value 
of  the  Chinese  products  will  be  calculated  with  the  domestic  price  paid  (or  the  export 
price  to  third  countries)  of  like  products  in  an  analogue  market-economy  country.  A 
maximized  dumping  margin  is  likely  to  appear  afterwards,  and  then  a  single  high 
anti-dumping  duty  will  be  imposed  on  all  relevant  Chinese  producers. 
Compared  with  the  EU,  the  methods  taken  by  the  Japanese  authority  have  brought  out  an 
accurate  and  fair  outcome  in  this  case.  In  addition,  since  dumping  margins  for 
non-co-operators  are  based  on  the  best  information  available,  and  they  are  higher  than 
those  of  cooperating  exporters,  it  will  actually  encourage  foreign  exporters  to  cooperate 
in  future  anti-dumping  investigations.  All  of  these  show  the  significant  differences 
between  Japan  and  the  EU's  anti-dumping  policy  against  imports  from  transitional 
economies  like  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
223 V.  Different  methodologies  to  determine  anti-dumping  duty  rates 
for  dumped  Chinese  exporters. 
A.  The  EU's  one  country  one  duty  rule  and  individual  treatment. 
The  EU's  anti-dumping  Regulation  stipulates  that  in  the  cases  of  imports  from  NMEs,  a 
single  average  rate  of  duty  is  applied  to  all  imports  from  that  country.  86  In  practice  since 
the  early  1990s,  the  Commission  has  stressed  repeatedly  that  in  anti-dumping 
proceedings  with  regard  to  imports  from  NMEs,  it  will  generally  impose  a  single 
anti-dumping  duty  on  all  exports  from  such  countries  on  a  country-by-country  basis.  87 
Due  to  the  favourable  progress  gained  in  the  economic  reform  of  original  NMEs  such  as 
the  People's  Republic  of  China,  the  EU  provided  conditional  individual  treatment.  If  an 
NME  exporter  can  meet  the  criteria  of  the  treatment  to  show  that  its  export  activities  are 
not  subject  to  state  interference,  its  anti-dumping  duty  will  be  determined  on  an 
individual  basis  according  to  its  export  price.  The  latest  legislation  was  updated  in 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002 
. 
88  It  sets  five  criteria  for  the  conditional 
individual  treatment. 
(a)  in  the  case  of  wholly  or  partly  foreign  owned  firms  or  joint  ventures,  exporters  are 
free  to  repatriate  capital  and  profits; 
(b)  export  prices  and  quantities,  and  conditions  and  terms  of  sale  are  freely  determined; 
(c)  the  majority  of  the  shares  belong  to  private  persons.  State  officials  appearing  on  the 
86  Art.  9  (5),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98. 
87  Jianyu  Wang,  fn  65  above  at  p  123. 
88  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002  of  5  November  2002  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
384/96  on  the  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European 
Community.  OJ  2002  L305/1- 
224 board  of  Directors  or  holding  key  management  positions  shall  either  be  in  minority  or 
it  must  be  demonstrated  that  the  company  is  nonetheless  sufficiently  independent  from 
state  interference; 
(d)  exchange  rate  conversions  are  carried  out  at  the  market  rate;  and 
(e)  State  interference  is  not  such  as  to  permit  circumvention  of  measures  if  individual 
exporters  are  given  different  rates  of  duty.  89 
The  conditional  individual  treatment  seems  to  be  much  more  flexible  and  reasonable  than 
the  one  country  one  duty  rule.  However,  even  the  EU  itself  admit  that  the  criteria  of  the 
treatment  are  so  strict  that  very  few  exporters  has  been  granted  the  treatment  in  practice 
since  the  method  was  stipulated.  Under  the  regime,  within  three  years  since  the  method 
was  firstly  provided  in  1997,  only  3  out  of  27  Chinese  companies  qualified  for  individual 
treatment.  90  Therefore,  it  is  applied  as  an  exception  rather  than  a  general  rule. 
Furthermore,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002  explicitly  provides  that  only 
wholly  or  partly  foreign  owned  firms  or  joint  ventures  are  eligible  to  apply  for  the 
individual  treatment.  This,  compared  with  the  corresponding  legislation  of  the  U.  S., 
Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan,  is  an  additional  requirement  which  is  far  from 
reasonable. 
B.  The  U.  S.  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan's  individual  treatment  for 
imports  from  NMEs  or  transitional  economies. 
Unlike  the  EU,  the  U.  S.  adopts  individual  treatment  towards  NMEs  in  a  more  flexible  and 
realistic  way.  Once  a  company  from  an  NNIE  can  demonstrate  that  it  operates 
89  Art.  1(6),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002. 
90  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  protection  against 
dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*  COM/2000/03  6-3  )  final 
-  ACC  2000/0160  */  pp.  3,5  &  13. 
225 independently  and  is  free  of  government  control  from  both  law  and  fact  aspects,  its 
anti-dumping  duty  will  be  determined  by  the  U.  S.  authorities  on  an  individual  basis.  As  a 
result,  towards  imports  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  the  U.  S.  grants  individual 
treatment  almost  in  every  case,  including  Chinese  state-owned  enterprises.  9' 
In  the  Silicon  Carbide  case,  92  the  U.  S.  anti-dumping  authorities  made  an  investigation  of 
both  law  and  facts,  and  concluded  that  ownership  by  all  the  people  is  not  synonymous  to 
central  government  control.  The  state-controlled  companies  concerned  were  no  longer 
subject  to  government  control  in  law  or  in  fact.  Therefore,  they  were  granted  individual 
treatment. 
Following  the  idea,  recognizing  the  changes  gained  in  China's  economic  reform,  the  rule 
of  individual  treatment  has  been  confirmed  in  numerous  U.  S.  anti-dumping  cases.  On  the 
contrary,  the  EU  authorities  have  systematically  refused  to  grant  individual  treatment  to 
Chinese  exporters,  even  to  China-foreign  joint  ventures.  From  this  point  of  view,  we  can 
see  that  though  both  the  U.  S.  and  the  EU  have  similar  provision  for  individual  treatment 
in  law,  the  way  they  apply  it  makes  a  significant  difference  to  the  outcomes. 
As  to  other  developed  countries  such  as  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan,  their 
anti-dumping  authorities  grant  individual  treatment  automatically  to  Chinese  exports  to 
determine  their  respective  duty  rate  in  anti-dumping  proceedings. 
From  the  above  analysis,  it  is  apparent  that  the  EU  adopts  an  overly  strict  approach  to 
apply  individual  treatment  to  Chinese  exporters.  It  not  only  unreasonably  exerts  an  extra 
burden  of  proof  on  them,  but  also  is  likely  to  bring  out  rather  high  an&dumping  duty  as  a 
result  of  the  investigation. 
91  JIanyu  Wang,  fn  65  above  at  p  139. 
92  Silicon  carbide  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  U.  S.  Federal  Register,  Vol.  59,2  May  1994,  p. 
22587. 
226 Conclusion. 
This  chapter  compares  the  anti-dumping  legislation  (towards  NMEs  and  EIT)  of  the  EU 
and  the  U.  S.,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan.  It  indicates  the  differences  between  the 
EU  and  the  other  four  countries'  anti-dumping  rules  by  analysing  them  from  both  legal  and 
practical  aspects  (see  Table  5.1).  It  particularly  focuses  on  the  different  methods  and 
attitudes  that  these  countries  take  when  they  determine  normal  values  and  anti-dumping 
duties  towards  the  People's  Republic  of  China  as  a  transitional  economy  in  anti-dumping 
investigations. 
Table  5.1.  Summary  of  the  different  approaches  to  anti-dumping  legislation  applicable  to 
China. 
Country  EU  U.  S.  Australia  N  Z93  Japan 
Determination  of  Default 
94  ACM95  CVM+SCM  ACM  MET  SCM 
Normal  Value  Exception 
96  MET  MET  MET 
97  MET 
98 
Determination  of  Default  OCODR  IT  IT  IT  IT 
AD  duty  Exception  IT 
In  summary,  compared  with  the  EU,  the  U.  S.  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan  have 
adopted  less  stringent  but  more  practical  approach  towards  imports  from  China  through 
93  N.  Z:  New  Zealand. 
94  If  Chinese  exporters  do  not  apply  or  fail  to  reach  certain  criteria,  such  a  methodology  will  be  applied 
automatically. 
95  ACM:  analogue  country  method;  SCM:  surrogate  country  method;  CVM:  constructed  value  method; 
MET:  market  economy  treatment;  OCODR:  one  country  one  duty  rule;  IT:  individual  treatment. 
96  Exception  here  means  those  methods  applied  as  exceptions  rather  than  rules  by  anti-dumping 
authorities,  because  exporters  bear  the  burden  of  proof,  and  it  is  very  difficult  for  them  to  meet  the 
criteria. 
97  Under  Australian  anti-dumping  law,  Chinese  exporters  bear  the  burden  of  proof  to  get  MET. 
However,  the  law  provides  more  specific  and  practical  criteria  so  that  most  Chinese  exporters  can  get 
MET  in  investigations  of  recent  years. 
98  Japanese  anti-dumping  law  does  not  grant  MET  to  Chinese  exporters  automatically.  However, 
Japanese  authority  adopts  a  more  flexible  and  less  stringent  approach  to  assess  Chinese  exporters 
econornic  status  in  anti-dumping  proceedings. 
227 their  anti-dumping  legislation. 
1.  They  have  much  more  detailed  provisions  in  anti-dumping  investigations,  which 
match  the  complexity  of  the  broad  spectrum  of  transitional  economies.  That  is  to  say, 
under  the  law,  normal  values  of  exports  from  specific  industries  which  developed  at 
an  advanced  economic  level  in  a  transitional  economy  can  be  determined  with  more 
accuracy. 
2.  They  have  more  substantive  and  procedural  rules  regulating  their  authority's  practice 
in  anti-dumping  investigations.  The  authorities  are  endowed  with  less  discretion  while 
determining  dumping  and  injury.  According  to  the  laws,  they  are  required  to  examine 
more  essential  facts  before  reaching  a  conclusion,  and  this  brings  out  a  more  accurate 
and  reasonable  judgement  in  anti-dumping  investigations. 
3.  They  apply  the  new  approaches  99  to  Chinese  exports  more  often  than  the  EU  at  least 
from  a  statistical  point  of  view.  In  other  words,  the  new  treatment  is  adopted  by  these 
four  countries  as  a  rule  rather  than  exceptions  in  practice.  As  a  result,  more  Chiriese 
companies  have  been  granted  MET  and  individual  treatment  in  anti-dumping 
investigations.  This  fact  shows  that  the  amended  law  actually  meets  its  target,  i.  e.  to 
match  the  favourable  changes  achieved  in  China's  economic  reform. 
In  short,  this  chapter  makes  an  effort  to  understand  the  most  appropriate  approaches  to 
determine  normal  values  and  dumping  duties  for  Chinese  exports  in  anti-dumping 
investigations.  Therefore,  by  analyzing  other  developed  countries'  antiýdumping  policy 
towards  China,  it  provides  a  necessary  and  comprehensive  study  for  the  conclusion  of 
this  thesis,  which  will  set  out  proposals  on  certain  key  issues  in  the  EU's  current 
anti-dumping  legislation  applicable  to  exports  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
99  i.  e.  conditional  MET  and  individual  treatment. 
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Table  5.2.  Anti-Dumping:  Initiations:  by  reporting  party  from  01/01/95  to  30/06/01 
Reporting  Party  1995  19961  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Totals 
Argentina  27  221  15  8  24  45  10  151 
Australia  5  171  42  13  241  15  to  126 
Brazil  5  18  11  18  16  11  3  82 
Canada  11  5  14  8  18  21  23  100 
Chile  4  3  0  2  0  5  0  14 
Colombia  4  1  1  6  2  3  0  17 
Costa  Rica  0  4  1  1  0  0  0  6 
Czech  Republic  0  0  0  2  1  0  0  3 
Ecuador  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1 
Egypt  0  0  7  12  5  1  0  25 
European  Community  33  25  41  22  65  31  13  230 
Guatemala  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1 
India  6  21  13  27  65  41  16  189 
Indonesia  0  11  5  8  10  3  1  38 
Israel  5  6  3  7  0  1  2  24 
Japan  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  2 
Korea,  Rep.  of  4  13  15  3  6  2  3  46 
Malaysia  3  2  8  1  2  0  0  16 
Mexico  4  4  6  12  11  7  1  45 
New  Zealand  10  4  5  1  4  10  1  35 
Nicaragua  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  2 
Panama  0  0  0  2  0  0  0 
Peru  2  7  2  3  8  1  0  23 
Philippines  1  1  2  3  6  2  0  15 
Poland  0  0  1  0  7  0  0 
229 Reporting  Party  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Totals 
Sl  i  -  -  oven  a  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
S  th  Af  i  ou  r  ca  16  33  23  41  16  1  21  5  155 
Th  il  d  a  an  0  1  3  0  01  0  1  5 
T  i  id  -  r  n  ad  and  To  ago  0  1  0  4  31  1  0 
Turkey  0  0  4  1  8  2  1  16 
U.  S.  14  22  15  36  47  47  39  220 
Uruguay  0  0  0  0  01  1  2  3 
Venezuela  3  21  6  10  7  1  30 
Totals  for  01/01/95  -  30/06/01  157  224'1  243  2541  356  272  134 
Source:  WTO  Secretariat.  100 
Table  5.3  Anti-dumping  (AD)  investigations  V  measures  taken  by  European  Union, 
United  States,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan  towards  imports  from  China  during  I 
January  1995-  30  June  2002. 
Importing  country  AD  investigations  launched  Definitive  measures  taken 
European  Union  38  25 
United  States  37  32 
Australia  14  3 
New  Zealand  4  0 
Japan  0  0 
Sources:  WTO  Reports  on  anti-dumping  (G/ADP/N  series).  WTO  trade  data.  Author's 
computations. 
100  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Statistics,  fn  19  above. 
230 Table  5.4  New  definitive  anti-dumping  measures  (exclude  reviews)  taken  and 
undertakings  accepted  during  I  January  1998  -  31  December  2002  against  imports 
from  China  by  European  Union,  United  States,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan. 
I  ti  P  d  ,  mpor  ng 
countries 
ro  uct  Date  of 
initiation 
Definitive  duty  Effective 
date 
European  Steel  ropes  and  cables  20.05.99--  60.4%  17.08.99 
Union  Hot-rolled  flat  products  of 
non-alloy  steel 
13.05.99  8.1%  net 
free-at-Cty-frontier 
price  , 
before  duty 
10.08.2000 
Malleable  cast  iron  tube  or  pipe 
fittings 
29.05.99  49.4%  18.08.2000 
Electronic  weighing  scales  16.09.99  0-30.7%  30.11.2000 
Coke  of  coal  in  pieces  with 
diameter  of  more  than  80  mm 
16.09.99  equal  to  fixed  amount 
of  EUR  32.6  per  tonne 
of  dry  net  weight 
15.12.2000 
Aluminium  foil 
' 
18.02.2000 
- 
15%  17.05.2001 
Colour  television  receivers  71 
. 
04.2000  24,5-44,6%, 
undertakings  accepted 
29.08.2002 
integrated  electronic  compact 
fluorescent  lamps 
17-05-2000  0,0-66,1%  19.07.2001 
Ferro-molybdenum  9.11.2000  22.5%  6.2.2002 
Zinc  oxides  20.12.2000  6-28%  5.3.2002 
Sulphanilic  acid  6.7.2001  21%  25.7.2002 
United  States  Preserved  Mushrooms  02.02.98  154-198%  19.02.99 
Creatine  Monohydrate  10.03.99  0.00-50.32%  04.02.00 
Aspirin  23.06.99  16.51-144.02%  11.07.00 
Cold-Rolled  Carbon  Steel  Plate  25.06.99  20.64-23.54%  27.09.00 
Concentrated  Apple  Juice  06.07.99  0.00-51.74%  05.06.00 
Synthetic  Indigo  28.07.99  79.7-129.6%  19.06.00 
Steel  Concrete  Reinforcing  Bars  25-7.2000  133.00%  07.09.01 
Foundry  Coke  17.10-00  76.19-214.89%  17.09.01 
Honey  26.10.00  25.88-183.80%  10.12.01 
Certain  Hot-Rolled  Carbon 
Steel  Flat  Products 
04.12.00  64.20-90.83%  29.11.01 
Pure  Magnesium  14.11.00  24.67-305.56%  19.11.01 
Folding  Gift  Boxes  19.03.01  1.67-164.75%  08.01.02 
Automotive  Replacement  Glass 
Windshields 
27.03.01  3.71-124.50%  04.04.02 
Folding  Metal  Tables  and 
Chairs 
24.05.01  0.00-70.71%  27.06.02 
Structural  Steel  Beams  20.06.01  15.23-89.17%  18.06.02 
Certain  Circular  Welded  Carbon 
Quality  Steel  Pipe 
21.06.01  0.00-36.42%  24.05.02 
Cold-Rolled  Carbon  Steel  Flat 
Products 
26.10.01  105.35%  03.10.02 
Ferrovanadium  26.12.01  13.03-66.71%  29.11.02 
Australia  Steel  shelving  kits  15.09.00  38-114%  03.10.01 
Sodium  metabisulfide  12.09.01  83%  04.06.02 
New  Zealand 
1 
-3  No  new  anti-dumping  measure  was  taken  towards  China  during  I  January  1998 
December  2002. 
231 Japan  No  new  anti-dumping  measure  was  taken  towards  China  during  I  January  1998-31 
December  2002. 
Sources:  WTO  Reports  on  anti-dumping  (G/ADPN  series).  WTO  trade  data.  Author's 
computations. 
232 Chapter  Six 
New  Issues  with  regard  to  the  EU's  Anti-Dumping 
Practice  towards  Imports  from  China  after  the 
Latter's  accession  to  the  VffO 
Introduction 
Anti-dumping  decisions  of  the  European  Union  (EU)  are  made  by  the  European 
Commission  and  Council.  Under  Article  230  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  has  the  jurisdiction  to  review  the  legality  of 
acts  of  the  Council  and  the  Commission.  An  application  can  be  lodged  by  a  Member  State, 
the  Council  or  the  Commission  on  grounds  of  lack  of  competence,  infringement  of  an 
essential  procedural  requirement,  infringement  of  the  Treaty  or  of  any  rule  of  law  relating 
to  its  application,  or  misuse  of  powers.  If  a  measure  is  of  direct  and  individual  concern  to 
a  natural  or  legal  person,  he  can  challenge  it  before  the  Court  as  well.  ' 
In  the  field  of  anti-dumping,  the  Court  of  First  Instance  has  jurisdiction  to  hear  such 
2 
applications.  Therefore,  before  China  entered  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO),  if 
there  was  any  dispute  relating  to  the  EU's  anti-dumping  measures  imposed  on  Chinese 
exports,  these  decisions  could  be  challenged  before  the  Court  of  First  Instance  by  Chinese 
exporters,  European  importers  or  complainants  under  Article  23  0.3 
I  Para.  I  of  Art.  230  (ex  Art.  173),  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community. 
2  Ivo  Van  Bael  &  Jean-Francois  Bellis,  Anti-Dumping  and  other  Trade  Protection  Laws  of  the  EC  3rd 
edn.  (Bicester:  CCH  Europe,  1996)  at  p  10. 
3,  The  case  law  of  the  Court  has  now  developed  to  the  point  where  it  may  be  said  that,  as  a  general  rule, 
complainants,  exporters  and  importers  have  standing  under  Article  173',  Ivo  Van  Bael  & 
Jean-Francois  Bellis.  fn  2  above  at  p  330. 
233 Since  the  first  anti-dumping  investigation  against  Chinaý  was  initiated  by  the  EU  in 
August  1979,  six  measures  relating  to  Chinese  exports  have  been  challenged  before  the 
Court  of  First  Instance.  Among  these  cases,  two  were  brought  by  European  importers 
against  the  European  Commission  and  the  Council,  and  the  contested  Regulations  were 
declared  to  be  invalid  in  both  cases.  5  However,  as  to  the  other  four  measures  challenged 
by  Chinese  exporters  (including  two  Hong  Kong  exporters),  6  all  of  them  failed. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  only  cases  brought  by  European  exporters  have  been 
successful,  and  it  could  be  argued  therefore  that  the  Court  reflects  the  trade  interests  of  the 
EU  itself.  It  is  also  recognized  that,  in  practice,  the  Court  is  unwilling  to  interfere  in  the 
7 
detailed  determinations  of  the  Commission  and  the  Council. 
China  entered  the  WTO  on  II  December  200  1.  This  changes  the  processes  and 
procedures  of  the  settlement  of  anti-dumping  disputes  with  EU,  because  now  China  is 
entitled  to  the  rights  for  WTO  developing  country  Members.  In  the  context  of  WTO 
membership,  new  issues  and  disputes  may  arise  with  regard  to  the  EU's  antimdumping 
practice.  First,  under  the  WTO  trade  and  legal  system,  the  EU  bears  the  obligation  in 
anti-dumping  proceedings  to  treat  China  in  a  way  consistent  with  the  GATT  and  WTO 
laws  from  both  a  procedural  and  substantive  prospectives.  Second,  China  enjoys  the 
4  80/1116/EEC:  Commission  Decision  of  4  December  1980  accepting  undertakings  offered  by  the 
exporters  of  saccharin  and  its  salts  originating  in  China  and  the  United  States  of  America  and 
terminating  the  proceedings  concerning  imports  of  saccharin  and  its  salts  from  China,  Japan  and  the 
United  States  of  America.  OJ  1980  L  331/41. 
5  Case  16/90,  Detlef  Nblle,  trading  as  'Eugen  N61le'  v  Hauptzollamt  Bremen-Freihafen,  ECR  1991 
1-05163.  Case  358/89,  Extramet  Industrie  SA  v  Council  of  the  European  Communities,  ECR  1992 
1-03813. 
6  Case  75/92,  Gao  Yao  (Hong  Kong)  Hua  Fa  Industrial  Co.  Ltd  v  Council  of  the  European  Union,  ECR 
1994  1-03141.  Case  161/94,  Sinochem  Heilongjiang  v  Council  of  the  European  Union,  ECR  1996 
11-00695.  Case  155/94,  Climax  Paper  Converters  Ltd  v  Council  of  the  European  Union,  ECR  1996 
11-00873.  Case  170/94,  Shanghai  Bicycle  Corporation  v  Council  of  the  European  Union,  ECR  1997 
11-01383. 
7  Ivo  Van  Bael  &  Jean-Francois  Bellis,  fn  2  above  at  p  335. 
234 special  and  differential  treatment  for  developing  countries  provided  by  the  WTO 
agreements.  Third,  the  dispute  settlement  mechanism  of  the  WTO  is  based  on  the 
principle  that  any  Member  can  challenge  trade  measures  taken  by  any  other  Member,  so 
that  even  those  countries  that  are  economically  weak  can  challenge  the  more 
economically  powerful.  8  Therefore,  China  can  make  use  of  the  system  to  solve  disputes 
with  other  Members. 
This  chapter  examines  these  issues  in  four  sections.  It  analyzes  the  special  and  differential 
treatment  provisions  contained  in  the  Agreement  on  Implementation  of  Article  VI  of  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  1994  (Anti-Dumping  Agreement)  and  the 
Uruguay  Round  Understanding  on  Rules  and  Procedures  Governing  the  Settlement  of 
Disputes  (DSU). 
Section  one  analyzes  Article  15  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement,  which  provides  a 
developed  country  Member's  obligation  to  actively  consider  the  possibility  of 
constructive  remedies  prior  to  imposition  of  an  anti-dumping  measure  that  would  affect 
the  essential  interests  of  a  developing  country.  In  order  to  explain  its  implications  in 
practice,  the  interpretation  given  by  the  WTO  Panel  in  the  Indian  Bed  Linen  case  is 
analyzed.  9 
In  the  second  part,  I  illustrate  the  special  and  differential  treatment  for  developing  and 
least-developed  country  Members  under  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  system. 
Corresponding  provisions  are  contained  in  the  DSU,  including  Article  3(12),  Article  4 
(10),  Article  8(10),  Article  12(l  0),  Article  12(11),  Article  21.2,21(7)  and  21(8),  Article 
8  Julio  lacarte-Muro  &  Petina  Gappah,  'Developing  Countries  and  the  WTO  Legal  and  Dispute 
Settlement  System:  a  View  from  the  Bench'  (2000)  3(3)  Journal  of  International  Economic  Law,  395 
at  p  395. 
91  European  Communities  -  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton-Type  Bed  Linen  from  India", 
Report  of  the  Panel,  WTO  document  code:  WT/DS141/R.  Available  by  searching  through 
<http:  //docsonIine.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I  December  2002). 
235 24  and  Article  27(2)  of  the  DSU.  In  this  part,  I  also  analyze  the  application  of  the  DSU  in 
the  context  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
Two  types  of  foreseeable  EU-China  anti-dumping  disputes  after  China's  accession  to  the 
WTO  are  enumerated  in  the  third  section.  They  include  disputes  involving  normal  value 
calculation  for  the  imports  in  question,  and  disputes  based  on  the  EU's  practice  of  use-out 
domestic  data  and  zeroing  methodology  in  its  anti-dumping  investigations. 
In  the  last  part  of  the  chapter,  I  indicate  the  potential  difficulties  for  China  to  invoke  the 
WTO  special  and  differential  treatment  provisions  to  protect  its  trade  interests  against  the 
EU's  anti-dumping  decisions.  Generally  speaking,  these  are  also  the  difficulties  that  other 
developing  countries  face  when  they  try  to  seek  proper  dispute  settlements  under  DSU 
and  other  WTO  laws. 
In  short,  this  chapter  focuses  on  new  issues  that  may  arise  with  regard  to  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  practice  towards  China.  It  illustrates  the  WTO  special  and  differential 
treatment  provisions  that  China  may  invoke  after  its  accession  to  the  WTO,  and  several 
foreseeable  disputes  that  may  arise  in  future.  In  this  way,  it  deepens  the  study  of  this 
thesis  from  a  prospective  point  of  view. 
1.  Article  15  of  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement.  10 
A.  General  introduction. 
Article  15  of  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  provides  that: 
It  is  recognized  that  special  regard  must  be  given  by  developed  country  Members  to  the 
10  WTO  Anti-Dumping  refers  to  the  Agreement  on  Implementation  of  Article  VI  of  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  1994. 
236 special  situation  of  developing  country  Members  when  considering  the  application  of 
anti-dumping  measures  under  this  Agreement. 
Possibilities  of  constructive  remedies  provided  for  by  this  Agreement  shall  be  explored 
before  applying  anti-dumping  duties  where  they  would  affect  the  essential  interests  of 
developing  country  Members. 
The  number  of  anti-dumping  measures  against  imports  from  developing  countries  and  the 
adverse  effects  of  these  measures  have  increased.  Thereforeq  WTO  developing  country 
Members  have  emphasized  that  Members  should  take  any  anti-dumping  action  with  care 
and  responsibility,  and  ensure  that  any  such  action  should  be  in  compliance  with  the 
Agreement,  so  as  not  to  disrupt  trade  between  Members  unnecessarily.  "  Based  on  this 
idea,  particular  attention  was  given  to  Article  15  of  the  WTO  An&Dumping  Agreement 
in  the  WTO  Doha  4th  Ministerial  Conference  in  2001.  During  the  session,  it  was 
emphasized  that  Article  15  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  is  a  mandatory  provision, 
and  the  modalities  for  its  application  would  benefit  from  clarification.  In  the  meantime, 
the  Committee  on  Anti-Dumping  Practices  was  instructed,  through  its  working  group  on 
Implementation,  to  examine  this  issue  and  to  draw  up  appropriate  recommendations 
within  twelve  months  on  how  to  operationalize  this  provision.  12 
11  1  Concerns  Regarding  Special  and  Differential  Treatment  Provisions  in  WTO  Agreements  and 
Decisions',  WTO  document  code:  WT/COMTD/W/66.  Available  by  searching  through 
<http:  //docsonline.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I  December  2002). 
12  ,  WTO  Ministerial  Conferences  -  Doha  4th  Ministerial  -  Implementation-Related  Issues  and 
Concerns,  Doha  WTO  Ministerial  2001:  Ministerial  Declarations  and  Decisions',  WTO  document 
code:  WT/MIN(O  1)/DEC/I  7.  Available  from: 
<http:  //www.  wto.  org/wto/english/thewto-e/minist-e/minO  I 
_e/mindecl_implementation_e. 
htm> 
December  2002). 
237 B.  Interpretation  of  Article  15  in  the  Indian  bed  linen  case 
The  Indian  Bed  Linen  case  is  a  good  example  to  analyze  Article  15.  First,  the  WTO  Panel 
interpreted  the  provision  in  great  detail,  which  gives  important  reference  and  guidance  to 
its  future  application.  Second,  India's  claim  based  on  the  rule  was  sustained.  The  WTO 
Panel  decision  is  beneficial  to  the  Indian  textile  industry,  which  is  crucial  to  the  country's 
economy.  Third,  this  case  has  had  a  great  influence.  It  has  led  to  several  amendments  of 
the  EU's  anti-dumping  regulations.  '  4  The  chain  of  events  and  culminating  acts  are  unique 
in  the  legal  history  of  the  European  Community  15  and  also  rather  rare  in  that  of  the 
WTO.  16 
Furthermore,  it  is  significant  to  examine  The  Indian  Bed  Linen  case  when  we  analyze  the 
future  application  of  Article  15  of  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  by  China.  India  is 
a  huge  developing  country  among  WTO  Members,  with  a  high  percentage  of  linen  and 
textile  among  its  exports.  China  is  in  the  same  situation  as  India  at  this  point,  so  the  WTO 
ruling  is  an  important  reference  to  similar  cases  involving  China  in  the  future. 
13  'European  Communities  -  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton-Type  Bed  Linen  from  India', 
fn  9  above. 
14  Regulation  (EC)  2398/97  imposing  definitive  anti-dumping  duties  against  imports  of  bed  linen 
originating  in  India,  Egypt  and  Pakistan,  OJ  1997  L332/1,  as  last  amended  by  Regulation  (EC) 
554/2000,  OJ  2000  L68/1. 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  1644/2001  of  August  7,2001  amending  Regulation  (EC)  2398/97  imposing 
a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  cotton  type  bed  linen  originating  in  Egypt,  India  and 
Pakistan  and  suspending  its  application  with  regard  to  imports  originating  in  India,  OJ  2000  L219/1. 
15  Since  'European  Community'  and  'European  Communities'  are  used  in  the  WTO  documents 
relating  to  dispute  settlement,  I  will  use  these  terms  rather  than  the  'European  Union  (EU)'  when  I 
analyze  the  Indian  Linen  case  in  this  chapter. 
16  Dan  Horovitz,  'International  Trade  (Editorial)  A  Regulated  Scope  for  E.  U.  Compliance  with  WTO 
Rulings',  (2001)  7(6)  Int.  T.  L.  R.,  153  at  p  153. 
238 1.  Background. 
On  28  November  1997,  the  European  Community  adopted  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
2398/97,  imposing  final  anti-dumping  duties  on  imports  of  cotton--type  bed  linen  from 
India.  17  The  Indian  government  thought  that  the  measure  was  inconsistent  with  the  WTO 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement,  and  its  due  benefits  under  the  WTO  Agreement  had  been 
nullified  or  impaired  as  a  result.  Therefore,  on  3  August  1998,  it  requested  consultations 
with  the  European  Community  pursuant  to  Article  4  of  the  DSU,  Article  XXIII  of  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  1994  ('GATT  1994')  and  Article  17  of  the 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement.  '  8 
On  18  September  1998  and  15  April  1999,  India  and  the  European  Community  held 
consultations  in  Geneva,  but  they  failed  to  reach  a  mutually  satisfactory  resolution  of  the 
matter.  According  to  Article  XXIII:  2  of  GATT  1994,  Article  6  of  the  DSU  and  Article  17 
of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement,  India  requested  the  establishment  of  a  Panel  to  examine 
the  matter  on  7  September  1999.19  Based  on  the  request,  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body 
established  a  Panel  on  27  October  1999.20 
In  India's  submission  to  the  Panel,  it  requested  that  the  Panel  find  that  the  an6clumping 
measure  taken  by  the  European  Communities  violated  many  provisions  of  the  WTO 
17  Council  Regulation  (EC)  2398/97  imposing  definitive  anti-dumping  duties  against  imports  of  bed 
linen  originating  in  India,  Egypt  and  Pakistan,  OJ  1997  L332/1 
18  'European  Communities  -  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton-Type  Bed-Linen  from  India 
-  Request  for  Consultations  from  India',  WTO  document  code:  WT/DS  141  /1.  Available  by  searching 
through  <http:  //docsoniine.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I  December  2002). 
19  ,  European  Communities  -  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton-Type  Bedlinen  from  India  - 
Request  for  the  Establishment  of  a  Panel  by  India',  WTO  document  code:  WT/DS  141/3.  Available  by 
searching  through  <http:  //docsonIine.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I  December  2002). 
20  ,  European  Communities  -  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton-Type  Bedlinen  from  India  - 
Constitution  of  the  Panel  Established  at  the  Request  of  India  -  Note  by  the  Secretariat',  WTO 
document  code:  WT/DS  141/4.  Available  by  searching  through 
<http:  //docsonline.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I  December  2002). 
239 Anti-Dumping  Agreement  such  as  Article  15,  under  which,  India  claimed,  the  EC  failed 
to  explore  possibilities  of  constructive  remedies  before  imposing  anti-dumping  duties,  as 
the  rule  requires. 
Here,  I  should  indicate  that  The  Indian  Bed  Linen  case  is  rather  complex  as  a  whole,  and 
the  proceeding  is  ongoing.  The  WTO  ruling  is  not  only  based  on  the  consideration  of 
Article  15,  but  also  other  provisions  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement.  21  For  the  purposes 
of  this  chapter,  I  will  only  examine  India's  claim  under  Article  15,  and  the  corresponding 
interpretation  given  by  the  WTO  Panel. 
2.  Understanding  of  the  first  sentence  of  Article  15  of  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. 
The  first  sentence  provides:  'It  is  recognized  that  special  regard  must  be  given  by 
developed  country  Members  to  the  special  situation  of  developing  country  Members 
when  considering  the  application  of  anti-dumping  measures  under  this  Agreement.  ' 
India  argued  that  this  sentence  states  a  preference  that  the  special  situation  of  developing 
countries  should  be  an  element  to  be  weighed  when  a  developed  country  makes  that 
evaluation.  Therefore,  the  first  part  of  Article  15  does  not  impose  any  specific  legal 
obligation.  22  Both  the  Panel  and  the  EU  agreed  with  this  interpretation. 
3.  Understanding  of  the  second  sentence  of  Article  15. 
The  second  sentence  provides  that  'possibilities  of  constructive  remedies  provided  for  by 
this  Agreement  shall  be  explored  before  applying  anti-dumping  duties  where  they  would 
21  In  the  first  submission  of  India  of  6  March  2000,  India  claims  31  inconsistencies  of  the  EU's 
practice  with  the  WTO  Anti  -Dumping  Agreement. 
22  6.2  1,  'European  Communities  -  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton-Type  Bed  Linen  from 
India',  fn  9  above. 
240 affect  the  essential  interests  of  developing  country  Members.  ' 
India's  claims  under  Article  15  are  mainly  based  on  this  part  of  the  provision.  India 
indicated  that  the  second  sentence  contains  a  stricter  obligation  than  the  first  one,  because 
it  uses  the  word  'shall',  which  shows  a  clear  and  specific  legal  obligation  to  'explore 
possibilities'  by  developed  country  Members. 
From  this  point  of  view,  in  its  submission  to  the  Panel,  India  first  stressed  the  importance 
of  the  bed  linen  and  textile  industries  to  its  economy  as  a  developing  country,  and  that  the 
EU's  anti-dumping  duties  would  'affect'  these  essential  interests.  However,  the 
Commission  did  not  even  mention  it,  or  consider  the  possibilities  of  constructive 
remedies.  23 
Second,  India  suggests  that  the  reference  to  remedies  provided  for  by  the  AntiDumping 
Agreement  indicates  that  such  remedies  may  consist  in  the  non-imposition  of 
anti-dumping  measures  or  in  the  acceptance  of  an  undertaking.  Texprocil,  the  Cotton 
Textiles  Export  Promotion  Council  of  India,  acting  on  behalf  of  Indian  producers  and 
exporters,  tried  to  offer  price  undertakings.  However,  these  were  rejected  by  the 
European  Communities  without  substantive  consideration.  Therefore,  India  asserted  that 
the  European  Communities  acted  inconsistently  with  Article  15  of  the  AntiDumping 
Agreement. 
4.  WTO  Panel's  interpretation  and  recommendation. 
The  Panel  noted  that  both  parties  agree  that  the  second  sentence  of  Article  15  imposes 
legal  obligations  on  developed  country  Members.  With  regard  to  India's  first  claims, 
there  is  no  dispute  that  the  application  of  anti-dumping  duties  would  affect  the  essential 
interests  of  India  as  a  developing  country.  As  to  the  second  point,  however,  both  parties 
241 disagreed  on  what  constitutes  'constructive  remedies  provided  for  by  this  Agreement'  and 
what  is  required  by  the  obligation  to  'explore'  the  'possibilities'  of  such  remedies.  24 
After  examining  the  wording  of  the  provision  in  the  context  of  the  WTO  An&Dumping 
Agreement,  the  Panel  disagreed  with  India's  suggestion  that  a  'constructive  remedy' 
might  be  a  decision  not  to  impose  anti-dumping  duties  at  all.  Instead,  it  indicated  that 
imposition  of  a  lesser  duty  or  acceptance  of  a  price  undertaking  would  constitute 
C  25  constructive  remedies'  within  the  meaning  of  Article  15 
. 
The  Panel  further  explained  that  Article  15  imposes  no  obligation  to  actually  provide  or 
accept  any  constructive  remedy  that  may  be  identified  and/or  offered.  26  It  does,  however, 
impose  an  obligation  to  actively  consider,  with  an  open  mind,  the  possibility  of  such  a 
remedy  prior  to  the  imposition  of  an  anti-dumping  measure  that  would  affect  the  essential 
interests  of  a  developing  country. 
Based  on  this  understanding,  the  Panel  pointed  out  that  the  key  issue  in  this  case  is 
whether  the  EU  authorities  actively  considered  with  an  open  mind  the  possibilities  of 
price  undertakings  with  Indian  exporters  prior  to  the  imposition  of  final  anti-dumping 
23  Recital  6.219,  ibid. 
24  Recital  6.227,  ibid. 
25  Recital  6.229,  ibid. 
26  In  footnote  92  of  the  Panel  Report  (ibid),  it  provided  following  explanation:  We  note  that  our 
interpretation  of  Art.  15  in  this  regard  is  consistent  with  that  of  a  GATT  Panel  which  considered  the 
predecessor  of  that  provision,  Art.  13  of  the  Tokyo  Round  Anti-Dumping  Code,  which  provision  is 
substantively  identical  to  present  Art.  15.  That  Panel  found: 
'The  Panel  noted  that  if  the  application  of  anti-dumping  measures  'would  affect  the  essential  interests  of 
developing  countries',  the  obligation  that  then  arose  was  to  explore  the  'possibilities'  of  'constructive 
remedies'.  It  was  clear  from  the  words  'possibilities'  and  'explored'  that  the  investigating 
authorities  were  not  required  to  adopt  constructive  remedies  merely  because  they  were  proposed.  ' 
EC  -  Imposition  of  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton  Yarn  from  Brazil,  Panel  Report, 
ADP/  13  7,  adopted  30  October  1995,  para.  5  84  (emphasis  added). 
242 measures  in  the  bed  linen  investigation.  27  Due  to  the  bare  rejection  of  Texprocil's 
undertaking  by  the  European  Communities,  the  Panel  found  nothing  would  demonstrate 
that  the  EU  had  actively  explored  the  possibilities  of  constructive  remedies.  Therefore, 
the  EU  failed  to  act  consistently  with  its  obligations  under  Article  15  of  the 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement.  28 
C.  Article  15  of  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  and  China 
From  the  Indian  Bed  Linen  case,  it  is  clear  that  'constructive  remedy'  does  not  refer  to 
complete  elimination  of  anti-dumping  duties.  However,  imposition  of  a  lesser  duty,  a 
price  undertaking  or  other  acceptable  actions  might  be  adopted  as  a  'constructive  remedy' 
within  the  context  of  Article  15. 
In  recent  years,  if  Chinese  products  are  found  to  have  been  dumped  in  an&dumping 
investigations,  anti-dumping  duties  will  be  imposed  subsequently  regardless 
undertakings  offered  by  exporters.  In  fact,  statistics  shows  that  from  1990,  the 
Commission  seldom  accepts  undertakings  proposed  by  Chinese  exporters.  It  gives  the 
reason  that  undertakings  are  not  normally  accepted  from  companies  operating  in  NMEs 
due  to  the  high  risk  of  circumvention  . 
29However,  such  argument  hardly  can  be  justified 
under  WTO  trade  laws. 
China  entered  the  WTO  on  II  December  2001  as  a  developing  country.  Therefore,  in 
future  anti-dumping  proceedings  initiated  by  developed  country  Members  such  as  the  EU, 
it  is  entitled  to  the  special  treatment  provided  by  Article  15.  This  will  make  a  welcome 
27  Recital  6.234,  ibid. 
28  Recital  6.238,  ibid. 
29  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  393/98  of  16  February  1998  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty 
on  imports  of  stainless  steel  fasteners  and  parts  thereof  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China, 
India,  the  Republic  of  Korea,  Malaysia,  Taiwan  and  Thailand,  OJ  1998  L50/1. 
243 difference  for  China  in  anti-dumping  proceedings  launched  by  WTO  developed  country 
Members,  including  EU's  obligation  to  consider  the  acceptance  of  undertaldngs  offered 
by  Chinese  producers. 
In  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigations  in  the  past,  the  Commission  never  mentioned 
China's  status  as  a  developing  country.  But  it  has  to  do  so  now,  and  to  further  explore 
possibilities  of  constructive  remedies.  Otherwise,  it  will  be  regarded  as  a  violation  of 
Article  15  of  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
IL  The  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  System. 
'Dispute  settlement  system  is  generally  considered  to  be  one  of  the  cornerstones  of  the 
multilateral  trade  order.  '  30  As  a  great  success  of  the  Uruguay  Round  and  the 
establishment  of  the  WTO,  it  has  been  significantly  strengthened  and  streamlined  through 
the  DSU.  31 
The  WTO  dispute  settlement  system  ensures  that  commitments  and  obligations 
negotiated  and  agreed  upon  will  be  respected  and  enforced.  In  case  of  disputes  which  may 
arise  in  the  course  of  implementing  WTO  agreements,  it  does  not  impose  new  obligations, 
but  it  does  enforce  those  already  agreed  by  providing  Members  with  a  clear  legal 
framework  to  achieve  a  desirable  solution. 
The  WTO  dispute  settlement  system  is  able  to  protect  weaker  Members  against  unilateral 
action  by  the  strongest  under  DSU  and  other  WTO  laws.  Therefore,  after  China's 
accession  to  the  WTO,  it  can  resort  to  the  Dispute  Settlement  Mechanism  to  claim  its  due 
30  ,A  Summary  of  the  Final  Act  of  the  Uruguay  Round', 
<http:  //www.  wto.  org/english/docs-e/legal_e/ursum-e.  htm#Understanding>  (I  December  2002). 
31  Annex  2,  to  the  Marrakesh  Agreement  Establishing  the  WTO  in  the  Results  of  the  Uruguay  Round 
of  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations:  The  Legal  Texts  GATT/WTO  Secretariat,  Geneva  (1994). 
244 rights  in  trade  disputes  against  other  Members.  Furthermore,  as  a  developing  country, 
China  is  entitled  to  the  special  and  differential  treatment  for  developing  countries 
provided  by  the  DSU  on  a  procedural  level,  together  with  those  substantive  rules  offered 
in  WTO  Agreements  contained  in  Annex  I  to  the  Marrakech  Agreement  Establishing  the 
World  Trade  Organization. 
What  are  the  basic  requirements  and  rules  of  DSU?  What  are  provisions  of  the  special  and 
differential  treatment  for  developing  country  Members  contained  in  the  DSU?  How  does 
China  invoke  them  to  settle  disputes  in  case  of  anti-dumping  proceedings  initiated  by 
developed  country  Members  such  as  the  EU?  I  will  answer  these  questions  in  the 
following  part. 
A.  Brief  introduction  to  the  Uruguay  Round  Understanding  on  Rules  and 
Procedures  Governing  the  Settlement  of  Disputes  (DSU). 
The  DSU  is  a  horizontal  WTO  agreement.  It  sets  up  procedures  for  solving  disputes 
which  may  arise  among  WTO  Members  in  the  implementation  of  different  WTO 
32 
agreements.  For  this  purpose,  a  Dispute  Settlement  Body  includes  representatives  of  all 
WTO  Members  and  is  established  to  be  responsible  for  the  management  of  the  DSU.  It  is 
empowered  to  establish  Panels  of  experts  to  examine  a  case,  adopt  Panel  and  Appellate 
Body  reports,  monitor  the  implementation  of  Panel  recommendations  and  authorize  the 
suspension  of  concessions  when  a  country  does  not  comply  with  a  ruling.  33 
The  DSU  emphasizes  that  Members  shall  not  themselves  make  determinations  of 
violations  or  suspend  concessions,  but  shall  make  use  of  the  dispute  settlement  system. 
So,  it  specifies  detailed  time-frames  and  procedures  throughout  the  whole  process  of 
32  Art.  1  (1),  Understanding  on  Rules  and  Procedures  Governing  the  Settlement  of  Disputes. 
33  Art.  2  (1),  Understanding  on  Rules  and  Procedures  Governing  the  Settlement  of  Disputes. 
245 dispute  settlement,  including  consultation,  Panel  recommendation  and  Appellate 
review.  34  It  also  sets  out  rules  for  compensation  or  the  suspension  of  concessions  in  the 
event  of  non-  implementation.  In  the  meantime,  as  an  important  feature  of  the  DSU,  it 
provides  a  number  of  provisions  taking  into  account  the  specific  interests  of  the 
developing  and  the  least-developed  country  Members. 
B.  Special  and  differential  treatment  provisions  for  developing  and  the 
least-developed  countries  contained  in  the  DSU. 
The  DSU  has  established  a  number  of  provisions  in  accordance  with  special  and 
differential  treatment  for  developing  and  the  least-developed  country  Members  with 
regard  to  dispute  settlement.  They  include  Article  3(12),  Article  4(10),  Article  8(10), 
Article  12(10),  Article  12(11),  Article  21(2),  21(7)  and  21(8),  Article  24  and  Article  27(2) 
of  the  DSU. 
1.  Article  3(12) 
Article  3(12)  of  DSU  provides  when  a  developing  country  Member  brings  a  complaint 
against  a  developed  country  Member  under  a  relevant  WTO  agreement,  it  has  the  right  to 
invoke  the  provisions  contained  in  the  Decision  of  1966  35  as  an  alternative  to  those  of  the 
DSU.  In  case  of  conflicts  of  the  two  sets  of  rules,  the  Decision  of  1966  will  precede. 
However,  Article  3(12)  has  never  been  invoked  by  any  developing  country  Member 
because  the  new  rules  offer  similar  or  even  better  treatment  in  practice.  36 
34  'WTO  Settling  Disputes,  the  Panel  Process', 
<http:  //www.  wto.  org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif  e/disp2_e.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
35  Decision  of  5  April  1966  on  Procedures  under  Art.  XXIII,  BISD  14S/l  8. 
36  Mary  E.  Footer,  'International  Trade  Developing  Country  Practice  in  the  Matter  of  WTO  Dispute 
Settlement',  (2001)  35(l)  J.  W.  T.,  55  at  p  63. 
246 2.  Articie  4  (10) 
It  stipulates  that  Members  should  give  special  attention  to  particular  problems  and 
interests  of  developing  country  Members  during  consultations. 
3.  Article  8(10) 
It  relates  to  the  composition  of  the  Panel.  It  enables  a  developing  Member,  upon  its 
request,  to  have  at  least  one  of  the  three  Panel  members  from  a  developing  country 
Member  in  case  of  disputes  with  developed  country  Members.  This  provision  is  well 
observed,  under  which  developing  country  Member's  interests  can  be  better  considered. 
4.  Article  12 
Under  Article  12(10),  sufficient  time  must  be  given  to  a  developing  country 
Member  to  prepare  its  argument  when  it  is  a  defendant  in  a  dispute. 
Article  12(11)  provides  that  the  Panel  should  explicitly  indicate  the  relevant 
provisions  of  special  and  differential  treatment  contained  in  the  agreements  that  have 
been  raised. 
5.  Article  21. 
Article  21.2  asks  for  particular  attention  to  be  paid  to  matters  affecting  developing 
countries  with  regard  to  the  surveillance  of  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body 
recommendations. 
This  Article  was  invoked  in  the  Indonesian  Automobile  case  in  July  1998,37  in  which 
';  7  Indonesia  -  Certain  Measures  Affecting  the  Automobile  Industry,  complaint  by  the  European 
Community,  WTO  document  code:  WT/DS54/R.  Available  by  searching  through 
<http:  //docsonIine.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I  December  2002) 
247 Indonesia's  request  for  an  extension  of  extra  six  months  to  implement  the  rulings  of  the 
Dispute  Settlement  Body  was  supported. 
Article  21(7):  'If  the  matter  is  one  which  has  been  raised  by  a  developing  country 
Member,  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body  shall  consider  what  further  action  it  might  take 
which  would  be  appropriate  to  the  circumstances.  ' 
Article  21(8)  requires  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body  to  consider  not  only  the  trade 
coverage  of  measures  complained  of,  but  also  their  impact  on  the  economy  of 
developing  country  Members  concerned  before  it  decides  what  appropriate  action 
might  be  taken. 
6.  Article  24:  Special  Procedures  Involving  LeastDeveloped  Country  Members 
Article  24.1  asks  for  particular  consideration  to  be  given  to  the  special  situation  of  the 
least-developed  countries  (LDCs)  and  due  restraint  to  be  exercised  towards  them  by 
developed  country  Members  in  dispute  settlement  proceedings. 
Article  24.2  provides  where  consultations  involving  an  LDC  have  not  been  successful, 
special  procedures  such  as  the  intermediation  of  the  WTO  Director-General  can  be 
introduced  before  a  Panel  is  established. 
However,  since  no  LDC  has  been  involved  in  WTO  disputes  so  far,  Article  24  has  never 
beeninvoked. 
38 
38  M.  E.  Footer,  fn  36  at  p  73. 
248 7.  Article  27(2) 
Article  27(2)  specifies  the  WTO  Secretariat's  obligation  to  provide  additional  legal 
advice  and  assistance  or  a  qualified  legal  expert  from  the  WTO  technical  cooperation 
services  to  any  developing  country  Member  at  its  request  in  respect  of  dispute  settlement. 
However,  such  legal  assistance  is  not  satisfactory  from  the  developing  country  Members' 
point  of  view.  They  consider  that  its  quality  and  quantity  is  insufficient. 
Based  on  the  above  description,  it  is  clear  that,  in  theory,  developing  country  and 
least-developed  country  Members'  interests  are  given  special  consideration  in  dispute 
settlement  proceedings  under  the  DSU.  However,  the  developed  country  Members' 
performance  in  practice  is  far  from  satisfactory  as  to  this  point,  mainly  because  most  of 
the  special  and  differential  treatment  provisions  in  the  DSU  are  too  general  and  loose  to 
become  compulsory.  So,  there  is  a  need  and  trend  for  the  improvement  of  the  DSU  with 
regard  to  special  and  differential  treatment  to  developing  country  and  least-developed 
country  Members. 
This  is  an  interesting  issue,  but  as  it  is  not  relevant  to  this  thesis,  it  will  not  be  explained 
further.  What  I  want  to  stress  through  the  above  illustration  is  that  after  China's  accession 
to  the  WTO,  it  can  make  use  of  these  special  and  differential  treatment  provisions  of  DSU 
in  cases  of  anti-dumping  disputes  against  a  developed  Member  such  as  the  EU.  In  spite  of 
the  existing  deficiencies  of  the  DSU,  China  will  benefit  more  and  more  from  the  WTO 
dispute  settlement  system  following  its  reform  and  improvement. 
C.  Application  of  the  Dispute  Settlement  Understanding  under  the  WTO 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
Article  17  of  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  is  about  Consultation  and  Dispute 
249 Settlement.  Article  17.1  establishes  the  general  principle  that  the  Dispute  Settlement 
Understanding  is  applicable  to  anti-dumping  disputes. 
However,  it  is  noticeable  that  Article  17.6  provides  a  special  standard  of  review  by  Panels 
in  examining  disputes  in  anti-dumping  cases  with  regard  to  both  matters  of  fact  and 
questions  of  interpretation  of  the  Agreement.  As  to  the  establishment  of  facts,  if  it  was 
found  proper  and  the  evaluation  was  unbiased  during  a  Member's  anti-dumping 
investigation,  even  though  the  Panel  might  have  reached  a  different  conclusion,  the 
evaluation  shall  not  be  overturned.  In  addition,  a  Panel's  interpretation  of  a  provision  of 
the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  according  to  customary  rules  of  interpretation  of  public 
international  law39  shall  also  be  in  conformity  with  the  Agreement.  When  a  provision  in 
question  has  several  permissible  interpretations,  if  the  one  on  which  the  antýdumping 
authority's  measure  is  based  is  consistent  with  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement,  then  the 
Panel  must  adopt  this  very  interpretation. 
This  provision  may  limit  the  Panel's  power  in  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  process,  and 
there  has  some  controversy  about  its  side  effects  . 
40  Nevertheless,  such  a  review  defends 
factual  decisions  and  legal  interpretations  of  national  authorities,  and  is  intended  to 
prevent  dispute  settlement  Panels  from  making  decisions  purely  based  on  their  own 
views. 
39  Arts.  31  &  32  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties. 
40  Jacques  H.  J.  Bourgeois,  'International  Law  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  in  the  Field  of  Anti-Dumping 
Law',  (1998)  1(2)  J.  I.  E.  L.  pp.  259-276. 
250 Ifl.  Foreseeable  EU-China  anti-dumping  disputes  after  China's 
accession  to  the  WTO. 
There  are  two  types  of  disputes  which  are  likely  to  arise  in  the  EU's  antimdumping 
proceedings  involving  Chinese  products.  The  first  one  relates  to  the  implementation  of 
the  Protocol  published  upon  China's  accession  to  the  WTO  (Protocol)  41  which  contains  9 
provisions  governing  other  WTO  Members'  practice  to  determine  normal  values  of 
imports  from  China  without  using  price  information  from  China  in  anti-dumping 
investigations.  The  second  kind  of  disputes  are  those  already  in  existence  but  have  not 
been  settled  properly  yet.  42  Due  to  China's  WTO  membership,  these  issues  can  now  get  a 
clear  solution  under  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  mechanism  and  relevant  special  and 
differential  treatment  provisions  for  developing  and  least-developed  country  Members. 
A.  Disputes  based  on  provisions  of  normal  value  calculation  contained  in 
the  Protocol  upon  China's  accession  to  the  WTO  (Protocol). 
New  EU-China  anti-dumping  issues  may  arise  under  the  Protocol.  In  the  'Report  of  the 
working  party  on  the  accession  of  China',  43  China  agreed  that  other  WTO  Members  may 
not  adopt  the  domestic  prices  or  costs  of  Chinese  products  to  determine  their  normal 
values  in  anti-dumping  investigations.  44  As  a  part  of  the  report,  the  'draft  protocol  on  the 
accession  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China'  provides  that: 
The  importing  WTO  Member  may  use  a  methodology  that  is  not  based  on  a  strict 
41  ,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China',  I  October  2001.  WTO  document  code: 
WT/ACC/CHN/49.  Available  by  searching  through  <http:  //docsoniine.  wto.  org/gen_search.  asp>  (I 
December  2002). 
42  They  will  be  analyzed  later  in  this  chapter. 
43  ,  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China',  fn  41  above. 
44 
Fn  41  at  p  79. 
251 comparison  with  domestic  prices  or  costs  in  China  if  the  producers  under  investigation 
cannot  clearly  show  that  market  economy  conditions  prevail  in  the  industry  producing 
45  the  like  product  with  regard  to  manufacture,  production  and  sale  of  that  product  . 
It  is  agreed  that  the  above  provision  will  be  valid  for  15  years  after  China  entered  the 
WTO.  46  This  concession  was  made  by  China  as  part  of  the  conditions  on  its  accession. 
Under  the  legislation,  the  EU's  analogue  country  method  of  determining  the  normal 
values  for  Chinese  products  is  explicitly  legalized  until  its  provision  expires.  However, 
China  also  specifies  the  following  requirements  in  order  to  prevent  other  WTO  Members 
from  abusing  their  rights: 
(a)  The  WTO  Member  which  initiates  the  anti-dumping  investigation  shall  establish  and 
publish  in  advance  the  criteria  for  determining  whether  the  application  of  market 
economy  treatment  (MET)  is  appropriate  and  the  methodology  in  determining  price 
comparability.  (Summary  of  the  original  text.  ) 
(b)  The  importing  WTO  Member  should  ensure  that  it  had  notified  its 
market-economy  criteria  and  its  methodology  for  determining  price  comparability 
to  the  Committee  on  Anti-Dumping  Practices  before  they  were  applied.  47 
(c)  The  process  of  investigation  should  be  transparent  and  su  icient  opportunities 
should  be  given  to  Chinese  producers  or  exporters  to  make  comments,  especially 
comments  on  the  application  of  the  methodology  for  determining  price 
comparability  in  a  particular  case.  48 
45 
Section  15.  a.  (ii),  'Draft  Protocol',  ibid. 
46 
Section  15.  d,  ibid. 
47  Recital  15  1,  'Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of  China',  fn  41  above. 
48  Ibid. 
252 (d)  The  importing  WTO  Member  should  give  notice  of  information  which  it 
required  and  provide  Chinese  producers  and  exporters  an  ample  opportunity  to 
present  evidence  in  writing  in  a  particular  case.  49 
(e)  The  importing  WTO  Member  should  provide  Chinese  producers  and  exporters  a 
full  opportunity  for  the  defence  of  their  interests  in  a  particular  case.  50 
(f)  The  importing  WTO  Member  should  provide  a  sufficiently  detailed  reasoning  of 
its  preliminary  and  final  determinations  in  a  particular  case.  51 
In  summary,  these  six  requirements  ask  for  more  consideration  to  be  given  to  Chinese 
producer  interests,  and  more  transparency  for  both  the  anti-dumping  proceedings  and  the 
anti-dumping  authority's  decisions  when  WTO  Members  use  other  methodologies  rather 
than  the  Chinese  product's  domestic  prices  to  determine  their  normal  values. 
However,  examining  these  provisions  carefully,  two  issues  stand  out.  First,  they  use 
'should'  rather  than  'shall'  in  the  wording,  so  they  do  not  actually  impose  exact 
obligations  on  the  WTO  Members,  strictly  speaking.  Second,  their  content  is  too  general, 
with  a  lack  of  necessary  definition  and  explanation.  For  example,  subparagraph  (e) 
stipulates  that  the  importing  WTO  Member  should  provide  Chinese  producers  and 
exporters  a  full  opportunity  for  the  defence  of  their  interests  in  a  particular  case.  However, 
it  does  not  specify  what  constitutes  a  'full  opportunity';  the  criteria  given  by  an  importing 
country  and  exporting  country  can  be  quite  different  due  to  their  contrary  interests  in  an 
anti-dumping  proceeding.  Likewise,  subparagraph  (f)  asks  for  'sufficiently  detailed 
reasoning'  of  determination,  but  does  not  offer  a  detailed  explanation. 
49 
Ibid. 
50  Ibid. 
51 
Ibid. 
253 These  problems  will  be  reflected  in  anti-dumping  investigations  involving  Chinese 
products  after  China's  accession  to  the  WTO.  At  that  time,  implementation  of  the 
aforementioned  provisions  may  bring  out  new  issues  and  disputes.  As  a  result,  EU's 
anti-dumping  proceeding  towards  imports  from  China  may  become  more  complex  than 
ever.  Under  such  circumstances,  both  China  and  the  EU  may  resort  to  the  WTO  dispute 
settlement  system  for  a  clear  solution  to  discrepancies  under  the  An&Dumping 
Agreement. 
B.  Other  disputes  in  EU-China  anti-dumping  proceedings  that  can  be 
settled  under  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  mechanism. 
Under  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement,  if  a  Member  considers  that  its  due  benefit  is 
being  nullified  or  impaired  directly  or  indirectly  by  another  Member,  it  may  ask  the 
Member  for  consultation  or  refer  such  matters  to  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body.  52  In  that 
case,  the  respondent  country  of  the  anti-dumping  proceeding  may  build  its  claim  on  the 
ground  that  it  finds  the  authority's  measure  is  inconsistent  with  one  or  more  provisions  of 
the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
In  addition,  there  remain  ambiguities  in  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement,  and  it  still 
leaves  room  for  significant  differences  in  approach  to  the  enforcement  of  antimdumping 
laws.  These  differences  are  likely  to  bring  out  disputes,  because  the  investigating  side  and 
the  respondent  side  may  disagree  about  the  approach,  due  to  their  respective  interests. 
The  respondent  country  may  bring  such  disputes  to  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body.  53 
It  is  impossible  to  enumerate  all  anti-dumping  disputes  and  their  causes  in  this  chapter. 
52  Art.  17,  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
53  M.  Koulen,  'The  New  Anti-Dumping  Code  through  its  Negotiating  History'  in  J.  J.  J.  Bourgeois, 
F.  Berrod,  E.  Gippini  (eds),  The  Uruguay  Round:  A  European  Lawyers'  Perspective  (EUP:  Brussels 
1996)  152  at  p  195. 
254 Therefore,  only  two  of  them  will  be  examined  here,  both  of  which  are  likely  to  arise  in 
respect  of  EU's  anti-dumping  practice  against  imports  from  China,  and  in  which  China 
may  have  solid  reasons  to  support  its  claim  under  the  WTO  DSU  and  An6Dumping 
Agreement. 
1.  Dispute  over  use-out  domestic  data  methodology. 
Disputes  over  use-out  domestic  data  methodology  may  only  arise  in  cases  of  imports 
from  China  or  other  countries54  subject  to  the  EU's  conditional  MET.  55  According  to  the 
EU's  anti-dumping  policy  towards  China,  use-out  domestic  data  methodology  refers  to 
the  practice  when  a  Chinese  exporter  A  gets  MET  in  an  antiýdumping  investigation 
(which  means  the  normal  values  of  the  products  will  be  based  on  their  domestic  sales 
56  prices).  Instead  of  using  the  price  elements  of  Company  A,  the  authority  will  adopt  the 
data  from  a  third  market  economy  (ME)  to  determine  normal  values  for  other  Chinese 
exporters. 
In  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigations  in  the  past,  Chinese  exporters  found  use-out 
domestic  data  methodology  extremely  unacceptable,  mainly  because  it  is  unreasonable 
both  in  theory  and  in  practice,  and  it  is  likely  to  bring  out  artificially  higher  dumping 
margins  and  heavier  anti-dumping  measures  as  a  result. 
a.  Use-out  domestic  data  methodology  is  unreasonable. 
54  Art.  1,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2238/2000  of  9  October  2000  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
384/96  on  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European 
Community,  OJ  2000  L257/2. 
55  Art.  2,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  of  27  April  1998  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
on  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community.  OJ 
1998  L  128/18. 
56  This  issue  is  fully  illustrated  in  section  11  of  chapter  three. 
255 In  theory,  the  use-out  domestic  data  methodology  deliberately  keeps  the  flaws  of  the  EUs 
traditional  analogue  country  method.  The  rationale  for  the  analogue  country  method  is 
based  on  the  presumption  that  price  information  from  non-market  economies  (NMEs)  is 
unreliable  due  to  strict  state  control.  Therefore,  data  from  a  third  ME  will  be  used  to 
calculate  normal  values  for  imports  from  NMEs,  because  they  can  reflect  market  signals 
better.  As  discussed  in  chapter  three  of  this  thesis,  the  analogue  country  method  normally 
brings  out  artificially  high  dumping  margins  due  to  the  actual  differences  in  the 
development  levels  of  two  countries.  In  order  to  minimize  such  differences,  Article  2 
(A)(7)  of  the  EU's  Anti-Dumping  Regulation  57  provides  that  'an  appropriate  market 
economy  third  country  shall  be  selected  in  a  not  unreasonable  manner'.  However,  the 
flaws  of  the  analogue  country  method  can  be  completely  avoided  if  the  authority  adopts 
the  domestic  price  from  the  Chinese  company  who  get  MET  to  calculate  normal  values 
for  other  Chinese  exporters  in  the  same  anti-dumping  investigation.  Since  the 
development  levels  of  these  enterprises  in  a  country  are  quite  similar,  the  price  from  the 
company  who  gets  MET  is  the  best  reference  to  determine  normal  values  for  others.  As  a 
result,  it  will  bring  out  dumping  margins  which  are  closest  to  fact  in  an&dumping 
investigations. 
Surprisingly,  the  EU  authority  refuses  to  do  so  and  insists  on  applying  the  use-out 
domestic  data  methodology  towards  imports  from  China  in  anti-dumping  investigations. 
58 
In  an  interview  with  an  official  of  the  EU  trade  Directorate  General  (DG),  he  explained 
that  the  authority's  practice  of  the  use-out  domestic  data  methodology  is  consistent  with 
the  current  Anti-Dumping  Regulation  . 
59First,  the  Regulation  does  not  specify  that  the 
authority  shall  use  one  Chinese  exporter's  domestic  price  to  determine  normal  values  for 
57  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against  dumped  imports 
from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community,  OJ  1996  L  56/1. 
58  Interview  with  the  Administer  of  the  European  Commission,  DG  Trade,  Brussels,  12  July  2002. 
59  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96. 
256 others  if  it  gets  MET.  Second,  in  accordance  with  the  legislation,  a  third  ME  is  selected 
before  the  decision  of  MET  is  made  by  the  Commission.  Therefore,  the  Commission  will 
not  have  enough  time  to  calculate  the  normal  value  for  other  Chinese  exporters  again  by 
using  the  domestic  sales  price  of  the  company  which  gets  MET.  Besides,  the  Commission 
should  ask  the  European  industry  to  comment  in  that  case,  and  it  will  make  the 
proceeding  take  longer.  At  that  stage,  it  is  simply  impossible  to  recalculate  normal  values 
for  all  other  Chinese  exporters. 
Chinese  exporters  may  find  the  above  theoretical  explanation  unacceptable.  With  regard 
to  the  first  reason,  it  can  argue  that  the  EU's  current  legislation  also  does  not  explicitly 
prohibit  the  use  of  a  company's  price  information  as  reference  to  others  in  an 
anti-dumping  proceeding.  With  regard  to  another  reason  based  on  time  sufficiency,  it  is 
clear  that  use  of  existing  domestic  price  of  the  exporter  who  gets  MET  can  rule  out  all 
inconvenience  and  difficulties  to  get  similar  information  from  a  third  economy,  so  it  will 
actually  save  time  and  cost  for  the  authority. 
b.  Use-out  domestic  data  methodology  leads  to  artificially  higher  antidumping 
duties. 
As  explained  before,  use-out  domestic  data  methodology  keeps  the  flaws  of  analogue 
country  method,  i.  e.  to  maximize  dumping  margins  of  the  imports  concerned,  so  it  will 
result  in  heavier  anti-dumping  measures  to  be  imposed  on  Chinese  products. 
In  the  Chinese  fluorescent  lamps  case  of  2001 
'60  two  Chinese  exporting  producers  were 
granted  MET,  and  some  of  the  others  requested  the  Commission  to  use  the  domestic  sales 
prices  of  those  two  companies  to  determine  the  normal  values  of  their  products.  However, 
60  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1470/2001  of  16  July  2001  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty 
and  collecting  definitively  the  provisional  duty  imposed  on  imports  of  integrated  electronic  compact 
fluorescent  lamps  (CFL-i)  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China  OJ  2001  L  195/8. 
257 the  Commission  rejected  the  proposal  on  the  ground  that 
Article  2(7)  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  provides  that  in  the  case  of  imports 
from  countries  like  the  PRC,  the  normal  values  are  to  be  established  on  the  basis  of  the 
price  or constructed  value  in  an  ME  third  country  unless  an  exporting  producer  meets 
the  criteria  set  out  in  subparagraph  (c)  of  paragraph  7  of  that  Article.  61 
Therefore,  Mexico  was  selected  as  an  analogue  country  in  this  case.  As  the  result  of 
use-out  domestic  data  methodology,  the  two  Chinese  companies  who  got  MET  were 
found  not  to  be  dumped,  while  others  were  imposed  with  different  anti-dumping  duties  as 
high  as  66.1  percent. 
The  issue  whether  use-out  domestic  data  methodology  is  consistent  with  the  WTO 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement  needs  more  detailed  interpretation,  and  this  can  be  achieved 
through  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  mechanism.  Since  it  is  easy  to  find  out  that  if  the  two 
Chinese  companies'  price  information  is  adopted  as  reference  to  others  exporters,  a  lesser 
duty  could  be  concluded  as  the  result  of  an  anti-dumping  investigation,  the  Chinese 
exporter's  proposal  might  be  supported  under  Article  15  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
Under  that  provision,  if  China  can  convince  the  dispute  settlement  authority  that  the 
imposition  of  anti-dumping  duties  will  affect  its  essential  interests,  the  EU  will  have  the 
obligation  to  explore  the  possibility  of  constructive  remedies,  including  the  application  of 
the  use-out  domestic  data  methodology  which  can  bring  out  less  anti-dumping  duties. 
2.  Dispute  over  the  EU  authority's  zeroing  methodology. 
Unlike  disputes  of  use-out  domestic  data  methodology,  disputes  on  the  EU  authority's 
61  Recital  11,  Council  Regulation  (EQ  No  1470/200  1.  (Emphasis  not  in  original) 
258 zeroing  methodology  may  be  put  forward  by  any  country  when  the  EU  authority  adopts 
zeroing  methodology  in  anti-dumping  investigations  to  calculate  dumping  margins,  i.  e. 
make  comparison  between  normal  values  and  export  prices  of  the  imports  in  question. 
a.  Concept  and  effect  of  zeroing  methodology. 
The  practice  of  'zeroing'  arises  in  situations  where  an  investigating  althority  makes 
multiple  comparisons  of  export  price  and  normal  value,  and  then  aggregates  the  results 
of  these  individual  comparisons  to  calculate  a  dumping  margin  for  the  product  as  a 
whole.  62 
Sometimes  the  imports  in  question  include  several  modes  of  the  products,  so  comparisons 
will  be  made  for  each  mode  at  first,  then  the  authority  will  get  a  total  dumping  amount  by 
aggregating  the  outcomes  of  all  comparisons.  As  the  result  of  a  single  comparison,  the 
export  price  may  be  either  lower  or  higher  than  the  normal  value.  It  is  called  a  'negative' 
margin  when  the  export  price  is  higher  than  normal  value.  With  regard  to  the  European 
Communities'  practice,  it  counts  a  negative  margin  as  zero  of  the  dumping  amount  in 
course  of  comparison,  then  arrives  at  the  total  dumping  amount  by  aggregating  the  results 
of  comparisons  of  all  modes  of  imports.  This  is  the  so-called  'zeroing  methodology'. 
As  a  result  of  such  calculations,  the  overall  dumping  amount  will  be  larger  than  it  actually 
is,  due  to  the  exclusion  of  those  negative  dumped  values  (see  Table  6.1).  The  authority 
will  divide  the  total  dumping  amount  by  the  value  of  all  imports  to  get  dumping  margins. 
The  larger  dumping  amount  is,  the  higher  the  dumping  margin  will  be.  Since  the  zeroing 
method  artificially  increases  the  dumping  amount,  it  results  in  a  bigger  dumping  margin 
than  the  actual  one.  Consequently,  a  more  sever  anti-dumping  measure  may  be  imposed 
62  'European  Communities  -  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton-Type  Bed  Linen  from  India', 
fn  9  above  at  p  32. 
259 on  imports  than  is  necessary  (see  Table  6.2). 
Table  6.1. 
Product  mode  Dumping  amount  (DA) 
1  $100 
-$50 
Table  6.2.  If  the  total  export  value  (EV)  is  $150,  then 
Zeroing  method 
Non-zeroing  Method 
Total  dumping  amount  (TDA) 
$100  +  $0  =  $100 
$100  -  $50  =  $50 
DA  under  zeroing  method 
$100 
so 
Dumping  Margin  (TDA/EV) 
1001150  =  66.67  percent 
50/150  =  33.33  percent 
b  WTO  Panel's  opinion  towards  zeroing  methodology  in  the  Indian  Bed  Linen 
case. 
63 
In  the  Indian  Bed  Linen  case,  the  European  Communities  compared  weighted  averages  of 
export  prices  and  the  normal  value  for  each  of  several  models  or  product  types  of  bed 
linen.  64  The  authority  adopted  the  zeroing  methodology  to  arrive  at  a  total  dumping 
amount,  and  then  divided  it  by  the  value  of  the  exports  involved,  including  the  value  of 
those  models  for  which  the  individual  margin  was  negative. 
The  EC's  practice  of  zeroing  methodology  was  challenged  by  India  under  Article  2(4)(2) 
of  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement.  65  India  indicated  that  the  use  of  the  word 
63  6  European  Communities  -  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton-Type  Bed  Linen  from  India', 
fn  9  above  at  p  32. 
64  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2398/97  of  28  November  1997  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping 
duty  on  imports  of  cotton-type  bed  linen  originating  in  Egypt,  India  and  Pakistan,  OJ  1997  L  332/1. 
65  Art.  2.  (4)(2)  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  provides:  'Subject  to  the  provisions  governing  fair 
comparison  in  [Article  2.4],  the  existence  of  margins  of  dumpin&  during  the  investigation  phase  shall 
normally  be  established  on  the  basis  of  a  comparison  of  a  weighted  average  normal  value  with  a 
260 ýaverage'  and  'all'  in  Article  2(4)(2)  clearly  precludes  excluding  certain  amounts  from  the 
calculation  simply  because  they  showed  'negative'  dumping.  Therefore,  India  argued  that 
the  practice  of  zeroing  methodology  is  not  consistent  with  the  requirement  set  forth  in 
Article  2(4)(2)  that  the  comparison  should  take  into  account  the  'weighted  average  of 
prices  of  all  comparable  export  transactions'. 
According  to  Article  2  (4)  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement,  which  requires  that  'a  fair 
comparison  shall  be  made  between  the  export  price  and  the  normal  value',  the  Panel 
interpreted  Article  2(4)(2)  as  obligating  an  investigating  authority  to  make  its 
determination  in  a  way  which  fully  accounts  for  the  export  prices  on  all  comparable 
transactions.  However,  an  overall  dumping  margin  calculated  on  the  basis  of  zeroing 
4negative'  margins  is  not  based  on  comparisons  which  fully  reflect  all  comparable  export 
prices. 
Based  on  the  above  points,  the  Panel  concluded  that  the  European  Communities  acted 
inconsistently  with  Article  2(4)(2)  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  in  establishing  the 
existence  of  margins  of  dumping  on  the  basis  of  a  methodology,  which  included  zeroing 
negative  price  differences  calculated  for  some  models  of  bed  linen.  66  As  a  result,  in  order 
to  comply  with  the  ruling  and  its  WTO  obligations  linked  to  such  rulings,  the  E.  C.  was 
obliged  to  take  steps  to  rectify  the  illegality  of  the  initial  1997  bed  linen  Regulation.  67 
weighted  average  of  prices  of  all  comparable  export  transactions  or  by  a  comparison  of  normal  value 
and  export  prices  on  a  transaction-to-transaction  basis.  A  normal  value  established  on  a  weighted  jn 
average  basis  may  be  compared  to  prices  of  individual  export  transactions  if  the  authorities  nd  a 
pattern  of  export  prices  which  differ  significantly  among  different  purchasers,  regions  or  time  periods, 
and  if  an  explanation  is  provided  as  to  why  such  differences  cannot  be  taken  into  account 
appropriately  by  the  use  of  a  weighted  average-to-weighted  average  or  transaction-to-transaction 
comparison.  ' 
66  'European  Communities  -  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton-Type  Bed  Linen  from 
India',  fn  9  above  at  p  38. 
67  Council  Regýlation  (EC)  No  160/2002  of  28  January  2002  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
2398/97  imposin  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  cotton-type  bed  linen  originating  in 
Egy.  pt,  India  anTPakistan,  and  terminating  the  proceeding  with  regard  to  imports  originating  in 
Pakistan,  OJ2002  L  26/1. 
261 c.  Disputes  about  zeroing  methodology  in  future. 
Article  2(4)(2)  of  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  provides  for  three  possibilities  to 
establish  a  dumping  margin: 
A  comparison  of  a  weighted  average  normal  value  with  a  weighted 
average  of  prices  of  all  comparable  export  transactions; 
A  comparison  of  normal  value  and  export  prices  on  a 
transaction-to-transaction  basis;  or 
A  comparison  of  the  normal  value  established  on  a  weighted  average 
basis  to  prices  of  individual  export  transactions  (in  certain  specific 
cases). 
In  the  Indian  Bed  Linen  case,  the  European  Communities  applied  the  first  option  in 
establishing  the  dumping  margin  for  Indian  products,  and  its  practice  of  the  zeroing 
methodology  was  halted  by  the  Panel.  However,  the  WTO  ruling  does  not  limit  the 
application  of  zeroing  method  in  the  second  and  the  third  options.  This  implies  that  in 
future  anti-dumping  proceedings,  the  EU  authority  will  possibly  not  use  the  zeroing 
method  when  comparing  a  weighted  average  normal  value  with  a  weighted  average  of 
prices  of  all  comparable  export  transactions,  but  alternatively,  it  may  continue  such  a 
practice  fo  r  comparisons  of  normal  value  and  export  prices  on  a 
transaction-to-transaction  basis  or  comparison  of  the  normal  value  established  on  a 
weighted  average  basis  to  prices  of  individual  export  transactions. 
If  this  happens  in  anti-dumping  proceedings  towards  Chinese  products,  using  the  Indian 
Bed  Linen  case  as  a  good  example,  China  may  ask  for  a  clear  interpretation  and  ruling 
through  the  dispute  settlement  system  under  the  WTO  DSU  and  Anti-Dumping 
262 Agreement. 
More  and  more  disputes  based  on  different  reasons  will  come  up  in  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  proceedings  concerning  imports  from  China.  What  I  have  analyzed  above 
are  just  two  of  them,  which  are  very  likely  to  be  put  forth  by  China  and  to  be  settled  under 
the  DSU  after  her  accession  to  the  WTO. 
IV.  Potential  difficulties  for  China  to  invoke  VVTO  laws  to  protect 
its  interests  against  EUs  anti-dumping  decisions. 
With  WTO  membership,  China  now  can  make  use  of  special  and  differential  treatment 
provisions  contained  in  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  and  DSU  to  protect  its  trade 
interests  and  settle  disputes  occurring  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  proceedings.  However, 
difficulties  may  arise  when  such  an  attempt  is  made.  Generally  speaking,  these  are 
common  to  many  developing  countries,  and  they  are  reasons  why  only  a  small  number  of 
cases  are  presented  by  developing  country  Members  under  DSU  and  other  WTO  laws.  68 
A.  Shortage  of  necessary  human  resources. 
A  developing  country  such  as  China  lacks  the  necessary  human  resources  and 
administrative  structures  to  detect  possible  inconsistencies  with  WTO  agreements  and 
then  to  maximize  their  use  of  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  system  effectively.  It  is  noticed 
that  the  most  frequent  users  of  the  dispute  settlement  system  have  extensive  human  and 
financial  resources  to  bring  and  defend  complaints.  They  cooperate  with  export  interest 
groups  very  well,  and  they  have  global  commercial  and  diplomatic  representation,  which 
68  4  Up  to  September  2000,  only  53  claims  were  presented  by  developing  countries  among  total  207 
requests  for  consultations'. 
Jose  Luis  Perez  Gabilondo,  'International  Trade  Developing  Countries  in  the  WTO  Dispute 
Settlement  Procedures'.  (2001)  35(4)  J.  W.  T.,  483. 
263 allows  extensive  contacts  within  and  outside  the  Geneva  circUit. 
69  So,  shortages  of 
relevant  human  resources  and  institutions  will  become  key  impediments  to  the  capacity 
of  China  to  benefit  from  international  trade  and  technical  assistance. 
B.  Deficiencies  of  the  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  System. 
Other  major  difficulties  for  China  in  making  good  use  of  the  special  and  differential 
treatment  provisions  in  case  of  anti-dumping  disputes  with  the  EU  are  the  deficiencies  of 
the  current  WTO  dispute  settlement  system. 
1.  Time  consuming  procedures. 
The  duration  of  a  dispute  settlement  and  enforcement  is  too  long  to  be  good  for  the  party 
to  a  dispute  even  if  a  favourable  ruling  is  made  in  the  end.  A  standard  and  complete 
procedure  needs  one  year  and  three  months  in  total  '70 
but  in  practice,  it  normally  takes 
much  longer  to  achieve  a  solution.  Considering  the  high-speed  rhythm  of  today's  global 
trade,  the  side  effects  due  to  the  timing  of  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  system  are  worth 
noting. 
2.  Ineffective  enforcement  of  the  WTO  rulings. 
The  actual  enforcement  of  the  WTO  ruling  can  make  dispute  settlement  more 
complicated  and  time  consuming.  For  example,  in  the  Indian  Bed  Linen  case,  71  the 
proceedings  began  on  7  August  1998,  and  the  Panel  Report,  favourable  to  India,  was 
69  Horn,  H.  and  Mavroidis,  P.,  'Remedies  in  the  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  System  and  Developing 
Country  Interests',  Paper  for  the  World  Bank  (I  I  April  1999)  at  p  28.  <http:  //www.  worldbank.  org> 
(21  July  2002). 
70  ,  WTO  Settling  Disputes,  the  Panel  Process',  fn  34  above. 
71  Section  6.102,  'European  Communities  -  Anti-Dumping  Duties  on  Imports  of  Cotton-Type  Bed 
Linen  from  lndia,  '_fn  9  above  at  p  32. 
264 published  on  30  October  2000.72  However,  the  dispute  has  not  been  settled  properly  so  far 
due  to  the  EU's  unsatisfactory  implementation  of  the  WTO  ruling. 
3.  Trend  towards  stricter  or  narrower  interpretation  of  special  and  differential 
tre,  ratment  provisions. 
When  we  examine  these  special  and  differential  treatment  provisions  carefully,  it  is  easy 
to  see  that  some  of  them  are  too  general  to  be  invoked  directly.  Under  such  circumstances, 
a  proper  interpretation  is  needed.  However,  developing  countries  may  feel  the  trend 
towards  stricter  interpretation  by  the  WTO  Panel  when  they  try  to  make  use  of  these  rules 
73  to  protect  their  trade  interests  against  developed  Members 
.  The  stricter  the 
interpretation  is,  the  less  likely  that  the  developing  country  concerned  is  able  to  invoke  it. 
So,  it  is  no  doubt  that  a  stricter  interpretation  of  such  provisions  given  under  the  WTO 
dispute  settlement  system  will  prevent  developing  and  least-developed  countries  to 
benefit  from  the  original  intention  of  the  special  and  differential  treatment. 
From  this  point  of  view,  China  may  find  it  difficult  when  it  tries  to  invoke  special  and 
differential  treatment  provisions  contained  in  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  and 
DSU  to  protect  its  interests  against  the  EU's  antimdumping  decisions.  However,  with  its 
continuous  replenishment  of  the  human  resource  in  the  field  of  WTO  laws,  and  following 
the  irresistible  trend  of  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  system's  reform,  China  will  be  able  to 
benefit  more  and  more  from  the  WTO  trade  system  while  seeking  settlement  of 
anti-dumping  disputes  with  the  EU. 
72  ,  Request  for  Consultations  by  India  on  7  August  1998', 
<http:  //mkaccdb.  eu.  int/dsu/doc/ds  14  1-I.  doc>  (I  December  2002). 
73  M  E.  Footer,  fn  36  at  p  84. 
265 Conclusion. 
As  a  developing  country,  China's  WTO  membership  entitles  it  to  special  and  differential 
treatment  and  the  right  to  solve  disputes  with  other  Members  through  the  WTO  dispute 
settlement  system.  As  a  result,  new  issues  and  disputes  may  arise  with  regard  to  the  EU's 
anti-dumping  practice  towards  China. 
Special  and  differential  treatment  provisions  that  China  may  invoke  to  protect  its 
trade  interests  against  the  EU's  anti-dumping  decisions  include  Article  5  of  the 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement  and  Article  3(12),  Article  4  (10),  Article  8(10),  Article 
12(10),  Article  12(11),  Article  21.2.21(7)  and  21(8),  Article  24  and  Article  27(2)  of 
the  DSU. 
Article  15  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  specifically  considers  the  interests  of 
developing  Members.  Under  this  provision,  the  EU  has  the  obligation  to  actively  consider 
the  possibility  of  constructive  remedies  prior  to  imposition  of  an  anti-dumping  measure 
that  would  affect  the  essential  interests  of  China.  In  the  meantime,  China  can  suggest  the 
imposition  of  a  lesser  duty,  a  price  undertaking  or  other  acceptable  actions  that  might  be 
adopted  as  'constructive  remedy'  within  the  context  of  Anti-Dumping  Agreement. 
With  regard  to  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  system,  the  DSU  has  established  a  number  of 
provisions  in  accordance  with  special  and  differential  treatment  for  developing  and 
least-developed  country  Members.  China  may  invoke  them  to  seek  proper  settlement  of 
anti-dumping  disputes  with  the  EU.  Such  disputes  may  be  caused  by  the  EU's  practice  of 
Normal  value  calculation,  use-out  domestic  data  and  zeroing  methodology  in  its 
anti-dumping  investigations. 
Like  other  developing  countries,  China  may  find  it  difficult  to  invoke  these  special  and 
differential  treatment  provisions  in  practice  due  to  the  shortage  of  necessary  expertise  and 
266 the  existing  deficiencies  of  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  system.  However,  such  a 
situation  may  be  improved  by  China's  attempts  to  develop  capacity  in  this  area  and  the 
irresistible  trend  towards  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  system's  reform. 
267 Chapter  Seven 
Conclusions 
1.  The  EUs  anti-dumping  approach  to  imports  from  China  and 
underlying  reasons. 
From  I  January  1995  to  31  December  2001,  the  European  Commission  initiated  36 
anti-dumping  investigations  against  imports  from  China,  which  accounts  for  24  percent 
of  the  EU's  total  anti-dumping  proceedings  for  the  same  period.  '  However,  at  present, 
imports  from  China  only  account  for  around  7  percent  of  all  exports  to  the  EU.  2  In 
addition,  over  the  past  twenty  years,  the  overall  number  of  EU's  antýdumping  cases  has 
gone  down,  while  those  against  China  has  risen  sharply  especially  in  the  past  ten  years. 
Furthermore,  as  the  result  of  the  EU's  antimdumping  investigations,  most  Chinese  exports 
were  found  to  be  dumped  and  high  definitive  anti-dumping  duties  were  imposed  on  them. 
These  show  that  the  EU  has  launched  a  disproportionately  large  amount  of  antýdumping 
investigations  towards  imports  from  China  and  imposed  severe  anti-dumping  measures 
on  them  afterwards.  The  reasons  for  this  should  be  found  by  examining  issues  arising 
both  in  the  EU  and  in  China. 
A.  On  the  EU  side. 
With  regard  to  the  EU,  its  current  approach  is  to  be  found  in  its  anti-dumping  legislation, 
II  Initiations:  by  Importing  Country  from  01/01/95  to  30/06/02'(2002)  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Statistics 
<http:  //www.  wto.  org/englishltratop_e/adp_e/adp-stattab2_e.  htm>  (I  December,  2002). 
2,  Trade  in  Goods  Statistics'  (2001)  <http:  //europa.  eu.  int/comm/trade/goods/stats.  htm>  (I  December, 
2002) 
268 in  particular,  how  this  legislation  is  applied  in  practice  with  regard  to  Chinese  exports. 
The  EU  treats  China  as  a  non-market  economy  (NME)  in  anti-dumping  proceedings.  As 
analyzed  in  the  first  chapter,  due  to  a  lack  of  concrete  provisions  in  the  WTO 
anti-dumping  legal  framework  to  determine  normal  values  and  anti-dumping  duty  levels 
of  imports  from  NMEs,  the  EU  adopts  a  hybrid  regime  towards  China.  It  includes  the 
analogue  country  method,  one  country  one  duty  rule,  conditional  market  economy 
treatment  (MET)  and  individual  treatment. 
The  first  two  are  the  traditional  methods  used  by  the  EU  in  relation  to  NMEs.  The  others 
are  renewed  policies  now  applied  due  to  the  dramatic  progress  achieved  by  China's 
economic  reforms.  In  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigations,  traditional  NME  treatment 
will  be  applied  to  imports  from  China  automatically,  unless  Chinese  exporters  can  meet 
the  criteria  set  for  conditional  MET  or  individual  treatment.  Traditional  NME  treatment 
maximizes  dumping  margins  artificially,  therefore,  it  creates  huge  unfairness  to  Chinese 
exporters.  Conditional  MET  and  individual  treatment  are  welcome  amendments  made  for 
the  old  policy,  but  they  have  been  adopted  as  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule  since 
published.  So,  all  of  the  four  methodologies  contain  unreasonable  factors  either  in  theory 
or  in  practice. 
1.  The  analogue  country  method! 
This  is  the  method  that  the  EU  authority,  the  Commission  routinely  adopts  to  determine 
the  normal  values  of  imports  from  China.  The  analogue  country  is  a  very  vague  concept, 
and  it  brings  out  a  series  of  questions  without  answers  in  the  law.  For  example:  what  is  the 
basis  for  the  analogue?  Should  it  be  the  development  of  the  country  concerned,  or  the 
respective  production  process,  or  the  comparability  of  the  products,  or  the  comparability 
3  Art  2(7),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against  dumped 
imports  frorn  countries  not  Member  of  the  European  Community,  OJ  1996  L56/1. 
269 of  the  respective  industry?  All  of  these  issues  are  not  specified  in  the  EU  anti-dumping 
legislation.  Therefore,  the  problem  of  comparing  prices  on  different  markets  is 
compounded  under  the  analogue  country  method.  Even  worse,  an  analogue  country  is 
firstly  proposed  by  the  complainant  in  the  anti-dumping  investigation,  and  the  selection 
of  such  a  country  does  not  consider  the  relative  level  of  economic  development  or  GNP 
per  capita  of  the  third  ME.  As  a  result,  the  analogue  country  method  brings  to  the 
anti-dumping  authority  an  additional  complex  procedure  to  select  a  third  market 
economy  (ME).  In  the  meantime,  it  results  in  huge  unfairness  to  Chinese  exporters. 
a.  It  maximizes  the  dumping  margin  artificially  in  anti-dumping  investigations. 
b.  It  absolutely  offsets  NME's  comparative  advantages  in  international  trade. 
c.  The  time  limit  for  NMEs  to  comment  is  over  strict. 
d.  It  makes  the  outcome  of  the  selection  to  be  unpredictable,  so  that  NME  exporters  will 
never  know  how  to  avoid  'dumping'  their  goods.  However,  there  is  a  need  for  certainty 
both  in  law  and  in  the  terms  of  trade. 
2.  One  country  one  duty  rule. 
Like  the  analogue  country  method,  the  one  country  one  duty  rule  applies  to  imports  from 
China  automatically.  Under  this  rule,  all  Chinese  exports  which  are  found  dumped  by  the 
Commission  in  the  anti-dumping  investigation  will  be  subject  to  the  same  rate  of 
anti-dumping  duty.  The  general  rate  will  be  the  highest  of  all.  To  Chinese  exporters,  the 
rule  is  unacceptable  because  it  neglects  the  fact  that  they  operate  independently  of 
government  control  after  China's  enterprise  reform.  Besides,  since  all  Chinese  exporters 
receive  the  same  duty  under  the  one  country  one  duty  rule,  it  is  unfair  to  those  who  make 
4  Art.  9(5),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96. 
270 great  efforts  to  cooperate  with  the  Commission  in  anti-dumping  investigations,  because 
their  duty  rates  should  be  based  on  their  own  dumping  margin  and  information  provided. 
3.  Conditional  MET.  5 
In  April  1998,  the  EU  amended  its  anti-dumping  legislation,  and  provided  conditional 
MET  for  China  and  Russia.  Under  the  new  rule,  if  Chinese  exporters  can  meet  the  five 
criteria,  6  demonstrate  that  they  operate  under  market  conditions  without  significant  state 
interference,  then  their  domestic  sales  prices  will  be  adopted  to  determine  the  normal 
values  of  their  products. 
In  an  anti-dumping  investigation,  Chinese  companies  hope  to  get  MET,  because  it  will 
normally  bring  low  dumping  margin  or  no  dumping  as  a  result.  This  can  be  seen  from  the 
following  case.  7 
5  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  of  27  April  1998  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on 
protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community.  OJ  1998 
L128/18. 
6  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98  provides  the  five  criteria  for  conditional  market  economy 
treatment: 
'-  decisions  of  firms  regarding  prices,  costs  and  inputs,  including  for  instance  raw  materials,  cost  of 
technology  and  labour,  output,  sales  and  investment,  are  made  in  response  to  market  signals  reflecting 
supply  and  demand,  and  without  significant  State  interference  in  this  regard,  and  costs  of  major  inputs 
substantially  reflect  market  values, 
-  firms  have  one  clear  set  of  basic  accounting  records  which  are  independently  audited  in  line  with 
international  accounting  standards  and  are  applied  for  all  purposes, 
-  the  production  costs  and  financial  situation  of  firms  are  not  subject  to  significant  distortions  carried 
over  from  the  former  non-market  economy  system,  in  particular  in  relation  to  depreciation  of  assets, 
other  write-offs,  barter  trade  and  payment  via  compensation  of  debts, 
-  the  firms  concerned  are  subject  to  bankruptcy  and  property  laws  which  guarantee  legal  certainty  and 
stability  for  the  operation  of  firms,  and 
-  exchange  rate  conversions  are  carried  out  at  the  market  rate.  ' 
7  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1470/2001  of  16  July  2001  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty 
and  collecting  definitively  the  provisional  duty  imposed  on  imports  of  integrated  electronic  compact 
fluorescent  lamps  (CFL-i)  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  OJ  2001  L  195/8. 
271 Table  7.1  A  comparison  of  different  levels  of  anti-dumping  duty  under  the  analogue 
country  method  and  the  MET. 
Ownership  of  the  manufacturer  Method  adopted  to  Rate  of  anti-dumping 
determine  the  Non-nal  Value  duty  (percent) 
Wholly  foreign  owned  MET  0 
company 
I 
Chinese  firms  (State-owned)  na  a=  logue  country  method 
[66.1 
, -ýOource:  UJ  2UUI  L195/8. 
The  conditional  MET  was  provided  to  accommodate  the  new  changes  in  China's 
economic  development.  However,  since  the  law  entered  into  force  in  1998,  less  than  15 
percent  of  Chinese  exporters  get  such  treatment.  8  From  this  point  of  view,  the  change  of 
the  law  does  not  meet  its  objective. 
As  the  anti-dumping  authority,  the  Commission  usually  refuses  to  grant  MET  to  Chinese 
companies  for  four  reasons.  They  are  namely,  information  insufficiency,  state 
interference,  beyond  deadline  and  non-standard  accounting  records.  Examining  these 
closely,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  Commission  interprets  the  criteria  for  MET  excessively 
strictly. 
a.  information  insufficiency. 
Information  provided  to  the  Commission  by  any  firm  applying  for  MET  must  encompass 
the  entire  industry  of  which  it  is  a  part.  Even  if  only  one  firm  exports  to  the  EU,  that  firm 
must  convince  the  entire  industry  to  provide  information  about  financial  activity  to  the 
EU.  Otherwise,  it  will  be  deemed  as  information  insufficiency.  But  the  fact  is  that  it  is 
extremely  difficult  to  obtain  industry  wide  information  within  the  time  deadlines 
8  The  data  is  collected  by  the  author  based  on  the  EU  Official  Journal  from  April  1998  to  April  2002. 
272 specified  by  law.  In  the  Glycine  case  of  2000,9  five  Chinese  companies  were  refused 
MET,  one  of  the  reasons  given  is  that  they  could  not  provide  information  on  the  entire 
chemicals  industry  in  China. 
b.  State  interference. 
In  practice,  Chinese  state-owned  companies  never  get  MET,  because  the  EU  thinks  that 
such  ownership  means  significant  state  interference.  As  to  other  companies,  if  they  sell 
part  of  their  products  to  the  state,  its  application  for  MET  will  be  rejected,  because  the 
Commission  presumes  that  the  price  of  sales  to  the  state  would  not  be  at  market 
determined  prices,  therefore,  it  has  indirect  state  interference  in  its  industry  pricing.  If  one 
of  the  inputs  is  state-controlled,  the  company  will  not  get  MET  as  well,  because  the  EU 
think  that  such  prices  are  determined  by  the  state  rather  than  the  market  This  conclusion  is 
unreasonable  because  Member  States  of  the  EU  have  many  state  controlled  firms,  such  as 
utilities  and  transportation  companies,  and  this  does  not  negate  their  market  treatment. 
Industries  can  sell  their  output  to  the  government  at  preferential  prices,  and  not  be 
considered  non-market.  In  the  EU,  there  is  also  state  ownership  of  some  public  goods, 
such  as  fisheries,  which  does  not  make  the  fishing  industry  non-market.  From  this  point 
of  view,  normal  business  contact  with  the  state  should  not  be  the  reason  for  the 
Commission  to  reject  a  Chinese  company's  application  for  MET. 
c.  Beyond  deadline. 
Another  reason  of  the  rejection  of  MET  is  that  Chinese  companies  failed  to  submit  all  the 
information  needed  within  the  time  limit.  In  an  anti-dumping  investigation,  exporters 
from  ME  shall  submit  their  questionnaires  within  40  days  after  initiation.  If  Chinese 
9  Recital  11,  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  1043/2000  of  18  May  2000  imposing  a  provisional 
anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  glycine  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  OJ  2000 
L  118/6. 
273 companies  apply  for  MET,  their  burden  of  proof  is  even  heavier,  but  the  application  and 
all  information  deemed  necessary  have  to  be  given  to  the  Commission  within  21  days 
after  the  initiation.  There  is  no  apparent  reason  for  this  difference,  so  this  is  unfair  as  well. 
d.  Non-standard  accounting  records. 
To  grant  conditional  MET  to  Chinese  exporters,  the  Commission  requires  that  companies 
have  one  clear  set  of  basic  accounting  records;  these  records  must  be  independently 
audited  in  line  with  international  accounting  standards;  and  these  records  must  be  applied 
for  all  purposes.  'O 
These  requirements  have  been  rigorously  enforced  and  have  been  the  justification  for  the 
rejection  of  the  majority  of  applications  for  the  conditional  MET,  mainly  because  they  are 
cumulative  in  nature  but  all  must  be  satisfied  at  the  same  time.  "  In  addition,  the 
completeness  of  accounting  records  is  an  issue  relating  to  the  firm's  management  rather 
than  its  economic  nature.  Some  European  firms  do  not  have  sound  accounting  records 
due  to  poor  management,  but  we  cannot  therefore  affirm  that  they  operate  on  an  NME 
basis.  Likewise,  if  a  Chinese  company  does  not  have  a  clear  set  of  accounting  records  or 
if  it  has  not  been  audited,  it  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  firm  is  of  NME  nature. 
However,  in  Malleable  Cast  Iron  Tubes  and  Pipe  Fittings  case  in  2000,12  the  Commission 
refused  to  grant  MET  to  three  Chinese  exporters  simply  because  they  could  not  meet  all 
the  three  requirements  enumerated  above  at  the  same  time. 
10  Art.  2.7  (c),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98. 
11  Robert  M.  MacLean,  'Evaluating  the  Impact  of  the  E.  C.  's  Conditional  Market  Economy  Principle  in 
Chinese  and  Russian  Anti-Dumping  cases'  (2001)  7(3)  International  Trade  Law  &  Regulation  65  at 
70. 
12  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  449/2000  of  28  February  2000  imposing  a  provisional 
anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  malleable  cast  iron  tube  or  pipe  fittings  originating  in  Brazil,  the 
Czech  Republic,  Japan,  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  the  Republic  of  Korea  and  Thailand  and 
accepting  an  undertaking  offered  by  an  exporting  producer  in  the  Czech  Republic,  OJ  2000  L55/3. 
274 From  the  above  analysis,  it  can  be  seen  that  main  reason  that  only  a  few  Chinese  exporters 
get  MET  is  because  the  criteria  and  the  way  the  Commission  interpret  and  apply  them  in 
anti-dumping  investigations  is  too  stringent. 
4.  Individual  treatment. 
When  a  Chinese  exporter  fails  to  get  MET,  it  can  still  apply  for  individual  treatment  in 
order  to  have  its  individual  anti-dumping  duty  based  on  its  own  dumping  margin. 
However,  like  the  conditional  MET,  the  problem  of  individual  treatment  is  that  the 
Commission  applies  the  rules  in  an  excessively  strict  way  in  practice.  Even  the  EU  itself 
has  to  admit  the  overlap  in  the  criteria  of  individual  treatment  has  resulted  in  the  fact  that 
only  those  exporters  that  can  fulfil  the  requirements  for  conditional  MET  are  able  to 
qualify  for  individual  treatment.  13 
From  this  point  of  view,  the  main  stream  of  the  EU's  current  an&dumping  policy  towards 
China  is  the  traditional  NME  Treatment.  Though  the  amendments  of  conditional  MET 
and  individual  treatment  are  positive  progresses  in  legislation,  the  Commission  does  not 
make  their  application  to  be  consistent  with  the  objective,  i.  e.  to  adapt  to  the  change  of 
economic  status  due  to  China's  economic  reform. 
5.  Non-use  of  anti-subsidy  measures  towards  China. 
In  addition  to  the  above  unreasonable  factors  of  the  EU's  current  an&dumping  legislation 
towards  China,  the  EU's  non-use  of  countervailing  measures  may  be  another  reason 
leading  to  the  disproportionately  high  amount  of  the  anti-dumping  proceedings  towards 
China. 
13  Recital  53,  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  on  protection 
against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community  /*  COM/2000/0363 
final  -  ACC  2000/0160. 
275 According  to  the  provisions  of  the  WTO  Agreement  on  Subsidies  and  Countervailing 
Measures,  a  countervailable  subsidy  exists  if  the  following  facts  are  found. 
a.  There  is  a  financial  contribution  by  the  government,  and 
b.  The  subsidy  is  directed  at  specific  industries  or  sectors  or  at  exports; 
c.  There  is  a  net  benefit  to  the  recipient  and  the  conditions  of  normal  competition  must 
be  adversely  affected. 
14 
Under  the  WTO  legal  framework,  dumping  and  subsidy  are  two  different  concepts  and 
they  are  governed  by  different  sets  of  rules.  However,  as  a  result  of  subsidy,  the  export 
price  may  be  lower  than  the  normal  value  of  an  import,  which  also  constitutes  dumping. 
In  that  case,  the  importing  country  may  impose  either  countervailing  duties  or 
anti-dumping  measures  on  the  import  in  question.  15 
Unlike  its  anti-dumping  Regulation,  the  EU's  Regulation  on  subsidy  and  countervailing 
measures  16  does  not  provide  any  special  provision  for  NMEs  in  countervailing  duty 
investigations.  This  tacitly  implies  that  'such  cases  are  not  to  be  initiated  against 
countries  that  are  on  the  EU's  NME  list'  because  'the  subsidies  concept  had  no  meaning 
outside  the  context  of  a  market-based  economic  system.  17 
Consequently,  there  is  hardly  any  countervailing  duty  investigation  initiated  towards 
imports  from  China  within  the  past  ten  years.  Instead,  the  EU  has  launched  increasing 
14  Arts  l(l),  1  (2)  and  (5),  'Agreement  on  Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures'  The  Results  of  the 
Uruguay  Round  ofMultilateral  Trade  Negotiations  (GATT,  Geneva,  1994).. 
15  A_rt.  V1  (5),  GATT. 
16  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2026/97  on  protection  against  subsidised  imports  from  countries  not 
members  of  the  European  Community,  OJ  1997  L  288/1. 
17  Alexander  Polouektov,  'Non-Market  Economy  Issues  in  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Law  and 
Accession  Negotiations.  Revival  of  a  Two-Tier  MembershipT  (2002)  36  J.  W.  T  I  at  pp.  23  &  25. 
276 anti-dumping  proceedings  against  these  Chinese  products. 
B.  On  the  side  of  China. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  EU's  policy  results  in  the  large  number  of  anti-dumping  proceedings 
against  imports  from  China  and  subsequently  high  anti-dumping  duties.  On  the  other 
hand,  Chinese  exporters  are  responsible  for  their  own  faults  which  have  made  things 
worse.  They  are  mainly  non-cooperation,  untechnical  response  and  genuine  dumping  in  a 
few  cases. 
1.  Non-cooperation. 
Exporter's  non-cooperation  exists  in  any  country's  anti-dumping  investigation,  so  it  is  not 
an  exception  in  the  case  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  proceedings  towards  China.  However, 
statistics  show  that  anti-dumping  investigations  against  Chinese  products  are  defended  by 
the  least  number  of  manufacturers  and  exporters.  18 
Non-cooperation  of  those  Chinese  exporters  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigation  may 
be  attributed  to  two  reasons.  First  of  all,  most  of  them  are  angry  at  the  unfair  treatment  of 
NNIE  that  Chinese  exporters  normally  get  in  the  EU's  antiýdumping  investigations.  Due 
to  the  extremely  low  percentage  to  get  the  MET  and  individual  treatment  in  the  past  cases, 
they  foresee  the  unfavourable  judgement  made  under  the  analogue  country  method  and 
the  one  country  one  duty  rule,  plus  the  high  cost  and  difficulty  of  timely  cooperation,  they 
finally  decide  to  give  up  their  business  in  the  European  market  as  a  result  of 
non-cooperation. 
In  a  few  cases  of  non-cooperation,  those  Chinese  exporters  simply  do  not  know  the 
importance  to  respond  to  the  Commission's  questionnaires  due  to  their  lack  of  common 
18  Robert  M.  Maclean,  fn  II  above  at  35. 
277 knowledge  Of  international  trade.  19  However,  such  cases  become  fewer  and  fewer  due  to 
the  Chinese  government's  great  effort  to  popularise  this  knowledge. 
Without  close  cooperation  with  the  European  Commission  in  its  anti-dumping 
investigations,  Chinese  exporters  are  subject  to  the  analogue  country  method  and  the 
highest  anti-dumping  duty.  The  devastating  consequences  are  increasingly  known  to 
Chinese  exporters.  Therefore,  the  number  of  cases  of  non-cooperation  by  Chinese 
companies  has  decreased  sharply  in  recent  years.  20 
2.  Untechnical  response. 
This  happens  when  Chinese  exporters  cooperate  with  the  Commission,  while  they  are 
unable  to  provide  favourable  or  timely  information  simply  because  their  lawyers  lack  the 
necessary  techniques  to  handle  anti-dumping  cases. 
Considering  the  tight  time  limit  and  huge  amount  of  information  required,  satisfactory 
completion  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  questionnaires  in  the  case  of  imports  from  NMEs  is 
a  hard  task.  Good  lawyers  who  are  familiar  with  anti-dumping  rules  and  international 
trade  laws  are  necessary  in  that  circumstance.  Such  professionals  are  not  rare  in  foreign 
international  law  firms  like  those  in  Brussels,  but  there  are  not  many  in  China.  It  is  no 
doubt  that  China  has  a  large  quantity  of  good  lawyers,  but  compared  with  those  foreign 
ones,  most  of  them  are  less  experienced  in  the  field  of  an&dumping. 
Normally,  the  problem  for  Chinese  exporters  to  resort  to  these  foreign  law  firms  in 
response  to  anti-dumping  proceedings  is  the  high  costs.  The  average  charge  of 
anti-dumping  cases  is  above  $100,000  by  a  foreign  law  firm,  while  the  cost  asked  by 
19  This  is  analyzed  by  experienced  anti-dumping  lawyers  during  several  interviews  conducted  in 
different  law  firms  in  Brussels,  June  2002. 
20  This  is  found  by  analyzing  the  EU's  anti-dumping  cases  before  and  after  1995. 
278 Chinese  domestic  law  firms  can  be  $5,000  or  even  lower.  Given  the  difficultY  for  Chinese 
exporters  to  get  conditional  MET  and  individual  treatment  in  the  EU's  an&dumping 
investigations  even  with  the  help  of  foreign  law  firms  in  the  past,  most  Chinese 
companies,  especially  small  ones,  are  not  willing  to  turn  to  foreign  law  firms  when  they 
receive  anti-dumping  questionnaires  from  the  Commission. 
Unprofessional  lawyers  are  unable  to  make  use  of  international  trade  law  and  principles 
freely  to  protect  the  interests  of  their  client.  As  a  result,  an  untechnical  response  from 
Chinese  exporters  may  be  deemed  as  inadequate  cooperation  by  the  Commission  in 
anti-dumping  investigations,  and  finally  brings  a  less  favourable  outcome  to  them. 
3.  Lack  of  standard  accounting  records. 
The  second  criteria  of  the  MET  requires  that  firms  have  one  clear  set  of  basic  accounting 
records  which  are  independently  audited  in  line  with  international  accounting  standards 
and  are  applied  for  all  purposes.  21  To  Chinese  exporters,  the  lack  of  such  accounting 
records  is  one  of  the  most  frequent  reasons  leading  to  the  rejection  of  MET  in  practice. 
Besides,  it  constitutes  the  main  reason  for  the  Commission  to  reject  undertakings  offered 
by  Chinese  companies. 
4.  Genuine  dumping  in  a  few  cases. 
In  a  few  cases,  high  anti-dumping  duties  have  been  imposed  on  Chinese  exporters  since 
their  products  are  actually  dumped.  22  The  motive  of  such  selling  under  cost  is  not  because 
those  manufacturers  want  to  exclude  competitors  from  the  European  market  with  a  low 
21  Art.  2(7)(c),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98. 
22  This  was  indicated  by  an  anti-dumping  lawyer  during  an  interview  in  Brussels,  June  2002.  It  is  also 
the  reason  why  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  enacted  the  Interim  Regulation  of  Punishing  Companies  which  Export  Products  with  Low 
Prices  on  20  March  1996. 
279 price  strategy.  Instead,  it  results  from  the  side  effect  of  Chinese  government's 
encouraging  export  policy. 
Following  China's  economic  reform  and  the  policy  of  opening  up  international  trade,  the 
government  has  realized  more  and  more  the  importance  of  international  trade  and  its 
advantages.  Exports  therefore  become  central  to  develop  the  country's  economy.  In  order 
to  promote  export  volumes,  the  Chinese  government  has  developed  policies  to  encourage 
exports.  For  example,  under  these  rules,  Chinese  producers  can  have  the  tariffs  on  their 
exports  partly  reimbursed,  and  they  can  keep  their  foreign  currency  account,  which  is  not 
available  without  certain  amount  of  exports.  Likewise,  a  high  quantity  of  exports  can  help 
the  company  get  other  similar  favourable  treatment  from  the  government,  which  might  be 
beneficial  to  its  development  of  other  sectors. 
Due  to  the  above  reason,  it  is  easy  to  understand  that  a  small  number  of  Chinese 
companies  are  willing  to  sacrifice  a  part  of  profits  from  their  exports,  i.  e.  to  dump  the 
products,  in  order  to  increase  the  export  volume,  and  then  to  be  entitled  to  certain  policies 
which  might  be  favourable  to  their  overall  development.  Therefore,  genuine  dumping 
sometimes  can  be  found  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigations  towards  China. 
/I.  Reform  of  the  EUs  anti-dumping  policy. 
A.  Reasons  for  reform. 
Considering  the  unreasonable  factors  in  the  EU's  current  anti-dumping  policy  towards 
China,  there  are  essential  economic  interests  and  political  reasons  which  call  for  reform. 
1.  To  meet  the  objective  of  the  amended  anti-dumping  policy  towards  China. 
The  EU  amended  its  anti-dumping  legislation  in  1998,  and  the  conditional  MET  was 
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The  intention  of  the  change  'w  23 
as  in  response 
to  the  ongoing  reforms  in  those  countries  and  the  fact  that  some  Russian  and  Chinese 
companies  operate  in  market  economy  conditions  and  therefore  their  prices  and  costs 
may  be  appropriate  for  the  calculation  of  normal  value.  24 
However,  due  to  the  huge  discretion  exercised  by  the  Commission  and  the  strict 
interpretation  given  in  specific  cases,  MET  is  seldom  granted  to  Chinese  exporters  in 
practice.  Therefore,  the  1998  amendment  and  its  application  cannot  reflect  the  change  of 
China's  economic  reform,  and  further  reform  both  in  law  and  in  practice  is  needed  to 
meet  the  objective  of  the  law. 
2.  For  a  better  EU-China  trade  relationship  and  a  stronger  Europe 
Facing  powerful  competitors  such  as  the  U.  S.  and  Japan  in  the  world  economy,  the  EU 
needs  the  cooperation  of  new  rapidly  developing  economies  to  enhance  its  share  of 
international  trade  and  enhance  its  strength  from  both  the  political  and  economic 
perspective. 
As  analyzed  in  Chapter  4,  China  is  one  of  the  countries  which  has  the  fastest  economic 
growth  in  the  world.  Its  current  average  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  growth  is  7.55 
percent  per  year,  25  and  its  average  growth  of  export  to  the  EU  is  24.42  percent  per  year  in 
the  past  three  years.  26  Such  trend  of  growth  will  be  further  strengthened  by  China's 
accession  to  the  WTO,  with  which  its  share  of  world  trade  may  double  between  1995  and 
23  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  905/98. 
24  Fn  13  above  at  pp.  2&I 
25  China's  real  GDP  growth  is  7.8  percent  in  1998,7.1  percent  in  1999,8.0  percent  in  2000  and  7.3 
percent  in  2001.  <http:  //europa.  eu.  int/comm/trade/>  (I  December  2002). 
26  The  value  of  imports  from  China  to  the  EU  is 49.7  billion  Euro  in  1999,70.3  billion  Euro  in  2000 
and  75.5  billion  Euro  in  2001,  from:  <http:  //europa.  eu.  int/comm/trade/goods/stats.  htm>  (I  December 
2002). 
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It  is  estimated  that  China's  real  imports  from  Western  Europe  will  increase  from  28,571 
Million  US  Dollars  in  1995  to  50,182  Million  US  Dollars  in  2005  28  Therefore,  China 
should  be  the  best  new  trade  partner  to  the  EU in  the  near  future.  Besides,  since  China  and 
the  EU's  economic  development  are  at  different  levels,  trade  between  them  will  greatly 
benefit  both  sides  and  therefore  is  sustainable  from  a  long  term  point  of  view. 
A  sound  trade  relationship  between  China  and  the  EU  is  essential  to  the  increasing  trade 
opportunities  for  both  sides.  However,  the  EU's  anti-dumping  policy  towards  China 
constitutes  a  threat  to  the  further  development  of  such  a  relationship.  In  fact, 
anti-dumping  is  a  very  sensitive  issue.  In  particular,  under  the  EU's  current  policy  which 
empowers  wide  discretion  to  the  Commission,  nearly  every  Chinese  export  in  the 
European  market  'is  potentially  vulnerable  to  dumping  accusations  and  calculations  of 
inflated  dumping  margins.  29  For  this  reason,  the  current  anti-dumping  legislation  and  the 
way  that  the  EU  authority  applies  it  should  be  improved,  and  a  less  stringent  and  more 
impartial  anti-dumping  policy  towards  China  is  necessary  for  a  better  future. 
3.  Need  to  restore  fair  competition  in  intemational  trade. 
The  intention  of  anti-dumping  legislation  is  to  restore  fair  competition  in  international 
trade.  Anti-dumping  measures  should  be  targeted  only  to  offset  the  unfavourable  effects 
produced  by  dumped  imports  rather  than  give  protection  to  domestic  industry. 
However,  as  the  result  of  improper  policies,  excessive  use  of  antimdumping  measure  may 
27  D  Bhattasali  and  M  Kawai,  'Implications  of  China's  Accession  to  the  World  Trade  Organization'  at 
p  1,  <  http:  //www.  worldbank.  org.  cn/English/content/wto-implications.  pdf>  (I  December  2002). 
28  D  Bhattasali  and  M  Kawai,  ibid  at  p  18. 
29  Alexander  Polouektov,  fn  17  above  at  p31. 
282 turn  the  outcome  upside  down.  The  EU's  antimdumping  policy  towards  China  maximizes 
the  dumping  margin  of  the  imports  in  anti-dumping  investigations.  It  actually  expels 
those  Chinese  products  out  of  European  market  with  severe  anti-dumPing  measures.  It 
also  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  impact  of  these  measures  is  not  only  confined  to 
Chinese  industry  itself.  European  importers,  distributors  and  agents  involved  in  the 
selling  of  Chinese  products  inside  the  EU  internal  market  will  be  affected  adversely  as 
well.  To  a  certain  extent,  the  commercial  interests  and  confidence  of  their  business  can  be 
spoiled  by  the  unpredictable  anti-dumping  proceedings  of  the  EU.  In  the  meantime, 
European  industries  which  use  Chinese  products  as  inputs,  components  or  parts  for 
manufacturing  other  goods  will  suffer  the  increased  production  costs  if  anti-dumping 
measures  are  taken  towards  these  imports.  Therefore,  excessive  use  of  these  measures  by 
the  EU  devastates  business  both  in  China  and  inside  the  European  market. 
Fair  competition  of  international  trade  calls  for  correct  use  of  anti-dumping  instruments. 
From  this  point  of  view,  the  EU's  anti-dumping  policy  towards  China  should  be  reformed 
to  be  more  reasonable  and  impartial. 
4.  The  need  for  gradual  reform  of  the  EUs  current  anUdumping  policy  before  the 
final  withdrawal  of  the  NME  treatment  in  2015. 
As  a  part  of  concessions,  China  agreed  to  the  EU  keeping  its  current  an6dumping  policy 
for  15  years  after  China's  accession  to  the  WTO.  30  In  my  opinion,  this  implies  the 
maximum  15  years  time  limit  for  the  EU  to  reform  its  anti-dumping  policy,  and 
completely  eliminate  the  analogue  country  method  and  one  country  one  duty  rule  from  its 
anti-dumping  legislation  towards  China.  Without  gradual  reform  beforehand,  sudden 
withdrawal  of  the  NME  Treatment  may  let  the  EU's  anti-dumping  authority  and  certain 
30  Section  15.  d,  Draft  protocol  on  the  accession  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  (Annex  to  Report  of 
the  working  party  on  the  accession  of  China,  WT/ACC/CHN/49). 
<http:  //www.  wto-org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.  htm>  (I  December  2002). 
283 domestic  industries  feel  it  hard  to  react  before  the  new  and  less  protective  legislation. 
5.  China's  resort  to  the  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  Mechanism  may  accelerate  the 
speed  of  reform  of  the  EUs  anti-dumping  policy. 
The  EU's  current  anti-dumping  legislation  towards  imports  from  NMEs  is  quite  general, 
and  it  lacks  concrete  provisions  to  govern  specific  issues.  Before  China  became  a 
Member  of  the  WTO,  the  European  Commission  enjoyed  huge  discretion  on  all  of  these 
disputes  in  its  anti-dumping  investigations.  However,  China's  current  WTO  membership 
makes  it  eligible  to  bring  disputes  arising  from  the  EU's  antiýdumping  decisions  to  the 
Dispute  Settlement  Mechanism.  Under  the  WTO  trade  laws  and  principles,  if  the  Panel 
decides  to  support  China's  argument,  the  EU  should  be  responsible  for  the  measures 
taken  and  revise  the  corresponding  decisions.  As  a  result,  these  proceedings  may 
accelerate  the  reform  of  the  EU's  anti-dumping  policy  towards  China. 
B.  Proposals  for  the  EU. 
Based  on  the  analysis  above,  the  following  proposals  are  suggested  to  the  EU  with  regard 
to  its  anti-dumping  policy  towards  China. 
1.  Proposals  towards  NME  status. 
The  first  suggestion  for  the  EU  is  to  treat  China  as  an  ME.  This  idea  sounds  quite  radical 
at  first  glance.  However,  it  is  reasonable  considering  the  fact  that  Russia  has  been 
recognized  as  an  ME  by  the  EU  since  5  November  2002,31  and  the  MET  are  now  applied 
to  Russian  exporters  automatically  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  proceedings.  China's  WTO 
membership  indicates  that  the  level  of  its  economic  development  is  much  higher  than 
31  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1972/2002  of  5  November  2002  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 
on  the  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community 
OJ  2002  1-305/1. 
284 Russia.  Based  on  this  point,  it  should  be  treated  as  an  ME  for  the  purpose  of  dumping 
determination 
as  well.  In  that  case,  all  disadvantages  of  the  analogue  country  method  can 
be  avoided,  and  all  Chinese  exporters  will  get  MET  automatically  in  antimdumping 
investigations. 
2.  Proposal  for  the  analogue  country  method. 
To  be  more  realistic,  the  Commission  should  minimize  the  use  of  the  analogue  country 
method  and  its  side  effects  produced  on  Chinese  exporters  in  antirdumping  proceedings. 
When  one  Chinese  company  gets  MET,  its  domestic  sales  price  should  be  adopted  to 
determine  normal  values  for  other  Chinese  exporters  in  the  same  anti-dumping 
investigation. 
If  no  Chinese  company  gets  conditional  MET  in  the  EU's  antýdumping  investigation,  a 
third  1\4E  which  is  at  a  similar  economic  development  level  should  be  selected.  In  that 
case,  the  country  which  has  a  similar  gross  national  income  (GNI)  to  China  should  be 
regarded  as  an  appropriate  analogue  country. 
When  cooperation  from  such  a  third  ME  is  not  available,  the  Constructed  Value  Method 
may  be  preferred  and  more  than  one  third  MEs  price  information  should  be  refeired  in 
that  case. 
32 
The  EU  should  have  more  specific  guidance  to  govern  the  selection  of  a  third  ME  when 
the  analogue  country  method  has  to  be  applied.  Since  it  is  a  very  complex  procedure,  and 
the  choice  is  significant  to  the  outcome  of  the  anti-dumping  investigation  and  the 
essential  interests  of  exporters,  less  discretion  should  be  given  to  the  Commission  as  the 
32  For  example,  use  the  labour  cost  of  country  A  and  the  production  cost  information  of  country  B, 
because  each  of  them  has  similarities  with  China  from  different  perspectives. 
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In  addition,  Chinese  exporters  should  be  given  more  time  to  comment  on  the  selection  of 
the  third  economy,  because  even  the  Commission  itself  admits  that  it  is  impossible  to 
collect  necessary  information  and  give  any  advice  within  a  mere  10  days.  33 
3.  Proposal  for  one  country  one  duty  rule  and  individual  treatment 
The  one  country  one  duty  practice  should  be  abandoned  completely  towards  a  Member  of 
the  WTO  such  as  China,  which  has  already  demonstrated  its  economic  status  and  strength 
before  accession.  Like  the  anti-dumping  authorities  of  the  U.  S.,  Australia,  New  Zealand 
and  Japan,  the  Commission  should  determine  the  anti-dumping  duty  rate  for  different 
exporters  according  to  their  own  dumping  margins.  That  is  to  say,  individual  treatment 
should  be  granted  to  Chinese  exporters  automatically  without  burdensome  application. 
4.  Proposal  for  the  conditional  MET 
In  the  EU's  anti-dumping  investigation  towards  imports  from  China,  the  Commission 
should  assess  Chinese  exporter's  application  for  the  MET  impartially.  Particularly,  their 
normal  business  contact  with  government  and  state-owned  companies  should  not  result  in 
the  rejection  of  application  for  the  MET.  In  the  meantime,  trade  behaviours  with  the  state 
which  may  lead  to  the  rejection  of  the  MET  should  be  specified  in  law  rather  than 
determined  case  by  case  by  the  Commission. 
The  EU's  anti-dumping  authority  should  interpret  and  apply  the  legislation  of  the 
conditional  MET  less  stringently  in  practice.  For  example,  it  should  accept  the 
application  from  a  Chinese  company  and  grant  them  MET  if  it  can  meet  most  of  the  five 
criteria.  Considering  the  unreasonable  factors  of  the  MET  provisions  discussed  above, 
33  Interview  with  the  Administer  of  the  European  Commission,  DG  Trade,  Brussels,  12  July  2002. 
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they  fail  to  meet  one  of  the  five  criteria. 
In  addition,  the  Commission  should  consider  Chinese  exporter's  application  for 
conditional  MET  during  sunset  reviews.  At  present,  the  Commission  refuses  to  introduce 
the  methodology  of  the  conditional  MET  in  sunset  reviews  carried  out  after  the  new 
legislation  came  into  force 
. 
34  It  argues  that  existing  anti-dumping  measures  can  be 
modified  only  during  interim  reviews  . 
35  However,  under  the  EU  legislation. 
) 
36  the  criteria 
to  initiate  an  interim  review  are  very  stringent.  As  a  result,  Chinese  exporters  normally 
cannot  apply  for  the  new  approach  of  the  MET  in  proceedings  with  regard  to  the  existing 
anti-dumping  measures.  The  EU's  practice  is  rather  unfair  to  these  exporters  which  may 
obtain  fundamental  progress  from  economic  reforms  of  the  past  five  years.  Like  other 
Chinese  firms,  they  should  have  the  same  opportunity  to  apply  for  conditional  MET. 
From  this  point,  after  five  years  elapses  since  the  anti-dumping  measures  were  taken,  the 
EU  authority  should  either  allow  the  exporters  to  apply  for  conditional  MET  in  sunset 
reviews,  or  consider  their  application  in  interim  reviews  which  are  initiated  with  less 
stringent  criteria. 
5.  Acceptance  of  undertakings. 
The  Commission  should  accept  undertakings  from  Chinese  companies  which  have  a 
sound  management  history.  Undertakings  are  not  normally  accepted  from  companies 
AS 
37 
operating  in  NME  - 
Due  to  the  Commission's  distrust,  few  undertakings  from  Chinese 
34  This  issue  has  been  analyzed  in  details  in  chapter  three,  section  II.  D.  5. 
35  Para.  19,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  312/2002  of  18  February  2002  imposing  a  definitive 
anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  certain  magnetic  disks  (3,5  microdisks)  originating  in  Japan  and  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  and  terminating  the  proceeding  in  respect  of  imports  of  3,5  microdisks 
originating  in  Taiwan.  OJ  2002  L  50/24. 
36  Art.  11  (3),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  3  84/96. 
37  Recital  58,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  393/98. 
287 exporters  have  been  accepted  since  1990.  However,  undertakings  from  Chinese 
companies  with  standard  accounting  records  should  be  considered,  and  the  prejudice 
must  be  corrected  after  China's  accession  to  the  WTO.  Otherwise,,  it  will  be  regarded  as  a 
violation  of  the  WTO's  non-discrimination  principle  by  the  Panel  in  the  case  of  dispute 
settlement. 
M.  Proposals  to  China. 
As  the  direct  victim  of  the  EU's  over  severe  anti-dumping  policy,  China  should  take 
corresponding  strategies  to  claim  its  due  rights  and  protect  its  trade  interests. 
A.  Proposals  to  the  government. 
1.  Capacity  building. 
Capacity  building  is  the  most  important  and  effective  strategy  for  China  to  protect  its 
trade  interests  in  anti-dumping  proceedings  launched  by  other  countries.  Here,  it  refers  to 
the  development  of  human  capital,  specialised  in  WTO  anti-dumping  legislation  and 
other  international  economic  laws  and  principles. 
First  of  all,  professional  anti-dumping  lawyers  are  essential  to  help  exporters  obtain 
proper  treatment  in  anti-dumping  investigations.  Since  they  are  familiar  with  the 
legislation  and  the  anti-dumping  authority's  traditional  practice,  they  not  only  can 
provide  accurate  information  required  on  time  and  claim  due  rights  for  their  clients  on  the 
base  of  law,  but  also  can  be  very  sensitive  to  any  illegal  point  of  decisions  made  by  the 
authority,  and  then  reply  on  a  legal  basis. 
Besides,  as  analyzed  in  Chapter  six,  after  China's  accession  to  the  WTO,  it  can  resort  to 
the  Dispute  Settlement  Mechanism  to  resolve  anti-dumping  disputes  with  the  EU. 
288 However,  China  lacks  necessary  human  resources  and  administrative  structures  to  detect 
possible  inconsistencies 
with  the  WTO  agreements,  and  then  to  maximize  their  use  of  the 
WTO  dispute  settlement  system  effectively.  Such  a  shortage  will  become  key 
impediments  to  its  capacity  to  benefit  from  the  international  trade  system  and  the  WTO's 
differential  and  favorable  treatment  for  developing  countries. 
All  of  the  above  calls  for  capacity  building  urgently.  China  should  emphasize  the 
development  of  these  human  resources,,  and  build  extensive  cooperation  with  other 
foreign  experts  in  international  organizations  with  sufficient  financial  backup.  Only  by 
doing  this,  can  it  defend  its  due  rights  properly  under  the  WTO  trade  laws. 
2.  Encourage  and  attract  European  investment. 
Considering  companies  which  get  the  MET  in  the  EU's  antýdumping  investigations,  all 
except  one  are  foreign  owned  firms  orjoint  ventures,  which  represent  whole  or  part  of  the 
European  investor's  economic  interests.  Likewise,  among  six  anti-dumping  appeal  cases, 
only  two  of  them  succeeded,  38  which  were  both  brought  by  European  importers. 
These  facts  show  that  the  EU's  anti-dumping  decisions  are  always  based  on  its  own 
essential  commercial  interests,  and  they  are  favourable  to  domestic  industries  or 
European  investors.  Therefore,  if  the  Chinese  government  encourages  and  attracts 
European  investment  in  the  form  of  joint  ventures  in  China,  when  these  companies 
participate  in  the  EU's  anti-dumping  proceedings,  they  may  be  treated  more  favourably 
than  others.  As  a  result,  the  part  of  interests  of  Chinese  shareholders  in  the  joint  ventures 
can  be  protected  simultaneously  to  a  certain  extent. 
38  Case  16/90,  Detlef  N61le,  trading  as  "Eugen  N61le"  v  Hauptzollamt  Bremen-Freihafen,  ECR  1991 
1-05163  and  Case  358/89,  Extramet  Industrie  SA  v  Council  of  the  European  Communities,  ECR  1992 
1-03813. 
289 3.  Regulate  the  order  of  export  transactions. 
The  Chinese  government  should  regulate  the  normal  order  of  export  transactions.  Normal 
export  should  be  encouraged  as  an  important  part  of  the  Opening  Policy,  but  at  the  same 
time,  the  Chinese  government  should  prohibit  exporters  from  dumping  their  products  in 
order  to  get  other  benefits.  China  enacted  the  Interim  Regulation  of  Punishing  Companies 
which  Export  Products  with  Low  Prices  in  1996 
. 
391-lowever,  there  are  few  exporters 
punished  accordingly  since  the  law  published.  Therefore,  the  government  really  should 
put  more  emphasis  to  the  implementation  of  such  Regulations. 
4.  Continuous  negotiation  with  the  EU  for  ME  status. 
The  Chinese  government  should  negotiate  with  the  EU  authorities  continuously  for  ME 
status.  Considering  the  EU's  recent  change  to  recognize  Russia  as  an  ME,  China's  WTO 
membership  is  the  best  justification  to  ask  for  the  same  treatment. 
B.  Proposals  for  Chinese  exporters. 
1.  Sound  management  of  the  company. 
In  the  context  of  the  EU's  five  criteria  established  to  grant  the  MET,  sound  management 
particularly  emphasizes  a  clear  set  of  basic  accounting  records,  which  are  in  line  with 
international  accounting  standards  and  principles.  Since  the  legislation  of  the  MET  was 
enacted  in  1998,  lack  of  clear  accounting  records  has  become  the  main  reason  to  prevent 
Chinese  exporters  from  getting  the  MET. 
According  to  China's  accounting  legislation  as  well  as  interviews  with  a  Chinese 
39  It  was  enacted  on  20  March  1996  by  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation,  PRC. 
This  regulation  is  applicable  to  all  foreign  trade  enterprises  in  China. 
<http:  //www.  people-com.  cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/1/1-2-39.  html>  (I  December  2002). 
290 economic  analyst  and  experienced  anti-dumping  lawyers,  40  it  becomes  clear  that  the 
accounting  method  adopted  by  Chinese  companies  is  basically  consistent  with 
international  standards.  However,  the  Commission  examines  the  accounting  records  so 
strictly  that  even  some  European  companies  may  find  it  hard  to  provide  the  satisfactory 
accounting  records  required. 
Therefore,  Chinese  companies  should  keep  accurate  and  standard  accounting  records, 
which  can  withstand  the  Commission's  careful  assessment. 
2.  Sufficient  cooperation  with  the  Commission  in  anti-dumping  investigations. 
The  prerequisite  for  exporters  to  protect  their  trade  interests  in  anti-dumping 
investigations  is  to  cooperate  with  the  authority.  With  regard  to  the  EU's  antýdumping 
proceedings  towards  China,  sufficient  cooperation  means  submitting  anti-dumping 
questionnaireS41  timeously  to  the  Commission,  and  try  to  give  any  other  information 
needed.  Cooperation  is  necessary  for  Chinese  companies  to  get  individual  anti-dumping 
duty  rate  and  even  MET  in  anti-dumping  investigations  if  the  Commission  thinks  that  the 
firm  operates  by  itself  without  significant  state  interference,  i.  e.  it  meets  the  five  criteria 
for  the  MET. 
Based  on  this  point,  Chinese  exporters  should  be  encouraged  to  cooperate  with  the 
Commission  in  anti-dumping  investigations.  In  the  meantime,  necessary  guidance  and 
help  should  be  provided  by  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  industry  corcerned. 
In  fact,  China  has  enacted  legislation  to  prohibit  non-cooperation  of  its  exporters  in 
40  Interview  with  analyst,  Research  Institute  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and  Economic 
Cooperation,  People's  Republic  of  China,  Beijing,  July  2001;  Interviews  with  experienced 
anti-dumping  lawyers  were  conducted  in  different  law  firms  in  Brussels,  June  2002. 
41  Questionnaires  include  normal  'Anti-Dumping  Questionnaire'  and  'Form  for  Companies  claiming 
Market  Economy  Status  and/or  Individual  Treatment  in  Anti-Dumping  Proceedings. 
291 anti-dumping  proceedingS,  42  and  the  Chambers  of  main  industries  have  made  efforts  to 
offer  training  and  to  strengthen  anti-dumping  knowledge  for  Chinese  enterprises.  As  a 
result  of  this  effective  strategy,  there  are  fewer  and  fewer  cases  of  non-cooperation  of 
Chinese  exporters  today.  These  Chambers,  therefore,  should  now  turn  to  stress  the 
important  role  that  professional  anti-dumping  lawyers  play  in  anti-dumping 
investigations,  and  try  to  give  them  some  advice  to  find  the  right  lawyer  to  ensure 
sufficient  cooperation  and  technical  response  in  anti-dumping  investigations. 
3.  Build  infonet  of  the  same  industry  worldwide. 
Under  the  EU's  current  anti-dumping  legislation,  if  Chinese  exporters  fail  to  get 
conditional  MET,  they  are  still  subject  to  the  analogue  country  method.  In  that  case,  the 
European  Commission  gives  the  exporters  10  days  to  comment  on  the  third  ME 
envisaged.  43  In  practice,  Chinese  exporters  cannot  give  any  constructive  comment  before 
the  deadline  because  the  time  limit  is  too  tight.  44 
In  the  Zinc  Oxides  case  of  2001 
9 
45  the  Commission  showed  its  intention  in  the  notice  of 
initiation  to  use  the  United  States  (U.  S.  )  as  an  appropriate  analogue  country  for  tl-e 
purpose  of  establishing  normal  value  for  imports  from  China.  Chinese  exporting 
producers  disagreed  with  this  proposal  by  arguing  the  different  levels  of  economic 
42  The  fifth  Command  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation  of  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  in  2001  -  Regulation  Governing  Chinese  Exporter's  Response  Towards 
Anti-Dumping  Investigations  Initiated  By  Other  Countries.  It  entered  into  force  on  I  December  200  1. 
<http:  //www.  moftec.  gov.  cn/article/200207/20020700031595_1.  xml>  (I  December  2002). 
43  Art.  2  (7),  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96,  O.  J. 
44  This  issue  has  been  analyzed  in  chapter  three,  Section  Lc  Theoretical  and  practical  analysis  of  the 
rule.. 
45  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  1827/2001  of  17  September  2001  imposing  a  provisional 
anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  certain  zinc  oxides  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  OJ 
2001  L248/17. 
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Position  in  the  market,  46  end-useS47  and  cost  structures48  betxý,  'een  the  U.  S. 
and  China.  Instead  of  the  U.  S.,  they  suggested  South  Korea,  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  Taiwan. 
or  Thailand  as  the  analogue  country,  but  they  could  not  substantiate  their  proposals.  The 
Commission  subsequently  sent  a  request  for  information  on  sales  and  market  conditions 
to  these  MEs.  Unfortunately,  only  two  producers  in  the  countries  suggested  by  Chinese 
exporters  were  willing  to  cooperate  with  the  Commission,  but  they  were  not  selected  as 
the  analogue  country  due  to  the  low  volumes  of  production  and  domestic  sales.  As  a 
result,  the  Commission  retained  its  initial  decision  to  use  the  U.  S.  as  the  analogue  country 
for  Chinese  products. 
However,  if  the  Chinese  exporters  had  the  information  of  producers  worldwide  of  the 
same  industry,  their  comment  on  the  selection  of  the  analogue  country  will  be  more 
persuasive.  Furthermore,  if  they  already  had  a  sound  relationship  with  the  major  foreign 
producers  in  the  world,  the  latter  might  be  willing  to  cooperate  with  the  Commission 
when  they  were  requested.  In  both  circumstances,  49  there  is  a  bigger  possibility  that  the 
exporters'  proposals  could  be  adopted  by  the  EU,  and  a  relatively  appropriate  analogue 
country  would  be  selected  for  them  as  a  result. 
46  The  U.  S.  producer's  oligopolistic  position  on  the  US  market  which  was  alleged  to  lead  to  artificially 
high  prices. 
47  As  the  rubber  industry  is  the  major  US  market  for  zinc  oxide  whereas  Chinese  exports  to  the 
Community  seem  to  be  used  primarily  in  the  ceramic  industry. 
48  Different  cost  structure.  It  was  claimed  that  the  cost  structure  in  the  USA  could  not  be  compared 
with  that  in  China,  where  labour  costs,  environmental  compliance  costs,  etc.  are  lower  than  in  the 
USA. 
49  of  course,  such  information  exchange  should  not  develop  into  a  possible  cartel  arrangement  which 
might  fall  foul  of  competition  rules. 
293 Summary 
While  exploring  the  genuine  reasons  why  the  EU's  current  anti-dumping  policy  after 
amendments  cannot  meet  its  objective  to  accommodate  the  change  of  China's  economic 
status  from  an  NME  to  a  transitional  economy  as  a  result  of  its  two  decades'  reform.  it  is 
particularly  important  for  us  to  examine  a  fact  -  'Commission  officials  admit  that  the 
formal  rule  change  was  more  in  name  than  in  substance'.  50  The  change  of  the  rules  was 
structured  to  allow  the  Commission  to  interpret  the  law  as  it  saw  fit  on  a  case-by-case 
basis,  and  the  Commission  officials  had  no  intention  of  administering  the  more  beneficial 
rules  to  Chinese  firms 
.51 
Therefore,  the  EU  bears  most  of  the  responsibility  for  the 
unfairness  and  the  unfavourable  impact  produced  by  its  anti-dumping  policy  towards 
China. 
Not  only  Chinese  exporters  but  also  different  European  economic  operators  which  are 
involved  in  the  selling  of  Chinese  products  are  unfavourably  affected  by  the  EU's 
excessive  use  of  anti-dumping  measures  towards  China.  Such  an  impact  will  be  enlarged 
following  China's  increasing  exports  to  the  European  market  after  its  accession  to  the 
WTO. 
For  this  reason,  proposals  are  made  for  both  EU  and  China  in  this  thesis  based  on  the 
following  research. 
a.  An  analysis  of  China's  economic  reforms  and  prospects  backed  by  its  national 
legislation,  its  WTO  accession  agreement  and  facts  provided  by  international 
50  Cynthia  M.  Horne,  'Belief  Stasis  as  an  Impediment  to  Policy  Implementation:  Non-Market 
Economies  and  Western  Trade  Laws',  paper  prepared  for  American  Political  Science  Association 
Conference,  San  Francisco,  CA,  August  30  -  September  2,2001,  P.  24. 
<http:  //pro.  harvard.  edu/papers/0  16/01601  OHomeCynth.  pdf>  (I  December  2002). 
51  Ibid. 
294 organizations  such  as  the  World  Bank; 
b.  A  comparative  study  of  other  major  WTO  developed  country  Member's 
anti-dumping  Policies  towards  China. 
However,  anti-dumping  is  the  governmental  protection  of  its  domestic  industry  against 
dumped  imports,  and  anti-dumping  legislation  is  a  political  tool  functioning  in  the  field  of 
the  economy.  Like  other  legislation,  one  country's  anti-dumping  policy  towards  another 
actually  is  the  outcome  of  the  contrast  of  the  two  sides'  political  and  economic  strength. 
Apparently,  it  is  a  very  complex  issue,  and  amendment  of  the  legislation  or  change  of  the 
policy  needs  huge  political  impetus  based  on  mutual  economic  interests. 
Therefore,  my  research  is  not  going  to  achieve  the  above  task.  To  be  more  realistic,  it 
proposes  some  practical  suggestions  for  EU  and  China  from  an  academic  point  of  view, 
which  may  ensure  that  the  implementation  of  the  EU  antimdurnping  legislation  be 
impartial  to  both  sides. 
Of  course,  only  time  can  tell  whether  the  Commission  will  adopt  a  less  stringent  approach 
to  its  anti-dumping  policy  towards  China,  but  from  a  personal  point  of  view,  I  believe 
some  positive  developments  are  essential  in  order  to  build  stronger  EU-China  relations. 
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